NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2459-24
IN THE MATTER OF JOHN H. HARRINGTON. ______________________
Submitted January 22, 2026 ‒ Decided April 17, 2026
Before Judges Mawla and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission.
Law Offices of Shannon Garrahan, PC, attorney for appellant John H. Harrington (Shannon Garrahan, on the brief).
Jennifer Davenport, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (Christopher Weber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Amy Chung, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant John H. Harrington, a resident of New Jersey, appeals from the
March 28, 2025 final administrative decision of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle
Commission (MVC) suspending his driving privileges, based on his conviction in the State of New York for driving while ability impaired (DWAI) in violation
of N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1192.1. After reviewing the record in light of well-
settled legal principles, we affirm.
We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record. It
is undisputed the New York Department of Motor Vehicles notified the MVC of
Harrington's arrest in June 2022, pursuant to the Interstate Driver License
Compact (Compact), N.J.S.A. 39:5D-1 to -14. As an enforcement mechanism,
the Compact imposes a reciprocal obligation on every signatory state to honor
each other's laws governing the eligibility to operate a motor vehicle. N.J.S.A.
39:5D-1(b)(2). The notice further reported Harrington's subsequent guilty plea
and conviction for DWAI, entered in March 2023 in Warwick, New York.
In late March 2023, the MVC issued a scheduled suspension notice to
Harrington, stating his driving privileges were subject to suspension as of April
14, 2023, for 730 days under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, N.J.S.A. 39:5-30, N.J.S.A.
39:5D-4, and N.J.A.C. 13:19-11.1 to -11.2. Through counsel, Harrington
requested a hearing, contending his "conviction in New York was not
substantially similar to New Jersey law." Specifically, he argued the factual
basis for his New York plea did not establish a prima facie case under New
Jersey statutes.
A-2459-24 2 In its April 17, 2023 response sent to Harrington's home address, the MVC
acknowledged his request for a hearing and informed him the hearing would be
decided based on the written submissions. The letter noted Harrington's hearing
request challenged whether his blood alcohol concentration (BAC) in the New
York conviction was below .08%, which related directly to the proposed
suspension in New Jersey. Harrington was advised he had the "affirmative
burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, . . . the State of New
York conviction was based exclusively on a violation of a proscribed . . . BAC
of less than .08%." (Emphasis added). He was instructed to provide a notarized
affidavit setting forth the relevant facts and his position, as well as copies of any
supporting documents or other evidence, using the requisite affidavit language.
Harrington's counsel provided a copy of the plea transcript to the MVC
and twice indicated Harrington would submit an affidavit. Counsel
subsequently withdrew from representing Harrington. In a separate letter sent
in May 2023, Harrington informed the MVC he was self-represented and would
submit supporting evidence. However, he did not provide any additional
documents or evidence to the MVC in support of his claim.
On March 28, 2025, the MVC issued the Order of Suspension effective
April 17, 2025, without a hearing. The MVC reiterated the sole issue was
A-2459-24 3 whether Harrington met his burden under the clear and convincing standard that
his New York conviction was for an offense based exclusively upon a violation
of a BAC less than .08%. It noted in the absence of proof of such BAC level,
Harrington "shall forfeit the right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways
of this State for a period of not less than one year or more than two years upon
conviction" under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 and N.J.A.C. 13:19-11.1 to -11.2. The MVC
also noted the New York conviction was Harrington's second alcohol-related
driving offense. He committed the first offense in New Jersey, resulting in a
conviction of both driving while intoxicated and refusal in Wayne on May 7,
2021.
The MVC explained Harrington failed to meet his burden because he did
not submit any proof regarding a BAC—specifically, the official record and plea
transcript did not make a BAC finding or reflect an admission to a BAC. The
plea colloquy showed only Harrington's voluntary admission to DWAI, which
includes the impairment element. Given the absence of supporting evidence,
the MVC determined Harrington did not satisfy his burden by clear and
convincing evidence his New York conviction was based exclusively on a blood
alcohol of less than .08% to meet the "very limited" exception to New Jersey's
statute. The MVC denied Harrington's motion for a stay pending appeal.
A-2459-24 4 On appeal, Harrington argues the MVC suspension order should be
vacated due to the "extreme delay" in issuing the order, which caused undue
prejudice. Harrington contends this delay violated his fundamental due process
rights.
Our review of an agency's determinations is limited. Allstars Auto Grp.,
Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (citing Russo v.
Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). "We review
a decision made by an administrative agency entrusted to apply and enforce a
statutory scheme under an enhanced deferential standard." E. Bay Drywall, LLC
v. Dep't of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 251 N.J. 477, 493 (2022) (citing Hargrove
v. Sleepy's, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 201-02 (2015)).
We "review[] agency decisions under an arbitrary and capricious
standard." Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm'n, 237 N.J. 465,
475 (2019) (citing In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)). Therefore, an
agency determination on the merits "will be sustained unless there is a clear
showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair
support in the record." Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.,
219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting Russo, 206 N.J. at 27).
A-2459-24 5 We reject Harrington's contention there was no proof he understood the
suspension process or had the opportunity to present further evidence as a self-
represented driver. The record contradicts his contention. The March 2023
suspension notice expressly informed Harrington of his right to request a hearing
and outlined the procedure. The April 2023 acknowledgement letter provided
additional details, specifying the disputed issue, advising him of his affirmative
burden, and explaining the submission of an affidavit. Both documents
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2459-24
IN THE MATTER OF JOHN H. HARRINGTON. ______________________
Submitted January 22, 2026 ‒ Decided April 17, 2026
Before Judges Mawla and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission.
Law Offices of Shannon Garrahan, PC, attorney for appellant John H. Harrington (Shannon Garrahan, on the brief).
Jennifer Davenport, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (Christopher Weber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Amy Chung, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant John H. Harrington, a resident of New Jersey, appeals from the
March 28, 2025 final administrative decision of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle
Commission (MVC) suspending his driving privileges, based on his conviction in the State of New York for driving while ability impaired (DWAI) in violation
of N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1192.1. After reviewing the record in light of well-
settled legal principles, we affirm.
We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record. It
is undisputed the New York Department of Motor Vehicles notified the MVC of
Harrington's arrest in June 2022, pursuant to the Interstate Driver License
Compact (Compact), N.J.S.A. 39:5D-1 to -14. As an enforcement mechanism,
the Compact imposes a reciprocal obligation on every signatory state to honor
each other's laws governing the eligibility to operate a motor vehicle. N.J.S.A.
39:5D-1(b)(2). The notice further reported Harrington's subsequent guilty plea
and conviction for DWAI, entered in March 2023 in Warwick, New York.
In late March 2023, the MVC issued a scheduled suspension notice to
Harrington, stating his driving privileges were subject to suspension as of April
14, 2023, for 730 days under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, N.J.S.A. 39:5-30, N.J.S.A.
39:5D-4, and N.J.A.C. 13:19-11.1 to -11.2. Through counsel, Harrington
requested a hearing, contending his "conviction in New York was not
substantially similar to New Jersey law." Specifically, he argued the factual
basis for his New York plea did not establish a prima facie case under New
Jersey statutes.
A-2459-24 2 In its April 17, 2023 response sent to Harrington's home address, the MVC
acknowledged his request for a hearing and informed him the hearing would be
decided based on the written submissions. The letter noted Harrington's hearing
request challenged whether his blood alcohol concentration (BAC) in the New
York conviction was below .08%, which related directly to the proposed
suspension in New Jersey. Harrington was advised he had the "affirmative
burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, . . . the State of New
York conviction was based exclusively on a violation of a proscribed . . . BAC
of less than .08%." (Emphasis added). He was instructed to provide a notarized
affidavit setting forth the relevant facts and his position, as well as copies of any
supporting documents or other evidence, using the requisite affidavit language.
Harrington's counsel provided a copy of the plea transcript to the MVC
and twice indicated Harrington would submit an affidavit. Counsel
subsequently withdrew from representing Harrington. In a separate letter sent
in May 2023, Harrington informed the MVC he was self-represented and would
submit supporting evidence. However, he did not provide any additional
documents or evidence to the MVC in support of his claim.
On March 28, 2025, the MVC issued the Order of Suspension effective
April 17, 2025, without a hearing. The MVC reiterated the sole issue was
A-2459-24 3 whether Harrington met his burden under the clear and convincing standard that
his New York conviction was for an offense based exclusively upon a violation
of a BAC less than .08%. It noted in the absence of proof of such BAC level,
Harrington "shall forfeit the right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways
of this State for a period of not less than one year or more than two years upon
conviction" under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 and N.J.A.C. 13:19-11.1 to -11.2. The MVC
also noted the New York conviction was Harrington's second alcohol-related
driving offense. He committed the first offense in New Jersey, resulting in a
conviction of both driving while intoxicated and refusal in Wayne on May 7,
2021.
The MVC explained Harrington failed to meet his burden because he did
not submit any proof regarding a BAC—specifically, the official record and plea
transcript did not make a BAC finding or reflect an admission to a BAC. The
plea colloquy showed only Harrington's voluntary admission to DWAI, which
includes the impairment element. Given the absence of supporting evidence,
the MVC determined Harrington did not satisfy his burden by clear and
convincing evidence his New York conviction was based exclusively on a blood
alcohol of less than .08% to meet the "very limited" exception to New Jersey's
statute. The MVC denied Harrington's motion for a stay pending appeal.
A-2459-24 4 On appeal, Harrington argues the MVC suspension order should be
vacated due to the "extreme delay" in issuing the order, which caused undue
prejudice. Harrington contends this delay violated his fundamental due process
rights.
Our review of an agency's determinations is limited. Allstars Auto Grp.,
Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (citing Russo v.
Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). "We review
a decision made by an administrative agency entrusted to apply and enforce a
statutory scheme under an enhanced deferential standard." E. Bay Drywall, LLC
v. Dep't of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 251 N.J. 477, 493 (2022) (citing Hargrove
v. Sleepy's, LLC, 220 N.J. 289, 201-02 (2015)).
We "review[] agency decisions under an arbitrary and capricious
standard." Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm'n, 237 N.J. 465,
475 (2019) (citing In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)). Therefore, an
agency determination on the merits "will be sustained unless there is a clear
showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair
support in the record." Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.,
219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting Russo, 206 N.J. at 27).
A-2459-24 5 We reject Harrington's contention there was no proof he understood the
suspension process or had the opportunity to present further evidence as a self-
represented driver. The record contradicts his contention. The March 2023
suspension notice expressly informed Harrington of his right to request a hearing
and outlined the procedure. The April 2023 acknowledgement letter provided
additional details, specifying the disputed issue, advising him of his affirmative
burden, and explaining the submission of an affidavit. Both documents
demonstrate the MVC properly informed Harrington of the nature of the
proceedings and his procedural obligations. Self-represented litigants are
entitled to meaningful due process but are held to the same statutory and
evidentiary standards as represented litigants. See Mims v. City of Gloucester,
479 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 2024).
While Harrington contends his former counsel submitted additional
evidence, the record shows neither he nor his former counsel presented any
additional documents, which raised disputed issues of material fact requiring a
hearing. Nor did he present any additional document beyond the New York plea
transcript. Failure to provide specific findings the New York conviction was
based on a BAC less than .08% obviated the need for an evidentiary hearing.
A-2459-24 6 N.J.A.C. 13:19-1.2(e); Frank v. Ivy Club, 120 N.J. 73, 98 (1990); N.J. Div. of
Motor Vehicles v. Pepe, 379 N.J. Super. 411, 419 (App. Div. 2005).
In this context, we now address Harrington's contention the MVC's
extreme delay in issuing the order of suspension in 2025 was prejudicial.
Harrington relies on In re Arndt, 67 N.J. 432 (1975); however, such reliance is
misplaced. In Arndt, the Court reversed the judgment and vacated the order of
suspension, concluding the MVC did not provide a satisfactory reason for the
delay, and the proceedings were conducted with unfair disregard of appellant's
rights. Specifically, the MVC issued the notice of proposed suspension twenty
months after the arrest and appellant's refusal to submit to a breath test, with the
actual suspension order issued ten months after the hearing.
"In limited circumstances, agency actions may be set aside as
fundamentally unfair where the agency failed to act within a reasonable time
and the delay 'evidence[d] an entire lack of that acute appreciation of justice
which should characterize a tribunal with [such a] delicate and important duty.'"
N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. G.R., 435 N.J. Super. 392, 403 (App.
Div. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting In re Arndt, 67 N.J. at 436-37).
Further, the doctrine of fundamental unfairness "effectuates imperatives that
government minimize arbitrary action, and [it] is often employed when
A-2459-24 7 narrowed constitutional standards fall short of protecting individual[s] against
unjustified harassment, anxiety, or expense." Ibid. (second alteration in
original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Miller, 216 N.J. 40, 71 (2013)).
Harrington presents no evidence of undue delay or arbitrary action in the
MVC's consideration of his submission, nor does he offer evidence supporting
a finding the MVC failed to act within a reasonable time. Instead, Harrington
highlights the amount of time that elapsed between the suspension notice and
the order of suspension. Bald assertions or conclusory statements unsupported
by the record are insufficient to establish prejudice. State v. Porter, 216 N.J.
343, 355 (2013). Accordingly, we discern no reversible error in the MVC's
decision to impose a suspension of his driving privileges, authorized by N.J.S.A.
39:5D-4 and N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and supported by the undisputed evidence in the
record.
Affirmed.
A-2459-24 8