In the Matter of Joel S. Wadsworth

307 Ga. 311

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: November 4, 2019
• Docket: S19Y1329
• Status: Published

Opinion

307 Ga. 311 FINAL COPY

S19Y1329. IN THE MATTER OF JOEL S. WADSWORTH.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before us on the State Bar’s notice

of discipline, which seeks the disbarment of Joel S. Wadsworth

(State Bar No. 730000), who has been a member of the Bar since

1972. The State Bar attempted to serve Wadsworth by mail at the

address listed with the State Bar, and subsequently at the same

address personally, but a staff investigator filed a return of service

non est inventus. The State Bar then properly served Wadsworth

by publication, pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). Wadsworth

failed to file a Notice of Rejection. Therefore, he is in default, has

waived his right to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such

discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by this

Court. See Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b).

The facts, as deemed admitted by Wadsworth’s default, show

that he represented several plaintiffs in a civil suit, but, during that representation, he failed on multiple occasions to respond to client

requests for information or documents related to the case.

Furthermore, Wadsworth became ineligible to practice law on

September 1, 2017, because of his failure to pay his Bar dues, but

thereafter nevertheless continued his representation of the civil

plaintiffs and failed to withdraw from that representation or take

any other action to protect the clients’ interests. Based on these

facts, the State Bar asserts that Wadsworth violated Rules 1.4 (a)

(3) and (4), 1.16 (d), and 5.5 (a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional

Conduct. The maximum sanction for a violation of Rule 1.4 or 1.16

is a public reprimand, while the maximum sanction for a violation

of Rule 5.5 is disbarment. In mitigation as to the appropriate level

of discipline, the State Bar notes Wadsworth’s absence of prior

discipline in his 45 years of practicing law; in aggravation, the Bar

notes Wadsworth’s failure to respond to the disciplinary proceedings

against him, his multiple violations showing a pattern of

misconduct, his “evident” dishonest and selfish motive, and his

substantial experience in the practice of law.

2 Although Wadsworth is in default and subject to some

sanction, we are not convinced that the recommended sanction of

disbarment is appropriate under the circumstances presented here.

The only violation of which Wadsworth is accused that would

warrant disbarment is the violation of Rule 5.5 (a) involving his

unauthorized practice of law after September 1, 2017 (based on his

failure to pay his Bar dues). However, no information is provided

regarding the extent to which Wadsworth continued the

representation of his clients after becoming ineligible to practice.

Absent some more serious supporting allegations, disbarment would

not necessarily be warranted for such a violation. See, e.g., In the

Matter of Iwu, 303 Ga. 539, 541 (813 SE2d 336) (2018) (three-year

suspension for violations of Rules 5.5 (a), 8.1 (a), and 8.4 (a) (4);

noting that “Iwu’s initial violation of Rule 5.5 (a) for having filed an

answer and counterclaim on behalf of a client while ineligible to

practice law may have subjected him to the much less serious

sanction of a public reprimand rather than a suspension or

disbarment. But, through Iwu’s choice to lie to the Bar during the

3 disciplinary proceedings in an effort to avoid taking responsibility

for his actions, he only exacerbated his own problems by subjecting

himself to more serious sanctions”). Furthermore, although the Bar

cited in aggravation Wadsworth’s “evident” dishonesty and

selfishness, none of the conduct alleged in the notice of discipline

supports such an assertion.

Accordingly, despite Wadsworth’s default, we reject the Bar’s

notice of discipline, as the sanction suggested therein is not

appropriate in light of the alleged conduct. Although we have the

authority to determine the appropriate level of discipline in this

matter, see Rule 4-208.1 (b) (“The Supreme Court of Georgia is not

bound by the State Disciplinary Board’s recommendation and may

impose any level of discipline it deems appropriate.”), we decline

here to exercise our discretion to do so, in the hope that any future

filing by the Bar as to this disciplinary matter either will contain

additional allegations more properly supporting the sanction the

Bar now seeks or will propose that some lesser sanction is sufficient

to address the misconduct at issue.

4 Notice of discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED NOVEMBER 4, 2019. Notice of discipline.

5 Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William D. NeSmith III, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittelman, William Van Hearnburg, Jr., Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.