In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-23-00162-CV __________________
IN THE MATTER OF J.J.B. III.
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 279th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. F-13502-J __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this accelerated appeal, Appellant J.J.B. III, a juvenile, complains the
juvenile court erred by waiving jurisdiction and transferring his case to criminal
district court when there is no evidence that the Jefferson County Juvenile Probation
Department exhausted all means to rehabilitate him. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§
54.02, 56.01(a), (c)(1)(A). For the reasons explained below, we affirm the juvenile
court’s Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to Criminal Court.
1 PERTINENT BACKGROUND
J.J.B. III, a sixteen-year-old, was charged with the following felony offenses
against persons or property: evading arrest/detention with a motor vehicle,
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and two counts of theft of a firearm. The State
filed a Petition for Discretionary Transfer, requesting that the juvenile court waive
jurisdiction and transfer the case to the appropriate criminal district court under
section 54.02 of the Texas Family Code because J.J.B. III was sophisticated and
mature enough to be treated as an adult. The State alleged that: (1) the prospects of
the public’s adequate protection and the likelihood of J.J.B. III’s reasonable
rehabilitation by the use of available procedures, services, and facilities to the
juvenile court warrant his treatment as an adult; (2) the record and J.J.B. III’s history
warrants his treatment as an adult; (3) J.J.B. III is sophisticated and mature enough
to be treated as an adult; and (4) the seriousness of the alleged offenses, J.J.B. III’s
background, and the community’s welfare requires criminal proceedings.
The trial court appointed counsel to represent J.J.B. III in the discretionary
transfer proceeding. The trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s Petition
during which it considered witness testimony and the following records in making
its decision: Certification Analysis, Dr. Nisha Amin’s Psychological Evaluation
Report, and Dr. Edward Gripon’s Psychiatric Evaluation. Dr. Amin’s Psychological
Evaluation states that J.J.B. III understood what he was charged with, the nature of
2 the pending proceedings, and that J.J.B. had demonstrates his capacity to assist his
counsel. In her report, Dr. Amin concluded that there are “no critical factors that
adversely affect” J.J.B. III and that “there is ample clinical evidence” that he is “fit
to proceed.” Dr. Gripon’s Psychiatric Evaluation states he diagnosed J.J.B. III with
ADHD by history and that while J.J.B. III had not been treated for that condition, he
did not have significant symptoms. Dr. Gripon concluded that J.J.B. III was “not
mentally disabled” and during his evaluation appeared to have “no mental health
contraindication to certification/discretionary transfer.”
Sheronda Lee (“Lee”), a probation officer with the Jefferson County Juvenile
Probation Department, testified that she prepared J.J.B. III’s Certification Analysis,
which includes information from Dr. Amin’s psychological report and Dr. Gripon’s
psychiatric report. Lee explained that, in her opinion, Dr. Amin’s and Dr. Gripon’s
reports raise no concerns about whether J.J.B. should be certified as an adult.
Lee explained that her analysis includes information that she received from
the police about the offenses that resulted in J.J.B.’s arrest. As to J.J.B.’s arrest, Lee
stated that on January 15, 2023, at about 3:00 a.m., Jefferson County Sheriff
Deputies were dispatched after a black male in black clothing wearing a facemask
was reported as seen pulling on car door handles on a security camera. When the
deputies spotted the black male, he got into a Ford F-150, and he drove off at speeds
of more than 100 miles per hour. By Lee’s account, when deputies activated their
3 emergency lights on their clearly marked Jefferson County patrol units, the driver
took deputies on a short pursuit for several miles and only stopped when the vehicle
crashed. Information Lee received from the police investigation indicated that upon
removing J.J.B. III, the sole occupant and driver in the Ford F-160, deputies found
he had two firearms, a Taurus 9mm and Sig Sauer .22, in his possession. J.C.C., the
owner of Ford F-150, advised he did not consent to anyone operating his truck. Lee
explained that police determined that D.C. owned the two pistols that were found in
J.J.B.’s possession, and that D.C. had reported the pistols as having been stolen when
two of his vehicles were burglarized the same night J.J.B. took the Ford F-150. When
an officer contacted the owner of the Ford F-150, J.C.C. told police that he no longer
feels safe and carries a gun when he goes outside.
Lee testified that J.J.B. III was charged with four state jail felonies, evading
detention with a vehicle, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and two charges for
stolen guns. Lee testified J.J.B. III was from Louisiana, where he violated his
probation for an aggravated assault case and was sentenced to Louisiana’s version
of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department Institutional Division. Lee explained J.J.B.
III, who was sixteen and a half, was discharged from the Louisiana juvenile prison
in February 2020 and committed the current offenses, which are crimes against
property, in January 2023 while on parole in Louisiana. Lee explained that J.J.B. III
4 was in detention and attending school when he ran from police and wrecked J.C.C.’s
vehicle.
Lee testified J.J.B. III was smart, polite, articulate, and mature for his age. Lee
explained J.J.B. III has a substance abuse problem and knowledge about guns. His
prior record includes illegal possession of a handgun, illegal possession of stolen
property, and theft of a firearm. Lee also explained that she received a report
showing while in Louisiana, J.J.B. III had been placed in a boy’s home and
committed to a facility, so the Texas Juvenile Probation Department could offer him
no more help than he had already received in Louisiana. Lee testified that based on
the multiple charges following J.J.B.’s January 15, 2023 arrest and J.J.B. III’s record,
in her opinion the likelihood that J.J.B. III is capable of being rehabilitated through
programs offered by or in coordination with those of the Juvenile Probation
Department is remote. Lee explained that in her opinion, J.J.B. III’s conduct was
willful, aggravating, and could lead to violence, and that she thought it would be in
the community’s best interest to treat him as an adult.
Joe Evans (“Evans”), an intervention specialist with the IEA program,
testified he is a mentor who intervenes on behalf of youth to ensure they correct their
behavior after they are detained. Evans testified he was working with J.J.B. III, who
reads a lot, and he meets with him twice a week to visit and play cards and games.
Evans explained that J.J.B. III was receptive to intervention, and based on his alleged
5 offenses, there was a possibility that he could be admitted to the program if he was
placed on probation. Evans also explained he would like to continue working with
J.J.B. III in the juvenile system and not see him certified as an adult, and he would
recommend J.J.B. III for the program, which was unavailable where J.J.B. III lived
in Louisiana. Evans testified J.J.B. III was sharper than the usual kids he deals with
in the program. Evans did not have an opinion on J.J.B. III being certified as an adult.
J.J.B. III’s mother, who lives in Louisiana, testified that she was at the hospital
visiting her newborn grandson when J.J.B. III committed the current offenses. J.J.B.
III’s mother explained she is a member of Family and Friends of Louisiana’s
Incarcerated Children (“FFLIC”) and the assistant lead for the Lafayette chapter.
According to her, the program’s goal is to represent children and to offer services
and mentorship programs, programs in which J.J.B.’s mother claimed that her son
was qualified to enroll. She explained that J.J.B. III was not involved with the
mentorship program when he was at the boy’s home in Louisiana, and she claimed
the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice did not offer him the services that she
thought he needed. J.J.B. III’s mother testified that her son should not be tried as an
adult for several reasons: in her opinion he is immature, lacks a consistent father
figure, and was pressured by older kids whom he considered to be his peers when
they brought him to Texas.
6 Jennifer Landry, a youth advocate for FFLIC and founder of Speaking 2
Inspire thru Experience Program, testified that J.J.B. III would benefit from her
program as well as other available programs. Chad Landry (“Chad”), an advocate
and chapter lead for FFLIC and founder of Speaking 2 Inspire thru Experience and
Bridging the Gap, testified that J.J.B. III would benefit from his mentoring programs.
Chad testified that J.J.B. III has a good heart and he would like the opportunity to
mentor him and show him a better way.
The juvenile court signed a Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to
Criminal Court, finding the allegations are felony grade offenses against persons or
property and there is probable cause that J.J.B. III committed the offenses and there
have been no previous adjudications. The juvenile court found J.J.B. III was
sophisticated and mature enough to be treated as an adult, and it found that the
prospect of the public’s safety, the lack of time for the use of juvenile justice
services, and J.J.B. III’s record and history warranted the transfer. In support of the
discretionary transfer, the juvenile court found that J.J.B. III had: (1) a history of
school referrals and Student Discipline Reports; (2) six incident reports while in
detention; (3) a history of marijuana use and knowledge of firearms; (4) a previous
charge of possession of a stolen firearm; (5) a prior probation revocation based on a
new charge of aggravated assault and his placement in a Louisiana boy’s home; and
(6) a recent release from a boy’s home in Louisiana. Concerning J.J.B. III’s
7 likelihood of rehabilitation using available procedures, services, and facilities, the
juvenile court made these findings in support of discretionary transfer: (1)
insufficient time to rehabilitate in a manner to adequately protect the public based
on the level of charged offenses; (2) the alleged crimes are so egregious and
aggravated that the psychological evaluation and reports show he will not be
amenable to rehabilitation efforts; and (3) J.J.B. III’s history and record make the
likelihood of rehabilitation doubtful. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction and
transferred J.J.B. III to criminal district court to be dealt with as an adult due to the
aggravated character of the felony offenses, the seriousness of the offenses to the
community, J.J.B. III’s willful conduct, pattern of adult living and repeated offenses,
emotional attitude, need for a controlled structured facility, and remote likelihood of
rehabilitation.
ANALYSIS
In a single issue, J.J.B. III complains the juvenile court erred by waiving
jurisdiction and transferring his case to criminal district court when there is no
evidence that the Jefferson County Juvenile Probation Department exhausted all
means to rehabilitate him. See id. §§ 54.02, 56.01(a), (c)(1)(A). Specifically, J.J.B.
III complains the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to follow the
Progressive Sanctions Model under Chapter 59 of the Texas Family Code, and if it
had done so, the maximum disposition would have been to place him on intensive
8 supervision with a monitor in his mother’s custody or in placement. See id. §§
59.001–.015. J.J.B. III also complains there is insufficient evidence establishing he
committed the offenses or that he was a threat to the community.
If, after an evidentiary hearing, a juvenile court determines that certain
requirements are satisfied, it may waive its jurisdiction and transfer a child to the
district court for criminal proceedings. Id. § 54.02(a), (c); Matter of C.M.M., 503
S.W.3d 692, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). The statutory
requirements for a juvenile court to waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and
transfer a child to criminal district court include:
(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of felony;
(2) the child was:
...
(B) 15 years of age or older at the time the child is alleged to have committed the offense, if the offense is a felony of the second or third degree or a state jail felony, an no adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning that offense; and
(3) after a full investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the child before the court committed the offense alleged and that because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a).
9 In making a determination under section 54.02(a)(3), the juvenile court shall
consider, among other matters:
(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person;
(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
(3) the record and previous history of the child; and
(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.
Id. § 54.02(f). “Any combination of these criteria may suffice to support a waiver of
jurisdiction; not every criterion need weigh in favor of transfer.” Matter of C.M.M.,
503 S.W.3d at 701 (citation omitted).
We review a juvenile court’s decision to waive its exclusive original
jurisdiction and transfer a case to criminal district court using a two-step process.
Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 887 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d).
First, we review the juvenile court’s finding using the traditional evidentiary
sufficiency review. Id. (citations omitted). “In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the
evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
findings and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not
reject it.” Id. (citations omitted); Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to
support the juvenile court’s findings, the evidence is legally sufficient. Bell, 649 10 S.W.3d at 887. In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all
the evidence to determine whether the juvenile court’s findings conflict with the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence to be clearly wrong or unjust. Id.;
Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 857 (citation omitted).
If the juvenile court’s findings are supported by legally and factually sufficient
proof, we then review the ultimate waiver decision under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. Collins v. State, 516 S.W.3d 504, 520 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, pet.
ref’d) (citations omitted); see also Matter of A.M., 577 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (citations omitted). In applying that
standard, we conduct our own analysis of the evidence and determine whether the
juvenile court acted without reference to the guiding rules or principles such that its
decision to transfer the case was arbitrary based on the evidence. See Collins, 516
S.W.3d at 520 (citation omitted); see also Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887.
The juvenile court found there is probable cause to believe J.J.B. III
committed the offenses of evading arrest with a vehicle, unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle, and theft of a firearm, which are all state jail felonies. J.J.B. III argues the
evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings that there was
probable cause he committed the alleged offenses. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §
54.02(a)(3).
11 In evaluating a probable cause determination, we consider whether there are
sufficient facts and circumstances to support a prudent person’s belief that the
accused juvenile committed the offense. See Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 858. “The
probable-cause standard ‘requires more than mere suspicion but less evidence than
needed to support a conviction or support a finding by a preponderance of the
evidence.’” Id. (quoting Matter of C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 702); see Guzman v. State,
955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citation omitted) (stating probable cause
is based on factual and practical consideration of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent people act). In determining probable cause, courts apply a “‘totality-of-
the circumstances analysis[.]’” Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 858 (citation omitted).
In reaching its probable-cause determinations, the juvenile court considered,
among other things, the testimony and documentary evidence submitted at the
certification hearing as described above. J.J.B. III was charged with unauthorized
use of a vehicle—that he intentionally and knowingly operated a motor-propelled
vehicle, an automobile owned by J.C.C., without J.C.C.’s effective consent. A
person commits the offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle if he intentionally or
knowingly operates another’s motor-propelled vehicle without the effective consent
of the owner. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.07(a). The evidence shows J.J.B. III
operated J.C.C.’s F-150 without J.C.C.’s effective consent.
12 J.J.B. III was charged with evading arrest/detention with a vehicle—that he
did then and there intentionally flee from J. Silva, the Complainant, a peace officer
lawfully attempting to detain the defendant and the defendant did then and there
know that Complainant was a peace officer attempting to lawfully detain him and
the defendant used a vehicle while in flight against the peace and dignity of the State.
A person commits the offense of evading arrest or detention if he intentionally flees
from a person he knows is a peace officer attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.
Id. § 38.04(a). The evidence shows that J.J.B. III was driving J.C.C.’s F-150 at
speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour when deputies activated their emergency lights
on clearly marked patrol units, and rather than pulling over, J.J.B. fled for several
miles and crashed the vehicle.
J.J.B. III was also charged with two counts of theft of a firearm—that J.J.B.
III did then and there intentionally and knowingly appropriate property, by acquiring
and exercising control of corporeal personal property, a firearm owned by D.C., with
the intent to deprive D.C. of the property, and without the effective consent of D.C.
A person commits the state jail felony offense of theft if he unlawfully appropriates
property with intent to deprive the owner of property and the said property stolen is
a firearm. Id. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(C). The evidence shows that when deputies removed
J.J.B. III from J.C.C.’s vehicle, he had two firearms, a Taurus 9mm and Sig Sauer
13 .22, on his person. D.C. reported his two firearms were stolen out of his vehicles the
same night J.J.B. III took J.C.C.’s vehicle.
After considering the totality of the circumstances and viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings, we conclude there is more
than a scintilla of evidence to support the trial court’s findings that there is probable
cause to believe J.J.B. III committed the alleged offenses of evading arrest with a
vehicle, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and theft of a firearm. See Bell, 649
S.W.3d at 887; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 858–59; Matter of C.M.M., 503
S.W.3d at 702; see also Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87. After considering all the
evidence, we conclude the juvenile court’s findings do not conflict with the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence to be clearly wrong or unjust. See Bell,
649 S.W.3d at 887; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 857. We conclude the juvenile
court’s findings that there is probable cause to believe J.J.B. III committed the
current offenses are supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.
J.J.B. III also argues the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court’s
finding that he was a threat to the community. In making its determination to waive
its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer J.J.B. III to criminal district court, the
juvenile court shall consider the welfare of the community and prospects of adequate
protection of the public. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a)(3), (f)(4). The record
shows the juvenile court considered the prospects of adequate protection of the
14 public and found that the public’s safety and welfare of the community warranted
the transfer for adult criminal prosecution. Lee testified that based on the totality
J.J.B. III’s current actions and past record, the public’s protection was remote and
that it was in the community’s best interest to transfer him to the adult system. The
evidence shows that along with his two current charges for theft of a firearm, J.J.B.
III has a knowledge about guns and a prior record that included illegal possession of
a handgun and theft of a firearm. The evidence also shows J.J.B. III drove at rates of
speed exceeding 100 miles per hour while fleeing from police, and the pursuit only
ended because he crashed the vehicle.
After considering the totality of the circumstances and viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s finding, we conclude there is more
than a scintilla of evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the public’s safety
and welfare of the community warranted J.J.B. III’s transfer for adult criminal
prosecution. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 858–59;
Matter of C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 702. After considering all the evidence, we
conclude the juvenile court’s finding does not conflict with the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence to be clearly wrong or unjust. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d
at 887; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 857. We conclude the juvenile court’s finding
that the public’s safety and welfare of the community warranted J.J.B. III’s transfer
is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.
15 J.J.B. III complains there is no evidence that the Jefferson County Juvenile
Probation Department exhausted all means to rehabilitate him. In making its
determination to waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer J.J.B. III to
criminal district court, the juvenile court is required to consider the likelihood of the
rehabilitation of the child using the procedures, services, and facilities that are
currently available to the juvenile court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f)(4). The
juvenile’s age at the time of the transfer “hearing is relevant to the ‘likelihood of the
rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently
available to the juvenile court’” because the juvenile court’s resources are designed
to assist and rehabilitate children, not adults. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 896–97
(citations omitted).
The trial court found that the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of J.J.B.
III using the procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile
court are in doubt. After reviewing and considering the prospects of J.J.B. III’s
rehabilitation, the trial court made these findings in support of discretionary transfer:
(1) there was insufficient time for the juvenile court to use the available procedures,
services, and facilities to rehabilitate J.J.B. III due to the level of the charged
offenses, his current age of sixteen, and the Family Code’s restriction that he could
be placed only on probation until his nineteenth birthday; (2) the Family Code’s
restriction that he may be incarcerated only until his nineteenth birthday provided
16 insufficient time for the juvenile court to provide the necessary services to
rehabilitate J.J.B. III in a manner that is adequate to protect the public; and (3) based
on the psychological evaluation, reports, and J.J.B. III’s alleged crimes, which are
so egregious and aggravated, he would not be amenable to the juvenile court’s
rehabilitation efforts.
The evidence shows that J.J.B. III had a criminal history in Louisiana where
he was placed in a boy’s home and committed to a facility. The evidence also shows
J.J.B. III violated his probation in Louisiana by committing aggravated assault, and
he committed the current offenses while on parole in Louisiana. Lee testified that
the Texas Juvenile Probation Department could not offer any help that J.J.B. III had
not already received in Louisiana, and there was nothing available to address J.J.B.
III’s situation in the time allowed. Lee testified that based on J.J.B. III’s current
offenses and history, the likelihood of any rehabilitation was remote. While the
juvenile court heard J.J.B. III’s mother testify that, in her opinion, Louisiana had not
offered her son the services that she thought he needed, as well as her testimony and
the testimony from several witnesses stating that J.J.B. III would benefit from
intervention and a mentoring program, the juvenile court could have determined that
a mentoring program would not provide the services necessary to sufficiently
rehabilitate J.J.B. III to offer adequate protection to the public if allowed to remain
in the juvenile system.
17 After considering the totality of the circumstances and viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s finding, we conclude there is more
than a scintilla of evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of J.J.B. III using the procedures, services, and facilities
currently available to the juvenile court are in doubt. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887,
896–97; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 860; Matter of C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 703.
After considering all the evidence, we conclude the juvenile court’s finding does not
conflict with the great weight and preponderance of the evidence to be clearly wrong
or unjust. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887; Matter of C.R., 571 S.W.3d at 857. We
conclude the juvenile court’s finding that the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation
of J.J.B. III using the procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the
juvenile court are in doubt is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.
As for J.J.B. III’s complaint that the juvenile court abused its discretion by
failing to follow the Progressive Sanctions Model, we note that a juvenile may not
appeal based on a departure from the Sanction Level Assignment Model provided
by Chapter 59 of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 59.014(3); In
re A.G., 292 S.W.3d 755, 762 n.2 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.); see also Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 59.003 (Sanction Level Assignment Model). Section 59.014
provides that a child may not appeal based on “a departure from the sanction level
assignment model provided by this chapter[.]” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 59.014(3).
18 Nothing in Chapter 59 prohibits imposing appropriate sanctions that are different
from those provided at any sanction level. In re C.C., 13 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 59.003(e)). A juvenile
may not appeal a departure from the Sanction Level Assignment Model because it
is treated more as a guide than a mandatory classification scheme. In re J.M., 287
S.W.3d 481, 496 n.8 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 59.014(3)); see also In re C.C., 13 S.W.3d at 858; In re A.G., 292 S.W.3d at
762 n.2. Since the Family Code does not permit a juvenile to bring this complaint on
appeal, we need not address it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
Having concluded that the juvenile court’s complained of findings are
supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence, we also conclude the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion by waiving jurisdiction and transferring J.J.B. III’s
case to criminal district court as its decision was not arbitrary based on the evidence.
See Collins, 516 S.W.3d at 520; see also Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887; Matter of A.M.,
577 S.W.3d at 659. Accordingly, we overrule J.J.B. III’s sole issue and affirm the
juvenile court’s Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to Criminal Court.
AFFIRMED.
W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice Submitted on May 6, 2024 Opinion Delivered May 23, 2024
Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ. 19