COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00023-CV
In the Matter of J.G. § From the 323rd District Court
§ of Tarrant County (323-94678J-11)
§ January 10, 2013
§ Opinion by Justice McCoy
JUDGMENT
This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that
there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
It is further ordered that appellant J.G. shall pay all costs of this appeal, for
which let execution issue.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
By_________________________________
Justice Bob McCoy COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00023-CV
IN THE MATTER OF J.G.
----------
FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
----------
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
----------
I. Introduction
In one point, Appellant J.G. appeals the trial court’s judgment that he
engaged in delinquent conduct by failing to stop and render aid to two victims
following a traffic accident that he caused. We affirm.
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2 II. Factual and Procedural Background
On October 31, 2010, shortly before midnight, J.G. was driving a Mercedes
convertible westbound on I-30; Joel Perry was driving an SUV with his father
James Perry as a passenger. The SUV was going sixty-five miles per hour in the
same direction as J.G. when J.G. hit it. Joel estimated that the SUV flipped over
three or four times before sliding down around 150 feet on the driver’s side.
According to Joel’s testimony, J.G. had driven ―significantly faster‖ than the
other cars on the road, at ―well over 100 miles an hour.‖ After rear-ending Joel’s
SUV, J.G. proceeded down the road, still traveling at a high rate of speed, for
approximately one-quarter of a mile before he hit a light pole. After hitting the
light pole, J.G. started walking or running2 away from the accident scene. J.G.
was apprehended about one-quarter of a mile to the west of his vehicle and
brought back to the scene.
Joel sustained bruising and a partial herniated disk in his lower back, and
James, who has multiple sclerosis, was shaken up and left hanging immobilized
on the passenger side immediately after the accident, and he sustained injuries
to his knee and ankle. James and Joel remained at the scene until James was
transported away by ambulance. J.G. stipulated that he was intoxicated at the
time of the collision.
2 James testified that he ―saw someone run from where the other car had hit the light standard in the median across the highway to the south.‖
3 The trial court adjudged J.G. delinquent of two counts of failure to stop and
return or remain at the scene of an accident (one for each vehicle occupant) and
driving while intoxicated and placed him on community supervision. J.G. appeals
the determination of both counts of failure to stop and return or remain at the
scene of an accident.
III. Failure to Stop and Render Aid
J.G. argues that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence to establish
that he had the ability to stop and render aid following the automobile accident.
J.G. asserts that the question at issue on appeal is whether ―[J.G.] could have
returned to the vehicle to render aid given the almost immediate arrival of
emergency personnel and the distance between his vehicle and the vehicle he
struck.‖
The standard of review for juvenile delinquency appeals is the same as the
criminal sufficiency review. In re M.C.S., Jr., 327 S.W.3d 802, 805 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2010, no pet.). In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Wise v. State, 364
S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We measure the sufficiency of the
evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct
jury charge for the case. Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App.
4 2011) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Such
a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment,
does not unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately
describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. The law
as authorized by the indictment means the statutory elements of the charged
offense as modified by the factual details and legal theories contained in the
charging instrument. See Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404–05 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000).
In its delinquent conduct petition, the State alleged that J.G. intentionally or
knowingly drove a vehicle that became involved in an accident resulting in injury
to James and Joel Perry and then, knowing the accident had occurred,
intentionally or knowingly left the accident scene without giving his name and
address to any person and without rendering reasonable assistance to James
and Joel when it was apparent that they were in need of medical treatment. See
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 550.021, .023 (West 2011). Section 550.021 also
requires that the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in
personal injury or death immediately stop at the accident scene or immediately
return and remain at the scene until he has complied with the requirements of
transportation code section 550.023. See id. § 550.021(a)(1)–(3); see also id.
§ 550.023 (requiring the operator to give his name and address, among other
identifying information, to any person injured or the operator or occupant of or
person attending a vehicle involved in the collision and to provide any person
5 injured in the accident with reasonable assistance, including transporting or
making arrangements for transporting the person to a physician or hospital for
medical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary, or if the injured
person requests the transportation); Huffman v. State, 267 S.W.3d 902, 909
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (stating that section 550.021(a)’s requirements are serial
requirements that all relate, step-by-step, to what an actor must do with respect
to the scene of an accident).
The evidence is sufficient to show that J.G. did not comply with section
550.021’s requirements: He did not immediately stop after the collision or
immediately return to the scene; instead, he left the scene at a high rate of speed
until he ran into a light pole a quarter of a mile away and then continued to walk
or run away from the accident scene.3 And because J.G. did not even try to
immediately stop or immediately return to the accident scene, he could not give
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COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00023-CV
In the Matter of J.G. § From the 323rd District Court
§ of Tarrant County (323-94678J-11)
§ January 10, 2013
§ Opinion by Justice McCoy
JUDGMENT
This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that
there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
It is further ordered that appellant J.G. shall pay all costs of this appeal, for
which let execution issue.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
By_________________________________
Justice Bob McCoy COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00023-CV
IN THE MATTER OF J.G.
----------
FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
----------
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
----------
I. Introduction
In one point, Appellant J.G. appeals the trial court’s judgment that he
engaged in delinquent conduct by failing to stop and render aid to two victims
following a traffic accident that he caused. We affirm.
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2 II. Factual and Procedural Background
On October 31, 2010, shortly before midnight, J.G. was driving a Mercedes
convertible westbound on I-30; Joel Perry was driving an SUV with his father
James Perry as a passenger. The SUV was going sixty-five miles per hour in the
same direction as J.G. when J.G. hit it. Joel estimated that the SUV flipped over
three or four times before sliding down around 150 feet on the driver’s side.
According to Joel’s testimony, J.G. had driven ―significantly faster‖ than the
other cars on the road, at ―well over 100 miles an hour.‖ After rear-ending Joel’s
SUV, J.G. proceeded down the road, still traveling at a high rate of speed, for
approximately one-quarter of a mile before he hit a light pole. After hitting the
light pole, J.G. started walking or running2 away from the accident scene. J.G.
was apprehended about one-quarter of a mile to the west of his vehicle and
brought back to the scene.
Joel sustained bruising and a partial herniated disk in his lower back, and
James, who has multiple sclerosis, was shaken up and left hanging immobilized
on the passenger side immediately after the accident, and he sustained injuries
to his knee and ankle. James and Joel remained at the scene until James was
transported away by ambulance. J.G. stipulated that he was intoxicated at the
time of the collision.
2 James testified that he ―saw someone run from where the other car had hit the light standard in the median across the highway to the south.‖
3 The trial court adjudged J.G. delinquent of two counts of failure to stop and
return or remain at the scene of an accident (one for each vehicle occupant) and
driving while intoxicated and placed him on community supervision. J.G. appeals
the determination of both counts of failure to stop and return or remain at the
scene of an accident.
III. Failure to Stop and Render Aid
J.G. argues that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence to establish
that he had the ability to stop and render aid following the automobile accident.
J.G. asserts that the question at issue on appeal is whether ―[J.G.] could have
returned to the vehicle to render aid given the almost immediate arrival of
emergency personnel and the distance between his vehicle and the vehicle he
struck.‖
The standard of review for juvenile delinquency appeals is the same as the
criminal sufficiency review. In re M.C.S., Jr., 327 S.W.3d 802, 805 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2010, no pet.). In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Wise v. State, 364
S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We measure the sufficiency of the
evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct
jury charge for the case. Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App.
4 2011) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Such
a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment,
does not unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately
describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. The law
as authorized by the indictment means the statutory elements of the charged
offense as modified by the factual details and legal theories contained in the
charging instrument. See Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404–05 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000).
In its delinquent conduct petition, the State alleged that J.G. intentionally or
knowingly drove a vehicle that became involved in an accident resulting in injury
to James and Joel Perry and then, knowing the accident had occurred,
intentionally or knowingly left the accident scene without giving his name and
address to any person and without rendering reasonable assistance to James
and Joel when it was apparent that they were in need of medical treatment. See
Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 550.021, .023 (West 2011). Section 550.021 also
requires that the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in
personal injury or death immediately stop at the accident scene or immediately
return and remain at the scene until he has complied with the requirements of
transportation code section 550.023. See id. § 550.021(a)(1)–(3); see also id.
§ 550.023 (requiring the operator to give his name and address, among other
identifying information, to any person injured or the operator or occupant of or
person attending a vehicle involved in the collision and to provide any person
5 injured in the accident with reasonable assistance, including transporting or
making arrangements for transporting the person to a physician or hospital for
medical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary, or if the injured
person requests the transportation); Huffman v. State, 267 S.W.3d 902, 909
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (stating that section 550.021(a)’s requirements are serial
requirements that all relate, step-by-step, to what an actor must do with respect
to the scene of an accident).
The evidence is sufficient to show that J.G. did not comply with section
550.021’s requirements: He did not immediately stop after the collision or
immediately return to the scene; instead, he left the scene at a high rate of speed
until he ran into a light pole a quarter of a mile away and then continued to walk
or run away from the accident scene.3 And because J.G. did not even try to
immediately stop or immediately return to the accident scene, he could not give
his information or render reasonable assistance to James or Joel.4 See Huffman,
267 S.W.3d at 909. Therefore, because the evidence is sufficient to support the
trial court’s finding, we overrule J.G.’s sole point.
3 J.G.’s complaint that he could not return to the scene because he was intoxicated and would have had to walk against traffic at night on the interstate for one-quarter of a mile is without merit because he managed to walk away from the accident scene for another quarter of a mile. 4 Although J.G. argues that he could not have returned to render aid before emergency vehicles arrived, the timing of the arrival of emergency personnel here is irrelevant when J.G. did not even attempt to return to the scene and instead walked away from it.
6 V. Conclusion
Having overruled J.G.’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BOB MCCOY JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; MCCOY and GABRIEL, JJ.
DELIVERED: January 10, 2013