In the Matter of Jeffrey Jackson

908 S.E.2d 627, 320 Ga. 318

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: November 5, 2024
• Docket: S25Y0009
• Status: Published

Opinion

320 Ga. 318 FINAL COPY

S25Y0009. IN THE MATTER OF JEFFREY JACKSON.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for

voluntary discipline filed by Jeffrey Jackson (State Bar No. 779477)

prior to the filing of a Formal Complaint. See Bar Rule 4-227 (b). In

his petition, Jackson asserts that an ongoing mental health crisis

forced him to close his private law practice — first temporarily and

then permanently — and that, in the process of doing so, he failed

to adequately communicate with and to properly withdraw from his

representation of some of his clients. Asserting that he has now

successfully navigated the crisis, he seeks to resolve eight client

grievances filed against him by admitting only that he violated Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) 1.41 and 1.16 (c)2

and (d),3 found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). Noting that the maximum

sanction for a violation of either rule is a public reprimand, Jackson

requests that the Court impose a State Disciplinary Review Board

reprimand but agrees to accept up to a public reprimand. In

1 GRPC 1.4 (a) provides:

A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), is required by these rules; (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. Meanwhile, GRPC 1.4 (b) provides that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” 2 GRPC 1.16 (c) provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen a lawyer withdraws it shall be done in compliance with applicable laws and rules.” 3 GRPC 1.16 (d) provides:

Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.

2 response, the Bar urges the Court to reject Jackson’s petition,

contending that it ignores many allegations of fact and fails to fully

address the extent of Jackson’s ethical violations.

Unfortunately, Jackson’s petition leaves open some significant

questions about when and how he allegedly advised his clients of his

decision to terminate his practice; whether, and, if so, to what

extent, Jackson may have violated more serious rules in addition to

GRPC 1.4 and 1.16 (c) and (d); and whether a reprimand is

appropriate discipline given the allegations of misconduct. We are

hesitant to overlook the fact that Jackson’s conduct may have caused

fairly serious harm to one or more of his clients and may also have

negatively affected the public’s perception of the legal profession in

general, among other ramifications. For these reasons, this Court is

not inclined to impose a State Disciplinary Review Board reprimand

or public reprimand to resolve the eight client grievances alleging

abandonment without more factual development from additional

proceedings. See In the Matter of Matteson, 314 Ga. 576, 580-581

(878 SE2d 196) (2022) (rejecting a petition for voluntary discipline

3 filed before the issuance of a formal complaint where the attorney

provided no proof of facts alleged in the petition, including mental

health issues and restitution, and no indication of what steps he had

taken to ensure no further rule violations upon return to the practice

of law); In the Matter of Braziel, 303 Ga. 154, 156 (810 SE2d 476)

(2018) (rejecting a petition for voluntary discipline filed before the

issuance of a formal complaint “[b]ecause of the uncertainty

regarding the underlying facts . . . and the possibility that a Rule 8.4

violation may have occurred”). Therefore, the petition for voluntary

discipline is rejected.

Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.

4 Decided November 5, 2024.

Petition for voluntary discipline.

Arora Law Firm, Jennifer L. Hyman; Stites & Harbison,

Johannes S. Kingma, Evan W. Elam, for Jackson.

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Russell D.

Willard, General Counsel State Bar Designate, William D. NeSmith

III, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, William V. Hearnburg, Jr.,

Andreea N. Morrison, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State

Bar of Georgia.