NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us
SJC-13011
IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM CHARLES HAMM.
Middlesex. January 8, 2021. - May 10, 2021.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.
"Anti-SLAPP" Statute. Conservator. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Interlocutory appeal. Probate Court, Accounts, Appeal. Jurisdiction, Probate Court.
Petition for appointment of guardian filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on July 21, 2000.
A motion to dismiss or strike objections to a conservator's final account, filed on March 25, 2019, was heard by William F. McSweeney, III, J., and a special motion to dismiss was also heard by him.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.
Breton Leone-Quick for the conservator. Charles M. Waters for the protected person.
CYPHER, J. We are asked to consider, in this appeal,
whether the "anti-SLAPP" statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, applies 2
to an objection to a conservator's final account, filed pursuant
to G. L. c. 190B, §§ 1-401 (e) and 5-418 (e), in the Probate and
Family Court (probate court). The conservator, Candace Hamm,
filed final accounts for each of the seventeen years for which
she and her husband, William H. Hamm, were the conservators for
their son William Charles Hamm (protected person).1 The
protected person filed an objection to the final accountings
and, subsequently, an amended objection. In response to the
amended objection, the conservator filed two motions to dismiss:
a motion to dismiss or strike the protected person's amended
objection to the accounting (motion to dismiss or strike) and a
special motion to dismiss the protected person's amended
objection pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H (anti-SLAPP motion).
A judge in the probate court denied both motions.
The conservator appealed, and we allowed the protected
person's application for direct appellate review. Because we
conclude that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply in this
circumstance, we affirm the judgment denying the special motion
to dismiss (albeit on different grounds from the judge, who
denied the motion on its merits). Additionally, although the
denial of the special motion to dismiss is immediately
1 William H. Hamm was a co-conservator until his death in March 2018. Candace Hamm is now acting both individually and in her capacity as her deceased husband's representative. 3
appealable pursuant to the doctrine of present execution, there
is no basis for an immediate appeal from the denial of the
motion to dismiss or strike, pursuant to the doctrine of present
execution or otherwise, and we therefore dismiss so much of the
appeal as seeks review of the denial of that motion.
Background. Candace and William H. Hamm were appointed
guardians for the protected person and conservators of his
estate in 2000. In 2014, the protected person filed a petition
in the probate court to terminate both the guardianship and the
conservatorship. By agreement of the parties, the court
terminated the guardianship. Because all of the parties were
then residing in Florida, they also agreed that jurisdiction
over the conservatorship, including whether to terminate it,
would be transferred to the appropriate court in Florida. The
protected person thereafter filed a suggestion of capacity in
the Florida court. The conservators agreed to a partial
restoration of capacity but sought a continued limited
guardianship of the property. To that end, a judge granted in
part and denied in part the protected person's motion, allowing
the partial restoration of capacity and appointing a third
party, Northern Trust Company, as limited guardian of the
property. The judge also clearly stated that the decision did
not release the conservator from any accounting proceedings 4
related to the guardianship or conservatorship of the protected
person's property.2
Meanwhile, while the proceedings in the Florida court were
ongoing, the protected person filed a petition in the probate
court in Massachusetts asking the court to order the conservator
to render inventories and accounts for the years of
conservatorship.3 The conservator eventually filed the required
accounts for each year of the conservatorship, from 2000 to
2016, as well as a petition for an order of complete settlement,
in March 2017, after the court ordered her to do so.4 The
protected person objected to the conservator's inventory and
accountings.
Additionally, separately, the parties were engaged in
litigation in Minnesota, related to various aspects of the
protected person's estate. In November 2018, the parties
reached a settlement agreement as to portions of that
2 The value of the protected person's estate grew in value from approximately $8 million to approximately $44 million during the 2000 to 2016 period of conservatorship.
3 Pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-418 (a), a "conservator shall account to the court for administration of the trust not less than annually . . . . On termination of the protected person's minority or disability, a conservator shall account to the court."
4 The conservatorship effectively ended in July 2016, when the Florida court appointed Northern Trust Company as the limited guardian of the protected person's estate. 5
litigation, but specifically carved out of the agreement certain
classes of claims, or potential claims, related to certain
identified family trusts. Subsequent to that settlement, the
protected person sought and received leave to file in the
probate court an amended objection to the conservator's
inventory and accountings, which he then filed in March 2019.5
In response to the amended objection, the conservator filed
her two motions to dismiss: the motion to dismiss or strike and
the anti-SLAPP motion. The judge in the probate court denied
both motions, in separate decisions. As to the anti-SLAPP
motion, the judge noted that neither case law nor the anti-SLAPP
statute itself addressed the question whether the statute
applied to an objection to a conservator's account pursuant to
G. L. c. 190B, §§ 1-401 (e) and 5-418 (e). The judge did not
reach the question, however, and instead concluded that even if
the statute did apply, the special motion to dismiss should be
denied on the merits. The judge also denied the conservator's
motion to dismiss or strike. In that motion, the conservator
had argued, among other things, that the protected person's
amended objection amounted to a tort claim for money damages
over which the probate court had no jurisdiction and that
certain of the claims in the amended objection were barred by
5 The protected person amended his objection in light of the settlement in the Minnesota litigation. 6
the settlement agreement in the Minnesota litigation. The judge
rejected both arguments and declined to strike the relevant
portions of the amended objection.
Following the denial of the two motions to dismiss, the
conservator took several steps. She filed a notice of appeal,
in which she stated her intent to appeal from the denial of both
motions. She then filed a petition with a single justice of the
Appeals Court pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par.,
seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal from the denial of
the motion to dismiss or strike. In her petition, she noted
that she was appealing as a matter of right from the denial of
the anti-SLAPP motion and that because the issues raised in that
appeal overlapped with the issues in her appeal from the motion
to dismiss or strike, allowing an interlocutory appeal from the
latter would help avoid piecemeal appellate review. The single
justice concluded that the appeal from the denial of the anti-
SLAPP motion was not a "compelling reason" to overcome the
policy against premature appellate review, and therefore, the
single justice denied the petition.
Following additional motion practice in both the probate
court and the Appeals Court, a different single justice of the
Appeals Court indicated that the conservator was free to renew
her argument regarding the scope of appeal in her brief (i.e.,
that the conservator was free to argue in her brief that the 7
denial of the motion to dismiss or strike was immediately
appealable), which the conservator has done. With all of that
in mind, we turn to the issues before us regarding both the
applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute and the scope of the
appeal.6
Discussion. 1. Applicability of the ant-SLAPP statute.
"The Legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute to counteract
'SLAPP' suits, defined broadly as 'lawsuits brought primarily to
chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom
of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.'"
Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 147
(2017), quoting Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427
Mass. 156, 161 (1998) (Duracraft). To that end, the statute
provides that "[i]n any case in which a party asserts that the
civil claims, counterclaims, or cross claims against said party
are based on said party's exercise of its right of petition
under the constitution of the United States or of the
commonwealth, said party may bring a special motion to dismiss."
G. L. c. 231, § 59H. The question we consider here is whether
the protected person's objection to the conservator's accounting
6 During the pendency of the trial court litigation, the court in Florida entered an order, in January 2019, terminating the limited guardianship and restoring full capacity to the protected person. For ease of reference, we follow the parties' lead and nonetheless refer to him as the protected person. 8
constitutes a "civil claim[], counterclaim[], or cross claim[]"
to which the anti-SLAPP statute would apply.7 Id.
As we observed in Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161, "[t]he
typical mischief that the [anti-SLAPP] legislation intended to
remedy was lawsuits directed at individual citizens of modest
means for speaking publicly against development projects." To
be sure, this is not the only type of case to which the anti-
SLAPP legislation applies. See, e.g., Blanchard, 477 Mass. at
151 (hospital president's statements to newspaper were
petitioning activity encompassed by anti-SLAPP statute); Cardno
ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 476 Mass. 479, 487 (2017) (anti-SLAPP
statute protects those looking to advance causes in which they
believe, such as environmental activists seeking protection of
statute, not just those seeking to protect their own rights);
Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 523 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9
(2004) (filing of complaint for abuse protection order and
submitting of supporting affidavits were petitioning activities
within protection of anti-SLAPP statute).
7 There is no question about the propriety of the conservator's interlocutory appeal from the denial of her anti- SLAPP motion. See, e.g., Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521- 522 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004) (pursuant to doctrine of present execution, "there is a right to interlocutory appellate review from the denial of a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute"). 9
Indeed, and again as we noted in Duracraft, 427 Mass. at
162, "[t]he legislative history in Massachusetts demonstrates
that in response to the problem of SLAPP suits the Legislature
intended to enact very broad protection for petitioning
activities." That said, we also noted that we were "dubious
that the Legislature intended to create an absolute privilege,"
and we therefore considered how best to interpret the statute to
"effect legislative intent that the statute be applied only to
SLAPPs and not to suits arising in wholly different
circumstances." Id. at 162-163 & n.11.
The circumstances presented here are just the type of
"wholly different circumstances" to which the anti-SLAPP statute
was not meant to, and does not, apply. Simply put, an objection
to an accounting filed pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, §§ 1-401 (e)
and 5-418 (e), does not constitute a "civil claim[],
counterclaim[], or cross claim[]" for purposes of G. L. c. 231,
§ 59H. Pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-418 (a), a conservator
appointed by the court to manage the estate of a protected
person "shall account to the court for administration of the
trust not less than annually unless the court directs
otherwise." Additionally, pursuant to § 5-418 (c), the account
must contain certain information, including a listing of the
balance of the prior account or inventory; a listing of the
services provided to the protected person; and any 10
recommendations for changes in the conservatorship plan. The
statute also provides, in § 5-418 (e), for objections to a
conservator's account. Any such objections are to be filed
pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 1-401 (e), which provides, in
relevant part, that an objecting party "shall file a written
affidavit of objections to the proceeding, stating the specific
facts and grounds upon which the objection is based." We do not
view this procedure as akin to a claim, counterclaim, or cross
claim as specified in G. L. c. 231, § 59H.
The conservator argues that an affidavit of objection is
simply a specialized form of pleading containing civil claims.
Relying on this court's decision in O'Rourke v. Hunter, 446
Mass. 814 (2006), she argues that such affidavits are "routinely
treated" as pleadings in the probate court. In that case, we
considered certain procedures relevant to a will contest and,
among other things, noted that "[a] motion to strike an
affidavit of objections is similar in some ways to a motion to
dismiss a complaint in a civil action under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12
(b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974)." Id. at 817-818, and cases
cited.8 The implication then, is that, if a motion to strike an
8 More specifically, in O'Rourke v. Hunter, 446 Mass. 814, 816 (2006), the court was considering rule 16 of the Rules of the Probate Court (1987). After the court's decision in that case, the rules were amended; the relevant standards for objections in will contests, as in cases involving conservators, are now found in G. L. c. 190B, § 1-401. 11
affidavit or objection "is similar in some ways" to a motion to
dismiss a complaint, then an affidavit of objection is "similar
in some ways" to a civil complaint. Even if that is so,
O'Rourke did not involve the anti-SLAPP statute, and we do not
take the implications of that case to mean that, in every
context, an affidavit of objection must be treated just like a
civil complaint.
Rather, as the protected person suggests, there is a
"fundamental difference" between an accounting of the type at
issue here and the types of lawsuits that were the basis for
anti-SLAPP legislation. This is not simply a dispute between
two parties; it involves a fiduciary relationship -- between the
conservator and the protected person -- and involves the
conservator's duty to account for the protected person's estate.
It is incumbent on the conservator to provide an accounting; she
is required to do so by statute, and the protected person has,
by statute, the right to file an affidavit of objection to the
accounting. This simply does not fall within the confines that
the Legislature had in mind in enacting the anti-SLAPP statute.9
9 In addition to arguing that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply in the context of this case, the protected person also argues that the conservator is actually using the anti-SLAPP statute as a litigation strategy -- that is, the "special motion may have been deployed not to limit 'strategic litigation,' but as an additional litigation tactic." Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 163 (1998). Given our conclusion 12
Indeed, we know of no cases in any jurisdiction in which
anti-SLAPP laws have been used in the way that the conservator
seeks to use the law here. We conclude that the anti-SLAPP
statute does not apply in the circumstances of this case,
involving an accounting and objections thereto.10
2. Scope of the interlocutory appeal from the motion to
dismiss or strike. We next address the conservator's purported
appeal from the denial of her motion to dismiss or strike, as to
which she raises two issues: (1) that the judge in the probate
court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over
certain of the protected person's claims in his amended
objection; and (2) that the judge erred in failing to afford
"full faith and credit" to the final judgment in the Minnesota
litigation. She posits a separate basis for the propriety of
the interlocutory appeal for each of the two issues, which we
consider in turn.
As the conservator correctly notes, the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by a party or by
the court. See, e.g., Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 460
that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply here, we need not consider this point.
10We do not address whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies to other probate court proceedings, or to other proceedings involving conservators, guardians, or other similarly situated individuals. 13
Mass. 91, 99-100 (2011), and cases cited. This does not mean,
however, that a ruling on that issue is necessarily a proper
subject for interlocutory appeal. As we stated in Maxwell,
which involved the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in the
context of an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion
for summary judgment, "the ruling regarding subject matter
jurisdiction is . . . not properly the subject of interlocutory
appeal." Id. at 99.
In Maxwell, we went on to consider the jurisdictional
issue, but only after concluding that doing so was "the lesser
evil," in the context of that case, between the "undesirable
options of wasting judicial resources through duplicative,
piecemeal appellate litigation and permitting [the defendant] to
circumvent a bedrock principle of appellate procedure." Id. at
99.11 This case does not present the same type of circumstances,
and even if it did, this would not necessarily mean that we are
bound to consider the interlocutory appeal or, more importantly,
that the conservator has any right to an interlocutory appeal.
"As a general rule, there is no right to appeal from an
interlocutory order unless a statute or rule authorizes it."
Among other reasons for considering the subject matter 11
jurisdiction issue in the interlocutory appeal, we noted that the issue made up the majority of the parties' briefs, the plaintiff did not object to consideration of the issue, and the issue also had been addressed in amicus briefs. Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91, 98-99 (2011). 14
Maddocks v. Ricker, 403 Mass. 592, 597-598 (1988), and cases
cited. See Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 687 (1999)
(interlocutory rulings, such as denial of motion to dismiss, are
not final orders and thus generally not appealable until
ultimate disposition of case).12
The conservator fares no better with her argument that the
issue whether the judge in the probate court failed to afford
"full faith and credit" to a final judgment in the Minnesota
litigation is the proper subject of an interlocutory appeal
pursuant to the doctrine of present execution. That doctrine
applies to cases "where the interlocutory ruling will interfere
with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal from the
final judgment," and "where the matter is collateral to the
merits of the controversy" (quotations and citations omitted).
Marcus v. Newton, 462 Mass. 148, 152 (2012). Even if the
judge's ruling on the full faith and credit issue is collateral
to the merits of the parties' dispute, the ruling does not
interfere with the conservator's rights in a way that cannot be
remedied in an appeal from a final judgment.
The conservator argues that she should not be required to
defend against claims that were a part of and were disposed of
in the Minnesota litigation and, further, that this is an issue
12Any exceptions to the rule do not appear to apply to the conservator's appeal. 15
of full faith and credit -- that the full faith and credit
clause bars duplicative litigation. In reality, what the
conservator is arguing is that claims raised and resolved in the
Minnesota litigation are subject to the parameters of res
judicata; that is, that the protected person is precluded from
relitigating them. See Wright Mach. Corp. v. Seaman-Andwall
Corp., 364 Mass. 683, 688-689 (1974) ("[T]he principle of res
judicata requires that a valid and final personal judgment
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter serve as a bar to any further proceedings
between the same parties on the same claim. . . . The effects
of the res judicata doctrine extend to judgments rendered in
other States through the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution . . .").
Res judicata claims, however, are not subject to the
doctrine of present execution. See Mooney v. Warren, 87 Mass.
App. Ct. 137, 138 (2015). In Mooney, the Appeals Court rejected
the defendant's argument that a motion to dismiss on res
judicata grounds was akin to a motion to dismiss on the basis of
immunity from suit. See id. at 138-139. Unlike interlocutory
orders involving claims of immunity from suit, which are
immediately appealable because the right to immunity from suit
is lost forever if the order is not appealed until the close of
litigation, a defense based on res judicata is about "freedom 16
from liability," not "freedom from suit." Id. at 139, quoting
Marcus, 462 Mass. at 152. As with the conservator's subject
matter jurisdiction claim, her full faith and credit claim is
one that can be readily addressed, and remedied if need be, in
an appeal from a final judgment.
Conclusion. The judgment denying the anti-SLAPP special
motion to dismiss is affirmed. So much of the appeal as seeks
review of the denial of the motion to dismiss or strike is
dismissed.
So ordered.