NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3547-23
IN THE MATTER OF GREGORY GARCIA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY POLICE TRAINING COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent. __________________________
Argued September 30, 2025 – Decided November 7, 2025
Before Judges Susswein and Augostini.
On appeal from the New Jersey Police Training Commission, Docket No. PTC-24-0116.
Timothy R. Smith argued the cause for appellant (Caruso Smith Picini, PC, attorneys; Timothy R. Smith, of counsel; Zinovia H. Stone, on the briefs).
Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, of counsel; Daniel W. Knox, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Petitioner Gregory Garcia appeals the Police Training Commission's June
5, 2024 final agency decision revoking his law enforcement license based on his
guilty plea conviction for possession of a large capacity ammunition magazine.
Garcia contends that the revocation of his license was premature because he had
not exhausted his direct appeals of the criminal conviction. He also contends
that even if the New Jersey and United States Supreme Courts decline to hear
his appeal—as has now occurred—we should reverse his license revocation in
the interests of justice. After reviewing the record in light of the governing legal
principles, we affirm.
I.
Garcia was a police officer employed by the Wharton Police Department.
A search of his residence revealed various weapons, ammunition, and firearms
accessories. Garcia was charged with several false representations and gun
possession offenses. On November 14, 2022, he pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to one count of possessing a large capacity ammunition magazine —
a fourth degree crime—in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j). On January 13,
2023, the trial court sentenced Garcia to a one-year period of non-custodial
probation. Petitioner's judgment of conviction was entered on January 17, 2023.
A-3547-23 2 On May 16, 2024, the Commission notified Garcia that it was moving to
revoke his law enforcement license based on the criminal conviction. The
Commission's notice stated that "the Police Licensure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-66,
et seq. . . . and N.J.A.C. 13:1-12.1(g) . . . mandate revocation of a law
enforcement license upon proof of a criminal conviction" and that plaintiff was
"convicted" of a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j) on January 13, 2023. Petitioner
requested a hearing and asked the Commission to hold the hearing in abeyance
until the resolution of his appeal of the underlying conviction. The Commission
declined to hold the hearing in abeyance, explaining that it was "statutorily
required" to revoke petitioner's license given the entry of a judgment of
conviction.
On June 5, 2024, the Commission issued a Final Agency Decision
revoking petitioner's law enforcement license. The Commission found that
petitioner's criminal conviction rendered him "statutorily ineligible to hold a law
enforcement license pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71(e)(e) and N.J.A.C. 13:1-
12.1(g)." This appeal followed.
Garcia also appealed his criminal conviction, which we affirmed on
October 7, 2024, issuing an unpublished decision. State v. Garcia, No. A-1606-
22 (App. Div. Oct. 7, 2024). On January 28, 2025, the New Jersey Supreme
A-3547-23 3 Court denied Garcia's petition for certification. State v. Garcia, 260 N.J. 3
(2025). On June 23, 2025, the United States Supreme Court denied his petition
for a writ of certiorari. Garcia v. New Jersey, 145 S. Ct. 2819 (2025) (mem.).
In the present appeal, Garcia contends that the Commission prematurely
revoked his license because his criminal conviction had not been fully
adjudicated, as all avenues of appeal had not been exhausted. He also contends
that we should overturn his license revocation in the interests of justice. 1
II.
The Police Training Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 52:17B-66 to -77.19, governs the
licensure of law enforcement officers and authorizes the Commission to
implement a statewide licensure system. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71a. The Act
explicitly requires the Commission to revoke a police officer's license if the
officer has been convicted of a crime. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71e(e).2 The
1 We note that Garcia's contention that even if the United States Supreme Court denies certiorari, his license revocation should still be reversed "in the interests of justice" was first raised in his reply-brief. Although "[w]e generally decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief," Bacon v. State Dept. of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24, 38 (App. Div. 2015), certif. den. 224 N.J. 281 (2016), we have elected to address Garcia's argument that the Commission had discretion to refrain from license revocation. 2 N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71e(e) requires license revocation if an officer has been convicted of any offense listed in 52:17B-71b(a)(13)(a)-(c). That list includes
A-3547-23 4 Commission's regulations, adopted pursuant to the Act, similarly state that
"[p]roof of a conviction . . . shall result in the mandatory . . . revocation of
licensure." N.J.A.C. 13:1-12.1(g). This mandatory revocation requirement
supports the legislative goal of ensuring that police officers uphold the public
trust by meeting high standards of conduct and professionalism. N.J.S.A.
52:17B-66; see also In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 576 (1990) (recognizing that a
police officer is a "special kind of public employee" subject to a high standard
of conduct because they "represent[] law and order to the citizenry" (quoting
Twp. of Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965),
certif. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966))).
III.
We first address Garcia's contention that the Commission erroneously
revoked his license because, at the time of the final agency decision, he had not
yet exhausted all avenues of appeal of his criminal conviction. Specifically, in
his initial appeal brief, Garcia argues:
until either [petitioner's] appeals and/or petitions have been sought and denied by the highest courts in this State and in the United States. . . his conviction is not
any "crime in this State." N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71b(a)(13)(a). It is not disputed that unlawful possession of a large capacity magazine is a crime.
A-3547-23 5 final, and it was premature of the [Commission] to revoke his law enforcement license.
As we have noted, during the pendency of this appeal, both the New Jersey
and United States Supreme Courts declined to review Garcia's conviction, thus
concluding the direct appeal process. In these circumstances, the gravamen of
Garcia's argument has become moot. See Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 104
(2015) (holding an issue is moot when our decision "can have no practical effect
on the existing controversy.") (quoting Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell,
422 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22 (App. Div. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3547-23
IN THE MATTER OF GREGORY GARCIA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY POLICE TRAINING COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent. __________________________
Argued September 30, 2025 – Decided November 7, 2025
Before Judges Susswein and Augostini.
On appeal from the New Jersey Police Training Commission, Docket No. PTC-24-0116.
Timothy R. Smith argued the cause for appellant (Caruso Smith Picini, PC, attorneys; Timothy R. Smith, of counsel; Zinovia H. Stone, on the briefs).
Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, of counsel; Daniel W. Knox, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Petitioner Gregory Garcia appeals the Police Training Commission's June
5, 2024 final agency decision revoking his law enforcement license based on his
guilty plea conviction for possession of a large capacity ammunition magazine.
Garcia contends that the revocation of his license was premature because he had
not exhausted his direct appeals of the criminal conviction. He also contends
that even if the New Jersey and United States Supreme Courts decline to hear
his appeal—as has now occurred—we should reverse his license revocation in
the interests of justice. After reviewing the record in light of the governing legal
principles, we affirm.
I.
Garcia was a police officer employed by the Wharton Police Department.
A search of his residence revealed various weapons, ammunition, and firearms
accessories. Garcia was charged with several false representations and gun
possession offenses. On November 14, 2022, he pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to one count of possessing a large capacity ammunition magazine —
a fourth degree crime—in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j). On January 13,
2023, the trial court sentenced Garcia to a one-year period of non-custodial
probation. Petitioner's judgment of conviction was entered on January 17, 2023.
A-3547-23 2 On May 16, 2024, the Commission notified Garcia that it was moving to
revoke his law enforcement license based on the criminal conviction. The
Commission's notice stated that "the Police Licensure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-66,
et seq. . . . and N.J.A.C. 13:1-12.1(g) . . . mandate revocation of a law
enforcement license upon proof of a criminal conviction" and that plaintiff was
"convicted" of a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j) on January 13, 2023. Petitioner
requested a hearing and asked the Commission to hold the hearing in abeyance
until the resolution of his appeal of the underlying conviction. The Commission
declined to hold the hearing in abeyance, explaining that it was "statutorily
required" to revoke petitioner's license given the entry of a judgment of
conviction.
On June 5, 2024, the Commission issued a Final Agency Decision
revoking petitioner's law enforcement license. The Commission found that
petitioner's criminal conviction rendered him "statutorily ineligible to hold a law
enforcement license pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71(e)(e) and N.J.A.C. 13:1-
12.1(g)." This appeal followed.
Garcia also appealed his criminal conviction, which we affirmed on
October 7, 2024, issuing an unpublished decision. State v. Garcia, No. A-1606-
22 (App. Div. Oct. 7, 2024). On January 28, 2025, the New Jersey Supreme
A-3547-23 3 Court denied Garcia's petition for certification. State v. Garcia, 260 N.J. 3
(2025). On June 23, 2025, the United States Supreme Court denied his petition
for a writ of certiorari. Garcia v. New Jersey, 145 S. Ct. 2819 (2025) (mem.).
In the present appeal, Garcia contends that the Commission prematurely
revoked his license because his criminal conviction had not been fully
adjudicated, as all avenues of appeal had not been exhausted. He also contends
that we should overturn his license revocation in the interests of justice. 1
II.
The Police Training Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 52:17B-66 to -77.19, governs the
licensure of law enforcement officers and authorizes the Commission to
implement a statewide licensure system. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71a. The Act
explicitly requires the Commission to revoke a police officer's license if the
officer has been convicted of a crime. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71e(e).2 The
1 We note that Garcia's contention that even if the United States Supreme Court denies certiorari, his license revocation should still be reversed "in the interests of justice" was first raised in his reply-brief. Although "[w]e generally decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief," Bacon v. State Dept. of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24, 38 (App. Div. 2015), certif. den. 224 N.J. 281 (2016), we have elected to address Garcia's argument that the Commission had discretion to refrain from license revocation. 2 N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71e(e) requires license revocation if an officer has been convicted of any offense listed in 52:17B-71b(a)(13)(a)-(c). That list includes
A-3547-23 4 Commission's regulations, adopted pursuant to the Act, similarly state that
"[p]roof of a conviction . . . shall result in the mandatory . . . revocation of
licensure." N.J.A.C. 13:1-12.1(g). This mandatory revocation requirement
supports the legislative goal of ensuring that police officers uphold the public
trust by meeting high standards of conduct and professionalism. N.J.S.A.
52:17B-66; see also In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 576 (1990) (recognizing that a
police officer is a "special kind of public employee" subject to a high standard
of conduct because they "represent[] law and order to the citizenry" (quoting
Twp. of Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965),
certif. denied, 47 N.J. 80 (1966))).
III.
We first address Garcia's contention that the Commission erroneously
revoked his license because, at the time of the final agency decision, he had not
yet exhausted all avenues of appeal of his criminal conviction. Specifically, in
his initial appeal brief, Garcia argues:
until either [petitioner's] appeals and/or petitions have been sought and denied by the highest courts in this State and in the United States. . . his conviction is not
any "crime in this State." N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71b(a)(13)(a). It is not disputed that unlawful possession of a large capacity magazine is a crime.
A-3547-23 5 final, and it was premature of the [Commission] to revoke his law enforcement license.
As we have noted, during the pendency of this appeal, both the New Jersey
and United States Supreme Courts declined to review Garcia's conviction, thus
concluding the direct appeal process. In these circumstances, the gravamen of
Garcia's argument has become moot. See Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 104
(2015) (holding an issue is moot when our decision "can have no practical effect
on the existing controversy.") (quoting Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell,
422 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22 (App. Div. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
In the interest of completeness, we add that defendant's contention that, at
the time his license was revoked, he had not been "convicted" within the
meaning of the Act is incorrect. In International Longshoremen's Association
v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 171 N.J. Super. 508 (App. Div.
1979), we rejected that argument, holding that an administrative penalty based
on a criminal conviction "occurs upon conviction in the trial court and not only
after the expiration of all appeals." Id. at 515.
More recent cases confirm that a conviction occurs when a defendant
pleads guilty and the trial court enters a judgment of conviction—not only once
all avenues of appeal have been exhausted. See, e.g., State ex rel. T.M., 166
A-3547-23 6 N.J. 319, 330 (2001) ("[A] plea of guilty 'is itself a conviction; nothing remains
but to give judgment and determine punishment.'" (quoting Boykin v. Alabama,
39 U.S. 238, 242 (1969))); State v. Vendrell, 197 N.J. Super. 232, 236 (App.
Div. 1984) ("[I]t is well-settled that final judgment in the context of criminal
proceedings is the judgment of conviction despite the pendency of an appeal.");
State v. Compton, 28 N.J. Super. 45, 48 (App. Div. 1953) ("A conviction ensues
whether one pleads guilty to the charge or is found guilty by the court or a jury
as the result of a trial on the merits."); Schireson v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs,
130 N.J.L. 570, 573 (E. & A. 1943) ("A conviction in ordinary legal langua ge
consists of a plea of ‘guilty’ or verdict of guilty."). Given that New Jersey courts
consistently interpret "conviction" to mean a guilty plea or judgment of
conviction even if there are outstanding appeals, the Commission was required
to revoke petitioner's license before the direct appeals process had been
concluded.
IV.
We next address Garcia's additional argument as to why the revocation of
his license was inappropriate. Relying on Uricoli v. Board of Trustees, Police
& Firemen's Retirement System, 91 N.J. 62 (1982), Garcia argues that, like the
Board of Trustees in that case, the Commission has discretion not to revoke an
A-3547-23 7 officer's law enforcement license notwithstanding that the officer has been
criminally convicted. That interpretation of the Act is incorrect, contradicted
by the Act's plain and unambiguous text. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-71e(e) ("[T]he
commission shall revoke a law enforcement officer's license" if they have been
convicted of a crime in the State). Garcia's reliance on Uricoli is misplaced
because the statutory provision at issue in Uricoli is starkly different from the
provision in the Police Training Act. Uricoli dealt with a pension statute that
did not include an express statutory mandate but rather an implied flexible rule
that public pension awards require "honorable service." Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 66.
In sum, the revocation of a law enforcement license is mandatory and
automatic when, as in this case, the licensee is convicted of a crime. The
Commission simply had no discretion and thus we have no grounds upon which
to intervene. Cf. Berta v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 473 N.J. Super. 284, 302-03
(App. Div. 2022) (holding an appellate court will disturb an agency's
adjudicatory decision only if that the decision is arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable or is unsupported by substantial credible evidence in the record as
a whole, and noting a reviewing court will examine "whether the agency's action
violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the
law").
A-3547-23 8 To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of petitioner's
arguments, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
A-3547-23 9