In the Matter of Fincourt Braxton Shelton

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: August 28, 2017
• Docket: S17Y1780
• Status: 200

Opinion

302 Ga. 1 FINAL COPY

S17Y1780. IN THE MATTER OF FINCOURT BRAXTON SHELTON.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Report and

Recommendation of the Review Panel of the State Bar, recommending that

respondent Fincourt Braxton Shelton (State Bar No. 771101) be suspended for

four years as substantially similar reciprocal discipline, following his receipt of

a suspension pursuant to order of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Shelton,

who has been a member of the State Bar of Georgia since 2007, acknowledged

service of the notice of reciprocal discipline, filed pursuant to Rule 9.4 (b) of the

Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, as set forth in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), and

filed a response, to which he attached a filing he submitted in a reciprocal

discipline proceeding in the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Pennsylvania, which proceeding arose in response to the same four-year

suspension that prompted this disciplinary matter. The Bar replied, attaching

materials from the Pennsylvania disciplinary proceeding that led to his suspension.

Shelton’s Pennsylvania suspension was based on his conduct in two

unrelated client matters. In one matter, the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania found that Shelton made material misrepresentations in

court documents, mishandled funds that had been entrusted to him, labored

under a significant conflict of interest, committed a breach of his fiduciary

duties, and engaged in extreme incompetence. In the other matter, Shelton

persistently misrepresented the identity of a party in filed pleadings, acted

without the consent of his client, filed inaccurate and false documents, and

disbursed funds without authority to do so. In the Pennsylvania disciplinary

proceeding, Shelton failed to file a response to the petition for discipline filed

by that state’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Shelton did, however, participate

in a hearing before a three-member hearing committee, which concluded that

Shelton had committed the violations of which he was accused. After that

finding was reviewed and approved by the Disciplinary Board, the matter

proceeded to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which ordered that Shelton be

suspended for four years.

The Review Panel considered Shelton’s objections to the imposition of

2 reciprocal discipline, first finding to be without merit Shelton’s arguments that

he was deprived of due process because he was denied oral argument before the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, because the Disciplinary Board was not an

impartial body, and because the Disciplinary Board simply accepted as true the

allegations against him. The Review Panel noted that Shelton was clearly

provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard, as he was provided with

notice through service of the petition for discipline, to which he failed to

respond, and as he participated in the hearing before the hearing committee and

was allowed to file a brief before the Supreme Court. The Review Panel further

noted that the Pennsylvania disciplinary rules dictate that Disciplinary Board

members who investigate attorney misconduct are precluded from further

participation in that matter, such that there was no basis upon which to suspect

that there had been a lack of impartiality. The Review Panel next considered

and rejected Shelton’s argument that there was a lack of evidence supporting the

findings of misconduct in the Pennsylvania proceedings, finding that the record

of those proceedings supported the conclusions reached by the Pennsylvania

disciplinary authorities. Finally, the Review Panel considered Shelton’s

objection that the imposition of discipline would result in a “grave injustice,”

3 see Rule 9.4 (b) (3) (iii), as it would leave an innocent party without legal

representation, but rejected that argument, as Shelton had failed to present

evidence in support of that assertion and had failed to present any authority in

support of his assertion that depriving a client of its chosen counsel due to that

counsel’s suspension would constitute a grave injustice within the meaning of

the rule. Finding that Shelton had failed to prove the existence of any element

under Rule 9.4 (b) (3) to support the imposition of discipline other than that

imposed in Pennsylvania, the Review Panel recommended that Shelton be

suspended for four years and until such time as he has been readmitted to

practice in Pennsylvania.

Having reviewed the record, this Court agrees with the Review Panel’s

recommendation that a four-year suspension is the appropriate sanction in this

reciprocal discipline matter. Accordingly, we direct that Fincourt Braxton

Shelton be suspended from the practice of law in the State of Georgia for four

years. At the conclusion of the suspension imposed in this matter, if Shelton

wishes to seek reinstatement, he must offer proof to the State Bar’s Office of

General Counsel that he has been reinstated to the practice of law in

Pennsylvania. If the State Bar agrees that this condition has been met, the State

4 Bar will submit a notice of compliance to this Court, and this Court will issue

an order granting or denying reinstatement.

Shelton is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Four-year suspension with conditions for reinstatement. All the Justices

concur.

5 Decided August 28, 2017.

Suspension.

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Wolanda R. Shelton, Jenny

K. Mittelman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.