in the Matter of D.T., a Juvenile

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided October 28, 2021·No. 02-20-00312-CV·Published

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

No. 02-20-00312-CV

IN THE MATTER OF D.T., A JUVENILE

On Appeal from the 78th District Court Wichita County, Texas Trial Court No. 13147-JD-B

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Appellant D.T. was twelve years old when he stipulated to and was adjudicated delinquent for having committed aggravated sexual assault of a child by intentionally or knowingly causing the sexual organ of a child under the age of fourteen1 to contact his mouth or tongue, which would be a first-degree felony offense for an adult. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(e). The juvenile court placed D.T. on two years’ probation and then modified his probation twice. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05.

In three issues, D.T., who is now fifteen years old, complains about the second modification and disposition,2 arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion (1) by denying his motion for dismissal of the State’s modification petition, (2) by finding that he violated his probation, and (3) by ordering his probation extended until he turns eighteen. Because the record reflects no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

II. Discussion

A juvenile court is vested with considerable discretion in determining the suitable disposition for a child who has been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct and “in proceedings to modify an earlier disposition.” In re M.N.,

1 The record reflects that D.T.’s victim was a six-year-old relative at the time of the offense.

2 In juvenile cases, “disposition” is “akin to sentencing and is used to honor the non-criminal character of the juvenile proceedings.” In re D.L., 541 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

No. 02-18-00044-CV, 2019 WL 1715981, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 18, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); see In re J.M., No. 02-19-00325-CV, 2020 WL 3987581, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 4, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that the court reviews a decision to modify a juvenile disposition for an abuse of discretion); see also In re L.A.G.R., Nos. 07-14-00072-CV, -00073-CV, 2014 WL 5462540, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 28, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (requiring probation violation to be found by a preponderance of the evidence).

A juvenile court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or without reference to guiding rules or principles. M.N., 2019 WL 1715981, at *1. It does not abuse its discretion simply by basing its decision on conflicting evidence. In re C.C., No. 02-17-00216-CV, 2018 WL 1865804, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). We will not find that the juvenile court abused its discretion so long as some evidence of substantive and probative character exists to support its decision. Id. In conducting our review, we engage in a two-pronged analysis: (1) did the juvenile court have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) did it err in its application of discretion? Id. We apply the civil standards of review for the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence3 to support a

3 Under the legal-sufficiency standard of review, we may sustain such a challenge only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Shields v. Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017). In determining whether

disposition decision. In re B.R., No. 02-19-00328-CV, 2020 WL 3969556, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). A. Motion for Dismissal In his first issue, D.T. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying his motion for dismissal. In his second issue, he complains that the juvenile court abused its discretion by finding that he violated a probation condition regarding sex offender treatment, relying on the same argument that he makes in his first issue.

1. Background During the modification portion of the State’s case, the juvenile court took judicial notice of the pleadings that had been filed in the case.

legally sufficient evidence supports the finding under review, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could and must disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence” in support of the challenged finding. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding. See 4Front Engineered Sol., Inc. v. Rosales, 505 S.W.3d 905, 909 (Tex. 2016).

When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).

In its original petition, the State alleged that D.T. had committed an April 2018 aggravated sexual assault of a child, and in July 2018, the juvenile court placed D.T. on twenty-four months’ probation that contained both regular and sex-offender conditions. Condition (z) of D.T.’s regular probation conditions required him to attend, participate in, and successfully complete the sex offender treatment program. Although D.T.’s probation was set to end in July 2020, it was made “subject to subsequent extensions and additional proceedings” until he reached age 18.

In February 2019, the State petitioned to modify and extend D.T.’s disposition, alleging that in January 2019, D.T. had failed to complete the sex offender treatment program, violating Condition (z). D.T. stipulated that he had “fail[ed] to complete Sex Offender Treatment Program to the satisfaction of the treatment provider,” and in April 2019, the juvenile court entered a “Modified Order of Probation until July 1, 2020.” The April 2019 order was originally titled “Modified Order of Probation until 18th Birthday,” but “18th Birthday” was lined out and replaced by “July 1, 2020,” the same ending date as D.T.’s original twenty-four months of probation.

The April 2019 order added some conditions.4 As in the earlier order, it stated that D.T. would be “subject to subsequent extensions and additional proceedings until [he] is eighteen (18) years of age.” Also as in the earlier order, D.T. was required to

4 The new conditions provided, among other things, that D.T. would be placed in the probation department’s custody, that he would remain in the juvenile detention center until placed in the residential placement program, and that he would successfully complete the residential placement program.

attend, participate, and successfully complete the sex offender treatment program. Condition #21 of the additional sex-offender conditions—the condition at issue in the instant appeal—was included verbatim from the earlier order and required D.T. to

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