In the Matter of D.P. v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
• Decided: January 30, 2026
• Docket: 02-25-00426-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00426-CV ___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF D.P.

On Appeal from the 323rd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 323-125888-25

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant David Pierson1 challenges the juvenile court’s order waiving its

jurisdiction and transferring him to a criminal district court for prosecution as an

adult. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a). In two points, Pierson argues that the

evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s probable-cause finding that

he committed the alleged offenses or to justify his transfer to adult criminal court.

Because we hold that sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that it

had probable cause to believe that Pierson had committed the alleged offenses and

that evidence of the relevant statutory factors supported the juvenile court’s decision

to waive jurisdiction and transfer Pierson, we will affirm.

Background

On April 29, 2025, Alvin Sweet was shot and killed, and another person in the

area, Josmary Laucho, was injured. The police investigation of the shooting began at

the apartment complex where Sweet had crashed his car after driving away from

where he had been shot. Laucho had been shot by a stray bullet while walking to her

car at the complex, which is adjacent to a park. After finding Sweet’s tire tracks from

the park to the complex and shell casings at the park, investigators determined that

the shooting had occurred there. Investigations revealed that Sweet was a drug dealer

and had arranged to meet Zayne Burris, then seventeen, at the park that night. Burris

1 We use pseudonyms for the appellant, for his family, and for other juveniles involved in the case. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(j).

2 was arrested. When Detective Matthew Handler spoke to Burris at the jail where he

was being detained, Burris told him that he and some friends had planned to steal

THC vape pens from Sweet, and he named Pierson and several others as responsible

for the shootings.

Because Pierson was sixteen at the time of the alleged offenses, any proceeding

against him arising from the offenses fell within the Juvenile Justice Code. See Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. §§ 51.03, 51.04(a). Juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over

proceedings under the Juvenile Justice Code. See id. § 51.04. However, the State filed a

“Petition Requesting the Juvenile Court to Consider Discretionary Transfer to

Criminal Court (Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction).”

The petition contained six paragraphs alleging offenses related to the shootings

of Sweet and Laucho. For Sweet’s death, the State alleged that Pierson had committed

capital murder,2 murder under Penal Code Section 19.02(b)(1), 3 and murder under

Penal Code Section 19.02(b)(2). 4 In the remaining three paragraphs, the State alleged

2 “A person commits an offense if the person commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(b)(1) and: . . . the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit . . . robbery.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2). 3 “A person commits an offense if the person: . . . intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual.” Id. § 19.02(b)(1). 4 “A person commits an offense if the person: . . . intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.” Id. § 19.02(b)(2).

3 that Pierson had committed aggravated robbery of Sweet, had discharged a firearm “at

or in the direction of . . . Sweet,” and had committed aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon of Laucho. After a hearing, the juvenile court decided to waive its jurisdiction

and transfer Pierson. The court stated at the hearing’s conclusion that “the level of

planning” for the robbery of Sweet “d[id] not indicate juvenile delinquency or juvenile

behavior” and that it was “more appropriate for [Pierson] to be in the adult system for

this.” In its “Order of Transfer to a Criminal District Court and Waiver of

Jurisdiction,” the juvenile court found that there was probable cause to believe that

Pierson had committed all the alleged offenses except murder under Section

19.02(b)(2). The juvenile court further found that the offenses were against a person;

that Pierson was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to be tried as an adult; that it

was contrary to the best interests of the public for the juvenile court to retain

jurisdiction; and that because of the seriousness of the offenses alleged and Pierson’s

background, the community’s welfare required criminal proceedings. Pierson now

appeals.

Discussion

A. Juvenile Transfers and Standard of Review

Because the State alleged that Pierson had committed a felony, the juvenile

court could waive its jurisdiction and transfer Pierson to the criminal district court if

“after a full investigation and a hearing,” the court determined that (1) “there [wa]s

probable cause to believe that [Pierson had] committed the offense alleged” and

4 (2) “because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of [Pierson,]

the welfare of the community require[d] criminal proceedings.” Id. § 54.02(a). The

State had the burden to persuade the juvenile court by a preponderance of the

evidence to waive its jurisdiction and transfer the case. See In re J.H.,

No. 02-24-00370-CV, 2025 WL 356497, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 30, 2025,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting State’s burden in transfer proceeding); In re M. B.,

No. 14-23-00969-CV, 2024 WL 3041398, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

June 18, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re A.P., Nos. 01-25-00423-CV,

01-25-00424-CV, 01-25-00425-CV, 01-25-00428-CV, 01-25-00549-CV,

01-25-00550-CV, 01-25-00551-CV, 2025 WL 3454615, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Dec. 2, 2025, no pet.) (noting that juvenile court may “base its

determination of what the welfare of the community requires on either the

seriousness of the offense or the background of the juvenile; it need not find that

both necessitate criminal proceedings”).

In determining whether to waive jurisdiction and transfer the case, a juvenile

court must consider, among other matters,

(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person;

(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;

(3) the record and previous history of the child; and

5 (4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f).

Although the juvenile court must consider these factors, they are not elements

that the State must prove. See id.; J.H., 2025 WL 356497, at *3. Further, Section

54.02(f) “does not mandate that any particular factor be true, state that the factors are

exclusive, or limit the purpose for which the . . . factors may be considered.” J.H.,

2025 WL 356497, at *3 (quoting Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370, 382 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2021)). But “[t]he transfer of a juvenile offender from juvenile court to criminal

court for prosecution as an adult should be regarded as the exception, not the rule.”

Thomas, 623 S.W.3d at 376. “[T]he operative principle is that, whenever feasible,

children and adolescents below a certain age should be ‘protected and rehabilitated

rather than subjected to the harshness of the criminal system.’” Id. (citation omitted).

A juvenile may appeal a juvenile court’s transfer order, and “[t]he requirements

governing an appeal are as in civil cases generally.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(a),

(b), (c)(1)(A). We generally review a juvenile court’s transfer decision for abuse of

discretion, but sufficient evidence must support the juvenile court’s exercise of

discretion.5 In re J.J.T., 711 S.W.3d at 695; In re D.I.R., 650 S.W.3d 172, 176 (Tex.

5 In Moon v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals required factually supported, case-specific Section 54.02(f) findings for a transfer order. 451 S.W.3d 28, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), overruled by Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370. Citing Moon, appellate courts generally used a two-step review of a juvenile court’s ultimate decision to transfer a

6 App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (“[T]he court’s ultimate waiver decision is reviewed for

an abuse of discretion.”).

When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to

support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all

the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the

finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that

the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,

715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175,

176 (Tex. 1986).

child to criminal court, first considering whether sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings and, if so, then reviewing whether the transfer decision was nevertheless an abuse of discretion. Id.; see, e.g., In re A.B., No. 02-18-00274-CV, 2019 WL 983751, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). But then in Thomas, the court overruled the case-specific-findings requirement and rejected as “unworkable” any standard of review established under Moon. 623 S.W.3d at 381 (stating that “[t]o the extent that Moon established a new standard of review for sufficiency of a juvenile transfer order on direct appeal, that standard was tied to the requirement that the [juvenile] court enter case-specific fact findings justifying the transfer of jurisdiction,” and because the court was overruling “Moon’s requirement of case-specific fact-finding, that type of sufficiency review is unworkable”). However, the court did not establish a new standard of review, recognizing that since Moon, the legislature had amended the law to designate the Texas Supreme Court as the high court with jurisdiction to review a juvenile court’s transfer order. Id. at 382–83 (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01). Nevertheless, the Texas Supreme Court has—for now—continued to apply the two-step standard of review. In re J.J.T., 711 S.W.3d 687, 695 & n.21 (Tex. 2025) (noting that the parties had not asked it to use a different standard). Further, even aside from Moon, in determining whether a juvenile court has abused its discretion, we may consider whether the court had sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion. In re S.D., No. 05-24-01484-CV, 2025 WL 1284657, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 2, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).

7 B. Sufficient Evidence Supports Probable Cause

Pierson argues in his first point that “[t]here was insufficient evidence to

support the [juvenile] court’s finding that the child before the court committed the

offense alleged.” That is, he challenges the factual sufficiency6 of the evidence to

support a probable-cause finding under Family Code Section 54.02(a)(3). See Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a)(3); In re D.L.N., 930 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (evaluating factual sufficiency of juvenile court’s

probable-cause determination).

The question for a juvenile court at a transfer hearing is not whether the State

presented sufficient evidence to establish the child’s guilt. In re A.A., 929 S.W.2d 649,

6 Although Pierson does not specify whether he challenges the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence under this point, because he sets out a standard for factual sufficiency—against the great weight and preponderance of evidence—we read his point to challenge factual sufficiency. See Robert W. Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 361, 366 (1960) (discussing “insufficient evidence”/“against the great weight” challenges); see also William Powers, Jr., Another Look at “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence,” 69 Tex. L. Rev. 515, 518— 19 & n.11 (1991) (same). As with reviewing a juvenile court’s ultimate transfer decision, this court has previously reviewed a juvenile court’s probable-cause decision under Section 54.02 for sufficiency of the evidence. In re J.S., No. 02-23-00465-CV, 2024 WL 976526, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 7, 2024, no pet.). The First Court of Appeals has recently applied the standard for reviewing probable cause in criminal cases to a juvenile court’s probable-cause determination and held that the determination should be reviewed as a question of law rather than for sufficiency of the evidence. A.P., 2025 WL 3454615, at *4–5 (applying standard described in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87–91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Pierson’s brief applies a factual sufficiency standard to the juvenile court’s probable cause determination, neither party has asked us to consider applying a different standard, and that is the standard we apply here. See J.J.T., 711 S.W.3d at 695 & n.21 (declining to consider a different standard of review when parties had not asked it to).

8 653 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ). Instead, the juvenile court must

consider, among other things, whether the evidence is sufficient to establish probable

cause. The standard for probable cause “is much lower than the burden of proof

necessary to convict.” M. B., 2024 WL 3041398, at *5; see In re K.A.,

No. 10-25-00016-CV, 2025 WL 1911998, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco July 10, 2025, pet.

denied) (noting that Section 54.02 requires probable cause, “not proof of guilt”).

“Probable cause is based on probabilities”; it requires “more than mere suspicion” but

less evidence than would be required to support a finding by a preponderance of the

evidence. In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d 692, 702 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016,

pet. denied). Probable cause exists when sufficient facts and circumstances would

warrant a reasonably prudent person’s belief that the suspect had committed the

alleged offense. M. B., 2024 WL 3041398, at *5 (citing C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 702); In

re S.B., No. 02-19-00048-CV, 2019 WL 3334615, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July

25, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see Cornealius v. State, 870 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994), aff’d, 900 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

At the hearing, the State relied on the testimony of Matthew Handler, a

homicide detective with the North Richland Hills Police Department, to establish

probable cause. Pierson asserts that Handler’s testimony “did not meet the low

standard of probable cause or sufficient evidence to prove that [Pierson] was at the

scene or committed murder.” His brief points out categories of evidence that the

juvenile court did not have before it:

9 • “No non-party witness to [Pierson] being at the scene of the shooting”;

• “No ballistic evidence tying the guns seized by the police to the crime”;

• “No fingerprint or other forensic evidence tying [Pierson] to the crime scene or weapons”;

• “Nothing incriminating was retrieved from [Pierson]’s home”;

• “Nothing was reviewed from [Pierson]’s cell phone”;

• “No cell tower data placing [Pierson] at the crime scene”; and

• “No unambiguous circumstantial evidence that [Pierson] conspired to commit a crime.”

He further asserts that the primary evidence that the juvenile court did have—the

testimony of the other alleged participants (introduced by way of the detective’s

testimony)—was untrustworthy.7

Handler testified about the alleged offenses, how his investigation started, and

how the investigation led him to Pierson.

• Sweet was a drug dealer, and Pierson’s friend Burris regularly bought drugs from Sweet.

• Burris had bought some THC vape pens from Sweet, but one of the pens was “short in some of the wax . . . and some of the battery,” so

7 Pierson does not address whether, if the evidence was insufficient to show that he shot Sweet or Laucho, the evidence was sufficient to show probable cause under the law of parties. See J.S., 2024 WL 976526, at *2, *5 (applying law of parties to probable-cause determination); In re B.M., No. 01-18-00898-CV, 2019 WL 1388561, at *14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that juvenile court may make its probable-cause finding based on the law of parties). Because the record contains sufficient evidence to show that Pierson participated in the shooting, we do not address the applicability of the law of parties.

10 Burris planned to request 300 dollars’ worth of pens from him and to take them without paying.

• Burris proposed the idea to his friends through Instagram messages, stating, “Who’s down with getting back on the plug who scammed me?” Pierson responded, “Yes,” and said to another member of the group, “Let me go with you[,] [Owen].” In that series of messages among the group, Jorge Harris stated, “So we take him off the radar is what you saying,” which Handler understood to mean, “[W]e are going to kill Mr. Sweet.”

• According to Burris in his interview with Handler, however, when the group met up with Sweet, the shooting did not start until Sweet ran over the foot of one the people in the group:

[Burris] said when Mr. Sweet pulled up the—he and [Owen Matthews] were at the window, and Mr. Sweet the driver side window, they began asking him, “Okay, where’s the money? Where are the vapes?” And he stated that as Mr. Sweet began to . . . reach, you know, get the vape pens[,] [Matthews] reached into his pocket. That led [Burris] to then reach into his pocket where he said he was holding a firearm. [Matthews] pulls out a firearm from his waistband and [Burris] said that [Matthews] told him that when [Matthews] fired the shot it was because Mr. Sweet ran over his foot.

• After Matthews fired a shot, “the others that were holding a gun”— including Pierson, who Burris said had a .223 rifle—started to shoot as well. “At that time, Mr. Sweet [wa]s driving away from the scene in an attempt to flee.”

• Burris claimed that he was not one of the ones who shot at Sweet. In other words, according to Burris, although he planned to steal from Sweet, and a member of his group said in messages planning the offense that they would “take [Sweet] off the radar,” Burris did not plan Sweet’s shooting and did not participate in it.

• Officers found .223 and .22 caliber shell casings at the scene where Sweet had been shot and a 9-millimeter shell casing nearby.

11 • While Burris said that Pierson had a .223 rifle and Mathews had a Glock, Handler also interviewed Harris, who claimed that Pierson had carried a pistol.

• Burris told Handler that the firearm that Matthews “was holding is now at [Pierson’s] house,” while the rifles were at another group member’s home. Just as Burris told Handler, a search of the other group member’s house turned up two rifles—a .223 and a .22.

• While police were surveilling Pierson’s house, he and two other people left his house and drove off “at a high rate of speed.” Pierson stopped at another group member’s home, and when he left there, officers initiated a traffic stop of his vehicle and saw a Glock in plain view on the floorboard where Pierson was sitting.

• Officers detained Pierson for possessing the weapon.

Pierson points out that most of Handler’s evidence came from statements by

Burris or another accomplice, and he argues that the accomplice testimony is

inherently untrustworthy because the testimony is from a corrupt source. He further

points out that Handler did not say what, if anything, he may have promised Burris in

exchange for his statement; that Burris told the detective that Pierson had a rifle that

night but Harris said that Pierson had a pistol; and that Burris “conveniently” testified

that he alone had not fired any shots. Pierson concludes that the testimony “was

tainted” and was information “that a reasonable person would not in good conscious

rely upon.” We disagree that the testimony at the hearing does not support probable

cause.

The juvenile court could rely on Handler’s testimony in determining probable

cause. See D.I.R., 650 S.W.3d at 180 (“[A] juvenile court may rely on the testimony of

12 law enforcement officials to support a probable-cause finding.”); In re K.R.B.,

No. 04-95-00856-CV, 1996 WL 460027, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 14,

1996, no writ) (not designated for publication) (stating juvenile court had discretion to

consider officer’s testimony concerning probable cause); Edwards v. State,

No. 05-91-00185-CV, 1991 WL 258726, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 3, 1991, writ

dism’d w.o.j.) (not designated for publication) (holding that sufficient evidence

supported juvenile court’s probable cause determination even though only evidence

came from investigating officers).

Further, unlike at a criminal trial or juvenile disposition proceeding, no

accomplice corroboration is required when a juvenile court is determining probable

cause under Section 54.02. Compare Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02 (governing juvenile

court’s waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of child to criminal court and containing no

provision that accomplice testimony be corroborated), with id. § 54.03(e) (providing

that child cannot be adjudicated delinquent based on accomplice testimony “unless

corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the child with the alleged

delinquent conduct”), and Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14 (providing that “[a]

conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated

by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed”).

Thus, although Pierson challenges the trustworthiness of Handler’s sources, in

evaluating probable cause at a transfer hearing, the juvenile court was not prohibited

from considering statements made by accomplices. See In re D.D.C.,

13 No. 13-22-00239-CV, 2022 WL 11429990, at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Oct. 20, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). At this stage of proceedings, the

State was not required to provide corroborating evidence of accomplice testimony. See

J.J.T., 698 S.W.3d 320, 331 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023), rev’d on other

grounds, 711 S.W.3d 687; see also B.M., 2019 WL 1388561, at *13 (stating that juvenile

court could consider accomplice statement); In re D.J., 909 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 1995, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (holding that accomplice statements were

admissible because “a judge in a transfer hearing is permitted to consider evidence

that might be inadmissible in a criminal trial”).

Further, “[a]s statements against interest, accomplice statements can provide

probable cause.” J.J.T., 698 S.W.3d at 331; see Chavez v. State, No. 01-07-00563-CR,

2008 WL 5263404, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 18, 2008, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding accomplice’s statement

inculpating appellant was a statement against penal interest and therefore

trustworthy); Cornealius, 870 S.W.2d at 172 (stating that statements against penal

interest may be sufficient to establish probable cause). Burris’s statement to Handler

was against Burris’s penal interest because it was an admission that it was his idea to

meet up with Sweet to commit a criminal offense, that he recruited the others and

participated, and that the shooting occurred in the course of committing that offense.

See Yancey v. State, No. 03-23-00251-CR, 2025 WL 2369482, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin

14 Aug. 15, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (discussing law of

parties in context of murder committed during robbery).

Additionally, other evidence connected Pierson to the events of that night.

Pierson’s participation in the planning via Instagram—including his asking for a

ride—is evidence that Pierson knew that he would be participating in a criminal

offense against Sweet when the group met that night. In that same messaging, one of

the group mentioned “tak[ing] [Burris] off the radar.” Further, when Pierson was

detained, he had in his possession a gun matching the description of a gun that had

allegedly been used in the offense. See In re H.Y., 512 S.W.3d 467, 479–80 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). The juvenile court could consider that

evidence in its probable cause determination even though no ballistic evidence

introduced at the hearing affirmatively tied the gun to the offense. Finally, the juvenile

court was entitled to credit Handler’s testimony about the investigation regardless of

whether some of the witnesses he had interviewed provided contradictory statements

about who had used which weapon. See D.D.C., 2022 WL 11429990, at *8.

The juvenile court determined that sufficient facts and circumstances warranted

a reasonably prudent person to believe that Pierson had committed the alleged

offenses. Because that determination was not against the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence, we overrule Pierson’s first point.

15 C. Sufficient Evidence to Support Transfer

In his second point, Pierson argues that the evidence was not factually

sufficient to justify his transfer to adult criminal court. Pierson challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the Section 54.02(f) factors that the juvenile

court had to consider before waiving jurisdiction and transferring him. We disagree

that the court had insufficient evidence to support its transfer decision.

If the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, its transfer order must state the reasons

for waiving jurisdiction, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(h), but the order need not

contain case-specific findings, see In re T.H., No. 02-24-00159-CV, 2024 WL 3458027,

at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 18, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, the juvenile

court found in its order that there was probable cause to believe that Pierson had

committed the alleged offenses; stated that the juvenile court had considered the four

Section 54.02(f) factors; and found that Pierson was “of sufficient sophistication and

maturity to be tried as an adult” and that the alleged offenses were against a person.

We will summarize the evidence regarding the Section 54.02(f) factors and then

explain why the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s exercising its

discretion to waive its jurisdiction and order Pierson transferred to criminal court.

1. Nature of offense

With respect to the first Section 54.02(f) factor, the alleged offenses were

against persons. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f)(1); See In re J.D.,

No. 02-23-00177-CV, 2023 WL 6152620, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 21,

16 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Moreover, the alleged offenses were serious, and “[t]he

nature and seriousness of the specific alleged offense, alone, may justify the juvenile

court’s waiver of jurisdiction ‘notwithstanding other [S]ection 54.02(f) factors, so long

as the offense: (1) is substantiated by evidence at the transfer hearing, and (2) is of

sufficiently egregious character.’” T.H., 2024 WL 3458027, at *6 (quoting In re Z.M.,

No. 02-21-00213-CV, 2021 WL 4898851, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

Pierson contends that the State failed to put on sufficient evidence to prove

that he was at the scene of the alleged offense. However, we have already rejected

Pierson’s contention that insufficient evidence supported a probable cause

determination, and we therefore disagree that the State failed to put on sufficient

evidence to show that he was at the scene of the shooting.

2. Pierson’s sophistication and maturity

Regarding Pierson’s sophistication and maturity, to provide evidence of this

and other factors, the State called Keanetta Brown, a court intake officer at Tarrant

County Juvenile Services, who testified about Pierson’s behavior while in county

custody and about a psychological evaluation of Pierson. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 54.02(d) (providing that before a transfer hearing, “the juvenile court shall order and

obtain a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the

child, his circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense”). The

17 psychologist’s report discussed, among other things, Pierson’s maturity and

sophistication.

The psychologist who conducted the evaluation found that Pierson was polite

“and exhibited age-appropriate social skills,” that his level of maturity was

age-appropriate, and that his level of sophistication appeared to exceed that of

same-aged peers. But the assessments appeared to be based largely on Pierson’s

self-reporting of his history, and it was not always clear from the evaluation report

how some of his statements related to the psychologist’s conclusions. For example,

Pierson claimed that he had been involved in mixed martial arts and that his hands

were registered as weapons, and despite the juvenile nature of that claim, the

psychologist included it in the section explaining that Pierson had an above-his-age

level of sophistication. 8

Pierson also reported that he has held jobs in the past, which can show

maturity. 9 Further, the psychologist found that Pierson did not have an intellectual

8 Pierson’s mother testified that he “tries to act like he can be hard,” i.e., that he tries to act more tough and “street smart” than he actually was. The psychologist stated in her report that “[i]t seems unlikely that [Pierson] would try to appear more involved in negative activity than he actually was for the current evaluation.” But that assessment assumed that Pierson was mature and sophisticated enough to understand both the importance of the evaluation and how his statements could affect the evaluation. The psychologist did not explain how or if she determined that Pierson had such an understanding. However, Pierson does not complain about this conclusion.

Pierson said that when his family lived in California, he would run away for 9

weeks to a month at a time. He described living independently with “an older homie”

18 disability, has an IQ in the average range of intellectual functioning, and has a “strong

ability to learn.” The psychologist found Pierson’s thinking to be “logical and

goal-directed” and found no evidence of disordered thought processes. The

psychologist further noted that Pierson acknowledged that he had been accused of

capital murder and articulated sympathy for the deceased.

Pierson’s mother also testified about this factor, and her testimony supports

Pierson’s argument that his going along with friends did not show maturity. She

testified that in her opinion, Pierson was “mature in a lot of ways” and “immature in a

lot of ways, and especially when it comes down to being able to effectively pick

friends to be around on a basis where they’re enhancing his life, and they’re not

bringing something into his life that doesn’t need to be there.”

3. Pierson’s record and previous history

The juvenile court did not make specific findings related to the third and fourth

factors, but the juvenile court’s order stated that the court had considered the factors

in making its decision, and Pierson argues that those factors weigh against the

decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer him to criminal court.

and said that at that time, he worked providing lawncare services to pay for his own rent and food. If true, his ability to work to pay to support himself shows a certain level of maturity and sophistication. But Pierson’s mother denied to the psychologist that Pierson had run away in California. She said that Pierson had once stayed with some people she did not know for about a week, but she indicated this had happened after the family had moved to Texas. At the hearing, she denied that he had lived independently for any period of time in California, saying that he had been permitted to go visit friends but had only ever lived with her.

19 As to the third factor, the record contains contradictory information, as Pierson

and his mother provided conflicting statements about his history.

• Pierson told the psychologist that he tried marijuana at age 14 or 15 and did not like it. However, during his detention intake, Pierson said that he first smoked marijuana at age 9 or 10 and smoked regularly. Pierson’s mother said that his statement was “completely inaccurate.” However, Pierson tested positive for marijuana in May 2025.

• Pierson reported that, when he lived in California, he associated with gang members. But he explained that the gang members were children that he had grown up with who were not “like that” until high school, when they changed. His mother similarly appeared to describe “those kids” as friends who “lived on our street . . . in our neighborhood” and whom Pierson had known his whole life. There was no indication in the record that Pierson was around these alleged gang members when they engaged in any gang activity or if he had any association with them other than knowing them from the neighborhood. He did not have any gang associations in Texas. Contra In re C.M., No. 14-24-00223-CV, 2024 WL 4234514, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that juvenile’s history indicated that he had been active in gangs).

• Pierson had truancy issues in California but had been attending school more regularly since moving to Texas.

• Pierson’s only previous run-in with law enforcement had been on one occasion when he had attempted to interfere with law enforcement’s detention of Burris in connection with a minor-in-possession offense and had then run from law enforcement. Pierson had been charged with evading arrest, resisting arrest, and interfering with public duties. He had received a supervisory caution10 for those offenses.

10 “Supervisory caution is a ‘summary disposition’ that can be made by a probation officer . . . or other authorized person.” J.H., 2025 WL 356497, at *2, n.2; see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 52.03 (addressing when a law-enforcement officer authorized by that title may dispose of a child’s case without referral to juvenile court or charging the child in a court of competent criminal jurisdiction).

20 • Pierson complied with his curfew and chores at home, and his discipline level in detention had been outstanding.

4. Prospects of rehabilitation and protecting the public

Finally, as to the fourth factor, “the prospects of adequate protection of the

public and the likelihood of rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services,

and facilities currently available to the [j]uvenile [c]ourt,” Pierson contends that his

“progress in detention and his openness to treatment should indicate that [he] is

entitled to whatever services are available to him for the next two years” and that “[a]

waiver of jurisdiction precludes [him] the very programs designed for the types of

charges faced by” him.

Brown testified about the availability of services for Pierson:

• She stated that the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) provided “a whole broad [array] of rehabilitative services.”

• She further testified that there was a likelihood that Pierson could be rehabilitated if he were able to use the services and facilities available to the juvenile court through TJJD and the Tarrant County Juvenile Probation Department. Brown opined that based on Pierson’s outstanding behavior in detention, he had shown an ability to conform to the requirements of society.

• But Brown also testified that, based on a discussion with her supervisor, she did not believe that Pierson had time to complete the programs offered by TJJD. Pierson was seventeen and one month at the time of the hearing, and Brown explained that if he were adjudicated in the juvenile system, he would have less than two years before he aged out. Due to a waiting period before he could be transported to TJJD, the time for him to complete the Capital and Serious Offender Program or other programs offered by TJJD “would be inadequate.”

21 The juvenile court also had some evidence before it that Pierson had unmet—

and possibly serious—psychological needs.

• Pierson told the psychologist evaluating him that he had experienced suicidal ideation multiple times and said that he had been participating in therapy since he was “little” but had not received therapy in Texas. He also reported that in the past, he had experienced auditory hallucinations, including voices telling him to kill himself.

• On the other hand, Pierson’s mother denied that he had experienced any mental health problems before the family moved to Texas and denied that he had ever received any mental health treatment. She did state, however, that he had access to counseling at his California school “[i]f he [had] wanted it.”

• Pierson indicated that he was not currently experiencing those issues, and nothing in the record indicated that he has been diagnosed with a mental health condition that would make him a danger to the public.

• The psychologist reported that Pierson had been “traumatized by experience of childhood adversity,” including the experience of a friend being killed when Pierson was fourteen. She further opined that Pierson “exhibits difficulties consistent with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.” Although Pierson was not in need of inpatient psychiatric treatment, his evaluation suggested “that monitoring of [his] potential need for outpatient psychiatric treatment is warranted.”

5. Application

We conclude that the juvenile court had factually sufficient evidence on which

to support its transfer decision. As for the first factor, the alleged offenses were

indisputably against “the person of another,” and the evidence further showed that

the alleged offenses were serious and egregious. Thus, not only is this factor

supported by factually sufficient evidence, but it also weighs heavily in favor of the

juvenile court’s decision. See T.H., 2024 WL 3458027, at *6.

22 Regarding the second factor, the juvenile court had sufficient evidence

regarding Pierson’s maturity and sophistication to support the transfer. Although the

juvenile court was presented with conflicting evidence regarding Pierson’s maturity

and sophistication, that evidence was subject to the juvenile court’s interpretation. See

A.F., No. 02-23-00457-CV, 2024 WL 725511, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 22,

2024, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

Pierson argues that the psychologist’s opinion of his maturity and

sophistication is not borne out by the record, and he asserts that he was not the

“moving force” behind the plan regarding Sweet and that it takes no maturity or

sophistication to be enticed to participate in an offense. However, the purpose of this

factor is not to determine whether a juvenile has the same level of maturity and

sophisticated planning skills as the average adult. Rather, the purpose is to determine

whether the juvenile appreciates “the nature and effect of his voluntary actions and

whether they were right or wrong’” J.H., 2025 WL 356497, at *5 (quoting A.F.,

2024 WL 725511, at *5), and whether he “is capable of understanding the proceedings

against him[ and] could assist attorneys in his defense,” M. B., 2024 WL 3041398, at

*7 (citing Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 892 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet.

ref’d)).

Pierson had been initially detained for unlawfully carrying a firearm, and he told

the psychologist that he had the gun in his possession because he was “trying to help

a friend out,” that he had not wanted the gun at his house, and that he had been

23 arrested while attempting to take the gun back to the friend. From these statements

and Handler’s testimony, the juvenile court could have found that Pierson understood

that the gun had been used in an offense and that he was trying to get rid of the

evidence before it could be found and connected to him. His actions presented

evidence that Pierson could appreciate the nature and effect of his actions and

whether they were right or wrong. See T.H., 2024 WL 3458027, at *7 (stating that

juvenile demonstrated sophistication and maturity through the steps he took to evade

culpability and concluding that “the juvenile court could have reasonably determined

that [the juvenile] could appreciate the nature and effect of his actions”).

Additionally, Pierson’s statements to the psychologist indicated that he

understood the offenses of which he had been accused, and the juvenile court could

consider that Pierson seemed to understand the proceedings against him. Further, the

assessment of Pierson’s intellectual ability indicates that he could assist attorneys in his

defense. See In re E.M.P., Nos. 14-25-00176-CV, 14-25-00178-CV, 14-25-00596-CV,

2025 WL 2419942, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 21, 2025, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (holding that factor supported transfer when appellant had average

intellectual sophistication and had no history of special education or diagnoses of

intellectual disability). There was no evidence that Pierson was too immature and

unsophisticated to understand right from wrong, to understand the allegations against

him, or to assist in his own defense. The juvenile court’s finding as to this factor was

not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

24 The juvenile court also had conflicting evidence as to the third factor. There

was no dispute that Pierson’s only previous criminal history was for minor offenses

and that he had excellent behavior in detention. That is some evidence that weighs

against the transfer. But for the rest of Pierson’s history, he and Mother gave

conflicting information, and that evidence was subject to the juvenile court’s

interpretation. See id. Additionally, while in California, Pierson was friends with gang

members but did not, apparently, engage in any criminal activities with them or

associate with them while they did so. But that is not the case in his relationship with

Burris. He was present with Burris when he was previously detained by law

enforcement, tried to prevent law enforcement from detaining Burris, continued to

socialize with Burris after having received a supervisory caution for those offenses,

and then agreed to participate in a criminal offense with him. The juvenile court could

consider Pierson’s escalating behavior. Further, Pierson tested positive for marijuana

in a May 2025 positive drug test, contradicting his statement to the psychologist that

he had only tried it once when he was younger. Any finding by the juvenile court that

Pierson’s history favored transfer was not against the great weight and preponderance

of the evidence.

Regarding the fourth factor, the juvenile court had some evidence that Pierson

had experienced some serious mental health issues, but the court did not have

evidence that he was currently experiencing those issues, and the psychologist who

conducted Pierson’s evaluation did not opine that he had a mental health condition

25 that made him a danger to the community. However, the juvenile court also could—

and did—consider the serious nature of the offenses alleged in evaluating whether the

protection of the public and the likelihood that Pierson could be rehabilitated weighed

in favor of transfer. Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 896–97. As for rehabilitation, Brown testified

that Pierson was a good candidate, but she further testified that juvenile services

would not have sufficient time to rehabilitate him given his age and the waiting period

for transfer to TJJD where a rehabilitative program would be available. Pierson’s age

was a relevant factor for the juvenile court to consider for this factor because “the

resources of the juvenile court are designed to assist and rehabilitate children, not

adults.” Id.; see In re T.L., No. 02-19-00200-CV, 2019 WL 4678565, at *9 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Sept. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering child “would possibly age

out [of the juvenile system] before he could complete participation in beneficial

programs”). Cf. Coffin v. State, 885 S.W.2d 140, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (noting

that court could conclude from testimony that “the resources of the juvenile system

were inadequate to ensure appellant could be rehabilitated before once again released

into the general public”).

Thus, the juvenile court had evidence that Pierson did not have time to be

rehabilitated while in the juvenile system, and there was no evidence presented to

contradict that testimony. However, even if the juvenile court did not accept Brown’s

assessment of whether Pierson would have sufficient access to services for

rehabilitation, a juvenile court’s transfer order may be upheld even if not every factor

26 weighs in favor of transfer. See In re T. J. E. G., No. 03-24-00382-CV,

2025 WL 337115, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing

Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 886–87).

In sum, considering all the factors and the pertinent evidence together, we

cannot say that the juvenile court had factually insufficient evidence on which to

support its decision. See J.H., 2025 WL 356497, at *3; A.F., 2024 WL 725511, at *2,

*3 (noting that “no one factor is vital to the juvenile court’s [transfer] decision so long

as there is sufficient evidence overall” and holding that “the great weight of the

evidence—of each factor and overall—supported transfer”).

Pierson does not argue that even if sufficient evidence supports the juvenile

court’s findings, the court nonetheless abused its discretion by transferring him to

criminal court. However, even if Pierson’s brief could be read as raising an

abuse-of-discretion argument, the record does not show that the juvenile court acted

without reference to guiding rules and principles by waiving its jurisdiction and

transferring Pierson to criminal court. See In re D.T., Nos. 01-24-00568-CV,

01-24-00569-CV, 2025 WL 208492, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 16,

2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). We overrule Pierson’s second point.

Conclusion

Having overruled Pierson’s two points, we affirm the juvenile court’s order.

27 /s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice

Delivered: January 30, 2026