In the Matter of D.G. and D.P., Etc.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: July 8, 2026
• Docket: A-1323-24/A-1324-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NOS. A-1323-24 A-1324-24

IN THE MATTER OF D.G. AND D.P., POLICE OFFICERS (M0156D), UNION TOWNSHIP. ______________________

Argued June 4, 2026 – Decided July 8, 2026

Before Judges Gilson and Firko.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service Commission, Docket Nos. 2024-1727 and 2024-1728.

Michael Garcia argued the cause for appellants D.G. and D.P. (Fernandez Garcia, LLC, attorneys; Michael Garcia, of counsel and on the briefs).

Brian D. Ragunan, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Civil Service Commission (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Brian D. Ragunan, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In these consolidated appeals, appellants D.G. and D.P. appeal from a

November 27, 2024 final agency decision by the Civil Service Commission (Commission), which denied their requests to reopen their appeals of the

removal of their names from the eligible list of police officers for Union

Township (Township). Appellants also challenge the Commission's

determination that there was no good cause to extend their time to submit

psychological reports to counter the Township's psychological reports opining

that they were unfit to serve as police officers. We affirm.

I.

The pertinent facts are undisputed. In September 2023, the Township

placed appellants on its police officers' eligibility list after they passed the

Commission's Entry-Level Law Enforcement Examination. The Township's

psychological evaluator performed pre-employment screenings and did not

recommend appellants for appointment. The Township notified appellants of

their psychological disqualifications and their removal from the eligib ility list.

Appellants requested copies of the reports and raw data testing pertaining to

their psychological testing. The Commission denied their requests.

On February 16, 2024, appellants appealed to the Commission by letters

postmarked February 17, 2024. Appellants' counsel claims he endeavored to

identify a New Jersey licensed psychologist or psychiatrist who specialized in

psychological testing of police candidates. According to appellants' counsel his

A-1323-24 2 efforts were "stymied" because the reasons underpinning appellants'

psychological ineligibilities were unknown and only "seven" experts were

available to evaluate appellants.

In a March 15, 2024 letter, the Commission acknowledged the appeals and

informed appellants that under N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(e), they had ninety calendar

days from the filing of the appeals to submit reports and recommendations from

a New Jersey licensed psychologist or psychiatrist. Thus, the deadline for the

reports was May 17, 2024. The Commission's letter also informed appellants

that they could seek an extension for the submission of their fitness reports if

they could establish good cause. The Commission explained that receipt of the

Township's report did not toll the regulatory deadline. Additionally, the

Commission required any requests for an extension to be in writing with the

reason for the extension.

On March 26, 2024, appellants' counsel acknowledged receipt of the

Township's psychological reports. On June 24, 2024, thirty-eight days after the

May 17, 2024 deadline, appellants' counsel submitted expert reports authored

by Dr. Susan A. Funari. Dr. Funari found both appellants were fit for

appointment as police officers. Appellants' attorney certified the untimely

submissions were caused by the Township's delay in providing appellants' pre-

A-1323-24 3 appointment evaluations until March 26, 2024; counsel's difficulties in finding

a qualified expert; and counsel's illness requiring hospitalization followed by a

slow recovery.

On July 10, 2024, the Commission's deputy director sent appellants'

counsel two letters pertaining to each appellant advising good cause had not

been demonstrated to relax the ninety-day timeframe to accept Dr. Furnari's

reports. The letters stated Dr. Furnari's evaluations were conducted after the

ninety-day deadline. The deputy director noted it is an "appellant's

responsibility to begin securing a psychological evaluation as soon as the

appellant files an appeal or even before that time" and "to address any

contingencies" that may arise. Because appellants did not submit substantive

documentation within the stated timeframe to refute the findings of the

Township's pre-employment psychological examinations, the appeals were

closed.

On July 19, 2024, appellants' counsel sought reconsideration of the deputy

director's denial and to restore their names to the eligibility list. Appellants

contended there was good cause shown for an extension to submit their rebuttal

reports because they received the Township's report late and due to their

counsel's illness. The matters were forwarded to the Commission for

A-1323-24 4 consideration by the full board. On November 27, 2024, the Commission issued

a single final agency decision dismissing both appeals and rejecting appellants'

claims for extensions. The Commission acknowledged that the Township had

the burden of proof in psychological appeals pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:4 -6.3(b).

The Commission then noted that N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(d) required the Township to

submit the psychological reports within twenty days, or its request for removal

might be denied.

The Commission explained that the rules on filing timeframes for those

types of appeals were designed to facilitate the timely processing of these

appeals and to establish a contemporaneous record of an eligible's medical or

psychological condition at the time of appointment for the Commission to

consider. The Commission noted that the time for filing rebuttal psychological

reports could be extended for good cause under N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(f).

According to the Commission, it is "imperative" that such timelines are

strictly enforced. The Commission noted that if "a candidate was improperly

rejected for the position, the remedy provided is a mandated appointment to the

position with a retroactive date of employment for seniority and salary step

purposes."

A-1323-24 5 The Commission found unpersuasive appellants' arguments that because

the Township had not submitted their reports in a timely manner, that delay

should constitute good cause for their late filing. To the contrary, the

Commission determined the Township had submitted the pre-appointment

psychological reports and tests "in a timely manner." The Commission pointed

out that many applicants submit their independent reports without their experts

receiving the appointing authority's report. The Commission rejected appellants'

contention that there are only seven licensed psychologists or psychiatrists in

this State who conduct evaluations in these circumstances.

The Commission found appellants' counsel's illness was insufficient to

establish good cause because this occurred "in the later part of the [ninety] -day

time period." In addition, the Commission highlighted appellants' counsel is not

a solo practitioner but rather a partner in a "two-attorney law firm." Therefore,

the Commission concluded that appellants failed to establish good cause.

On appeal, appellants argue the Commission and the Township violated

the statutory time limits while at the same time, disqualified appellants for

violating those same statutory time limits, which is arbitrary and an abuse of

discretion. Appellants challenge the Commission's finding that there was no

good cause to extend their time to submit rebuttal psychological reports under

A-1323-24 6 N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(e). Appellants also contend the Township has not

demonstrated any prejudice by extending the ninety-day time limit. We are

unpersuaded by these arguments.

II.

"Judicial review of agency determinations is limited." Allstars Auto Grp.,

Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018). "An

administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless

there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that

it lacks fair support in the record." Ibid. (quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS,

206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). In reviewing the agency's decision, we consider:

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law;

(2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and

(3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[Ibid. (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).]

A-1323-24 7 "A reviewing court 'must be mindful of, and deferential to, the agency's

expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Id. at 158 (quoting

Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 10

(2009)). We "may not substitute [our] own judgment for the agency's, even

though [we] might have reached a different result." Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194

(quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). In contrast, "a reviewing court

is 'in no way bound by [an] agency's interpretation of a statute or its

determination of a strictly legal issue.'" Allstars Auto Grp., 234 N.J. at 158

(second alteration in original) (quoting Dep't of Children & Families, DYFS v.

T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 302 (2011)).

A.

First, appellants argue it was arbitrary and capricious for the Commission

not to extend the deadline for the submission of their rebuttal reports when both

the Commission and the Township violated the statutory time limits set forth in

N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(d). Appellants maintain that the Township did not send its

pre-employment screenings until approximately March 25, 2024, or thirty -three

days after the Commission received their appeals.

Contrary to appellants' argument, the ninety-day period for submission of

their rebuttal expert reports commenced with the filing of their appeals, not the

A-1323-24 8 date the appointing authority filed its submissions. N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(e).

Moreover, N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(d) does not impose any obligations or time limits

on the Commission. Therefore, appellants' argument lacks merit.

The Commission was correct in determining that nothing in the

regulations foreclosed appellants from timely preparing or submitting their

reports. The record shows the Township received notice of appellants' appeals

on March 13 and 15, 2024. Within twenty days of receipt, the Township

provided appellants' counsel with both appellants' pre-employment screenings.

Therefore, the Township did not violate N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(d).

Further, even if the Commission determined that the Township violated

N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(d), the regulation does not require an appointing authority to

automatically deny a request for removal because N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(d)(2)

states, "[a]ny appointing authority failing to submit the required materials within

the specified time may have its request for removal denied." This permissive

language granted the Commission the authority, rather than the obligation, to

deny the Township's request for removal, if it found the Township failed to

comply with the twenty-day time period to provide documentation to a petitioner

in N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5(d). Here, the Commission properly upheld the Township's

request for removal because it submitted the pre-employment screenings within

A-1323-24 9 twenty days of receipt of appellants' notices of the appeals. We conclude the

Commission's decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

B.

The Commission also did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner in

concluding appellants failed to establish good cause to extend the filing

deadlines for their rebuttal reports. Appellants were "fully aware" of the ninety-

day filing date for the submission of their rebuttal reports; and as such, they

were obliged to meet the date unless good cause was shown. "We have

recognized the term, 'good cause,' evades a precise definition." Est. of

Semprevivo v. Lahham, 468 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2021) (citing Ghandi

v. Cespedes, 390 N.J. Super. 193, 196 (App. Div. 2007)). To that end, we have

described the concept as "an amorphous term, that . . . 'is difficult of precise

delineation. Its application requires the exercise of sound discretion in light of

the facts and circumstances of the particular case considered in the context of

the purposes of the [rule] being applied.'" Ghandi, 390 N.J. Super. at 196

(quoting Del. Valley Wholesale Florist, Inc. v. Addalia, 349 N.J. Super. 228,

232 (App. Div. 2002)).

The Commission concluded that appellants failed to establish good cause

to extend the filing deadlines for their rebuttal reports. The Commission

A-1323-24 10 reasoned that the rules on filing timeframes for these types of appeals are

designed to facilitate the timely processing of these appeals and allow parties to

establish a contemporaneous record of the party's medical or psychological

condition at the time of appointment for the Commission to consider. This is

important because psychological reports for law enforcement titles are only

valid for one year. The Commission reasoned that a delay in the process may

prejudice current employees because if successful, then the remedy would be a

mandated appointment to the position with retroactive seniority, which could

displace the last employee that the appointing authority hired for that position.

We see no basis to disturb the Commission's decision.

C.

Finally, we reject appellants' argument that neither the Commission nor

the Township has demonstrated any prejudice. Appellants contend their rebuttal

reports were submitted only thirty-four days late, and the Commission's claim

of prejudice "rests squarely upon some future phantom employee who may be

displaced" if appellants were successful in their appeals.

We find nothing in the Commission's adherence to its regulations to

conclude otherwise. Appellants do not offer any argument or evidence to

A-1323-24 11 suggest that no prejudice would result to the Commission or Township.

Appellants merely raise speculative arguments.

Having considered the record and governing principles, we conclude that

appellants have failed to establish the Commission's final agency decision was

arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Moreover, the Commission's decision

is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.

Affirmed.

A-1323-24 12