In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 4, 2025
S25Y0221. IN THE MATTER OF DELL JACKSON.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of Special Master Adam M. Hames, who
recommends that respondent Dell Jackson (State Bar No. 386329),
who was admitted to the State Bar in 1993 and currently has
emeritus status,1 be disbarred in connection with a single client
matter. Jackson filed no exceptions to the Special Master’s report,
and the time has run for her to do so. See Bar Rule 4-218.
Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for the Court’s consideration.
The record before us shows that the State Bar filed its Formal
Complaint on December 15, 2023. On December 18, 2023, the State
1 An emeritus member is subject to discipline in Georgia. See In the Matter of Wayman, 307 Ga. 586 (837 SE2d 261) (2019). The record does not disclose when Jackson became an emeritus member of the Bar. Bar sent a copy of the complaint to Jackson’s official Bar address, a
post office box, requesting that she acknowledge service. Having
received no answer, Jackson was served by publication pursuant to
Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). After receiving no response, the Bar filed
a motion for default, which the Special Master granted. Thus, the
factual allegations and the disciplinary violations charged in the
Formal Complaint were deemed admitted by default. See Bar Rule
4-212 (a). In the motion, the Bar also asked for a hearing where the
parties could present evidence in aggravation and mitigation. And
while notice of the hearing was sent to Jackson’s address she had
listed with the Bar, Jackson did not appear at the hearing. The Bar
called no witnesses and offered no documents for the record, only
making a brief argument and answering questions from the Special
Master. The Special Master’s report then followed.
The facts, as deemed admitted by Jackson’s default, show that
Jackson represented a client in his direct appeal before this Court.2
In doing so, Jackson failed to provide the client with a copy of his
2 Thomas v. State, 300 Ga. 433 (796 SE2d 242) (2017).
2 trial transcript upon his request; refused to communicate with him
regarding the status of his appeal or the issues to be raised; failed
to notify him of the status of the appeal; and failed to provide him
with a copy of the Court’s opinion once it issued. Jackson stopped
communicating with the client and never resumed communications.
Based on this conduct, Jackson admitted by default to violations of
Rules 1.2 (a),3 1.3,4 and 1.4 (a),5 of the Georgia Rules of Professional
3 Rule 1.2 (a) provides in relevant part that “a lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation, and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.” While the Special Master indicated in his report that he was “not entirely convinced” that Jackson violated this Bar Rule, the record indicates that Jackson made no attempt to contact her client after being assigned to his case to discuss the scope of the matters to be raised on appeal. And, while Rule 1.2, Comment 3 provides that “[a]t the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client’s behalf without further consultation,” there is no indication that is what occurred here; indeed, at the hearing on this matter, the State Bar stated the client “wanted to participate in the discussion about the issues, and he requested the trial transcript so he could go over them” but “she never discussed the issues to be raised.” 4 Rule 1.3 provides, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client. Reasonable diligence as used in this rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.” 5 Rule 1.4 (a) provides in relevant part that a lawyer shall “reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished; []keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; [and] promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.” 3 Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).
In considering the appropriate level of discipline, the Special
Master considered the American Bar Association Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”). In the Matter of
Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (470 SE2d 232) (1996). See also ABA Standard
3.0 (when imposing a sanction, a court should consider the duty
violated, the lawyer’s mental state, the potential or actual injury
caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and the existence of aggravating
or mitigating factors). However, it also noted that while the ABA
Standards are generally instructive, each case must be decided on
its own facts and the level of punishment “rests in the sound
discretion of” this Court. In the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 213 (857
SE2d 212) (2021). The Special Master then noted that the duty
violated here is to the client, and that ABA Standard 4.4 lays out a
wide range of possible penalties for lack of diligence and
abandonment of a client, including disbarment, which the Standard
provides is generally appropriate when “a lawyer abandons the
practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a
4 client[.]” See ABA Standard 4.41 (a).
The Special Master then determined that there are several
aggravating factors that apply to Jackson, including that she
committed multiple offenses as related to this client; that she had
substantial experience in the practice of law, having been admitted
to the Bar in 1993; and that the client was vulnerable, in that he did
not have any legal training or understanding of the judicial system
and had to rely on Jackson to perform her function as an appellate
attorney and she failed to perform that duty. See ABA Standards
9.22 (d), (h) and (i).6 As for mitigating factors, the Special Master
found that Jackson had no other disciplinary history. See ABA
Standard 9.32 (a).
The Special Master also determined that Jackson owed the
6 The Special Master also stated that her failure to participate in the
disciplinary process was an aggravating factor, but ABA Standard 9.22 (e) provides that “bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency” is an aggravating factor, and, here, there is no indication that Jackson acted in bad faith or intentionally in failing to respond to the disciplinary authorities. Cf. In the Matter of McCalep, 318 Ga. 260, 263 (897 SE2d 846) (2024) (listing 9.22 (e) as an aggravating factor in default case where attorney did acknowledge service but showed “a marked unwillingness to participate in the disciplinary process”). 5 client the duties of communication and diligence and that Jackson’s
failures resulted in the client’s potential serious injury in foreclosing
available legal remedies, including his ability to file a timely federal
or state habeas petition. See 28 USC § 2244 (d); OCGA § 9-14-42 (c)
(1). Accordingly, the Special Master held that our precedent
addressing discipline under similar circumstances leaves little
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In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 4, 2025
S25Y0221. IN THE MATTER OF DELL JACKSON.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of Special Master Adam M. Hames, who
recommends that respondent Dell Jackson (State Bar No. 386329),
who was admitted to the State Bar in 1993 and currently has
emeritus status,1 be disbarred in connection with a single client
matter. Jackson filed no exceptions to the Special Master’s report,
and the time has run for her to do so. See Bar Rule 4-218.
Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for the Court’s consideration.
The record before us shows that the State Bar filed its Formal
Complaint on December 15, 2023. On December 18, 2023, the State
1 An emeritus member is subject to discipline in Georgia. See In the Matter of Wayman, 307 Ga. 586 (837 SE2d 261) (2019). The record does not disclose when Jackson became an emeritus member of the Bar. Bar sent a copy of the complaint to Jackson’s official Bar address, a
post office box, requesting that she acknowledge service. Having
received no answer, Jackson was served by publication pursuant to
Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). After receiving no response, the Bar filed
a motion for default, which the Special Master granted. Thus, the
factual allegations and the disciplinary violations charged in the
Formal Complaint were deemed admitted by default. See Bar Rule
4-212 (a). In the motion, the Bar also asked for a hearing where the
parties could present evidence in aggravation and mitigation. And
while notice of the hearing was sent to Jackson’s address she had
listed with the Bar, Jackson did not appear at the hearing. The Bar
called no witnesses and offered no documents for the record, only
making a brief argument and answering questions from the Special
Master. The Special Master’s report then followed.
The facts, as deemed admitted by Jackson’s default, show that
Jackson represented a client in his direct appeal before this Court.2
In doing so, Jackson failed to provide the client with a copy of his
2 Thomas v. State, 300 Ga. 433 (796 SE2d 242) (2017).
2 trial transcript upon his request; refused to communicate with him
regarding the status of his appeal or the issues to be raised; failed
to notify him of the status of the appeal; and failed to provide him
with a copy of the Court’s opinion once it issued. Jackson stopped
communicating with the client and never resumed communications.
Based on this conduct, Jackson admitted by default to violations of
Rules 1.2 (a),3 1.3,4 and 1.4 (a),5 of the Georgia Rules of Professional
3 Rule 1.2 (a) provides in relevant part that “a lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation, and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.” While the Special Master indicated in his report that he was “not entirely convinced” that Jackson violated this Bar Rule, the record indicates that Jackson made no attempt to contact her client after being assigned to his case to discuss the scope of the matters to be raised on appeal. And, while Rule 1.2, Comment 3 provides that “[a]t the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client’s behalf without further consultation,” there is no indication that is what occurred here; indeed, at the hearing on this matter, the State Bar stated the client “wanted to participate in the discussion about the issues, and he requested the trial transcript so he could go over them” but “she never discussed the issues to be raised.” 4 Rule 1.3 provides, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client. Reasonable diligence as used in this rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.” 5 Rule 1.4 (a) provides in relevant part that a lawyer shall “reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished; []keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; [and] promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.” 3 Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).
In considering the appropriate level of discipline, the Special
Master considered the American Bar Association Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”). In the Matter of
Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (470 SE2d 232) (1996). See also ABA Standard
3.0 (when imposing a sanction, a court should consider the duty
violated, the lawyer’s mental state, the potential or actual injury
caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and the existence of aggravating
or mitigating factors). However, it also noted that while the ABA
Standards are generally instructive, each case must be decided on
its own facts and the level of punishment “rests in the sound
discretion of” this Court. In the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 213 (857
SE2d 212) (2021). The Special Master then noted that the duty
violated here is to the client, and that ABA Standard 4.4 lays out a
wide range of possible penalties for lack of diligence and
abandonment of a client, including disbarment, which the Standard
provides is generally appropriate when “a lawyer abandons the
practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a
4 client[.]” See ABA Standard 4.41 (a).
The Special Master then determined that there are several
aggravating factors that apply to Jackson, including that she
committed multiple offenses as related to this client; that she had
substantial experience in the practice of law, having been admitted
to the Bar in 1993; and that the client was vulnerable, in that he did
not have any legal training or understanding of the judicial system
and had to rely on Jackson to perform her function as an appellate
attorney and she failed to perform that duty. See ABA Standards
9.22 (d), (h) and (i).6 As for mitigating factors, the Special Master
found that Jackson had no other disciplinary history. See ABA
Standard 9.32 (a).
The Special Master also determined that Jackson owed the
6 The Special Master also stated that her failure to participate in the
disciplinary process was an aggravating factor, but ABA Standard 9.22 (e) provides that “bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency” is an aggravating factor, and, here, there is no indication that Jackson acted in bad faith or intentionally in failing to respond to the disciplinary authorities. Cf. In the Matter of McCalep, 318 Ga. 260, 263 (897 SE2d 846) (2024) (listing 9.22 (e) as an aggravating factor in default case where attorney did acknowledge service but showed “a marked unwillingness to participate in the disciplinary process”). 5 client the duties of communication and diligence and that Jackson’s
failures resulted in the client’s potential serious injury in foreclosing
available legal remedies, including his ability to file a timely federal
or state habeas petition. See 28 USC § 2244 (d); OCGA § 9-14-42 (c)
(1). Accordingly, the Special Master held that our precedent
addressing discipline under similar circumstances leaves little
doubt as to the proper sanction, where Jackson abandoned her client
and failed to respond to the disciplinary authorities. See In the
Matter of Lawrence, 315 Ga. 723, 723 (884 SE2d 377) (2023); In the
Matter of Blain, 315 Ga. 475, 477 (883 SE2d 315) (2023); In the
Matter of Powell, 310 Ga. 859, 860 (854 SE2d 731) (2021).
Having reviewed the record, we agree that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction, and that disbarment is consistent with prior
cases in which an attorney admitted, by virtue of default, to
violating similar provisions of the GRPC that carry disbarment as a
sanction and failed to participate fully in the disciplinary process.
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of Dell Jackson be
removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the
6 State of Georgia. Jackson is reminded of her duties pursuant to Bar
Rule 4-219 (b).
Disbarred. All the Justices concur.