In the Matter of Deborah Lynn Haklin
This text of 915 S.E.2d 634 (In the Matter of Deborah Lynn Haklin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
321 Ga. 530 FINAL COPY
S25Y0686. IN THE MATTER OF DEBORAH LYNN HAKLIN.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of special master Jack J. Helms, Jr., who
recommends that respondent Deborah Lynn Haklin (State Bar No.
317385), having defaulted in this matter, be suspended for one year
for several violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct
(“GRPC”) involving her abandonment of a client.1 After neither
party requested review by the Review Board, the State Bar
submitted the record to this Court, and Haklin has not filed any
exceptions to the special master’s report and recommendation.
The facts, as deemed admitted by Haklin’s default, show that
in March 2019, Haklin was hired to represent a client with regard
to an adoption of five children who were related to the client, for
1 Haklin is also currently on an administrative suspension for failing to
pay her Bar dues. which representation the client paid $2,300 of an agreed-upon
$2,500 fee. After the client traveled out of state to obtain and return
to Haklin documents signed by the children’s biological parents
surrendering their parental rights, Haklin informed the client that
she would file those documents with the court and obtain a hearing
date. However, Haklin took no action to proceed with the adoptions
and, when questioned about the matter by the client, provided only
excuses. Upon the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Haklin ceased
communicating with the client entirely, despite the client’s
continued attempts to contact her. Almost two years after her last
communication with the client, Haklin re-commenced
communications, notifying the client that Haklin was discontinuing
the representation, and that the client’s file was available to be
picked up. The client asked Haklin about a refund, but Haklin
refused and called the client “derogatory names and accused her of
‘going after [her] sister’s kids.’” Haklin later admitted to the Bar
“that the text messages she sent to [the client], which included
derogatory names and accusations, were ‘in very poor taste.’”
2 Based on Haklin’s misconduct, the special master concluded
that she had violated Rules 1.2 (a),2 1.3,3 1.4 (a),4 and 1.55 of the
GRPC. The maximum sanction for a single violation of Rules 1.2 and
1.3 is disbarment; the maximum sanction for a single violation of
Rules 1.4 (a) and 1.5 is a public reprimand. After citing the American
Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA
Standards”), see In the Matter of Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (456 SE2d
52) (1995) (disciplinary authority should consider (a) the duty
violated, (b) the lawyer’s mental state, (c) the potential or actual
2 Rule 1.2 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that “a lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.” 3 Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client. Reasonable diligence as used in this rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.” 4 Rule 1.4 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that a lawyer shall “reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished; [ ] keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; [and] promptly comply with reasonable requests for information[.]” 5 Rule 1.5 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall not make an
agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.”
3 injury caused by the misconduct, and (d) aggravating and mitigating
factors), the special master determined that Haklin violated her
duties to pursue the client’s goals in a reasonably expeditious
manner and to not abandon the client; that Haklin knowingly
violated the Rules; and that the client suffered actual injury from
the loss of her legal fee and Haklin’s complete abandonment of her
legal matter. The special master further concluded that ABA
Standards 4.42 (suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or
potential injury) and 7.2 (suspension is generally appropriate when
a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty
as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the
public, or the legal system) applied to Haklin’s misconduct. The
special master determined, in aggravation of discipline, that Haklin
had a dishonest or selfish motive, that she committed multiple
offenses against this client, that she refused to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of her conduct, that she had substantial experience
in the practice of law having been admitted to the Bar in 1997, and
4 that she had shown an indifference to making restitution; the only
factor identified in mitigation of discipline was Haklin’s lack of a
prior disciplinary record. See ABA Standard 9.22 (b), (d), (g), (i) and
(j); ABA Standard 9.32 (a).
In light of the foregoing, the special master determined that a
one-year suspension was appropriate discipline, citing in support In
the Matter of Johnson, 301 Ga. 231, 231-232 (800 SE2d 277) (2017)
(imposing a six-month suspension for lawyer who accepted fees from
client and ultimately abandoned the matter); In the Matter of Sakas,
301 Ga. 49, 49-51 (799 SE2d 157) (2017) (imposing a six-month
suspension for lawyer who abandoned client’s case to the detriment
of the client); In the Matter of Collins, 261 Ga. 802, 802 (411 SE2d
711) (1992) (imposing a one-year suspension for abandoning client’s
legal matter and refusing to return client’s file). However, the cases
cited by the special master in support of the recommended discipline
are materially distinguishable, as Johnson primarily involved an
issue related to the attorney’s failure to supervise a paralegal; Sakas
arose from a petition for voluntary discipline; and Collins does not
5 appear to have involved the aggravating factors that the special
master found in this case.
Instead, having reviewed the record and the applicable case
law, we determine that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in
this matter. See, e.g., In the Matter of Jackson, 321 Ga. 256, 257 (913
SE2d 688) (2025) (on special master’s report and recommendation,
disbarring attorney who abandoned a single client; violated Rules
1.2 (a), 1.3, and 1.4 (a); had no prior disciplinary history, but
aggravating factors included multiple offenses related to the client,
substantial experience in the practice of law, and a vulnerable client
who “did not have any legal training or understanding of the judicial
system and had to rely on [his attorney] to perform her function as
an appellate attorney and she failed to perform that duty”); In the
Matter of Blain, 315 Ga. 475, 475-477 (883 SE2d 315) (2023) (on
notice of discipline, disbarring attorney who abandoned a single
client; committed violations of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, and 3.2; had no
prior disciplinary history, but had “experience in the practice of law
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