In the Matter of C.R.R.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: March 6, 2025
• Docket: A-2730-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2730-22

IN THE MATTER OF C.R.R. _________________________

Submitted February 4, 2025 – Decided March 6, 2025

Before Judges Chase and Vanek.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Petition No. 0221 XTR 2022 000003.

Evan F. Nappen Attorney at Law, PC, attorneys for appellant C.R.R. (Ali Homayouni, on the briefs).

Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (K. Charles Deutsch, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant C.R.R.1 appeals from a final extreme risk protective order

(FERPO) entered against him pursuant to the Extreme Risk Protective Order Act

1 Records relating to FERPO proceedings are confidential and shall not be disclosed to persons other than the respondent except for good cause shown. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Admin. Directive #19-19, Guidelines for Extreme Risk of 2018 (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:58-20 to -32. Based on our thorough review of

the record and prevailing law, we affirm.

I.

We discern the salient facts from the record developed at the FERPO

hearing. On November 13, 2022, Garfield Police Department (GPD) Officer

Kopacz and several other officers, responded to a call from defendant's father,

W.R., reporting an "armed suicidal male," later identified as defendant, ingested

thirty Klonopin pills and threatened to shoot the police himself if law

enforcement attempted to enter defendant's apartment. When an investigation

revealed defendant was the registered owner of several firearms, Kopacz

notified the Bergen County Regional SWAT team.

Kopacz then spoke with defendant on the phone. During this

conversation, defendant stated, "he was a loser and had no direction in life," and

advised his firearms were in a locked gun safe. Defendant's brother, R.R., told

Kopacz that defendant "has been depressed lately, but was under the care of a

psychiatrist and was taking prescription medication."

Protective Orders attach. 1, Guideline 8(a) (Aug. 12, 2019) (hereinafter AOC Directive). We also refer to certain individuals whose statements and testimony are included in the record by their initials to protect their privacy and the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(9). A-2730-22 2 Law enforcement arrived at defendant's residence and, after defendant

confirmed he took thirty Klonopin pills, Kopacz convinced him to leave the

apartment unarmed. After he was frisked, defendant told Kopacz "he was unsure

of his career and felt like he shouldn't live anymore." Kopacz did not observe

any signs of overdose. Defendant gave the officers the key to his gun safe and

verbal consent to retrieve the firearms from inside his apartment. Defendant

was then involuntarily committed and taken to Hackensack University Medical

Center (HUMC).

GPD recovered twelve firearms, two duffle bags, two green metal cans

containing assorted ammunition, various high-capacity handgun and rifle

magazines, and one inert "dummy" flashbang from defendant's apartment. GPD

officers subsequently learned that one firearm, a Glock 43, was missing from

the firearms recovered.

Kopacz returned to HUMC where he served defendant with a Temporary

Extreme Risk Protective Order (TERPO), and learned from defendant the

missing firearm was in defendant's Jeep along with illegal high-capacity

magazines and hollow point bullets. Kopacz ultimately recovered the missing

firearm from the Jeep.

Defendant testified that although he told his mother he consumed thirty

A-2730-22 3 Klonopin pills, he did not intend to harm himself and lied to his mother about it

because he "was very upset with her" and "wanted to scare her." Defendant

sought treatment for anxiety through cognitive behavioral therapy and by

consulting with a psychiatrist, who prescribed the Klonopin. Defendant testified

he has improved since he began therapy and taking Klonopin but denied telling

his family or Kopacz anything about his mental health status.

A letter written by defendant's psychologist, Dr. Kaplan, was moved into

evidence. Dr. Kaplan stated defendant "presents with bipolar disorder and panic

disorder," and during their sessions they "explored the reasons why [defendant]

ingested a large quantity of anti-anxiety medication." In response, defendant

testified he took "less than five" Klonopin on the night of the incident, not the

thirty he told his mother and Kopacz he ingested.

After the TERPO was entered, defendant enrolled in Forge Health's

intensive inpatient program for anxiety, followed by an outpatient program

where he "attend[s] one to two sessions per week, three hours per session." In

addition to taking Klonopin, defendant takes four other prescription medications

for mental health disorders, sees his psychologist once a week, and consults with

his psychiatrist every two weeks.

Defendant did not dispute the evidence establishing he was involuntarily

A-2730-22 4 committed to a mental health facility in 2011. A narrative from the 2011

commitment was read into the record, establishing: "[a]s per mom, patient is

destroying property and throwing things plus suicidal ideation . . . [defendant]

had a violent outburst throwing and breaking things and verbalized that [he]

'wants to hurt himself,' [and] there is no 'fun in life anymore.'"

Towards the end of the hearing, the trial court asked defense counsel for

a proffer as to W.R.'s testimony. Counsel proffered W.R. would testify

defendant's mother relayed to him that defendant told her he consumed "the

drugs"; he was not told directly defendant was committing suicide or wanted to

harm himself; and he called the police to be on the safe side. With the State's

consent, the trial court stated it would accept the proffered testimony as "one

hundred percent accurate," thus obviating the need to call W.R. to testify.

Defense counsel did not object.

The trial court granted the FERPO in an oral decision, followed by written

amplification pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(d). The trial court found Kopacz to be

credible as he "spoke clearly and answered all of counsels' questions directly

and without hesitation." Conversely, the trial court found defendant not credible

since he "was evasive at times . . . failed to answer all questions directly," and

"directly contradicted the accounts of his mother, father, brother, and responding

A-2730-22 5 officers." The trial court determined "[defendant] repeatedly minimized the

severity of his statements and his struggles with mental health . . . ."

The trial court found the following factors established in the record under

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f): one, the history of threats or acts of violence against self

or others; two, history of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force

against another person; seven, history of drug or alcohol abuse and recovery

from this abuse; twelve, prior history of involuntary commitment in a hospital

or treatment facility for persons with psychiatric disabilities; thirteen, past and

present treatment of mental health disorders; fourteen, compliance or failure to

comply with mental health treatment; and fifteen, diagnosis of a mental health

disorder.

The trial court found factor one predicated on defendant's statements that

he ingested thirty Klonopin pills and his threat to open fire on officers if they

attempted to enter his apartment. The trial court relied on the undisputed proffer

that W.R. was not directly told by defendant about his ingestion of the Klonopin.

The trial court found defendant's statements to Kopacz, "that he was a loser,

lacked direction in life, and [that he] wished to stop living," highlighted the

significance of defendant's initial failure to disclose the location of the Glock 43

and his possession of illegal high-capacity magazines and hollow point bullets.

A-2730-22 6 The trial court also considered defendant's undisputed admittance to a mental

health facility in 2011 "following a violent outburst and suicidal statements."

Regarding factor two, the trial court cited to the threats of harming himself

and others made to officers, reasoning "[t]hese were threats that deeply worried

his parents because defendant possessed multiple firearms." The trial court also

referenced defendant's 2011 commitment, finding "while much of [defendant's]

behavior is self-harmful in nature, breaking things and throwing them around

can pose a danger to others around [defendant]."

The trial court also found the record established factor seven, citing to

defendant's "use of Klonopin in the instant situation," as confirmed by

defendant's psychologist in writing. The trial court found factor twelve was

established by evidence of his commitments in 2011 and 2022. The trial court

pointed to evidence in the record establishing factors thirteen, fourteen, and

fifteen based on R.R.'s statements defendant "suffered from depression and took

psychotropic medications," defendant's testimony about his own medications,

and the professional diagnosis regarding his daily "prescribed medications . . .

for his anxiety and mental health disorders." The trial court also cited to Dr.

Kaplan's diagnosis of defendant's bipolar and panic disorders, and his

participation in counseling at a mental health clinic.

A-2730-22 7 At the conclusion of the proceeding, the trial court entered the FERPO.

II.

Defendant appealed, arguing the following points:

POINT I

THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY FINDING FACTORS [ONE], [TWO] AND [SEVEN] UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(F).

POINT II

THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY REACHING AND FINDING FACTORS [TWELVE] THROUGH [FIFTEEN].

POINT III

THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY GRANTING THE FERPO WHEN THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE, OUTSIDE OF HEARSAY, THAT APPELLANT POSED A SIGNIFICANT DANGER OF CAUSING BODILY INJURY TO HIMSELF OR OTHERS.

POINT IV

AS APPLIED TO [DEFENDANT], THE FERPO ENTERED AGAINST HIM WAS A VIOLATION OF HIS INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN SELF-DEFENSE UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.

We address defendant's arguments in turn.

A-2730-22 8 III.

We begin by acknowledging our review of a trial court's fact-finding

function is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). "A reviewing

court is bound by the trial court's findings 'when supported by adequate,

substantial, credible evidence.'" Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. 116, 121

(App. Div. 2005) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). Deference is particularly

appropriate where the evidence is largely testimonial and hinges upon a court's

ability to make credibility assessments. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412.

The interpretation of a statute is a legal question, State v. Revie, 220 N.J.

126, 132 (2014), reviewed de novo, "unconstrained by deference to the decisions

of the trial court . . . [,]" State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 329 (2015). We will "not

disturb the 'factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [we

are] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with

the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the

interests of justice.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (alteration in original) (quoting

Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).

After careful review, we conclude the trial court did not err in entering the

FERPO based on the substantial, credible evidence adduced at the FERPO

hearing.

A-2730-22 9 A.

The Act "permits the emergent removal of weapons from any person who

poses a danger to self or others [and] . . . supplements other statutory

mechanisms for removing firearms from persons who legally possess them." In

re D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super. 397, 401 (App. Div. 2021) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:58-

3(f)). There is a two-step process to removing firearms: first the court decides

if "it will issue a temporary order to remove firearms" and then, "after a plenary

hearing, the court decides if it will issue a final order to remove [the] firearms

indefinitely." 2 Id. at 401-02 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23 and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-24).

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-24(b) governs the issuance of FERPOs, providing in part:

If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing that the respondent poses a significant danger of bodily injury to the respondent's self or others by having custody or control of, owning, possessing, purchasing, or receiving a firearm, the court shall issue an extreme risk protective order.

In considering a TERPO or FERPO application, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f)

requires a court to consider whether a respondent:

(1) has any history of threats or acts of violence by the respondent directed toward self or others;

2 N.J.S.A. 2C:58-25(c) sets forth the procedure for obtaining an order terminating a FERPO. Our reference to the modifiability of the FERPO should not be construed as reflecting any opinion as to whether the order at issue may be vacated in the future on subsequent application with sufficient proofs. A-2730-22 10 (2) has any history of use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force by the respondent against another person;

(3) is the subject of a temporary or final restraining order or has violated a temporary or final restraining order issued pursuant to the 'Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991,' . . . ;

(4) is the subject of a temporary or final protective order or has violated a temporary or final protective order issued pursuant to the 'Victim's Assistance and Survivor Protection Act' . . . ;

(5) has any prior arrests, pending charges, or convictions for a violent indictable crime or disorderly persons offense, stalking offense pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10], or domestic violence offense enumerated in [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19];

(6) has any prior arrests, pending charges, or convictions for any offense involving cruelty to animals or any history of acts involving cruelty to animals;

(7) has any history of drug or alcohol abuse and recovery from this abuse; or

(8) has recently acquired a firearm, ammunition, or other deadly weapon.

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f) and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-24(b) must be read in harmony

with each other and the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) Directive,

which "summarizes the Act and promulgates Guidelines . . . that prescribe the

process for obtaining orders under the Act." D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super. at 402.

A-2730-22 11 "Because the AOC Directive implements the Court's constitutional power to

promulgate rules governing practice and procedure and administration of the

courts, the AOC Guidelines have 'the force of law.'" Ibid. (citing State v.

Morales, 390 N.J. Super. 470, 472 (App. Div. 2007)).

A trial court must first find one of the "behavioral" factors has been

established before considering factors twelve through fifteen, as to whether a

defendant:

(12) has any prior involuntary commitment in a hospital or treatment facility for persons with psychiatric disabilities;

(13) has received or is receiving mental health treatment;

(14) has complied or has failed to comply with any mental health treatment; and

(15) has received a diagnosis of a mental health disorder.

[Id. at 404 (citing AOC Directive Guideline 3(d)).]

No single factor is determinative, rather, in weighing each of the factors,

"[t]he court shall issue the FERPO . . . if it finds 'by a preponderance of the

evidence at the hearing that the [individual] poses a significant danger of bodily

injury to the [individual's] self or others' by possessing a firearm." Id. at 406-

07 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:58-24(b)).

A-2730-22 12 We affirm entry of the FERPO, determining the trial court's findings are

supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence. We defer to the trial

court's factual findings based on its credibility determinations because they were

not "so wide of the mark [such] that the judge was clearly mistaken." See N.J.

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007).

B.

We are unconvinced the trial court improperly considered the evidence

"from the incident that [gave] rise to the petition for the subject TERPO or

subsequent FERPO" in considering factors one, two, and seven. Our statutory

interpretation of the plain language allows the trial court to consider "any

history" of violence or physical force which, in this case, includes both the 2011

and 2022 involuntary commitments.

When interpreting a statute, "[t]he overriding goal is to determine as best

we can the intent of the Legislature, and to give effect to that intent." State v.

Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 604 (2014) (quoting State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513, 529

(2012)). If a plain language reading of the statute "leads to a clear and

unambiguous result, then our interpretive process is over." Richardson v. Bd.

of Trs., PFRS, 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007). Only if we find an ambiguity in the

A-2730-22 13 statutory language, do we turn to extrinsic evidence, such as legislative intent.

See State v. Olivero, 221 N.J. 632, 639 (2015).

We conclude since N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f)(1), (2), and (7) unambiguously

qualify "history" with the term "any," the statute was meant to be construed

expansively. "Any" is defined as "one or some indiscriminately of whatever

kind . . . ." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 647 (11th ed. 2022).

Here, the plain meaning of the statute is clear, and therefore, we "'apply that

plain meaning and end our inquiry.'" In re H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 418 (2020)

(quoting Garden State Check Cashing Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Banking & Ins., 237

N.J. 482, 489 (2019)).

C.

We are also unpersuaded the trial court found the record established

factors one and two under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f) based solely on hearsay within

hearsay. Our jurisprudence establishes a FERPO may be predicated in part, on

hearsay, but "'there must be a residuum of legal and competent evidence in the

record to support'" its issuance. D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super. at 406 (quoting Weston

v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 51 (1972)).

We are satisfied the trial court did not base its decision in this case on

hearsay alone. The court properly considered defendant's 2011 involuntary

A-2730-22 14 commitment as evidenced by defendant's testimony and medical records;

defendant's statements and actions concerning his Klonopin ingestion;

statements by defendant's family that he was depressed; and his threat to shoot

himself and the police. This admissible evidence, including that subject to a

hearsay exception, paired with Kopacz's personal knowledge of weapons in

defendant's possession at the time of the incident support the trial court's

issuance of the FERPO. Based on this primarily non-hearsay evidentiary

predicate, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

factors one and two were established and "supported by adequate, substantial,

credible evidence." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12.

We are equally unconvinced by defendant's assertion the trial court erred

in finding factor seven, history of drug abuse and recovery from such abuse,

simply because defendant did not show signs of overdose. Whether or not

symptoms of overdose were observed is not dispositive where defendant

testified on cross examination, he "took less than five" Klonopin and offered no

substantive response to his psychologist's letter confirming he and defendant

"explored the reasons why [defendant] ingested a large quantity of anti-anxiety

medication." (emphasis added). We also agree with the trial court's reasoning

that "regardless of whether taking the Klonopin was suicidal in nature, it is a

A-2730-22 15 sign of drug abuse."

D.

Having found factors one, two, and seven established in the record, we are

unconvinced the trial court erred in considering factors twelve, thirteen,

fourteen, and fifteen and find the trial court based its findings on substantial,

credible evidence in the record. See Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412.

The trial court's finding on factor twelve, that there was "prior involuntary

commitment in a hospital or treatment facility," is supported by evidence of the

2011 commitment, along with the 2022 involuntary commitment that led to the

FERPO. Factors thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen were established by defendant's

own testimony that he continues to receive mental health treatment, by regularly

seeing a psychologist and a psychiatrist, receiving treatment at a mental health

clinic, and taking a variety of psychiatric medications for diagnosis of anxiety

and bipolar disorders.

E.

We are unconvinced defendant was deprived of due process by way of

proffering W.R.'s testimony since he invited the error now raised on appeal.

Under the invited error doctrine, trial errors that "were induced,

encouraged or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are

A-2730-22 16 not a basis for reversal on appeal . . . ." State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345

(1987) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Harper, 128 N.J. Super. 270, 277

(App. Div. 1974)). The doctrine is grounded in considerations of fairness and

is intended to prevent defendants from manipulating the system. State v. A.R.,

213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013). "'[D]efendant cannot beseech and request the trial

court to take a certain course of action, and upon adoption by the court, take his

chance on the outcome of the trial, and if unfavorable, then condemn the very

procedure he sought[,] . . . claiming it to be error and prejudicial.'" State v.

Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 358 (2004) (quoting State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 471

(1955)).

Defense counsel could have objected after the court ruled it would accept

the proffer as to W.R.'s testimony, but did not do so. In issuing its ruling, the

trial court accepted the proffer as to W.R.'s testimony, finding defendant did not

make any statements to W.R. as to the ingestion of Klonopin and his mental

state on the evening of the incident.

We discern no plain error 3 since, even if the trial court dealt with the issue

in a cursory manner, the process did not "'cut mortally into the substantive rights

3 See R. 2:10-2 ("[T]he appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court ."); see also

A-2730-22 17 of [] defendant.'" See Corsaro, 107 N.J. at 345 (alteration in original) (quoting

Harper, 128 N.J. Super. at 277).

F.

Although defendant argues the Act is unconstitutional as applied to him,

we decline to substantively adjudicate the issue where defendant failed to

comply with Rule 4:28-4, requiring notice to the New Jersey Attorney General

(AG) of a constitutional challenge to any state statute. Defendant's non-

compliance deprived the AG of the right to participate before the trial court and

this court on appeal.4

Were we to look beyond this fatal error, defendant's generalized assertions

fail to establish the Act is inconsistent with prevailing jurisprudence, which

Corsaro, 107 N.J. at 348 ("The question . . . is whether [the purported error] was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'") (citing R. 2:10-2). 4 Rule 4:28-4 states in pertinent part:

(a) Actions Involving Validity of Statute, Ordinance, etc.; Unknown Owners.

(1) State enactments; unknown owners. If the validity of a State constitutional provision or of a statute, rule, regulation, executive order or franchise of this State is questioned in any action to which the State or an agency or officer thereof is not a party, the party raising the question shall give notice of the pendency of the action to the Attorney General. A-2730-22 18 permits a state to restrict rights to possess firearms in certain instances. To this

end, defendant's categorical reliance on N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v.

Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), that "a person does not have to live a perfect life to

be eligible to enjoy Second Amendment rights," is not dispositive of the issue

before us. Even pre-Bruen, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged

state-imposed limitations on the right of individuals diagnosed with mental

illness to possess firearms. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,

626 (2008) ("[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on long-

standing prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the mentally ill

. . . ."); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) ("We

made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such long-standing

regulatory measures as 'prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the

mentally ill . . . .") (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).

New Jersey decisional law is in accord, with the Court recognizing "the

right to bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States

Constitution is subject to reasonable limitations." In re Forfeiture of Pers.

Weapons & Firearms Identification Card belonging to F.M., 225 N.J. 487, 506

(2016) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626). "The police power of the state provides

our Legislature with the authority to regulate firearms and establish such

A-2730-22 19 'reasonable limitations' on their ownership." Id. at 506-07 (citing McDonald,

561 U.S. at 901) ("[T]he very text of the Second Amendment calls for regulation,

and the ability to respond to the social ills associated with dangerous weapons

goes to the very core of the States' police powers."); see also Crespo v. Crespo,

201 N.J. 207, 210 (2010).

The Court's decision in F.M. likewise recognized that individuals with a

diagnosed mental illness may be disqualified from owning firearms under

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5). F.M., 225 N.J. at 513; see also In re M.U.'s Application

for a Handgun Purchase Permit, 475 N.J. Super. 148, 163-64 (App. Div. 2023)

(holding the denial of the petitioner's application for a handgun purchase permit

under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5), does not violate the petitioner's Second

Amendment rights because of the petitioner's "multiple instances of negative

police interactions . . . .").

Here, notwithstanding the procedural infirmity precluding review of this

issue, we note that defendant fails to establish the Act is not within the

continuum of permissible, lawful restrictions authorized under federal and state

jurisprudence to protect the public. See M.U., 475 N.J. Super. at 193

("[I]ndividuals whose armament poses a risk to public health, safety or welfare,

as evidenced by their record of misconduct that evinces a disrespect for the rule

A-2730-22 20 of law, are likewise beyond the ambit of the people protected by the Second

Amendment.") (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, not only is defendant's

limited constitutional argument procedurally barred but we also remain

substantively unconvinced based on the minimal legal precedent and analysis

submitted by the parties on the issue.

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's

remaining arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.

Clerk of the Appellate Division

A-2730-22 21