In the Matter of Compelling the Sale of Maya Kun's Firearm

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: March 31, 2026
• Docket: A-0076-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0076-24

IN THE MATTER OF COMPELLING THE SALE OF MAYA KUN'S FIREARM. __________________________

Submitted March 11, 2026 – Decided March 31, 2026

Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jablonski.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. GPR-0068-23.

Evan F. Nappen Attorney at Law, PC, attorneys for appellant Maya Kun (Louis P. Nappen, on the brief).

Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Ian C. Kennedy, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Maya Kun appeals from an order compelling the sale of her

handgun and prospectively barring her from being issued a handgun purchase

permit (HPP) or a firearm purchaser identification card (FPIC). The police were

called to Kun's home on April 12, 2023, because her boyfriend, D.G., was experiencing a mental health crisis. Kun voluntarily surrendered her firearm

(for which she was licensed in New York) on the day of the incident.

The State subsequently filed a motion to compel the sale of Kun's firearm.

Following a hearing, the court granted the State's motion and ordered Kun was

"prohibited from owning, purchasing, possessing, or receiving firearms and/or

ammunition, and from securing or holding a[n] [FPIC] or [HPP] pursuant to

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3, or a permit to carry a handgun pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4."

After a careful review of the record and applicable law, we conclude the trial

court erred in compelling the sale of Kun's firearm, and reverse and remand for

an order consistent with this opinion.

I.

We gather the following facts from the trial court's hearing, where Kun

and Closter Police Department (CPD) officers Anthony Lofaro and Jorge Vela

testified. Kun is a Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine who specializes in child

psychology. On April 12, 2023, CPD responded to Kun's home after being

informed by a third party that Kun's live-in boyfriend, D.G., "had made

concerning statements about wanting to harm himself." Upon arrival, Kun told

Lofaro that D.G. had been drinking heavily since April 6 and planned to kill

himself because of his anguish over the anniversary of his mother's death. The

A-0076-24 2 first officer testified D.G. smelled of alcohol, was "mildly aggressive," and had

a bruise above his right eye, apparently caused by falling while intoxicated. The

responding officers eventually decided to transport D.G. to the hospital for

evaluation. Kun testified D.G. was evaluated and sent home the same day.1

Kun voluntarily surrendered her firearm to police on the date of the

incident. The firearm, a Glock G19, was stored in a safe in the primary bedroom,

accessible only with a code and key. The firearm was removed after D.G. was

placed in the ambulance and sent to the hospital. Kun had a New York Firearms

ID Card for the Glock, but she did not have a New Jersey FPIC or HPP .

Kun testified that she and D.G. lived together for three years with her three

children from another relationship. She was the only person with access to the

gun safe. In response to questioning, by the trial court, Kun stated she would

have given D.G. access because she had no concerns about his mental health.

However, later on in the hearing, Kun corrected this earlier statement and said

she would not give D.G. access. At the hearing, Kun also produced a July 2024

letter from D.G.'s psychoanalyst, which stated:

I have been seeing [D.G.] for symptoms related to his mother's passing since 2022. During this time, I have not had any concerns related to suicidality or homicidal[ity] on his part. This includes during the

1 The trial court mistakenly found D.G. was involuntarily committed. A-0076-24 3 episode in question, which took place in April 2023, around the anniversary of his mother's death. [D.G.] has no history of violence, has not had a drink in a year, despite losing his father two months ago. He also attends Alcoholics Anonymous meetings every week and achieved his 90 meetings in 90 days benchmark.

It is my professional opinion that he does not pose any danger to society or himself.

The trial court found both officers credible and concluded D.G. was

disqualified from having an HPP or FPIC because he was (1) "likely to engage

in conduct, other than justified self-defense, that would pose a danger to self or

others," N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c); (2) "suffer[ing] from a physical defect or disease

which would make it unsafe for that person to handle firearms, [or] . . . substance

use disorder," N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3); (3) had been involuntarily committed,

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(13); and (4) would pose a threat to the health, safety, or

welfare of the public if issued a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5). The court

considered the letter from D.G.'s psychoanalyst a "net opinion" and insufficient

to prove D.G. "no longer has that particular disability in a manner that would

interfere with or handicap that person in the handling of firearms." N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3(c)(3).

The court also found Kun was not fit to own a gun as she was a threat to

the health, safety, or welfare of the public if issued a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-

A-0076-24 4 3(c)(5). In making its decision, the court considered only Kun's statement that

she was willing to give D.G. access to the gun safe despite his mental health and

did not credit her later testimony correcting this earlier statement. In sum, the

court held:

[I]n my view, given the totality of the evidence here, it is common sense given the fact that you would give access to a person who clearly has been very troubled. Who's expressed suicidal ideation, has had an issue with alcoholism and continues to treat with a psychologist for the past year, that cohabitates with you. Given the totality of the evidence here, and your initial answer to me that you wouldn't hesitate to give him access to your firearms, I do find that the State has met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence and you're disqualified pursuant to [N.J.S.A.] 2C:58- 3[(c)(5)]. II.

We review "a trial court's legal conclusions regarding firearms licenses de

novo." In re N.J. Firearms Purchaser Identification Card by Z.K., 440 N.J.

Super. 394, 397 (App. Div. 2015). We "accept a trial court's findings of fact

that are supported by substantial credible evidence," particularly when the

evidence is testimonial and involves credibility determinations. In re Return of

Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 116-17 (1997). A "trial court's interpretation

of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not

entitled to any special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531,

A-0076-24 5 552 (2019) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140

N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

We begin our analysis by acknowledging the relevant legal principles.

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 governs the purchase of firearms in the State of New Jersey

and requires a person to obtain an FPIC or HPP in order to purchase a gun. Here,

Kun voluntarily surrendered her stored firearm to police, which she had

purchased legally in another state.

In J.W.D., the defendant's FPIC and firearms were seized after his wife

filed a domestic violence complaint and received a temporary restraining order

(TRO) against him. 149 N.J. at 111. After the TRO was dismissed, the

defendant wrote a letter to the Hunterdon County Prosecutor's Office requesting

his FPIC and firearms be returned. Ibid. The Hunterdon County Prosecutor's

Office returned J.W.D.'s FPIC and firearms. Ibid.

J.W.D.'s wife filed a second domestic violence complaint against him and

obtained a TRO that required confiscation of his FPIC and firearms. Ibid.

J.W.D. filed a cross-complaint against his wife. Ibid. Following a trial, the

Family Part dismissed the complaints and dissolved the TROs. Id. at 112.

J.W.D. sent a second letter to the Hunterdon County Prosecutor's Office

requesting the return of his firearms. Ibid. The State opposed, and after a

A-0076-24 6 hearing, the trial court ultimately found a "volatile situation" and continued

possession of an FPIC and firearms by the defendant "would not be in the

interest of public health, safety, or welfare." Id. at 113.

Our Supreme Court concluded the Legislature intended that "a court

should not return weapons to a defendant who is a threat to the public health,

safety, or welfare." Id. at 116; see also State v. W.C., 468 N.J. Super. 324, 334

(2021) (confirming J.W.D.'s conclusion that "the State is entitled to forfeiture

of weapons . . . 'if the court finds that the defendant' is disqualified from holding

a[n] [FPIC] . . . under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) because he or she 'poses a threat

to the public health, safety, or welfare'" (quoting J.W.D., 149 N.J. at 116)). The

J.W.D. Court emphasized, "The contrary result—the return of weapons to a

defendant who is a threat to the public—would be an invitation to a tragedy. We

doubt the Legislature would have intended so disastrous a result." J.W.D., 149

N.J. at 116.

In State v. Cunningham, 186 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 1982), prior to

the Supreme Court's decision in J.W.D., we similarly determined that when a

firearm is lawfully taken, "a return of the firearm to its owner at a time when the

owner would be disqualified from obtaining a permit to acquire the firearm

constitutes a transfer that is prohibited by the statute." Id. at 511. We stressed

A-0076-24 7 the clear intention of "the statutory design is to prevent firearms from coming

into the hands of persons likely to pose a danger to the public." Ibid. This result

is achieved "by providing for the revocation of an [FPIC] when its possession

has become disqualified under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c) subsequent to the issuance

of the card." Id. at 511-12.

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 governs the issuance of HPPs and FPICs. A person may

not receive either an HPP or an FPIC if they are (1) "known in the community

in which the person lives as someone who has engaged in acts or made

statements suggesting the person is likely to engage in conduct, other than

justified self-defense, that would pose a danger to self or others," N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3(c), or (2) subject to any of the disqualifiers listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:58 -

3(c)(1) to (15). Relevant to this case are the disqualifiers barring the issuance

of a permit to

any person who suffers from a physical defect or disease which would make it unsafe for that person to handle firearms, to any person with a substance use disorder unless any of the foregoing persons produces a certificate of a medical doctor, treatment provider, or psychiatrist licensed in New Jersey, or other satisfactory proof, that the person no longer has that particular disability in a manner that would interfere with or handicap that person in the handling of firearms .... ....

A-0076-24 8 . . . any person where the issuance would not be in the interest of the public health, safety or welfare because the person is found to be lacking the essential character of temperament necessary to be entrusted with a firearm[.] ....

. . . [or] any person who has previously been voluntarily admitted to inpatient treatment . . . or involuntarily committed to inpatient or outpatient treatment . . . unless the court has expunged the person's record . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3), (5), (13).] The statute does not require that an applicant provide information regarding

other members of the applicant's household, although there are requirements

regarding the safekeeping of a firearm from minors. See N.J.S.A. 2C:58-

15(a)(1) to (3). N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f) allows the State to file a motion to revoke

an FPIC if the holder becomes subject to any of the disqualifiers listed in

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c). The State has the burden of proving the owner is

disqualified by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re R.W.T., 477 N.J.

Super. 443, 461 (App. Div. 2023).

With this statutory and regulatory backdrop in mind, we turn to

petitioner's contentions. Kun argues N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f) does not authorize the

State to seize nor compel the sale of firearms that are then in the owner's

possession, citing In re M.U.'s Application for a Handgun Purchase Permit, 475

A-0076-24 9 N.J. Super. 148, 199 (App. Div. 2023) (noting N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f) does not

authorize "the forfeiture of firearms already possessed"). We disagree and

conclude M.U. is distinguishable because the firearm in that case remained in

the owner's possession. Id. at 164-68. Here, Kun voluntarily surrendered the

firearm, and the State maintained possession throughout the proceedings. Under

those circumstances, the State cannot not return a firearm if the owner would

otherwise be disqualified under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3. See Cunningham, 186 N.J.

Super. at 511 ("[W]hen the police lawfully take possession of a firearm, we

conclude that a return of the firearm to its owner at a time when the owner would

be disqualified from obtaining a permit to acquire the firearm constitutes a

transfer that is prohibited."). The rationale of Cunningham is that it would be

illogical for the State to return a firearm to a person the State would not grant a

purchase permit to in the first place. See id. at 511-12. When this is the case,

the State must seek permission to sell the firearm and give the proceeds to the

owner. See id. at 513.

However, the trial court erred in disqualifying Kun based on D.G.'s

alleged mental-health struggles. All of the disqualifiers in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)

address the conduct of the firearm owner, not that of an adult third party who

lives with the owner. Despite this clear language, the court's opinion was

A-0076-24 10 overwhelmingly focused on D.G.'s conduct and risk propensity. The trial court

found D.G. was disqualified from having an HPP or FPIC pursuant to several

disqualifiers: N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c) (reputation in community for conduct that

threatens self or others); N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3) (mental illness); N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3(c)(13) (prior involuntary commitment); and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5)

(character or temperament posing threat to public health, safety, or welfare) .

The court considered the letter from D.G.'s psychoanalyst as a "net opinion,"

and insufficient to prove that D.G. "no longer has that particular disability in a

manner that would interfere with or handicap that person in the handling of

firearms." N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3). But D.G. was not the owner of the gun, the

weapon had not been seized from him, there was no domestic violence order in

place, and he was not seeking an HPP or FPIC.

The court had no reason to make findings regarding D.G. The State did

not present evidence or prove issuance of a firearm to D.G. would be a threat to

health, safety, or welfare because it was not seeking to disqualify D.G. from

possessing either an HPP or an FPIC. The incident in question happened on

April 12, 2023. The trial court decided the motion over a year later, on August

5, 2024. The State presented the two officers who responded to the scene that

day, but they did not proffer any evidence of D.G.'s present condition. D.G.

A-0076-24 11 himself did not testify, and there was no testimony from any health care

professional stating D.G. was a danger to himself or others. The State had the

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Kun, not D.G., was

disqualified pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3. See R.W.T., 477 N.J. Super. at 461.

Despite this, the court mistakenly concluded D.G. was mentally ill and

suffering from a substance-use disorder and therefore disqualified him pursuant

to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3), despite the lack of any credible evidence of D.G.’s

mental illness or substance abuse. No testimony was presented from treating

physicians or anyone who has diagnosed D.G. with a mental illness. Moreover,

no expert testimony was presented to prove D.G. was suffering from a

"substance use disorder." Ibid. The court also concluded D.G. was disqualified

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(13) because he had been involuntarily

committed. But the State did not present any evidence D.G. had been

involuntarily committed. One of the officers testified D.G. was taken to be

screened, but D.G. was taken home after the evaluation. Additionally, the State

did not prove D.G. was "known in the community in which" he lived, N.J.S.A.

2C:58-3(c), as someone who was a danger to himself or others. No witnesses

testified about D.G.'s reputation in the community.

A-0076-24 12 Compounding its error, the trial court then attributed the risk it found D.G.

posed to Kun because of her statement she "wouldn't hesitate to give [D.G.]

access" to her firearm safe. Solely due to this statement, the court disqualified

her under the "health, safety, or welfare" subsection. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5).

The court's finding that Kun "wouldn't hesitate" to give D.G. access is not

supported by substantial, credible evidence. See J.W.D., 149 N.J. at 116-17.

The only basis of this finding was Kun's answer (which she later clarified) to

the following hypothetical question:

Court: Would you ever give him access to the combination or the key?

A. Yes, I would. I don't have any –

Court: You would give him access?

A. I don't have concerns for him being suicidal or homicidal. I’m a psychiatrist myself. So, I don't, I mean, you probably want me to say I wouldn't, but like honestly, because I don’t have – Court: Oh, no, I don't want you to say anything other than the truth, okay?

A. I am telling you the truth. He's sober. He's not, this was a one time thing. He was grieving his mother. He drank for those six days. When the officers came in he was taken to the hospital. The psychiatrist there evaluated him deemed him not suicidal homicidal. Sent him home the same day. He's been in therapy. I think his therapist provided a letter. [The therapist] also has not been concerned for his safety.

A-0076-24 13 It was unreasonable for the court to construe this answer as anything other than

Kun's expression of her confidence in D.G.'s mental health and current stability.

Far more probative testimony elicited at the hearing revealed Kun responsibly

stored her firearm by locking it in a safe, accessible only to her. Moreover, she

testified, in the three years she and D.G. had lived together before the incident,

D.G. had never requested nor was ever given access to the firearm. 2 The trial

court’s finding lacks support in this record.

Moreover, the trial court's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)

improperly engrafted a storage requirement onto the statute. Although there is

a statute regulating firearm storage to preclude access to minors, see N.J.S.A.

2C:58-15, there exists no New Jersey statute regulating the storage of firearms

for people who cohabitate with other adults. Simply put, Kun was under no

legal obligation to lock away her firearm simply because she lived with D.G. It

2 We note this testimony was elicited through direct questioning by the court. When presiding over a bench trial, the court may examine witnesses "to clarify testimony, aid the court's understanding, elicit material facts, and assure the efficient conduct of the trial." D.M.R. v. M.K.G., 467 N.J. Super. 308, 320-21 (App. Div. 2021); N.J.R.E. 614. In this case, the trial court extensively cross- examined Kun for clarifying her earlier statement she would give D.G. access to her firearm and, in doing so, crossed "that fine line that separates advocacy from impartiality" and substantially prejudiced Kun's right to a fair hearing. Id. at 321 (quoting Village of Ridgewood v. Sreel Inv. Corp., 28 N.J. 121, 132 (1958)). A-0076-24 14 is not the court's role to rewrite N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 to impose such a requirement.

State v. Jones, 475 N.J. Super. 520, 531 (App. Div. 2023) ("[I]t is not our 'job

to engraft requirements' on a statute 'that the Legislature did not include.

[Rather,] [i]t is our role to enforce the legislative intent as expressed through the

words used by the Legislature.'" (second and third alterations in original)

(quoting Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 388 (2015))).

In sum, there is a lack of substantial credible evidence in this record

demonstrating Kun poses a threat to the public health, safety, or welfare.

N.J.S.A. 58-3(c)(5). In the absence of any legislative intent, the trial court

cannot use the risk D.G. may pose to deny Kun her right to possess a firearm.

We reverse and remand for entry of an order vacating the compelled sale

of Kun's firearm and the prospective forfeiture of her right to a FPIC. If Kun

chooses to apply for a FPIC and HPP, the application should be analyzed under

the statutory procedure. On remand, the court should determine whether "the

firearms may be returned from the federally licensed firearms dealer, or whether

some other remedy is available." M.U., 475 N.J. Super. at 203.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-0076-24 15