319 Ga. 527 FINAL COPY
S24Y0534. IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER TYSON.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for
voluntary discipline filed by Respondent Christopher Tyson (State Bar
No. 142208) before the issuance of a formal complaint. See Bar Rule
4-227 (b) (2). Tyson admits to conduct in violation of Rules 1.15 (I) (a),
1.15 (I) (b), 1.15 (I) (c), and 1.15 (II) (b) of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum
penalty for a violation of these rules is disbarment. Tyson requests a
six-month suspension, and the State Bar, through its response,
supports Tyson’s request. However, for the reasons explained below,
we decline to accept Tyson’s petition.
Tyson admits that he represented a client in a personal injury
matter arising out of a vehicle accident in December 2018 and that he
settled the client’s case in November 2020 for $6,300. Upon receiving
the settlement check, Tyson deposited the check into his IOLTA account. Tyson notified the client of the receipt of funds, but he did not
notify a chiropractor from whom the client sought treatment and who
had an interest in any settlement funds resulting from the case. Tyson
paid an ERISA lien for medical benefits on behalf of the client but did
not promptly disburse the settlement funds owed to the client or the
chiropractor, did not maintain sufficient funds in his IOLTA account,
and used those funds for personal expenses. Tyson, who was admitted
to practice law in 1996, claims in an affidavit that he eventually
stopped practicing in June 2021, at which time he relocated to
Louisiana. Since July 2022, Tyson has been administratively
suspended from the State Bar of Georgia for failing to pay his license
fees.
In his representation of the client, Tyson admits to violating Rule
1.15 (I) (a) by failing to safeguard the settlement funds owed to the
client and the chiropractor in his IOLTA account; Rule 1.15 (I) (b) by
disregarding the chiropractor’s interest in the funds from the
settlement; Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing to promptly notify the
chiropractor of the receipt of the settlement and failing to promptly
2 disburse the funds owed to the client and the chiropractor; and Rule
1.15 (II) (b) by withdrawing from the IOLTA account unearned funds
for personal use.
Tyson submits the following factors in mitigation of discipline: he
has made restitution to the client and the chiropractor; he has fully
and completely cooperated in this disciplinary matter; he has
expressed remorse by submitting this petition and agreeing to be held
responsible for his wrongdoing; and, though he has a disciplinary
history, his prior discipline is remote and for unrelated conduct. See
ABA Standard 9.32 (d), (e), (l), & (m).
In support of his purported restitution, Tyson includes with his
petition a copy of two $2,100 checks made out to the client and the
chiropractor. The checks are dated June 22, 2023 — almost three years
from the date on which Tyson received the settlement. Neither the
petition nor the response explains how a 2023 payment of $4,200
constitutes restitution for Tyson improperly managing $6,300 in 2020,
and there is nothing in the record indicating whether the client and
the chiropractor agree that these checks constitute full restitution and
3 whether they feel that they have been made whole.
Tyson requests a six-month suspension from the practice of law.
The State Bar does not dispute Tyson’s admissions of fact, admissions
of rules violations, or the mitigating factors set forth in his petition.
The State Bar supports Tyson’s six-month suspension with the
condition that he follow the procedures in Bar Rule 1-501 (b) to lift his
administrative suspension before returning to the practice of law.
While the State Bar acknowledges that the maximum penalty for
violations of the trust account rules is disbarment, it notes that when
the totality of the circumstances supports less severe discipline, this
Court has imposed suspensions or even reprimands. See, e.g., In the
Matter of Coggins, 314 Ga. 813 (879 SE2d 502) (2022) (accepting
petition for voluntary discipline requesting six-month suspension for
lawyer who violated Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and (b) and 1.15 (II) (a), (b), and
(c) by disregarding third-party’s interest in funds, commingling client
and personal funds, and using client funds to support his other
business interests); In the Matter of Mathis, 312 Ga. 626 (864 SE2d
40) (2021) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline requesting
4 public reprimand for lawyer who mismanaged trust account resulting
in insufficient balance). Further, the State Bar maintains that the
Court has previously imposed a six-month suspension for similar rule
violations both where similar mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are present and even where there are no mitigating
circumstances. See, e.g., Coggins, 314 Ga. at 818; In the Matter of
Summers, 278 Ga. 57 (597 SE2d 364) (2004) (accepting petition for
voluntary discipline requesting six-month suspension for attorney
who held client funds in IOLTA account for over four years, during
which time the account at times contained insufficient funds to cover
the obligation).
However, while we do have precedents accepting a petition for
voluntary discipline requesting a six-month suspension for
intentionally violating Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II), a six-month
suspension is generally not sufficient when the conduct involves
improperly converting client funds for personal use — even where the
attorney has provided restitution. A longer suspension would be more
appropriate in those circumstances. See, e.g., In the Matter of Veach,
5 310 Ga. 470 (851 SE2d 590) (2020) (accepting petition for voluntary
discipline requesting 18-month suspension where attorney failed to
properly disburse funds and removed estate funds from his IOLTA
account for personal use); In the Matter of Morgan, 303 Ga. 678 (814
SE2d 394) (2018) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline
requesting two-year suspension with conditions where attorney
withdrew funds from client’s estate and deposited it for personal use);
In the Matter of Saunders, 304 Ga. 824 (822 SE2d 235) (2018)
(accepting petition for voluntary discipline requesting 12-month
suspension where attorney converted client funds for her own personal
use). And in In the Matter of Hine, 314 Ga. 70 (875 SE2d 716) (2022),
the Court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline requesting a six-
month suspension where the attorney failed to properly communicate
with his client and converted estate funds for his personal use, even
where the attorney repaid his clients and had no prior disciplinary
history. See 314 Ga. at 76.1
1 However, in Hine, the attorney converted an amount substantially larger
than the settlement here and neglected to address in the petition the fact that he significantly overcharged the estate’s beneficiaries. See 314 Ga. at 75-76. 6 Accordingly, for Tyson, we conclude that a six-month suspension
is insufficient — even if he made full restitution. But he has not even
shown that he has done that. Rather, Tyson has provided little detail
on restitution. There has been no affirmative showing of restitution
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319 Ga. 527 FINAL COPY
S24Y0534. IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER TYSON.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for
voluntary discipline filed by Respondent Christopher Tyson (State Bar
No. 142208) before the issuance of a formal complaint. See Bar Rule
4-227 (b) (2). Tyson admits to conduct in violation of Rules 1.15 (I) (a),
1.15 (I) (b), 1.15 (I) (c), and 1.15 (II) (b) of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum
penalty for a violation of these rules is disbarment. Tyson requests a
six-month suspension, and the State Bar, through its response,
supports Tyson’s request. However, for the reasons explained below,
we decline to accept Tyson’s petition.
Tyson admits that he represented a client in a personal injury
matter arising out of a vehicle accident in December 2018 and that he
settled the client’s case in November 2020 for $6,300. Upon receiving
the settlement check, Tyson deposited the check into his IOLTA account. Tyson notified the client of the receipt of funds, but he did not
notify a chiropractor from whom the client sought treatment and who
had an interest in any settlement funds resulting from the case. Tyson
paid an ERISA lien for medical benefits on behalf of the client but did
not promptly disburse the settlement funds owed to the client or the
chiropractor, did not maintain sufficient funds in his IOLTA account,
and used those funds for personal expenses. Tyson, who was admitted
to practice law in 1996, claims in an affidavit that he eventually
stopped practicing in June 2021, at which time he relocated to
Louisiana. Since July 2022, Tyson has been administratively
suspended from the State Bar of Georgia for failing to pay his license
fees.
In his representation of the client, Tyson admits to violating Rule
1.15 (I) (a) by failing to safeguard the settlement funds owed to the
client and the chiropractor in his IOLTA account; Rule 1.15 (I) (b) by
disregarding the chiropractor’s interest in the funds from the
settlement; Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by failing to promptly notify the
chiropractor of the receipt of the settlement and failing to promptly
2 disburse the funds owed to the client and the chiropractor; and Rule
1.15 (II) (b) by withdrawing from the IOLTA account unearned funds
for personal use.
Tyson submits the following factors in mitigation of discipline: he
has made restitution to the client and the chiropractor; he has fully
and completely cooperated in this disciplinary matter; he has
expressed remorse by submitting this petition and agreeing to be held
responsible for his wrongdoing; and, though he has a disciplinary
history, his prior discipline is remote and for unrelated conduct. See
ABA Standard 9.32 (d), (e), (l), & (m).
In support of his purported restitution, Tyson includes with his
petition a copy of two $2,100 checks made out to the client and the
chiropractor. The checks are dated June 22, 2023 — almost three years
from the date on which Tyson received the settlement. Neither the
petition nor the response explains how a 2023 payment of $4,200
constitutes restitution for Tyson improperly managing $6,300 in 2020,
and there is nothing in the record indicating whether the client and
the chiropractor agree that these checks constitute full restitution and
3 whether they feel that they have been made whole.
Tyson requests a six-month suspension from the practice of law.
The State Bar does not dispute Tyson’s admissions of fact, admissions
of rules violations, or the mitigating factors set forth in his petition.
The State Bar supports Tyson’s six-month suspension with the
condition that he follow the procedures in Bar Rule 1-501 (b) to lift his
administrative suspension before returning to the practice of law.
While the State Bar acknowledges that the maximum penalty for
violations of the trust account rules is disbarment, it notes that when
the totality of the circumstances supports less severe discipline, this
Court has imposed suspensions or even reprimands. See, e.g., In the
Matter of Coggins, 314 Ga. 813 (879 SE2d 502) (2022) (accepting
petition for voluntary discipline requesting six-month suspension for
lawyer who violated Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and (b) and 1.15 (II) (a), (b), and
(c) by disregarding third-party’s interest in funds, commingling client
and personal funds, and using client funds to support his other
business interests); In the Matter of Mathis, 312 Ga. 626 (864 SE2d
40) (2021) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline requesting
4 public reprimand for lawyer who mismanaged trust account resulting
in insufficient balance). Further, the State Bar maintains that the
Court has previously imposed a six-month suspension for similar rule
violations both where similar mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are present and even where there are no mitigating
circumstances. See, e.g., Coggins, 314 Ga. at 818; In the Matter of
Summers, 278 Ga. 57 (597 SE2d 364) (2004) (accepting petition for
voluntary discipline requesting six-month suspension for attorney
who held client funds in IOLTA account for over four years, during
which time the account at times contained insufficient funds to cover
the obligation).
However, while we do have precedents accepting a petition for
voluntary discipline requesting a six-month suspension for
intentionally violating Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II), a six-month
suspension is generally not sufficient when the conduct involves
improperly converting client funds for personal use — even where the
attorney has provided restitution. A longer suspension would be more
appropriate in those circumstances. See, e.g., In the Matter of Veach,
5 310 Ga. 470 (851 SE2d 590) (2020) (accepting petition for voluntary
discipline requesting 18-month suspension where attorney failed to
properly disburse funds and removed estate funds from his IOLTA
account for personal use); In the Matter of Morgan, 303 Ga. 678 (814
SE2d 394) (2018) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline
requesting two-year suspension with conditions where attorney
withdrew funds from client’s estate and deposited it for personal use);
In the Matter of Saunders, 304 Ga. 824 (822 SE2d 235) (2018)
(accepting petition for voluntary discipline requesting 12-month
suspension where attorney converted client funds for her own personal
use). And in In the Matter of Hine, 314 Ga. 70 (875 SE2d 716) (2022),
the Court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline requesting a six-
month suspension where the attorney failed to properly communicate
with his client and converted estate funds for his personal use, even
where the attorney repaid his clients and had no prior disciplinary
history. See 314 Ga. at 76.1
1 However, in Hine, the attorney converted an amount substantially larger
than the settlement here and neglected to address in the petition the fact that he significantly overcharged the estate’s beneficiaries. See 314 Ga. at 75-76. 6 Accordingly, for Tyson, we conclude that a six-month suspension
is insufficient — even if he made full restitution. But he has not even
shown that he has done that. Rather, Tyson has provided little detail
on restitution. There has been no affirmative showing of restitution
having been completely paid. Tyson merely attaches two checks from
2023 equaling an amount less than the $6,300 at issue, and neither he
nor the State Bar provides any detail or response from the client or
the chiropractor on whether these checks constitute full restitution for
Tyson’s 2020 conduct.
Further, the petition does not fully consider Tyson’s disciplinary
history. According to the State Bar, in 2013, Tyson received an
Investigative Panel Reprimand for his violations of Rules 1.1 (lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client) and 1.16 (d) (upon
termination of representation, lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect client’s interests). The State Bar
contends that the 2013 sanction was “remote” and “for unrelated
conduct,” but our precedents approving six-month suspensions
typically do not involve attorneys with such disciplinary history. See
7 Coggins, 314 Ga. at 818 (noting lawyer’s lack of disciplinary history
when accepting request for a six-month suspension).
We believe a longer suspension is more appropriate based on the
facts before us. Even if Tyson made full restitution, six months is
insufficient considering the nature of his conduct and his disciplinary
history. However, we are unable to determine the more appropriate
discipline here without further information on Tyson’s purported
restitution. And regardless, “it has been the Court’s practice to reject
a petition in such circumstances rather than to impose a more
stringent discipline than that requested by the petitioner.” Veach, 310
Ga. at 472. We therefore reject Tyson’s petition for voluntary
discipline.
Petition for voluntary discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.
8 Decided July 16, 2024.
Petition for voluntary discipline.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William D.
NeSmith III, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittelman,
Andreea N. Morrison, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State
Bar of Georgia.