Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00314-CV
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile
On appeal from the 474th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge E. Alan Bennett, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2025-53-J
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant C.C. challenges the juvenile court’s Waiver of Jurisdiction
and Order of Transfer to a Criminal Court on the basis that the court lacked
jurisdiction to proceed with the transfer hearing absent proper notice.
Contrary to the two issues presented, we find that the two-day personal
service requirement was satisfied and that the summons provided sufficient
notice that the purpose of the hearing was for the consideration of a
discretionary transfer to criminal court. We affirm the trial court’s Waiver of
Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to a Criminal Court. Background
The State filed its Petition for Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court
(the “Petition”) alleging the C.C. committed the offense of aggravated robbery
by using or exhibiting a deadly weapon while committing theft. Attached to
the Petition was an Order directing C.C. to appear “on the 12th day June,
2025 at 9:30 A.M., in the 474th Judicial District Court of McLennan County,
located at the Bill Logue Juvenile Justice Center, Waco, Texas, for a hearing
on the State’s Petition for Discretionary Transfer to a Criminal District
Court.” Identical summons addressed to C.C. and C.C’s mother respectively
were issued May 22, 2025. Service was completed on both C.C. and his
mother on June 10, 2025.
The summons received by C.C. thrice mentioned the Petition for
Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court and attached a copy of the same.
The summons stated that the Petition would be heard on June 12, 2025. The
record does not reflect any hearing on the Petition or otherwise took place on
June 12, 2025. Subpoena applications were filed with the Clerk, reflecting a
setting date of August 4, 2025, but the record reflects no hearing on the
Petition on that date either. No subsequent summons was served.
The transfer hearing was held on August 14, 2025. The attorney for
C.C., C.C’s mother, and C.C. all attended the hearing. On the same day, the
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 2 trial court signed the Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to a
Criminal Court pursuant to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02. This appeal
followed.
In his appeal, C.C. raised two issues, alleging that (1) the juvenile court
lacked jurisdiction because TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.07(a)’s two-day,
personal-service requirement, incorporated by TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 4.02(b), was not satisfied, and that (2) the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction
because the summons did not state that the hearing was for discretionary
transfer, as § 54.02(b) requires. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02. The State did
not dispute that the appropriate standard of review is a de novo standard. 1
Issue One – Service Requirement was Satisfied
Section 53.07(a) of the Texas Family Code states, “the summons shall
be served upon him personally at least two days before the day of the
adjudication hearing.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.07. Here, there is no
dispute that the summons C.C. received on June 10, 2025, occurred more
than two days before the transfer hearing that took place on August 14, 2025.
C.C. argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the summons
received by C.C. was not received more than two days before the date listed
within the summons—June 12, 2025. Section 53.07(a) addresses the link
1 Even if the Court reviewed the trial court’s entry of Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to
a Criminal Court under an abuse of discretion standard, the result would not change.
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 3 between the receipt of summons and the hearing, not a date listed within the
summons. The plain language of the statute requires only that a summons be
received two days before the hearing. Clear statutory text is determinative of
legislative intent. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437
(Tex. 2009). We are not persuaded to read in additional requirements about
the date listed within a summons, especially when nothing in the record
suggests that C.C., his mother, or his lawyer were deprived of actual notice of
the transfer hearing. See Ex parte Rodriguez, 466 S.W.3d 846, 853 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2015) (the court notes evidence of actual notice in its evaluation of
waiver of defect in the service of summons). Such an argument is better
taken up with the legislature.
With regard to the change between the hearing date listed within the
summons and the actual date the hearing was held, courts across Texas have
agreed that if the record affirmatively shows that appellant received a
summons, jurisdiction would have then attached, and further summons
would not be required after each hearing postponement. See Matter of C.C.G.,
805 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1991, writ denied); In re E.S., No. 05-01-
01353-CV, 2002 WL 826960, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 2, 2002, no pet.);
In re R.M., 648 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ); In
the Matter of B.Y., 585 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1979, no
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 4 writ); See Ex parte Rodriguez, 466 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
Here, the record affirmatively shows that C.C. received a summons. Unlike
the case in Rodriguez, the record does not show that C.C. had to appear and
have the hearing reset within two days of first receiving his summons.
Rather, the first hearing and appearance that took place according to the
record is the transfer hearing that occurred August 14, 2025—more than two
months after C.C. received the summons.
Even if this Court was persuaded that the listed date of June 12, 2025,
within the summons created a defect in the summons, defects in summons do
not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction and can be waived. Hidalgo v. State,
945 S.W. 2d 313, 318 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997), aff'd, 983 S.W. 2d 746
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In Rodriguez, the court found that the defect
associated with service of summons, namely a defect with the date listed in
the summons, was waivable. Ex parte Rodriguez, 466 S.W.3d 846, 855 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2015). While there was no record to confirm such a waiver in
Rodriguez, here the record shows that C.C. and his attorney voluntarily
appeared and announced ready at the transfer hearing, that the trial court
advised C.C. of his rights and consequences, that C.C. understood and
acknowledged the rights and consequences, and that C.C. and his attorney
agreed to proceed.
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 5 We find that the record affirmatively shows C.C. was served summons
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Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00314-CV
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile
On appeal from the 474th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge E. Alan Bennett, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2025-53-J
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant C.C. challenges the juvenile court’s Waiver of Jurisdiction
and Order of Transfer to a Criminal Court on the basis that the court lacked
jurisdiction to proceed with the transfer hearing absent proper notice.
Contrary to the two issues presented, we find that the two-day personal
service requirement was satisfied and that the summons provided sufficient
notice that the purpose of the hearing was for the consideration of a
discretionary transfer to criminal court. We affirm the trial court’s Waiver of
Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to a Criminal Court. Background
The State filed its Petition for Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court
(the “Petition”) alleging the C.C. committed the offense of aggravated robbery
by using or exhibiting a deadly weapon while committing theft. Attached to
the Petition was an Order directing C.C. to appear “on the 12th day June,
2025 at 9:30 A.M., in the 474th Judicial District Court of McLennan County,
located at the Bill Logue Juvenile Justice Center, Waco, Texas, for a hearing
on the State’s Petition for Discretionary Transfer to a Criminal District
Court.” Identical summons addressed to C.C. and C.C’s mother respectively
were issued May 22, 2025. Service was completed on both C.C. and his
mother on June 10, 2025.
The summons received by C.C. thrice mentioned the Petition for
Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court and attached a copy of the same.
The summons stated that the Petition would be heard on June 12, 2025. The
record does not reflect any hearing on the Petition or otherwise took place on
June 12, 2025. Subpoena applications were filed with the Clerk, reflecting a
setting date of August 4, 2025, but the record reflects no hearing on the
Petition on that date either. No subsequent summons was served.
The transfer hearing was held on August 14, 2025. The attorney for
C.C., C.C’s mother, and C.C. all attended the hearing. On the same day, the
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 2 trial court signed the Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to a
Criminal Court pursuant to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02. This appeal
followed.
In his appeal, C.C. raised two issues, alleging that (1) the juvenile court
lacked jurisdiction because TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.07(a)’s two-day,
personal-service requirement, incorporated by TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 4.02(b), was not satisfied, and that (2) the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction
because the summons did not state that the hearing was for discretionary
transfer, as § 54.02(b) requires. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02. The State did
not dispute that the appropriate standard of review is a de novo standard. 1
Issue One – Service Requirement was Satisfied
Section 53.07(a) of the Texas Family Code states, “the summons shall
be served upon him personally at least two days before the day of the
adjudication hearing.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.07. Here, there is no
dispute that the summons C.C. received on June 10, 2025, occurred more
than two days before the transfer hearing that took place on August 14, 2025.
C.C. argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the summons
received by C.C. was not received more than two days before the date listed
within the summons—June 12, 2025. Section 53.07(a) addresses the link
1 Even if the Court reviewed the trial court’s entry of Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order of Transfer to
a Criminal Court under an abuse of discretion standard, the result would not change.
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 3 between the receipt of summons and the hearing, not a date listed within the
summons. The plain language of the statute requires only that a summons be
received two days before the hearing. Clear statutory text is determinative of
legislative intent. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437
(Tex. 2009). We are not persuaded to read in additional requirements about
the date listed within a summons, especially when nothing in the record
suggests that C.C., his mother, or his lawyer were deprived of actual notice of
the transfer hearing. See Ex parte Rodriguez, 466 S.W.3d 846, 853 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2015) (the court notes evidence of actual notice in its evaluation of
waiver of defect in the service of summons). Such an argument is better
taken up with the legislature.
With regard to the change between the hearing date listed within the
summons and the actual date the hearing was held, courts across Texas have
agreed that if the record affirmatively shows that appellant received a
summons, jurisdiction would have then attached, and further summons
would not be required after each hearing postponement. See Matter of C.C.G.,
805 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1991, writ denied); In re E.S., No. 05-01-
01353-CV, 2002 WL 826960, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 2, 2002, no pet.);
In re R.M., 648 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ); In
the Matter of B.Y., 585 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1979, no
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 4 writ); See Ex parte Rodriguez, 466 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
Here, the record affirmatively shows that C.C. received a summons. Unlike
the case in Rodriguez, the record does not show that C.C. had to appear and
have the hearing reset within two days of first receiving his summons.
Rather, the first hearing and appearance that took place according to the
record is the transfer hearing that occurred August 14, 2025—more than two
months after C.C. received the summons.
Even if this Court was persuaded that the listed date of June 12, 2025,
within the summons created a defect in the summons, defects in summons do
not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction and can be waived. Hidalgo v. State,
945 S.W. 2d 313, 318 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997), aff'd, 983 S.W. 2d 746
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In Rodriguez, the court found that the defect
associated with service of summons, namely a defect with the date listed in
the summons, was waivable. Ex parte Rodriguez, 466 S.W.3d 846, 855 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2015). While there was no record to confirm such a waiver in
Rodriguez, here the record shows that C.C. and his attorney voluntarily
appeared and announced ready at the transfer hearing, that the trial court
advised C.C. of his rights and consequences, that C.C. understood and
acknowledged the rights and consequences, and that C.C. and his attorney
agreed to proceed.
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 5 We find that the record affirmatively shows C.C. was served summons
more than two days prior to the transfer hearing, that jurisdiction attached,
and that a defect in the summons, if any, regarding the hearing date listed
therein, was waived.
Issue Two – Summons Sufficiently Stated Purpose of Hearing
C.C. complains that the summons served on him was invalid under
Section 54.02(b) of the Family Code because it did not state that the hearing
was for a discretionary transfer. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(b) Section
54.02(b) states:
The petition and notice requirements of Sections 53.04, 53.05, 53.06, and 53.07 of this code must be satisfied, and the summons must state that the hearing is for the purpose of considering discretionary transfer to criminal court.
See Id.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the summons need not
even expressly contain the words “to criminal court” to satisfy Section
54.02(b) if the summons expressly incorporates the attached petition by
reference and the petition contains references to criminal proceedings in
criminal court. Hardesty v. State, 659 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
Here, the summons did expressly contain the words “to criminal court” and
also attached the petition by reference. Specifically, the summons stated:
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 6 AND WHEREAS, the said PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY TRANSFER TO A CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT will be heard by said Court, at BILL LOGUE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER, 2601 GHOLSON ROAD, WACO, TEXAS, on the 12TH day of JUNE, 2025 at 9:30 o'clock AM
The above language makes clear that the express purpose of the
hearing is, at least in part, for the consideration of the Petition. The
summons, notifying C.C. “to appear … and to hear” the Petition, adequately
gives notice as to the purpose of the hearing and complies with Section
54.02(b). Polanco v. State, 914 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996,
pet. ref’d).
Conclusion
Because we find the court had proper jurisdiction to proceed with the
transfer hearing, we affirm the trial court’s Waiver of Jurisdiction and Order
of Transfer to a Criminal Court.
LEE HARRIS Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: February 26, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed CV06
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile Page 7