STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
11-1557
IN THE MATTER OF CAT ISLAND CLUB, L.L.C.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 240,286 HONORABLE HARRY FRED RANDOW, DISTRICT JUDGE
ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX CHIEF JUDGE
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
William M. Ford P. O. Box 12424 Alexandria, LA 71315-2424 Telephone: (318) 442-8899 COUNSEL FOR: Appellee - Court Appointed Liquidator
Charles Ray Minyard P. O. Box 3642 Lafayette, LA 70502 Telephone: (337) 266-2300 COUNSEL FOR: Appellee - Craig A. Davis
Ricky L. Sooter Provosty, Sadler, deLaunay, Fiorenza & Sobel, APC P. O. Box 1791 Alexandria, LA 71309-1791 Telephone: (318) 445-3631 COUNSEL FOR: Appellants - Tommy Pentecost and David Gaspard, Jr. John W. Munsterman P. O. Box 1848 Alexandria, LA 71309-1848 Telephone: (318) 445-6111 COUNSEL FOR: Appellee - Ty-Bar Industries, Inc. THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.
Two members of a limited liability company appeal the grant of a
summary judgment seeking dissolution of the company and the appointment of a
liquidator of the company’s property. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of
Ty-Bar, one of the members of the limited liability company, for the reasons
expressed below.
I.
ISSUES
We must decide:
(1) whether the trial court erred in granting Ty-Bar’s motion for summary judgment seeking dissolution of the limited liability company; and
(2) whether the trial court erred in appointing a liquidator to sell the property of the limited liability company.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Cat Island Club, L.L.C. (LLC) was formed on March 16, 2000. George
C. Gaiennie, III, registered agent for the LLC, executed the Articles of Organization
and the Initial Report and filed these documents with Louisiana’s Secretary of State.
The Initial Report listed seven initial members of the LLC:
1. Ty-Bar Industries, Inc. (Ty-Bar) 2. Craig A. Davis (Davis) 3. Tommy Pentecost (Pentecost) 4. David L. Gaspard, Jr. (Gaspard) 5. Brent Odom Bencaz (Bencaz) 6. Daniel Thomas Fontenot (Fontenot) 7. Martin James Fischer (Fischer) Ty-Bar is owned by Dean Tyler and William C. Barron. They solicited
members for the formation of the LLC to purchase land for a hunting and camping
spot in West Feliciana Parish.
On April 7, 2000, Ty-Bar purchased 383.46 acres of land, in its own
name, for $350,000.00 and collected capital contributions from the other members of
the LLC. Pentecost, Gaspard, and Davis made capital contributions of $50,000.00
each, paying $10,000.00 in cash and signing promissory notes for the $40,000.00
balances, in favor of Ty-Bar. Bencaz paid $50,000.00 in cash to Ty-Bar. The record
does not reflect the amount of the capital contribution of Ty-Bar, though it appears
that $50,000.00 was the anticipated amount. Pentecost and Gaspard aver that on April
7, 2000, they signed an original twelve-page Operating Agreement reflecting seven
members who each owned an equal 1/7 membership interest in the company, but they
did not retain a copy for their own files.
Three months later, on July 7, 2000, without amendment or further
documentation, Ty-Bar executed an eleven-page Operating Agreement which lists
only five “initial” members. This Operating Agreement indicates that Ty-Bar owns
3/7 membership interest, and therefore 3/7 of the voting power, in the LLC. It further
contains a new death clause, according to Pentecost and Gaspard, and it is missing the
signature blocks for Fontenot and Fischer, who, as it turns out, never made their
capital contributions. The last page of the Operating Agreement in the record
indicates at the bottom center that it is “Page 11 of 12 Pages.” Pentecost and Gaspard
aver that the twelve-page Operating Agreement they signed in April was changed
after they signed it.
On July 7, 2000, Ty-Bar, as seller, executed an Act of Cash Sale,
conveying the 383.46 acres of land to the LLC, for $500,000.00, not $350,000.00, and
the land was encumbered by Ty-Bar’s mortgage with Red River Bank. The bank’s
mortgage is not in the record, and the amount of the mortgage is not known. As in the
2 Operating Agreement, the signature and notary blocks for each of the members of the
LLC are at the back of the sale document, on pages with no text, and are executed and
notarized in different cities. As in the Operating Agreement, Pentecost and Gaspard
signed in Alexandria on April 7, 2000; Bencaz signed in Baton Rouge on April 7,
2000; Craig Davis signed in Lafayette on June 29, 2000; and Ty-Bar signed last, as a
member of the LLC, in Alexandria on July 7, 2000.1
Bencaz died, and his representative sold his interest in July 2010 to the
other members of the LLC for $22,000.00. Pentecost and Gaspard believed, prior to
Bencaz’s death, that each member owned an equal 1/5 of the LLC. Pentecost and
Gaspard transmitted $22,000.00 for Bencaz’s interest, but $11,000.00 was returned to
them. Ultimately, Ty-Bar purchased one half of Bencaz’s interest for $11,000.00, and
Pentecost and Gaspard purchased the other half for $5,500.00 each. The fourth
remaining member, Craig Davis, did not purchase any of Bencaz’s interest.
In December 2010, Ty-Bar filed a petition to dissolve the LLC and
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on that issue. Craig Davis
supported dissolution. Pentecost and Gaspard filed an opposition. The trial court
granted the motion for summary judgment ordering dissolution of the LLC, and it
appointed William Ford as liquidator. Pentecost and Gaspard filed this appeal.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, applying the same
criteria as the district court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate.
Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991).
A summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
1 On July 2, 2001, a year after selling the land to the LLC, Ty-Bar sold timber off of the land to Tyler Timber, Inc. for $190,500.00. Dean Tyler signed as buyer for Tyler Timber, Inc. While there was no reservation of timber rights in the sale document, Pentecost and Gaspard aver that it was discussed by the members of the LLC that Ty-Bar would receive the first timber proceeds as payment for its interest in the LLC. 3 interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue
of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code
Civ.P. art. 966(B).
IV.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Pentecost and Gaspard contend that the trial court erred in granting Ty-
Bar’s motion for summary judgment seeking dissolution of the LLC. They argue that
dissolution of the LLC and liquidation of the property was improper and that the asset,
the land, should be put in the possession of the members and partitioned in kind.
Dissolution
The formation and operation of limited liability companies in Louisiana
is governed by La.R.S. 12:1301, et seq. In his Written Reasons for Judgment, the trial
judge took the eleven-page Operating Agreement at face value and found that the
majority votes of the LLC (Ty-Bar’s 3/7 and Davis’s 1/7) had approved dissolution
under La.R.S. 12:1318. We find that judicial dissolution was proper under La.R.S.
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STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
11-1557
IN THE MATTER OF CAT ISLAND CLUB, L.L.C.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 240,286 HONORABLE HARRY FRED RANDOW, DISTRICT JUDGE
ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX CHIEF JUDGE
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
William M. Ford P. O. Box 12424 Alexandria, LA 71315-2424 Telephone: (318) 442-8899 COUNSEL FOR: Appellee - Court Appointed Liquidator
Charles Ray Minyard P. O. Box 3642 Lafayette, LA 70502 Telephone: (337) 266-2300 COUNSEL FOR: Appellee - Craig A. Davis
Ricky L. Sooter Provosty, Sadler, deLaunay, Fiorenza & Sobel, APC P. O. Box 1791 Alexandria, LA 71309-1791 Telephone: (318) 445-3631 COUNSEL FOR: Appellants - Tommy Pentecost and David Gaspard, Jr. John W. Munsterman P. O. Box 1848 Alexandria, LA 71309-1848 Telephone: (318) 445-6111 COUNSEL FOR: Appellee - Ty-Bar Industries, Inc. THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.
Two members of a limited liability company appeal the grant of a
summary judgment seeking dissolution of the company and the appointment of a
liquidator of the company’s property. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of
Ty-Bar, one of the members of the limited liability company, for the reasons
expressed below.
I.
ISSUES
We must decide:
(1) whether the trial court erred in granting Ty-Bar’s motion for summary judgment seeking dissolution of the limited liability company; and
(2) whether the trial court erred in appointing a liquidator to sell the property of the limited liability company.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Cat Island Club, L.L.C. (LLC) was formed on March 16, 2000. George
C. Gaiennie, III, registered agent for the LLC, executed the Articles of Organization
and the Initial Report and filed these documents with Louisiana’s Secretary of State.
The Initial Report listed seven initial members of the LLC:
1. Ty-Bar Industries, Inc. (Ty-Bar) 2. Craig A. Davis (Davis) 3. Tommy Pentecost (Pentecost) 4. David L. Gaspard, Jr. (Gaspard) 5. Brent Odom Bencaz (Bencaz) 6. Daniel Thomas Fontenot (Fontenot) 7. Martin James Fischer (Fischer) Ty-Bar is owned by Dean Tyler and William C. Barron. They solicited
members for the formation of the LLC to purchase land for a hunting and camping
spot in West Feliciana Parish.
On April 7, 2000, Ty-Bar purchased 383.46 acres of land, in its own
name, for $350,000.00 and collected capital contributions from the other members of
the LLC. Pentecost, Gaspard, and Davis made capital contributions of $50,000.00
each, paying $10,000.00 in cash and signing promissory notes for the $40,000.00
balances, in favor of Ty-Bar. Bencaz paid $50,000.00 in cash to Ty-Bar. The record
does not reflect the amount of the capital contribution of Ty-Bar, though it appears
that $50,000.00 was the anticipated amount. Pentecost and Gaspard aver that on April
7, 2000, they signed an original twelve-page Operating Agreement reflecting seven
members who each owned an equal 1/7 membership interest in the company, but they
did not retain a copy for their own files.
Three months later, on July 7, 2000, without amendment or further
documentation, Ty-Bar executed an eleven-page Operating Agreement which lists
only five “initial” members. This Operating Agreement indicates that Ty-Bar owns
3/7 membership interest, and therefore 3/7 of the voting power, in the LLC. It further
contains a new death clause, according to Pentecost and Gaspard, and it is missing the
signature blocks for Fontenot and Fischer, who, as it turns out, never made their
capital contributions. The last page of the Operating Agreement in the record
indicates at the bottom center that it is “Page 11 of 12 Pages.” Pentecost and Gaspard
aver that the twelve-page Operating Agreement they signed in April was changed
after they signed it.
On July 7, 2000, Ty-Bar, as seller, executed an Act of Cash Sale,
conveying the 383.46 acres of land to the LLC, for $500,000.00, not $350,000.00, and
the land was encumbered by Ty-Bar’s mortgage with Red River Bank. The bank’s
mortgage is not in the record, and the amount of the mortgage is not known. As in the
2 Operating Agreement, the signature and notary blocks for each of the members of the
LLC are at the back of the sale document, on pages with no text, and are executed and
notarized in different cities. As in the Operating Agreement, Pentecost and Gaspard
signed in Alexandria on April 7, 2000; Bencaz signed in Baton Rouge on April 7,
2000; Craig Davis signed in Lafayette on June 29, 2000; and Ty-Bar signed last, as a
member of the LLC, in Alexandria on July 7, 2000.1
Bencaz died, and his representative sold his interest in July 2010 to the
other members of the LLC for $22,000.00. Pentecost and Gaspard believed, prior to
Bencaz’s death, that each member owned an equal 1/5 of the LLC. Pentecost and
Gaspard transmitted $22,000.00 for Bencaz’s interest, but $11,000.00 was returned to
them. Ultimately, Ty-Bar purchased one half of Bencaz’s interest for $11,000.00, and
Pentecost and Gaspard purchased the other half for $5,500.00 each. The fourth
remaining member, Craig Davis, did not purchase any of Bencaz’s interest.
In December 2010, Ty-Bar filed a petition to dissolve the LLC and
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on that issue. Craig Davis
supported dissolution. Pentecost and Gaspard filed an opposition. The trial court
granted the motion for summary judgment ordering dissolution of the LLC, and it
appointed William Ford as liquidator. Pentecost and Gaspard filed this appeal.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, applying the same
criteria as the district court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate.
Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991).
A summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
1 On July 2, 2001, a year after selling the land to the LLC, Ty-Bar sold timber off of the land to Tyler Timber, Inc. for $190,500.00. Dean Tyler signed as buyer for Tyler Timber, Inc. While there was no reservation of timber rights in the sale document, Pentecost and Gaspard aver that it was discussed by the members of the LLC that Ty-Bar would receive the first timber proceeds as payment for its interest in the LLC. 3 interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue
of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code
Civ.P. art. 966(B).
IV.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Pentecost and Gaspard contend that the trial court erred in granting Ty-
Bar’s motion for summary judgment seeking dissolution of the LLC. They argue that
dissolution of the LLC and liquidation of the property was improper and that the asset,
the land, should be put in the possession of the members and partitioned in kind.
Dissolution
The formation and operation of limited liability companies in Louisiana
is governed by La.R.S. 12:1301, et seq. In his Written Reasons for Judgment, the trial
judge took the eleven-page Operating Agreement at face value and found that the
majority votes of the LLC (Ty-Bar’s 3/7 and Davis’s 1/7) had approved dissolution
under La.R.S. 12:1318. We find that judicial dissolution was proper under La.R.S.
12:1335, but not dissolution based upon majority consent under La.R.S. 12:1318,
because of the disputes over the Operating Agreement, the percentages of membership
interests expressed in the Operating Agreement, and the manner in which the
deceased member’s interest was acquired. The statutory distinction is significant
because it affects the distribution of the net assets after liquidation.
More specifically, La.R.S. 12:1334, entitled “Dissolution,” provides in
pertinent part:
Except as provided in the articles of organization or a written operating agreement, a limited liability company is dissolved and its affairs shall be wound up upon the first to occur of the following: ....
4 (2) The consent of its members in accordance with R.S. 12:1318. .... (4) Entry of a decree of judicial dissolution under R.S. 12:1335.
Here, the Articles of Organization are very general and only address
dissolution to the extent that a person dealing with the LLC can rely upon a certificate
executed by a representative of Ty-Bar. The Operating Agreement entered into the
record does not specifically address the dissolution of the LLC, and the portion stating
that Ty-Bar’s membership interest is greater is in dispute. Therefore, based upon
La.R.S. 12:1334(2), if the LLC’s Operating Agreement or its Articles of Organization
do not provide for the dissolution of the company, the LLC can be dissolved by the
consent of the majority under La.R.S. 12:1318.
Statutory dissolution by consent under La.R.S. 12:1318 provides that one
member gets a single vote, and it takes a majority of those single votes to dissolve the
LLC. More specifically, in pertinent part, La.R.S. 12:1318, entitled, “Voting rights of
members,” provides (emphasis added):
A. Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or a written operating agreement, each member of a limited liability company shall be entitled to cast a single vote on all matters properly brought before the members, and all decisions of the members shall be made by majority vote of the members.
B. Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or a written Operating agreement, a majority vote of the members shall be required to approve . . . :
(1) The dissolution and winding up of the limited liability company.
(2) The sale, exchange, lease, mortgage, pledge, or other transfer of all or substantially all of the assets of the limited liability company.
5 Here, since Bencaz passed away, there are only four remaining members
of the LLC. With Davis and Ty-Bar voting in favor of dissolution, and Pentecost and
Gaspard voting against it, the vote is two for and two against, and there is no majority
consent under R.S. 12:1318, and, therefore, no consent under the consent portion of
the dissolution statute, La.R.S. 12:1334(2).2
Notwithstanding, an LLC can also be dissolved under La.R.S. 12:1334(4)
through the entry of a decree of dissolution under La.R.S. 12:1335. Section 1335,
entitled “Judicial dissolution,” provides:
On application by or for a member, any court of competent jurisdiction may decree dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organization or operating agreement.
While Pentecost and Gaspard argue that judicial dissolution under
La.R.S. 12:1335 is not applicable because it is still “reasonably practicable” to carry
on the business of the LLC, we disagree. Numerous assertions and accusations have
arisen surrounding the operation of the LLC and the ownership interest of the
members. There also appear to be competing interests regarding the use of the land,
the only asset of the company, and the reason for which the LLC was created. In
alleging a fraudulent Operating Agreement, Pentecost and Gaspard clearly believe
there is self-dealing on the part of Ty-Bar. Ty-Bar and Davis want dissolution and
liquidation of the land while Pentecost and Gaspard do not. The members have
2 Pentecost and Gaspard assert that prior to Bencaz’s death, they believed that the five members, Ty-Bar, Davis, Bencaz, Pentecost, and Gaspard, each owned 1/5 of the LLC. Ty-Bar argues that Pentecost and Gaspard had to have known that Ty-Bar had a greater interest because when they purchased part of Bencaz’s interest, the Cash Sale stated that Ty-Bar was buying 3/6 of Bencaz’s interest, and that Davis, Pentecost, and Gaspard were buying 1/6 each of Bencaz’s interest. We find that of no moment for several reasons: the Cash Sale in the record is not signed by any LLC member; it does not represent what ultimately occurred, as Davis did not purchase any of Bencaz’s interest; it is dated July 15, 2010, ten years after the LLC’s formation and just five months before Ty-Bar filed its petition for dissolution; Pentecost and Gaspard aver that they sent a check for $22,000.00 to purchase Bencaz’s interest, but one half, or $11,000.00, of their transmittal was returned to them. 6 clearly reached an inability to work toward any goals or reasons for continued
association with each other.
There is very little Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting the limited
liability statutes, even though the Limited Liability Company Law has been enacted
since 1992. We find Weinmann v. Duhon, 01-1267 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/26/02), 818
So.2d 206, writ denied, 02-2082 (La. 11/1/02), 828 So.2d 574, on subsequent appeal,
08-186 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/28/08), 997 So.2d 647, writs denied, 08-2814, 08-2815, 08-
2830 (La. 3/13/09), 5 So.3d 117-118, instructive in its application of La.R.S. 12:1335.
There, the fifth circuit found that the trial court lacked authority to set aside various
provisions of the LLC’s operating agreement that had led to an impasse among its
members, and that the court should have ordered the LLC’s dissolution after it was
requested by two of its owners.
Similarly, we find that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on
business among the members and that judicial dissolution was proper under La.R.S.
12:1334(4) and La.R.S. 12:1335.
Liquidation
Pentecost and Gaspard take the position that instead of dissolution and
liquidation, the only asset of the LLC, the 383.46 acres of land, should be placed in
the possession of the members, so that they can effect a partition in kind. Ty-Bar and
Davis argue that this would result in another lawsuit and that the trial court was
authorized to appoint a liquidator under La.R.S. 12:1335 and La.R.S. 12:1336(B).
The trial court found that Pentecost and Gaspard had no interest in the land itself
under La. R.S. 12:1329 and, therefore, had no cause of action for a partition of the
land. The court then appointed the liquidator, William Ford. Pentecost and Gaspard
assert that it was error to do so. We disagree.
7 Louisiana Revised Statute 12:1329 states that: “[a] membership interest
shall be an incorporeal movable. A member shall have no interest in limited liability
company property.” Our jurisprudence has interpreted this to mean that individuals
cannot assert property claims as members of an LLC where the disputed property
interests are the property of the separate legal entity. See Kelly v. Porter, 08-4310
(U.S. E.D. La. 1/22/10), 687 F.Supp.2d 632; Northeast Realty, L.L.C. v. Misty Bayou,
L.L.C., 40,573 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/25/06), 920 So.2d 938; Van Meter v. Gutierrez, 04-
0706 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/16/05), 897 So.2d 786.
We note however, that, while the statutes prohibit a member from
demanding that a distribution be in the form of property, see La.R.S. 12:1326, 3 in
post-dissolution proceedings, the statutes do not prohibit the liquidator from making a
distribution in the form of movable or immovable property. See La.R.S. 12:1340(D).4
Additionally, La.R.S. 12:1336, entitled “Winding up,” provides for the
appointment of a liquidator, as follows (emphasis added):
A. Except as otherwise provided in the articles of organization or a written operating agreement, upon dissolution the members shall wind up the limited liability company's affairs. The windup of the limited liability company’s affairs may be conducted by appointment of one or more liquidators to conduct the windup and liquidation. However, such appointment shall not be operative until both of the following occur:
3 Louisiana Revised Statute 12:1326, entitled “Distribution in kind,” provides: Except as provided in a written operating agreement, a member, regardless of the nature of the member’s contribution, shall have no right to demand and receive any distribution from a limited liability company in any form other than cash. No member shall be compelled to accept from a limited liability company a distribution of any asset in kind to the extent that the percentage of the asset distributed to the member exceeds the percentage in which the member shares in distributions from the limited liability company. 4 Louisiana Revised Statute 12:1340, entitled, “Certificate of dissolution; assets omitted from liquidation; post-dissolution proceedings,” provides at Subsection (D): Any movable or immovable property inadvertently or otherwise omitted from the liquidation shall vest in the members conducting the liquidation or liquidator, for the benefit of the persons entitled thereto, and be distributed accordingly. 8 (1) Notice of authorization of the dissolution, stating that the limited liability company is to be liquidated out of court and giving the name and post office address of each liquidator, has been published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation in the parish in which the limited liability company’s registered office is located, and a copy of such notice, with the affidavit of the publisher of the newspaper to the fact of such publication attached, has been filed with the secretary of state.
(2) Articles of dissolution have been filed with the secretary of state in accordance with R.S. 12:1339.
B. However, any court of competent jurisdiction may wind up the limited liability company's affairs on application of any member or his legal representative or assignee or of any liquidator.
The authority to appoint a liquidator is also given to the court under
La.R.S. 12:1340(E).5
Here, the trial judge stated in his judgment that he was appointing Mr.
Ford to serve as liquidator with all of the authority granted to him under La.R.S.
12:145(C). This statute is found in Louisiana’s Business Corporation Law, but it is
nevertheless applicable. “All limited liability companies, regardless of date of
organization, shall have the powers, rights, and privileges provided for a corporation
organized under the Business Corporation Law (R.S. 12:1 et seq.), and provided for a
partnership organized under Title XI of Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code.”
La.R.S. 12:1303. The trial court’s judgment further stated that the liquidator would be
subject to the court’s supervision, and that any party could seek relief from the trial
court for any decisions made by the liquidator. We find no error in the trial court’s
5 Louisiana Revised Statute 12:1340, entitled, “Certificate of dissolution; assets omitted from liquidation; post-dissolution proceedings,” provides at Subsection (E): Following cessation of the separate existence, the members conducting the liquidation or liquidator shall still have power to take all action required to preserve the interests of the limited liability company, its creditors, and members. The court shall have power, on application by any interested party, to appoint, ex parte or on such notice as the court may order, a liquidator or new liquidator for any proper purpose in case of the death, disability, or unwillingness to serve of the last previous liquidator or last member. 9 appointment of a liquidator, subject to the trial court’s supervision and the liquidator’s
adherence to the Limited Liability Company Law, La.R.S. 12:1301, et seq, and the
findings expressed in this opinion.
With regard to the final distribution, the trial court found that the
proceeds from the sale of the land should be distributed under La.R.S. 12:1337, 6 first
to return the capital investment to each member, and then to distribute the remainder
of the proceeds to each member based upon each member’s interest in the LLC. This
is correct, though the membership interests in this case are not yet established in the
record of this appeal.
V.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm summary judgment based upon
judicial dissolution under La.R.S. 12:1335, and we affirm the appointment of a
liquidator subject to the court’s supervision and the Limited Liability Company Law
at La.R.S. 12:1301, et seq.
Costs are assessed against Tommy Pentecost and David L. Gaspard, Jr.
6 La.R.S. 12:1337, entitled, “Distribution of assets,” provides in pertinent part: A. Upon the winding up of a limited liability company, any assets remaining after paying or adequately providing for the payment of all debts and liabilities of the limited liability company, including all costs and expenses of the liquidation and any and all contingent liabilities of which the members or liquidator has knowledge, shall be distributed as follows:
....
(2) Except as provided in the articles of organization or a written Operating Agreement, to members and former members, first, for the return of their capital contributions, and secondly, respecting their membership interests, in the proportions in which the members share in distributions. 10