Opinion issued April 2, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00871-CV NO. 01-25-00872-CV ——————————— IN THE MATTER OF C.A.O.
On Appeal from the 314th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case Nos. 2025-01689J and 2025-01692J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an accelerated appeal from the Harris County Juvenile Court’s orders
waiving jurisdiction and transferring Appellant—a juvenile respondent—to
criminal district court to stand trial as an adult on charges of murder and
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue with respect to the transfers, arguing that the juvenile court abused its
discretion when it admitted a cell phone video that was not properly authenticated.
We affirm the juvenile court’s order.
Background1
In July 2025, the State filed two petitions in Harris County Juvenile Court
alleging that Appellant—a juvenile respondent born on October 27, 2007
(“C.A.O.”)—had engaged in delinquent conduct by committing murder and
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.2 The State alleged that on October 14,
2024, C.A.O. had “unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly threatened R.R. with
imminent bodily injury by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon,” and that on the
same day, C.A.O. had “unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly cause[d] the death
of Ivan Gabriel Bernardez . . . by shooting the Complainant with a deadly weapon,
namely a firearm.”
The State filed a motion in each proceeding requesting that the juvenile
court waive its original jurisdiction and transfer C.A.O. to criminal district court to
be tried as an adult pursuant to section 54.02(a) of the Texas Family Code. The
juvenile court held a hearing on the motions and signed an order in October 2025
1 To protect the identity of minor children, we refer to them by pseudonyms. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(c)(2). 2 The offenses allegedly were committed twelve days before C.A.O.’s seventeenth birthday. 2 waiving its jurisdiction and transferring C.A.O. to criminal district court for trial on
both charges.
Two witnesses testified during the certification hearing.
Detective Jordan Meister
Detective Meister of the Houston Police Department’s homicide division
testified that police were dispatched to a shooting on October 14, 2024, at
approximately 8:15 p.m.3 When the detectives arrived, they found a deceased
young Hispanic male lying on the ground with multiple gunshot wounds. The
complainant, Ivan Bernardez, was in a “defensive position.” According to
Detective Meister, seven 5.56 caliber rifle casings and one 9-millimeter casing
were recovered from the scene, indicating there were two shooters. No firearms
were found at the scene.
The police interviewed witnesses who initially identified four possible
suspects. Bernardez was a member of the “Federal Road” or “Fed Block” gang.
His gang “had beef” with another gang called 18th Street. The four suspects were
members of the 18th Street gang. Detective Meister testified that “multiple
witnesses made it seem like [C.A.O.] was the . . . leader of their 18th Street gang.”
3 Detective Meister testified that he was not originally involved in the investigation but “inherit[ed]” the case from two other detectives. He became lead detective on the case because he was working on another homicide involving the same witnesses and gangs. 3 The investigating officers recovered surveillance video from the apartment
complex where the shooting occurred, surveillance video from an apartment
complex across the street, and a cell phone video related to the assault allegedly
committed by C.A.O. earlier in the day involving R.R. The video from the
neighboring apartment complex showed two males in dark clothing approaching
Bernardez with their arms pointed at him. Detective Meister identified C.A.O. as
one of the males depicted and showed him holding a 5.56 rifle. The other male was
holding a 9-millimeter pistol. Detective Meister testified, “It appeared like the two
suspects were certainly looking for somebody.”
The court admitted the surveillance video from the neighboring apartment
complex and screen shots taken of the suspects from that video. Detective Meister
stated that the clothing in the screen shots matched the clothing seen in the
apartment surveillance videos during the murder. According to Detective Meister,
“multiple witnesses” identified the males in the screen shots as C.A.O. and E.R.C.,
a second suspect in the shooting.4 Detective Meister interviewed several witnesses
who corroborated that C.A.O. and E.R.C. were involved in Bernardez’s murder.
Detective Meister testified that during his investigation of an unrelated
murder involving another member of the Fed Block gang, he interviewed witnesses
involved in the present case. In working on the present case, he also re-interviewed
4 E.R.C. has been charged as an adult co-defendant in Bernardez’s murder. 4 some witnesses who had been interviewed by the original detectives who
investigated Bernardez’s murder.
Detective Meister then testified about the cell phone video related to the
assault allegedly committed by C.A.O. earlier in the day. The cell phone video
purportedly was taken from inside the car C.A.O. was traveling in while he
allegedly committed the aggravated assault against R.R. Detective Meister was
told that a woman named Cindy had recorded the video, but he was not able to
locate her. He also could not verify that the video had been recorded on October
14, 2024. However, when Detective Meister interviewed two other people who
were in the car allegedly involved in the assault on the day of the shooting, he
ascertained that “what they were talking about [was] depicted in [the] [cell phone]
video.” Detective Meister testified that in the cell phone video, a woman in the car
yelled what sounded like, “[C.A.O.], hell yeah.”
During the assault, C.A.O. allegedly threatened R.R. by shooting at the car
he was in. Others in R.R.’s car identified C.A.O. as the shooter. They said he was
using a rifle and that he was sitting behind the driver’s seat, both of which were
corroborated by the cell phone video.
According to Detective Meister, R.R. was shown surveillance stills and said
C.A.O. was wearing the same dark clothing during the assault as he apparently
wore during the murder. E.R.C.’s girlfriend, T.A., told Detective Meister that she
5 was in the same car as C.A.O. during the assault. She identified C.A.O. from the
surveillance stills. Detective Meister found her response and identification to be
credible.
Detective Meister also interviewed T.A.’s friend, M.V., who was in the car
during the assault. M.V. also identified C.A.O. from the stills. She said that during
the assault, C.A.O. pulled the rifle out of the backpack he appeared to be wearing
in the screen shots from the apartment surveillance video. Detective Meister also
testified that C.A.O.’s ex-girlfriend and two others identified C.A.O. from the
surveillance stills.
Detective Meister testified that he interviewed four members of the 18th
Street gang. One of them, E.P., provided the car that dropped off C.A.O. and the
other suspect at the apartment complex where Bernardez was killed. The car
belonged to E.P.’s mother. E.P. identified the suspects from the still shots.
Detective Meister also interviewed E.R.C.—C.A.O’s co-defendant in
Bernardez’s murder. E.R.C. told Detective Meister that C.A.O. used a rifle during
the murder, and that while they both raised their guns at Bernardez, only C.A.O.
fired at him. Detective Meister noted that the surveillance video from the
apartment complex across the street showed muzzle fire from only one firearm
during the murder.
6 E.R.C. also said that he was driving the car involved in the alleged assault of
R.R. He stated there had been “prior issues” between the 18th Street and Fed
Block gangs. The car R.R. was traveling in during the assault was a Fed Block
vehicle. E.R.C. told Detective Meister he did not know C.A.O. was going to fire at
the Fed Block car but that C.A.O. “did eventually fire the rifle at [R.R.’s] vehicle.”
Detective Meister testified about “multiple similarities” between
Bernardez’s murder and R.R.’s assault: both involved the same gangs, C.A.O was
involved in both incidents, and the weapon used was the same in both incidents.5
He said C.A.O. was known for using the rifle. Detective Meister testified that he
believes the assault and the murder were the result of “deliberate targeting.”
During the investigation, Detective Meister obtained C.A.O.’s Instagram
records and a forensic extraction of his cell phone. A picture in C.A.O.’s Instagram
account appeared to be C.A.O. holding two rifles and wearing the same clothes as
in the apartment complex surveillance video. A photo from C.A.O.’s cell phone
shows him holding a rifle.
When C.A.O. was arrested, he had a fully-loaded rifle magazine on him. His
rifle was not recovered. According to Detective Meister, authorities recovered 5.56
rifle rounds from Bernardez during his autopsy.
5 The testimony that the same weapon was used in the aggravated assault and the murder was the result of a finding made by NIBIN, a system that compares the unique marks a firearm makes when a bullet is fired and a shell casing is expended. 7 Detective Meister interviewed people from both gangs, as well as people
without gang affiliation, who identified C.A.O. as the shooter. He testified that no
one other than C.A.O. (1) had the motive to kill Bernardez, (2) had a NIBIN
finding lead back to an aggravated assault in which people identified him as the
shooter, (3) was identified by multiple people in a surveillance video as being in
the area before the murder, and (4) was identified by a co-defendant as being the
shooter in this case. He testified that he believes C.A.O. and E.R.C. killed
Bernardez.
Dr. Alexandra Tellez-Caruso
Dr. Tellez-Caruso, a psychologist for the Harris County Juvenile Probation
Department, testified that she conducted a certification evaluation on C.A.O. She
concluded that (1) he fell in the high end of the middle range for dangerousness
when you include the two charged offenses; (2) his intellectual sophistication is
below average; (3) his criminal sophistication is moderately high when you include
both of the charged offenses; (4) his maturity is moderately high; (5) he shows
moderately low treatment amenability when you include the two charged offenses;
and (6) when you include the charged offenses, he has a moderately high risk for
violently re-offending.
At the conclusion of the certification hearing, the court found probable cause
for the offenses and, “based on the seriousness of the offense and the welfare of the
8 community,” the court waived its jurisdiction and ordered C.A.O. to be tried in the
adult criminal system.
This appeal ensued. In his sole issue, Appellant argues the juvenile court
erred in admitting the cell phone video because it was not properly authenticated.
Transfer to Adult Criminal District Court
Section 54.02 of the Texas Family Code governs transfers by a juvenile
court to a criminal district court for criminal proceedings. Under Section 54.02(a),
a juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child 6
to a criminal district court if:
(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of felony;
(2) the child was:
(A) 14 years of age or older at the time he is alleged to have committed the offense, if the offense is . . . a felony of the first degree, and no adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning that offense; [and]
...
(3) after a full investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the child before the court committed the offense alleged and that because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.
6 In this context, “child” is defined as someone is “ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age.” TEX. FAM. CODE §51.02(2)(A). 9 TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(a); see Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 886 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d).
The State has the burden to persuade the juvenile court by a preponderance
of the evidence that the community’s welfare requires transfer of jurisdiction over
the child for criminal proceedings, either because of the seriousness of the offense
alleged, the background of the defendant, or both. Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 886 (citing
In re A.K., No. 02-20-00410-CV, 2021 WL 1803774, at *19 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth May 6, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). In considering whether the
preponderance of the evidence supports transfer under Section 54.02(a)(3), the
juvenile court must consider, among other things, the following non-exclusive
factors:
(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person;
(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
(3) the record and previous history of the child; and
(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.
TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(f); see also Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 886 (citing In re Z.T., No.
05-21-00138-CV, 2021 WL 3645103, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 17, 2021,
pet. denied) (mem. op.)). “Any combination of these factors may suffice to support 10 a waiver of the juvenile court’s exclusive original jurisdiction and not every factor
need weigh in favor of transfer[.]” Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 886 (citing In re B.M., No.
01-18-00898-CV, 2019 WL 1388561, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar.
28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)). “The juvenile court need not consider any other
factors, nor need it find that the evidence establishes each factor.” Bell, 649
S.W.3d at 886-87 (citing In re Z.M., No. 02-21-00213-CV, 2021 WL 4898851, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)). The factors are
intended to be “non-exclusive guides” to help the juvenile court determine whether
reason for transfer exists. Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887 (citing In re Z.T., 2021 WL
3645103, at *8).
Standard of Review7
We review a juvenile court’s ruling to admit or exclude evidence at a waiver
and transfer hearing for an abuse of discretion. In re C.P.C., No. 01-24-00672-CV,
2025 WL 2956226, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 21, 2025, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (citing In re A.W., 661 S.W.3d 547, 552 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist] 2023, pet. denied)). An abuse of discretion occurs if the court’s ruling is “so
clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might
disagree.” Id. (citing In re H.Y., 512 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
7 Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s order. He only makes a challenge to the admission of the cell phone video during the transfer hearing. 11 Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)). Even if a trial court errs in admitting evidence, any error
is cured if the same evidence is admitted elsewhere without objection. In re H.Y.,
512 S.W.3d at 473 (citing Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003)). Reversal is warranted only “where the error probably caused the rendition
of an improper judgment.” In re C.P.C., 2025 WL 2956226, at *2 (citing In re
A.W., 661 S.W.3d at 552).
Discussion
A. Application of the Rules of Evidence to Transfer Hearings
C.A.O. argues that the Texas Rules of Evidence apply to transfer hearings.
TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.17(c). The State disagrees, arguing that evidentiary rules are
not strictly applied in juvenile certification hearings.
We recently noted that “[t]here appears to be no published opinion that
indicates whether the Texas Rules of Evidence . . . appl[y] to juvenile transfer
proceedings pursuant to section 51.17(c) of the Texas Family Code.” In re C.P.C.,
2025 WL 2956226, at *3. We observed, however, that Texas appellate courts
“have characterized transfer proceedings as dispositional and not adjudicational,
allowing for the admission of hearsay statements and testimonial statements from
witnesses who are not present.” Id. (citing cases).8 This Court also has held that “a
8 See, e.g., L.M.C. v. State, 861 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (holding rights to confrontation not violated where evidence is not used to adjudicate guilt or innocence).
12 juvenile court is not required to rule on the admissibility of evidence during a
transfer hearing.” In re H.Y., 512 S.W.3d at 474 (citing Navarro v. State, Nos. 01–
11–00139–CR & 01–11–00140–CR, 2012 WL 3776372, at *6 (Tex. App.–
Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 17, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication)). In Navarro, we held that:
At a transfer and certification hearing, a juvenile court need only determine if there is “probable cause” that the juvenile committed the charged offense. The transfer and certification hearing is a nonadversary preliminary hearing, in which the juvenile court may rely upon hearsay as well as written and oral testimony. A transfer hearing “does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that an adjudication of guilt or innocence requires”; the hearing’s only goal is to determine the proper forum in which to adjudicate the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
2012 WL 3776372 at *5 (internal citations omitted). See also generally State v.
Lopez, 196 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref’d) (“The [transfer]
hearing is comparable to a criminal probable cause hearing and the court need not
resolve evidentiary conflicts beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (citing In re K.B.H., 913
S.W.2d 684, 689 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, no writ)).9
9 See State v. Lopez, 196 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref’d) (“The United States Supreme Court has recognized that although a juvenile court hearing to determine whether to waive jurisdiction and transfer a juvenile for trial as an adult is subject to essentials of due process and fair treatment, it is not required to conform to all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing.”) (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)). . 13 Indeed, there are numerous cases that hold that a juvenile court may consider
hearsay in transfer hearings. See, e.g., In re C.P.C., 2025 WL 2956226, at *2
(“Because a juvenile transfer hearing is dispositional rather than adjudicational in
nature, a juvenile court may consider hearsay without violating the juvenile’s right
to confrontation.”); In re B.M., 2019 WL 1388561, at *13 (“[B]ecause the transfer
hearing is a nonadversary preliminary hearing, the juvenile court may rely upon
hearsay as well as written and oral testimony in making its probable-cause
findings.”); In re A.W., 661 S.W.3d at 554 (“[A] juvenile court in a transfer hearing
is not required to resolve the admissibility of hearsay evidence offered against the
juvenile because of the non-adversarial nature of a transfer hearing.”); Grant v.
State, 313 S.W.3d 443, 444 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, no pet.) (“The juvenile court
can determine probable cause in a nonadversary preliminary hearing through the
use of hearsay besides written and oral testimony.”); McKaine v. State, 170 S.W.3d
285, 289 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, no pet.) (holding juvenile
court could consider hearsay evidence because “[s]trict rules of evidence are not
applied in transfer proceedings.”).
We have not found, nor has Appellant cited, any case applying the Rules of
Evidence when, as here, the authentication of a video or some other type of
evidence is at issue. We need not resolve the issue, however, because even if the
14 Rules of Evidence were applicable, they would not affect our disposition of the
appeal.
B. Authentication of the Cell Phone Video
During the transfer hearing, C.A.O. objected to the admission of the cell
phone video, which purportedly was made from inside the car when C.A.O.
allegedly shot at R.R. C.A.O. argued in the trial court that Detective Meister—the
sponsoring witness—had not authenticated the video because there was no time
stamp on it and he did not know definitively who had recorded the video or
whether it had been altered.
On appeal, C.A.O. argues the video was not properly authenticated because
it did not comply with Texas Rule of Evidence 901, which requires the offering
party “to produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is.” TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). C.A.O. notes that while the State
attempted to authenticate the cell phone video through Detective Meister’s
testimony, Detective Meister did not make the video, had no personal knowledge
of when or where the video was taken, and did not speak with “Cindy,” the person
who allegedly recorded the video. Further, the State did not call Cindy or any other
occupant of the car to testify about the circumstances under which the video was
recorded.
15 Detective Meister testified during the hearing that he was told the video was
recorded on October 14, 2024, but he could not verify that information. He
testified, however, that “multiple witnesses—all of whom were inside the” car
when the cell phone video was recorded—told him “that was the date it happened.”
Detective Meister testified that, after interviewing two people who were riding in
the car with C.A.O. when the video was recorded, he was able to determine that
their description of the assault matched what was depicted in the video. According
to Detective Meister, during the video the two witnesses called out C.A.O.’s name
as C.A.O. was shooting at the assault complainant.
Based on Detective Mesiter’s testimony, the State told the court that it had
“established that this evidence is what it purports to be, a cell phone video of what
happened inside of that car that is corroborated by the witnesses who [were] inside
of that vehicle.” On appeal, the State relies on Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018) in support of its argument that the cell phone video was
sufficiently authenticated. In Fowler, the Court of Criminal Appeals observed:
[E]ven though the most common way to authenticate a video is through the testimony of a witness with personal knowledge who observed the scene, that is not the only way. Evidence can also be authenticated by “[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.”
Id. at 849 (emphasis in original) (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(4)). Fowler
stemmed from a dispute regarding the authenticity of a surveillance video from a 16 Family Dollar store where the appellant shopped prior to committing theft of an
ATV. The store’s video could not be copied, so an investigating officer recorded a
copy of the video. Id. at 846. There was no audio on the video. Id.
At trial, defense counsel objected to the video’s admission because it was an
incomplete copy of a recording and the State had not established why the original
was not available. Id. The trial court admitted the video. Id. at 847. The court of
appeals held the trial court erred in admitting the video, but the Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed, holding the video had been properly admitted because it is
possible to prove the authenticity of a video “without the testimony of someone
who either witnessed what the video depicts or is familiar with the functioning of
the recording device.” Id. at 848. The Court held that while the State could have
produced testimony from witnesses who would have further authenticated the
video, the trial court’s determination that the police officer sufficiently
authenticated the video was a decision within the zone of reasonable disagreement.
Id. at 850. It further held that “[c]onclusive proof of authenticity before allowing
admission of disputed evidence is not required. Rule 901 ‘merely requires some
evidence sufficient to support a finding that evidence in question is what the
17 proponent claims.’” Id. at 848 (citing Reed v. State, 811 S.W.2d 582, 587 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991)).10
Consistent with Fowler, the El Paso Court of Appeals recently admitted a
cell phone video even though the person who recorded the footage did not
authenticate it. Gonzalez v. State, No. 08-23-00306-CR, 2024 WL 4189237, at *4
(Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 13, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). In Gonzalez, a bystander took cell phone video of an assault on the
complainant at a bus stop. 2024 WL 4189237, at *1. The bystander did not testify.
Id. at *2. During the trial, the defendant objected to the admission of the video,
arguing that only the person who recorded the video could say what he was doing
when he made the video, where he was located when the video was made, whether
his camera was working properly, and whether he deleted any part of the video. Id.
The complainant watched the cell phone footage and testified that the video fairly
and accurately depicted her assault and that she saw herself and the defendant in
the video. Id. She testified she did not believe the video had been altered. Id. The
trial court admitted the video. Id.
On appeal, the defendant argued the cell phone video was inadmissible
because the complainant “could not verify any details about the production of the
10 See generally Butler v. State, 459 S.W.3d 595, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (observing that text messages can be authenticated by witness who observes author type and/or send message, or by witness who knows text message came from phone number associated with purported sender). 18 footage, including whether it had any additions or deletions,” and that only the
person who made the video could authenticate it under Rule 901. Id. at *2, 4. In
addition, according to the appellant, the video “move[d] away from the action and
back again.” Id. at *4. The court disagreed, holding that “the trial court need not be
convinced that the item is authentic; it need only determine that a reasonable juror
could find that the item is authentic.” Id. at *3 (citing Watson v. State, 421 S.W.3d
186, 190 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d)). The court held that because
the complainant testified the video accurately showed what happened during the
assault, the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting the video. Id. at *4.
The Gonzalez court relied in large part on Hines v. State, 383 S.W.3d 615
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref’d), where a defendant argued that a police
officer’s dashboard camera video should not have been admitted because it was not
properly authenticated. Id. at 624. The defendant in Hines argued the video footage
could not be authenticated by the police officer who sponsored the video because
he could not verify whether the video had been altered in any way, and because the
sponsoring officer did not make the video, given that it was recorded by another
officer’s camera. Id. Holding that the officer could authenticate the video—which
the court identified as a “jumbled mess” because the camera did not operate
correctly—the court of appeals explained that a witness is not “required to be the
maker of the recording or have otherwise participated in the conversation in order
19 for his testimony that the recording is what it is claimed to be to sufficiently
authenticate it.” Id. at 624–25 (citing Angleton v. State, 971 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998)).
While all of these cases are illustrative, we find that Fowler is the most
persuasive. The juvenile court’s admission of the cell phone video in the present
case was a decision within the zone of reasonable disagreement. As the Court of
Criminal Appeals stated in Fowler, “Rule 901 ‘merely requires some evidence
sufficient to support a finding that evidence in question is what the proponent
claims.’” 544 S.W.3d at 848 (citation omitted). Detective Meister provided “some
evidence” to authenticate the cell phone video. He testified that others traveling in
the car when the video was recorded told him that the video depicted the
circumstances of the assault. He also testified that after he interviewed several
witnesses, he “was able to ascertain that what was on this cell phone video [was] a
fair and accurate depiction of what actually happened in this aggravated assault.”
The State was not required to produce those witnesses. As we previously
explained, a juvenile court may rely on hearsay during a transfer hearing, and
Detective Mesiter’s testimony, while based on hearsay, sufficiently authenticated
the video. We conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the cell phone video.
C. Harm
Even if the juvenile court erred in admitting the cell phone video, we
20 conclude the error was harmless. We can only reverse a juvenile court’s order
waiving jurisdiction if the error “probably caused the rendition of an improper
judgment.” In re C.P.C., 2025 WL 2956226, at *3 (citing TEX. R. APP. P.
44.1(a)(1)); see In re A.W., 661 S.W.3d at 554 (holding no harm demonstrated
when there was “an abundance of evidence to support the trial court’s finding”).
C.A.O. argues that the admission of the cell phone video was harmful
because the State’s case “relied heavily on Detective Meister’s testimony regarding
statements made by people who did not testify and were not subject to cross-
examination to test their veracity or bias.” He argues that the only physical
evidence that connected the assault to the murder was the presence of 5.56 shell
casings that may have come from the same gun, which was not found. He avers
that “[i]n the absence of live witnesses that could testify that they saw C.A.O. fire
that gun, the cell phone video was the State’s best evidence of a connection
between C.A.O. and the gun that was necessary to support a finding of probable
cause.”
The State responds that there was an “abundance of evidence” in addition to
the cell phone video to support the trial court’s finding that C.A.O. should be tried
as an adult. We agree.
First, the State proffered surveillance video from the apartment complex
across the street from where the shooting occurred. The State argues that the
21 apartment video and still shots from the video placed C.A.O. at the scene of the
homicide. Further, Detective Meister testified that “multiple witnesses”—including
members of the 18th Street gang, members of the Fed Block gang, and people who
did not belong to either gang—identified C.A.O. as the person who approached
Bernardez while holding a rifle.
Second, the State presented testimony identifying C.A.O. as the person who
held the rifle that killed Bernardez. Witnesses from the assault that occurred hours
before the murder identified C.A.O. from the surveillance video and confirmed that
he wore the same clothing during the assault and the murder. Further, E.P. told
police that on the day of the murder, he gave C.A.O. and E.R.C. a ride to the
apartment complex where Bernardez was killed and picked them up there later.
Third, the State argues that there was evidence that the rifle C.A.O. held in
the photos was the rifle used to kill Bernardez. The State presented evidence that
NIBIN indicated the same rifle was used in the assault and the murder. And the
surveillance video that captured the murder showed muzzle fire only from the gun
that one of the shooters was holding when the murder occurred. E.R.C. also told
Detective Meister that he and C.A.O. were armed when they confronted Bernardez,
that both raised their weapons, but that only C.A.O fired his rifle at Bernardez.
Fourth, Dr. Tellez-Caruso testified that, among other things, C.A.O. was in
the high end of the middle range for dangerousness, he showed moderately low
22 treatment amenability, he had a moderately high criminal sophistication and
maturity, and he had a moderately high risk for violently re-offending.
Finally, the State argues that any evidence from the cell phone video was
cumulative, as it did not contain any information that was not elicited during
Detective Meister’s testimony. Detective Meister testified that during his witness
interviews, he learned that C.A.O. was wearing all black and sitting behind the
driver’s seat when he fired his rifle during the assault. The video from the
neighboring apartment complex, which was admitted without objection, showed
what C.A.O. wore the night the assault and murder were committed, which
matched the description of what Detective Meister learned about the murder
suspect during his witness interviews. And C.A.O. did not object to the admission
of an Instagram photo that showed him holding a rifle and wearing the same jacket
he apparently wore in the surveillance video.
We conclude the admission of the cell phone video did not lead to the
rendition of an improper judgment. We overrule C.A.O.’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the juvenile court’s orders transferring C.A.O.’s cases to criminal
district court.
23 Veronica Rivas-Molloy Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.