In the Matter of C. P. C., a Child v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 17, 2025
• Docket: 01-24-00672-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued July 17, 2025.

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00672-CV ——————————— IN THE MATTER OF C.P.C., A CHILD

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 23-JV-0261

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The State accused appellant, C.P.C. 1, of the offense of sexual assault of a

child, alleging that the offense occurred while appellant was 15 years of age. See

TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(2)(B). Because appellant was over 18 years of age

at the time of the proceedings, the State petitioned the juvenile court to waive its

1 We use pseudonyms to refer to the minor appellant and complainant. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3). jurisdiction over appellant. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(j). The juvenile court

granted the State’s petition and waived its jurisdiction. Appellant appeals that

decision, complaining of the admission of hearsay and the sufficiency of the

evidence.

We affirm.

Background

Appellant was 21 years old at the time the State filed its original petition for

waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to district court. Prior to the hearing on the

petition, the juvenile court had not adjudicated any of the counts the State alleged

in its petition.

Detective Mandy Smith works at the Galveston Police Department’s

Criminal Investigations Division. In December of 2020, Galveston Police

Department Officer Larry Murph referred an investigation of a suspected sexual

assault of a child to Detective Smith. The complainant, D.M., made her initial

outcry2 during a therapy session. At the time D.M. made her initial outcry,

appellant was 18 years and 11 months old.

Prior to the admission of any video or testimony regarding D.M.’s

statements, appellant objected as follows:

2 “Outcry” is a term of art used to describe the first disclosure statement that a child complainant makes to an adult. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.072; TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.031. 2 [V]iolation[s] of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation as well, Judge, and also pursuant to 51.17(c) of the Texas Family Code states [sic]: Except as otherwise provided by this title, the Texas Rules of Evidence applicable to criminal cases and Articles 33.03 and 37.07 and Chapter 38 apply in a judicial proceeding under this title.

Appellant then requested a “running objection to everything that Detective Smith

did not personally view, which is almost everything . . . .” The juvenile court

granted the running objection. From the record, it does not appear that Detective

Smith ever spoke with D.M.

The juvenile court allowed Detective Smith to testify as to the content of

D.M.’s disclosure statement to D.M.’s grandmother, made after a disclosure during

a therapy session. According to D.M.’s outcry statement, appellant sexually

assaulted D.M. while D.M. was at a family friend’s home in Galveston by

penetrating her mouth, vagina, and anus.

Detective Smith identified Petitioner’s Exhibit 5 as a video recording of

D.M.’s forensic interview conducted by Kim Keever, which Detective Smith

witnessed in person. Detective Smith also testified as to the content of the video. In

the video, D.M. identified her assailant by appellant’s first name. Detective Smith

testified that, when asked for specific details, D.M. told the interviewer that

appellant had her take off her pants and her “drawers” but then D.M. shut down

3 and did not continue to talk about the incident. Before ending the forensic

interview, D.M. reported that she was lying down on her back on the floor.

Detective Smith identified records created during this investigation by the

sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE), explaining that nurses and health care

professionals often assist in these investigations. Detective Smith testified as to the

statements that D.M. made to the SANE. D.M. told the SANE that appellant

penetrated her orally, vaginally, and anally. D.M. was eight years old at the time of

the incidents, which occurred around Thanksgiving.

Detective Smith did not interview D.M.’s brothers or appellant’s mother, all

of whom were reportedly present in the home where the alleged assault occurred at

the time of the incident.

Detective Smith further explained that, as part of her investigation, she

considers whether the complainant has a potential motive to lie or fabricate.

Detective Smith’s investigation did not identify issues she would consider possible

motives to lie, such as relationship problems, custody battles, or other sources of

outside influence from adults.

J.B.3 is appellant’s uncle. Appellant lived with J.B. when appellant was four

or five years old and again when he was approximately 14, around the time of this

3 Because C.P.C. is a respondent in a juvenile case, we use pseudonyms for his family members to avoid disclosing identifying information. TEX. FAM. CODE § 58.007 (West 2025). 4 alleged incident. J.B. described appellant as obedient and said that he did his

chores around the house. J.B. authenticated a number of photographs of appellant

on family trips and as a Junior ROTC student.

T.S. is also appellant’s uncle. T.S. authenticated photos of appellant on

fishing trips and volunteering at the Special Olympics with T.S.’s daughter.

Ultimately, the juvenile court found probable cause and that it was

impracticable to proceed prior to appellant’s eighteenth birthday because of the

delayed outcry.

Hearsay Statements

In his first issue, appellant argues that “the juvenile court violated

Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights by admitting hearsay evidence without a right

to confrontation.”

A. Standard of Review

We review a juvenile court’s ruling to admit or exclude evidence at a waiver

and transfer hearing for an abuse of discretion. In re A.W., 661 S.W.3d 547, 552

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2023, pet. denied) (citing In re H.Y., 512 S.W.3d

467, 473 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)). An abuse of

discretion only occurs if the court’s ruling is “so clearly wrong as to lie outside the

zone within which reasonable people might disagree.” H.Y., 512 S.W.3d at 473

(quoting Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). Reversal

5 is only warranted where the error probably caused the rendition of an improper

judgment. A.W., 661 S.W.3d at 552.

B. Analysis

Appellant argues that the juvenile court violated his right to confrontation by

admitting hearsay evidence over counsel’s objection and without a hearing to

determine the veracity of the statements pursuant to section 54.031 of the Texas

Family Code. Additionally, according to appellant, the rules of evidence apply to a

juvenile certification proceeding pursuant to section 51.17(c) of the Texas Family

Code.

I. The Outcry Statement and Forensic Interview

To the extent that appellant objects based on the confrontation clause, we

cannot say that his rights were violated. Because a juvenile transfer hearing is

dispositional rather than adjudicational in nature, a juvenile court may consider

hearsay without violating the juvenile’s right to confrontation. In re S.J.M., 922

S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).

Pertaining to the outcry statement, appellant did not object based on Section

54.031, but instead on chapter 38 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure as

incorporated by section 51.17(c) of the Texas Family Code. Article 38.072 and

section 54.031 are substantively similar, except section 54.031 allows the

admission in certain circumstances of the hearsay statement of a child 12 years of

6 age or younger, see TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.031(a), and article 38.072 allows the

admission in certain circumstances of a hearsay statement of a child under 14 years

of age, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072 § 2(a)(1)(B)(ii). Because both

statutes apply to this outcry and the specific grounds for this objection are apparent

from the context, this claim is preserved for appellate review. TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a).

In determining the applicability of section 51.17(c) to juvenile certification

proceedings, we first look to the rules of statutory construction. In construing

statutes, we must first focus on the literal text of the statute in question and attempt

to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text. Whitfield v. State, 430 S.W.3d

405, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed

according to the rules of grammar and common usage. TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 311.011(a) (West 2025). However, if words and phrases have acquired a

technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, they

shall be construed accordingly. Id. § 311.011(b). Strict reading of the statutory

language is necessary because “the text of the statute is the law in the sense that it

is the only thing actually adopted by the legislators, probably through compromise,

and submitted to the Governor.” Whitfield, 430 S.W.3d at 408 (quoting Boykin,

818 S.W.2d at 785) (emphasis in original). Reviewing courts only consider

7 extratextual factors where the plain language of the statute would lead to absurd

results, or if the plain language is not plain but rather ambiguous. Id. However, if a

statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the rules of

construction. Helle v. Hightower, 735 S.W.2d 650, 652 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987,

writ denied). Such is the case here.

Texas Family Code section 51.17(c) states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise

provided by this title, the Texas Rules of Evidence applicable to criminal cases and

articles 33.03 and 33.07 and chapter 38, Code of Criminal Procedure, apply in a

judicial proceeding under this title.” “[T]his title” refers to Title 3 of the Texas

Family Code, i.e., the Juvenile Justice Code, and includes section 54.02, the statute

governing certification proceedings. Section 54.02(e) lists several documents that

the juvenile court may consider that likely contain hearsay, opinion testimony, or

both, specifically: “written reports from probation officers, professional court

employees, guardians ad litem appointed under section 51.11(d), or professional

consultants in addition to the testimony of witnesses.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.11(d)

(West 2025). Therefore, the plain language of these statutes suggests that the

legislature intended to carve out hearsay exceptions for written reports by

professionals assisting the juvenile court, as it has in other proceedings under the

Family Code. See, e.g., id. § 107.113 (child custody evaluation report). It also

8 suggests that article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure applies to

transfer proceedings.

Under article 38.072, known colloquially as the “outcry witness rule,” the

first statement a child complainant under 14 makes about an alleged offense to a

person who is 18 years of age or older is admissible if certain conditions are met.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.072, § 2. Specifically, the party intending to offer

the statement must, on or before the fourteenth day before the proceeding begins,

notify the adverse party of its intention to do so; provide the adverse party with the

name of the witness through whom it intends to offer the statement; and provide

the adverse party with a written summary of the statement. Id. § 2(b)(1). The court

must then find, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the

statement is reliable based on the time, content, and circumstances of the

statement. Id. Finally, the child must testify or be available to testify at the

proceeding in court or in any other manner provided by law. Id. § 2(b)(3). Section

54.031 provides the same procedural framework but applies more narrowly to the

statement of a child 12 years of age or younger. TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.031(a)

(West 2025). Each outcry statute conveys in its respective plain meaning that,

when hearsay comes in the form of an outcry statement, it is subject to these

procedural safeguards.

9 The record lacks any evidence of such safeguards here, however. The clerk’s

record contains no notice of the State’s intent to introduce the outcry statement.

Although there is no record of a preliminary hearing, it does not appear to be

disputed that neither Detective Smith nor Kim Keever, who conducted the forensic

interview, was the first person over 18 whom D.M. spoke to about the allegation,

or that she was under 14 at the time of the outcry. The juvenile court made no

findings about the reliability of the statement based on its time, content, and

circumstances. From the record, it does not appear that Detective Smith is certain

whether the proper outcry witness is D.M.’s grandmother or her therapist. Without

these prerequisites, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting D.M.’s outcry

statement through Detective Smith. See, e.g., Zarco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 816, 832

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (finding error in admitting outcry

statement after untimely notice by State); Duncan v. State, 95 S.W.3d 669, 671

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (finding error in admitting outcry

statement without preliminary hearing).

The courts of appeal have characterized transfer proceedings as dispositional

and not adjudicational, allowing for the admission of hearsay statements and

testimonial statements from witnesses who are not present. See, e.g., A.W., 661

S.W.3d at 553, 554-55; L.M.C. v. State, 861 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (holding rights to confrontation not violated

10 where evidence is not used to adjudicate guilt or innocence). We do not hold

otherwise here, but that the procedure for admitting certain hearsay statements

should still be followed.

II. Harm Analysis

However, we cannot say that appellant suffered harm from the juvenile

court’s error in admitting the outcry testimony without the proper procedural

requirements, where the juvenile court properly admitted other evidence that

contained the same information that supported the probable cause finding. Zarco,

210 S.W.3d at 832-33 (finding admission of outcry statement where notice was

deficient harmless error because other similar evidence from complaining witness

was admitted at trial without objection); Duncan, 95 S.W.3d at 672 (finding error

admitting outcry statement without a hearing was harmless because other similar

evidence from complaining witness was admitted at trial without objection).

This Court can only reverse a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction if

the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. TEX. R. APP. P.

44.1(a)(1); see A.W., 661 S.W.3d at 552 (holding no harm demonstrated where

there “was an abundance of evidence to support the trial court’s finding”).

As discussed above, pursuant to section 54.02(e), the juvenile court can

consider certain reports notwithstanding the rules of evidence, such as written

reports from probation officers, professional court employees, guardians ad litem,

11 or professional consultants. TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(e). Although the SANE

report is not listed as one of these reports, it appears to have been properly

admitted and would have survived any applicable evidentiary objection.

Generally, a document must be authenticated by a person who has personal

knowledge of its contents and who can testify that the document is what the

proponent claims that it is. TEX. R. EVID. 901; Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844,

850 (Tex. Crim. App. App. 2018) (holding that police officer authenticated store

surveillance video by cross-referencing time on receipt found on scene with time

stamp on video). In the case of a patient’s statements in medical records, such

statements are admissible if they are made for the purpose of diagnosis or

treatment. TEX. R. EVID. 804(3). A statement in the records by the treatment

provider is typically admissible as a record of a regularly conducted activity. Id. R.

803(6).

Detective Smith recognized and identified the SANE report as “a physical

done by one of the nurses or medical professionals that we work with on the

cases.” The juvenile court admitted the record and the statements it contained. The

record contained statements by D.M. again alleging that appellant penetrated D.M.

orally, vaginally, and anally at a location in Galveston County, Texas when D.M.

was eight years old. This record alone would have been sufficient for the juvenile

court to make its probable cause finding pursuant to section 54.02(j)(5) of the

12 Texas Family Code. Appellant was not harmed by the admission of the forensic

interview and outcry statement under these circumstances, where other evidence

that would have been admissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence provided the

same—if not more—inculpatory information than the hearsay statements in the

forensic interview and Detective Smith’s testimony. Nino v. State, 223 S.W.3d

749, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (finding harmless error

in admitting hearsay through improper outcry witness where additional admissible

evidence provided same information).

Having found that appellant was not harmed by the erroneous admission of

the forensic interview and outcry statement through Detective Smith, we now turn

to appellant’s second issue.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his second issue, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to

support the juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction under section 54.02(j)

of the Texas Family Code.

Our review of a transfer order is two-pronged. In re C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d

692, 701 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). First, we review a

juvenile court’s fact findings in support of a transfer decision under traditional

evidentiary sufficiency principles. H.Y., 512 S.W.3d at 478-79. We view the

13 evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and, if more than a

scintilla of the evidence supports a finding, the evidence is legally sufficient. In re

J.W.W., 507 S.W.3d 408, 413 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

Under a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider all the evidence presented to

determine if the court’s findings are against the great weight and preponderance of

the evidence so as to be clearly wrong or unjust. C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 701.

Second, we review the juvenile court’s waiver decision for an abuse of

discretion. C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 701. A juvenile court abuses its discretion when

it acts arbitrarily or outside of the zone of reasonable disagreement. See id.

This was a transfer under Texas Family Code section 54.02(j).

A juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a

person 18 years of age or older to the appropriate district court or criminal district

court for criminal proceedings if certain criteria are met. TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 54.02(j)(1). For a second- or third-degree felony, the accused must have been

between 15 and 17 years of age at the time of the alleged offense. Id. § 54.02(j)(2).

The offense cannot have been adjudicated or have been the subject of an

adjudication hearing. Id. § 54.02(j)(3). The juvenile court must also find from a

preponderance of the evidence that, for a reason beyond the control of the State, it

was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the eighteenth birthday of

14 the accused. Id. § 54.02(j)(4)(A). Finally, the juvenile court must determine that

there is probable cause to believe that the child before the court committed the

offense alleged. Id. § 54.02(j)(5).

At the hearing, the State had appellant’s birth certificate admitted into

evidence, proving that he was over 18 years of age at the time of the hearing. The

SANE records show that D.M. was 11 years old at the time of her examination on

December 17, 2020, and that the incident was alleged to have occurred when she

was 8 years old. This would place the incident in 2017, when appellant was fifteen

years old. The SANE records identify appellant by name and Detective Smith

identified appellant in the courtroom as the subject of the investigation. Detective

Smith testified that D.M. made her initial outcry in December 2020, which was

after appellant’s 18th birthday. Thus, the timing of D.M.’s initial outcry made it

impracticable to proceed before appellant’s 18th birthday. The juvenile court took

judicial notice of the fact that appellant had not been adjudicated or had an

adjudication hearing on any of the counts alleged by the State. The greater weight

of the evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the requirements of

sections 54.02(j)(1) through (4) of the Texas Family Code were proven by a

preponderance of the evidence. See Collins v. State, 516 S.W.3d 504, 525-26 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont 2017, pet. ref’d) (finding evidence sufficient to show that

15 prosecution before appellant’s eighteenth birthday was not practicable despite due

diligence where certain necessary information was not known to State).

D.M.’s statements in the SANE records contain sufficient probable cause to

believe that appellant penetrated D.M.’s mouth, vagina, and anus while she was 8

years old and appellant was 15. They are corroborated by the forensic interview

recording and body-worn camera video admitted at the hearing. The greater weight

of the evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that there was probable

cause to believe that appellant committed the offense. TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 54.02(j)(5); see Edwards v. State, No. 14-21-00432-CR, 2023 WL 4248745 at

*3-*4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 29, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(holding that statements complainant made during SANE examination

corroborated by police interview with complainant were sufficient to support

probable cause for search warrant for suspect’s buccal swab).

Because the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the

juvenile court’s findings under Texas Family Code section 54.02(j), the juvenile

court did not abuse its discretion in waiving its jurisdiction and ordering the

transfer to district court. Collins, 516 S.W.3d at 526; Edwards, 2023 WL 4248745

at *4-*5.

Conclusion

We affirm the juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction over C.P.C.

16 Amparo “Amy” Guerra Justice Panel Consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Dokupil.