TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-14-00028-CV
In the Matter of C.B.
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. J-32,272, HONORABLE RHONDA HURLEY, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
C.B. appeals the trial court’s order transferring him from the Texas Juvenile Justice
Department (TJJD)1 to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID)
to complete the remainder of his thirty-year determinate sentence for aggravated sexual assault of a
child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11 (governing juvenile court’s decision to parole or transfer juvenile
offender); Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 245.051(c) (governing release under supervision of child committed
to determinate sentence for delinquent conduct constituting violation of Texas Penal Code section
22.021); Tex. Penal Code § 22.021(a)(1), (a)(2)(B) (aggravated sexual assault). On appeal, C.B.
asserts that (1) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to transfer him to TDCJ-ID, (2) the
trial court erroneously transferred him to TDCJ-ID because the record establishes he should have
been transferred to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Parole Division (TDCJ-PD) to serve
1 The Texas Juvenile Justice Department was formerly known as the Texas Youth Commission (TYC). the remainder of his sentence on parole under supervision, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion
by ordering him to register as a sex offender. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
In April 2011, C.B., then sixteen years old, was arrested after sexually assaulting
his three-year-old cousin. The State filed a petition alleging delinquent conduct and seeking a
determinate sentence. C.B. waived his right to a jury trial and, after a hearing on May 17, 2011, the
district court, sitting as a juvenile court, found that C.B. had engaged in delinquent conduct. The
court committed C.B. to TJJD for a thirty-year determinate sentence. After considering C.B.’s
motion to be excused from registering as a sex offender, the court found that the decision on whether
C.B. should be required to register as a sex offender should be deferred until he had completed a sex
offender treatment program. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 62.351 (on motion by juvenile, court
must conduct hearing to determine whether interests of public require juvenile’s registration as sex
offender), .352 (court may enter order deferring decision on requiring sex offender registration until
respondent has completed sex offender treatment as condition of probation or while committed to
TJJD).
Because C.B. was sixteen years old at the time of the hearing on the State’s petition
for determinate sentence, it was not possible for him to serve the required three-year minimum
sentence in TJJD before his nineteenth birthday. See Tex. Hum. Res. Code §§ 245.051(c) (TJJD
may not release child under supervision without approval of juvenile court unless child has served
minimum period of confinement), .151(a) (TJJD may not discharge from its custody child serving
determinate sentence who has not served his minimum sentence). Instead, TJJD may request a
2 hearing before the juvenile court for the determination of whether the person should be released on
adult parole under the supervision of TDCJ-PD or transferred to TDCJ-ID to complete the remainder
of his determinate sentence.2 TJJD recommended that C.B. be released on adult parole under TDCJ-
PD’s supervision. The prosecuting attorney disagreed and sought to have C.B. transferred to TDCJ-
ID. Upon TJJD’s request for approval to release C.B. under supervision, the court was obligated to,
and did, conduct a hearing to determine whether C.B. should be transferred or released. Tex. Fam.
Code § 54.11(a).
At the hearing, several witnesses testified about whether C.B. should be released
on parole or transferred from TJJD to TDCJ-ID. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court
found that C.B. should be transferred to TDCJ-ID for completion of his thirty-year sentence. In its
written transfer order, the trial court noted that it had considered (1) the evidence and arguments of
counsel, (2) the experiences and character of C.B. before and after commitment to TJJD, (3) the
nature of the offense C.B. was found to have committed, (4) the protection of the victim of the
offense or any member of the victim’s family, (5) the recommendations of TJJD and of the
prosecuting attorney, and (6) C.B.’s best interests. See id. § 54.11(k) (identifying factors court may
consider when making determination whether to transfer person from TJJD to TDCJ-ID or release
him under supervision of TDCJ-PD). The trial court ordered C.B. returned by the Travis County
Sheriff’s Office to the care and custody of TJJD and then transferred to TDCJ-ID for the completion
2 TJJD’s letter requesting a hearing stated that C.B. “is 18 years of age and therefore subject to a transfer/release hearing under Sections 244.014 and 245.051, Human Resources Code and Section 54.11, Family Code.” The letter also acknowledged that a hearing was necessary because C.B. would not complete the three-year minimum sentence by his nineteenth birthday and therefore could not be released from TJJD without court approval.
3 of his sentence. The trial court also ordered C.B. to register as a sex offender. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art. 62.051. This appeal followed. In three issues C.B. contends that the trial court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the transfer order and that it abused its discretion by ordering that
he be transferred to TDCJ-ID and that he register as a sex offender.
Subject-matter Jurisdiction
We first consider C.B.’s second appellate issue in which he asserts that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to order C.B. transferred to TDCJ-ID. According to C.B., because TJJD was
recommending that he be released to adult parole under TDCJ-PD supervision, the trial court’s
jurisdiction was limited to either approving or disapproving of the release and the court did not have
the power to order him transferred to TDCJ-ID. We disagree.
TJJD may not retain custody of a youthful offender beyond his nineteenth
birthday. See Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 245.151(d), (e). Thus, prior to reaching the age of nineteen,
a determination must be made whether a juvenile serving a determinate sentence will be released
under supervision or transferred to TDCJ-ID to complete his sentence. Id. § 245.051. If the youthful
offender has been committed to TJJD for conduct constituting a first degree felony, TJJD is
prohibited from releasing him under supervision without approval of the juvenile court that entered
the order of commitment unless the youthful offender has served three years of his determinate
sentence. See id. § 245.051(c)(2). If, as in the present case, TJJD recommends release of a juvenile
who was sentenced for a first-degree felony and who has not served at least three years in TJJD, the
court must hold a hearing to determine whether the juvenile should be released under supervision
of TDCJ-PD or transferred to TDCJ-ID. Id. §§ 244.014; 245.051(c)(2); Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11(a);
4 see also In re J.D., No. 10-13-00112-CV, 2014 WL 5494709, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 26,
2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re L.C., No. 04-12-00326-CV, 2013 WL 1338358, at *2 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Apr. 3, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). After evidence has been presented and the
hearing has concluded, the trial court may order the return of the person to TJJD with or without
approval for the person’s release under supervision or order him transferred to TDCJ-ID to serve the
remainder of the determinate sentence. Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11(i)-(j).
C.B. was sixteen years old at the time of the hearing on the State’s petition for
determinate sentencing, and it was not possible for him to serve the required three-year minimum
sentence. For this reason, TJJD requested, and the court conducted, a “transfer/release” hearing.
Although TJJD recommended release on adult parole under TDCJ-PD supervision, the court did
not approve that recommendation and ordered C.B. returned to TJJD and thereafter transferred to
TDCJ-ID to serve the remainder of his sentence.
In his brief, C.B. asserts that the trial court can only order a transfer if it has received
a referral for transfer from TJJD not when, as here, TJJD recommends release. It is true that TJJD
may request the transfer of a child found to have engaged in delinquent conduct constituting a first-
degree felony to TDCJ once the child has reached the age of sixteen. See Tex. Hum. Res. Code
§ 244.014 (referral of violent and habitual offenders for transfer). But that provision of the Human
Resources Code does not limit the court’s jurisdiction to consider whether the juvenile should be
released under supervision or transferred to TDCJ-ID to complete his sentence in a hearing
conducted pursuant to Family Code section 54.11 when the child committed under a determinate
sentence is approaching his nineteenth birthday without having served the minimum required
5 sentence. TJJD requested a transfer or release hearing under Human Resources Code sections
244.014 (“Referral of Determinate Sentence Offenders for Transfer”) and 245.051 (“Release Under
Supervision”). The court had subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct the release or transfer hearing.
See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 51.04 (juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings under
Juvenile Justice Code); .0411 (court retains jurisdiction over person who is referred to court under
54.11 for transfer to TDCJ-ID or release under supervision).
C.B. also contends that the transfer was unauthorized because the evidence did not
demonstrate that his conduct indicated that the welfare of the community required the transfer. See
Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 244.014(a)(2) (transfer pursuant to section 245.014 requires showing that
child’s conduct indicates that welfare of community requires it). In essence, C.B. contends that the
evidence did not support a transfer order. Any such evidentiary shortcoming, however, would not
operate to deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the release or transfer hearing. We
overrule C.B.’s second appellate issue.
Transfer Order
In his first issue, C.B. argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
him transferred to TDCJ-ID instead of released on adult parole under TDCJ-PD supervision. A trial
court’s decision to transfer a juvenile from TJJD to TDCJ-ID is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
In re R.T., No. 03-13-00378-CV, 2014 WL 1691639, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 24, 2014,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re J.L.C., 160 S.W.3d 312, 313 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)).
In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we review the entire record to determine
if the trial court acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding principles or
6 rules. In re D.L., 198 S.W.3d 228, 229 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied). “The trial court’s
decision will be upheld if the record contains some evidence to support it.” In re N.K.M., 387
S.W.3d 859, 864 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.).
When conducting a transfer or release hearing pursuant to Family Code section
54.11, the trial court may consider written reports provided by “probation officers, professional
court employees, professional consultants, or employees of [TJJD].” Tex. Fam. Code § 54.11(d).
Additionally, when making a decision whether to approve TJJD’s recommendation for release
under supervision, the trial court may take into account:
the experiences and character of the person before and after commitment to [TJJD], the nature of the penal offense that the person was found to have committed and the manner in which the offense was committed, the abilities of the person to contribute to society, the protection of the victim of the offense or any member of the victim’s family, the recommendations of [TJJD] and prosecuting attorney, the best interests of the person, and any other factor relevant to the issue to be decided.
Id. § 54.11(k). The trial court is not obliged to consider all of the factors listed, and it may consider
relevant factors not listed. In re N.K.M., 387 S.W.3d at 864; see In re J.J., 276 S.W.3d 171, 178
(Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied). Moreover, the trial court can assign different weights to the
factors considered. In re N.K.M., 387 S.W.3d at 864.
At the hearing, the trial court heard evidence about the brutal nature of the underlying
offense, C.B.’s having admitted that he had previously coerced two boys his age into sexual conduct,
and one incident of sexual misconduct after C.B. was committed to TJJD. There was evidence that
C.B. was highly intelligent but suffered from an array of mental health disorders that were the focus
of his treatment while at TJJD. He also successfully completed a sexual behavior treatment program.
7 Dr. Alexandra Marks, a clinical psychologist at the Corsicana Residential Treatment Center where
C.B. lived, testified that C.B. has issues with isolation and withdrawal from other people, is impulsive,
and has difficulty managing his behavior when under stress or in a highly emotional state. There
was evidence that, during his exit interview from the sexual behavior treatment program, C.B.
reported that he was attracted to young children. Dr. Marks opined that C.B. could be “fairly
successful” on adult parole if in a very structured environment and if he participated in “aftercare
for sexual behavior” while in the community.
There was evidence that, although C.B. expressed remorse for his behavior, he had
trouble expressing empathy for others, which was attributed to a diagnosis of Asperger’s Disorder.
Patrick Weaver, a licensed professional counseling intern, reported that C.B. felt that his sentence
was excessive and that on a number of occasions C.B. threatened self-harm if he was not provided
with legal assistance. Dr. Madeline Byrne, TJJD’s manager of institutional clinical services,
recommended that C.B. be released under supervision but indicated that he should implement a
“relapse plan” that included avoiding pornography, never being unsupervised around children,
continuing mental health services, and staying active and busy. In her view, sex offenders reduce
the risk of reoffending by having a “well rounded life” and having emotional support from someone
close to them. Dr. Byrne testified that C.B. cooperated with the program, follows rules well, and
“existed within the structure of the treatment program with good compliance.”
The recommendation that C.B. be released on adult parole was based predominantly
on his compliance with the treatment program provided at the Corsicana Residential Treatment
Center, which focused on addressing his mental health issues. Each of the witnesses recommending
8 release under supervision stressed the importance of C.B.’s remaining in a highly structured
environment with continued mental health treatment. Larry Cucolo, TJJD’s court liaison,
recommended special conditions of parole including that C.B. participate in mental health treatment,
obtain gainful employment, participate in a sex offender treatment program, and be subject to
TDCJ-PD’s “Super Intensive Supervision Program,” which includes wearing an electronic monitor
and only being permitted to go to work, school, his parole office, and counseling.
The record establishes that the trial court reviewed the evidence in light of relevant
section 54.11(k) factors. The court acknowledged that C.B. sincerely regretted his actions and
wanted help with his mental health issues. But the court also expressed concern that C.B. had not
yet received all the services he needed, including additional sexual behavior treatment, and that the
evidence indicated that he was not yet able to control his impulses. The trial court heard evidence
that C.B. had a very negative relationship with his mother, did not have a relationship with his
father, and wanted to live with his grandparents, who might not be able to provide C.B. the highly
structured environment he needed to successfully reintegrate into the community.
C.B. contends that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the witnesses’
recommendations that he be released on adult supervision. But, as C.B. acknowledges, the trial court’s
discretion in a release or transfer hearing is broad, and the record includes evidence supporting the
trial court’s decision. This includes the brutal nature of the assault, previous incidents involving
sexual misconduct, an incident of sexual misconduct occurring at TJJD, and C.B.’s acknowledgment
at the conclusion of the sexual behavior treatment program that he was attracted to children. The
trial court was entitled to give more weight to the seriousness of the underlying offense and to the
concern that C.B.’s mental health issues, while improving, still caused him to be unable to control
9 his impulses when confronted with stressful situations. The trial court was also entitled to give more
weight to the fact that C.B. would require a considerable degree of structure in his life, and it was
not beyond the court’s discretion to conclude that C.B. was not ready to be released under
supervision and could pose a risk to the community if he were. Because there is some evidence to
support the trial court’s decision to transfer C.B. to TDCJ-ID as opposed to releasing him on adult
parole, we hold there was no abuse of discretion. We overrule C.B.’s first appellate issue.
Sex Offender Registration
In his third issue, C.B. contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
him to register as a sex offender pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure chapter 62.
According to C.B., he should not have been ordered to register because he had successfully
completed sex offender treatment and there was no evidence to indicate that registration was in the
public interest. The trial court originally deferred the decision on whether to require C.B. to register
as a sex offender until after he completed a sex offender treatment program. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art. 62.352(b)(1), (c). Once treatment is successfully completed, the juvenile offender is
exempted from registration unless a hearing is held on the State’s motion and the court determines
the interests of the public require registration. Id. art. 62.352(c). The standard of review is whether
the juvenile court committed procedural error or abused its discretion in requiring the juvenile
offender to register as a sex offender. Id. art. 62.357(b).
C.B. argues that the court abused its discretion because the evidence does not support
the trial court’s decision to require him to register. After successful completion of sex offender
treatment, the juvenile offender is exempt from registration unless the court finds that the
10 interests of the public nevertheless require registration. See In re L.L., Jr., 408 S.W.3d 383, 386
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.). In the absence of written findings, we will examine the trial
court’s implied findings that could support its decision. The court could have found under article
62.352(c) that C.B. successfully completed the treatment program but the interests of the public
require registration. C.B. states that there is no evidence to support such a finding, and thus he
challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the implied findings. In reviewing a legal
sufficiency challenge, we consider only the evidence tending to support the finding and disregard
all evidence and inferences to the contrary. See In re S.J.C., 304 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2010, no pet.). The evidence is legally sufficient if more than a scintilla of evidence supports
the challenged finding. Id. Here, there was evidence that C.B. committed a brutal sexual assault
on a very young child. There was also evidence that C.B. had a history of sexual misconduct before
and after his commitment to TJJD. The record includes evidence that C.B. is subject to impulsive
behavior when under stressful situations. In his exit interview from the sex offender treatment
program, C.B. reported that he was attracted to young children. We conclude that the record
contains more than a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to order that
C.B. register as a sex offender and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. We
overrule C.B.’s third appellate issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled C.B.’s three appellate issues, we affirm the trial court’s order
transferring C.B. to TDCJ-ID for the remainder of his determinate sentence and its order that
C.B. register as a sex offender pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure chapter 62.
11 _____________________________________________
Scott K. Field, Justice
Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Field
Affirmed
Filed: July 15, 2015