In the Matter of an Impounded Case

Opinion

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SJC-13846

IN THE MATTER OF AN IMPOUNDED CASE.

Suffolk. February 2, 2026. - May 8, 2026.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, Dewar, & Wolohojian, JJ.

Department of Children & Families. Declaratory Relief. Injunction, Superior Court. Jurisdiction, Superior Court, Juvenile Court. Superior Court, Jurisdiction. Juvenile Court, Jurisdiction. Practice, Civil, Injunctive relief, Declaratory proceeding, Motion to dismiss. Minor, Care and protection. Administrative Law, Regulations. Grandparent.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 4, 2024.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Joseph F. Johnston, J., sitting under statutory authority.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Jennifer M. Lamanna for the plaintiff. Phoebe Fischer-Groban, Assistant Attorney General, for Department of Children and Families & another. Morgan A. Russell for the children. Ann Balmelli O'Connor & Andrew L. Cohen, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 2

KAFKER, J. After initially placing the plaintiff's three

grandchildren into her foster care, the Department of Children

and Families (DCF) notified the plaintiff that it would be

placing the children into a new home. The plaintiff challenged

that decision pursuant to DCF's administrative fair hearing

process, see 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.01 (2014), but the

children were removed during the process; the hearing officer

subsequently rendered a final determination in the plaintiff's

favor. One month after that determination became final, with

the children still placed elsewhere, the plaintiff filed a

complaint in the Superior Court seeking (1) a declaration that

DCF had violated its own regulations by ignoring the results of

the fair hearing, and (2) an injunction returning her three

grandchildren to her care. Reasoning that the Juvenile Court

had exclusive original jurisdiction over placement-related

matters, a Superior Court judge, who was a Juvenile Court judge

sitting by special designation, concluded that the Superior

Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case.

We conclude that the Superior Court cannot grant the

injunctive relief requested by the plaintiff. When children

have been adjudicated in need of care and protection and placed

into DCF custody, any order concerning placement of such

children is relief reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of the

Juvenile Court. But the Superior Court can issue a declaration 3

that an agency's "practices or procedures" consistently violate

its own regulations, G. L. c. 231A, § 2, and thus the

plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim lies within the Superior

Court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm in part and

reverse in part the judgment of dismissal, and we remand the

case to the Superior Court.1

1. Background. Pursuant to care and protection

proceedings in the Juvenile Court, in January of 2023, DCF

removed three young children from their father's care and placed

them into foster care with the plaintiff, their paternal

grandmother. At the time of their removal, the children's

mother was missing and their father had been arrested in

connection with her disappearance.

In May of 2023, DCF notified the plaintiff that it intended

to remove the children from her care and place them instead in

the care of their maternal aunt and uncle. The plaintiff timely

sought review of that decision via an administrative fair

hearing. See 110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 10.00 (2014). Her appeal

triggered an automatic stay of the removal decision, but that

stay was lifted following a determination by a DCF regional

director that remaining with the plaintiff would endanger the

1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee for Public Counsel Services. 4

children's well-being. See 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.09(3).

Accordingly, on June 5, 2023, DCF removed the children from the

plaintiff's care and placed them with their maternal aunt and

uncle.2

The fair hearing began on August 10, 2023, and proceeded

over multiple days, concluding on September 21, 2023. On April

3, 2024 -- over one-half year later -- the hearing officer

issued a written decision in favor of the plaintiff;3 DCF took no

action to appeal from that decision, and it became final on May

6, 2024.

On June 4, 2024, the plaintiff commenced the instant action

in the Superior Court, naming DCF and its Commissioner as

defendants. Her two-count complaint requested injunctive and

declaratory relief under both G. L. c. 231A and G. L. c. 214,

2 The plaintiff also sought relief via the filing of a guardianship petition. She withdrew that petition on March 18, 2024, the same date when, after a trial in the care and protection proceeding in the Juvenile Court, DCF was awarded permanent custody of the children, and the father stipulated to the termination of his parental rights.

3 The decision's conclusion states: "The [plaintiff] has shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that [DCF]'s decisions to remove the children from the [plaintiff]'s kinship foster home was not made in conformity with [DCF] regulations and with a reasonable basis, and therefore, [DCF]'s decision is REVERSED." 5

§ 1.4 The Juvenile Court judge who was presiding over the

related care and protection proceedings was interdepartmentally

assigned to preside over this case in the Superior Court. See

G. L. c. 211B, § 9 (xi).

On June 18, 2024, DCF held a "Regional Clinical Review"

meeting, the purpose of which was to "review the appropriateness

of [the plaintiff] as a long-term resource." DCF concluded that

it would "support [the plaintiff's] role as a grandmother and

not as the permanent placement provider for the children." In

July of 2024, the children were removed from the care of their

maternal aunt and uncle and placed in an unrelated foster home.

In January of 2025, the defendants moved to dismiss the

complaint, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction and that

the complaint failed to state a claim. See Mass. R. Civ. P.

12 (b) (1), (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). The plaintiff cross-

moved for judgment on the pleadings. See Mass. R. Civ. P.

12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). On February 14, 2025, the

Superior Court issued its decision, wherein it explained that it

lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief and thus was

bound to dismiss the case. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (h) (3), 365

General Laws c. 231A governs the Superior Court's power to 4

grant declaratory relief, and G. L. c. 214, § 1, establishes its general equity jurisdiction. 6

Mass. 754 (1974). The plaintiff timely appealed, and we

transferred the case to this court on our own accord.

2. Discussion. "We review dismissal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction de novo." Gammella v. P.F. Chang's China

Bistro, Inc., 482 Mass. 1, 16 (2019). "Subject matter

jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the

type of relief sought" (quotation and citation omitted). Ten

Persons of the Commonwealth v. Fellsway Dev. LLC, 460 Mass. 366,

375 (2011).

The judge below correctly recognized that the Legislature

has empowered the Juvenile Court, and not the Superior Court,

with jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief requested by

the plaintiff: placing the children in her foster care. This

is because such relief flows from proceedings that are, by

statute, confined to the Juvenile Court. See G. L. c. 119,

§§ 24, 26.

Care and protection petitions must be initiated in the

Juvenile Court, see G. L. c. 119, § 24, and thus only the

Juvenile Court may commit children to the custody of DCF in such

proceedings, see G. L. c. 119, § 26. Once a child enters DCF

custody, DCF is empowered to "determine [the] child's place of

abode," G. L. c. 119, § 21, which is primarily in a private

foster home, see G. L. c. 119, § 32. Subsequent judicial review

of DCF's foster placement decisions occurs in the Juvenile 7

Court. See G. L. c. 119, § 21 ("If a parent or guardian objects

to [placement or visitation decisions], that parent or guardian

may take application to the committing court . . ."). See also

Care & Protection of Isaac, 419 Mass. 602, 608-611 (1995)

(discussing options for judicial review in care and protection

cases).

In Custody of a Minor (No. 1), 391 Mass. 572 (1984), we

were faced with the question whether, after an initial

determination of a child's needs in a care and protection

proceeding in the Juvenile Court, the Superior Court could

exercise jurisdiction over subsequent "review and

redetermination" proceedings, G. L. c. 119, § 26 (c). We

answered in the negative:

"We have little difficulty in deciding that the appropriate forum for the exercise of this review power is the Juvenile Court. This court has often recognized the unique character of the Juvenile Courts as forums in which, to the extent possible, the best interests of the child serve to guide disposition. . . . We can find no judicial policy or statutory indication that this . . . continuing right to review was meant to be vested in a court different from the court in which the care and protection petition was initiated." (Quotation and citation omitted.)

Custody of a Minor (No. 1), supra at 575-576. Similar reasoning

dictates the result here. Where a care and protection

proceeding must commence, progress, and face subsequent review

in the Juvenile Court, it follows that any placement-related

relief arising out of a custody determination in such a 8

proceeding must also be granted by the Juvenile Court. The

plaintiff's request that DCF be enjoined from "refusing to

return [the children] to her" is in substance a request for such

relief, and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Superior Court

to grant. Cf. Konstantopoulos v. Whately, 384 Mass. 123, 128-

129 (1981) (holding Probate Court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over claim seeking relief in nature of certiorari,

notwithstanding plaintiff's attempt to characterize it as

injunctive and declaratory relief).

The Superior Court's jurisdiction does, however, permit

declaratory relief, including "a determination of the legality

of the administrative practices and procedures of any municipal,

county or state agency or official which practices or procedures

are alleged to be . . . in violation of rules or regulations

. . . which violation has been consistently repeated." G. L.

c. 231A, § 2. See Kenney v. Commissioner of Correction, 393

Mass. 28, 31 n.6 (1984). Here, in addition to injunctive

relief, the plaintiff's complaint requested a declaration "that

[DCF's] decision to ignore the orders issued through its

administrative procedure is a violation of [its] governing

regulations." Granting such declaratory relief, where

warranted, lies within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court,

and therefore dismissing the complaint in full was error.

Should the plaintiff adequately plead and prove as much, the 9

Superior Court has jurisdiction to declare whether DCF's

practices or procedures regarding the fair hearing process were

consistently repeated and violated its own governing

regulations. This it may do, even though the Superior Court

lacks jurisdiction to order placement-related relief for a child

in DCF custody, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of

the Juvenile Court.

As for whether declaratory relief should issue, and for the

other, nonjurisdictional arguments raised by the parties in

their motions, "[t]he judge did not reach [them]. We do not

reach them either. They may be considered on remand." Doe v.

Attorney Gen. (No. 1), 425 Mass. 210, 216 (1997).

3. Conclusion. We affirm so much of the judgment as

dismisses the plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief,

reverse so much of the judgment as dismisses the plaintiff's

requests for declaratory relief, and remand the case to the

Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

So ordered.