NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3769-19
IN THE MATTER OF ALEJANDRO PEREZ, KEAN UNIVERSITY. ____________________
Argued February 2, 2022 – Decided February 15, 2022
Before Judges Whipple, Geiger and Susswein.
On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service Commission, Docket No. 2020-615.
Arthur J. Murray argued the cause for appellant Alejandro Perez (Alterman & Associates, LLC, attorneys; Stuart J. Alterman, of counsel; Arthur J. Murray, on the briefs).
Achchana Ranasinghe, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Kean University (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Achchana Ranasinghe, on the brief).
Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission (Debra A. Allen, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief).
PER CURIAM Appellant Alejandro Perez was employed as a police officer by
respondent Kean University (Kean). Perez was removed from employment
effective August 23, 2019, due to misconduct on February 6, 2019, and false
statements he made to an internal affairs investigator regarding that
misconduct. Perez appeals from the final administrative action of the Civil
Service Commission (Commission) affirming the granting of Kean 's motion
for summary decision and his removal. We affirm.
We derive the following facts and procedural history from the record.
Perez was employed by Kean as a campus police officer in the Kean
University Police Department (KUPD). On February 6, 2019, Perez was
dispatched around 3:00 a.m. to aid a student who complained of a sinus
infection. Perez called an ambulance to transport the student to the hospital
and then called Public Safety Telecommunicator Stephanie Willix. On the
recorded telephone line, Perez made several derogatory and insensitive
comments about the student because Perez felt the student somehow wasted his
time or was not sick enough to warrant his attention. Perez told Willix that the
student was a "f**king loser" and that he "will run [the student's] ass over with
this f**king car." Perez and Willix laughed and made additional jokes about
the student, including Perez's statement that the student should "tie the knot
around [his] head." A log of the call included the inappropriate language that
A-3769-19 2 was uttered. At one point, Perez referred to the student looking like the
character Private Pyle from the movie Full Metal Jacket.
Following the mocking phone call, Perez continued the night shift by
going to the Field House gymnasium (gym) on the Kean campus. Perez called
out for a meal break and went to exercise at the gym. Perez entered the locked
gym at about 3:11 a.m. Perez removed his duty weapon, police-issued radio,
and cell phone and laid them unsecured and unattended on a chair in a public
area of the gym. Before exercising, Perez used the restroom and became stuck
inside when the restroom door would not open. Perez could not call for help
because his radio and cell phone were both in the gym.
Perez was discovered around 4:00 a.m. by a custodian employed by a
third-party, who tried to open the door but could not. The custodian called
campus police and KUPD Lieutenant Keith Graham and Officer Sage
Kaneshige responded at around 4:51 a.m. The officers used a crowbar to pry
the door open, resulting in $1,573 in damages. The officers then socialized in
the gym until 5:31 a.m. Perez, Graham, and Kaneshige left the gym and
entered their respective patrol vehicles at 5:34 a.m. based on surveillance
footage. Perez remained inside his patrol vehicle while parked outside the
gym until 7:24 a.m. and did not perform any patrol duties between the time he
was freed from the restroom until the end of his shift at 8:00 a.m.
A-3769-19 3 An internal affairs investigation of the events of February 6 was
conducted by KUPD Lieutenant Thomas Hargrove. On March 28, 2019, Perez
was interviewed by Hargrove in the presence of his attorney and union
representative. Perez was untruthful at this interview when he stated he and
Graham spoke for approximately twenty minutes before they both drove off to
resume patrol duties. Video surveillance footage showed Perez remained
parked next to Graham's vehicle for one hour and fifty minutes after they left
the gym. While there was no allegation that Perez failed to respond to a call
for service, he was not patrolling the campus during the remainder of his shift.
On June 12, 2019, Perez was served with a Preliminary Notice of
Disciplinary Action (PNDA) that charged him with incompetency,
inefficiency, or failure to perform duties, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1); conduct
unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6); neglect of duty,
N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7); and other sufficient cause, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12).
Kean also charged Perez with violation of numerous KUPD Rules and
Regulations, including failure to abide rules and regulations (3.1.3), failure to
obey laws, rules, policies, and procedures (4.1.3), failure to perform assigned
duties (3.1.9, 4.1.1, 6.1.1), failure to conduct himself in accordance with high
ethical standards (3.1.6), improper handling of firearms (4.8.1, 4.8.3),
improper care of department property (4.8.4), improper use of department
A-3769-19 4 vehicles (4.8.9), failure to be truthful at all times (4.12.6), failing to be
courteous and orderly when dealing with the public (4.10.1), and committing
repeated violations (6.1.2). It also charged Perez with violating General Order
22.3.1.4A, which requires officers to sign a release form before using Kean's
workout facilities. The PNDA advised Perez that Kean sought his removal.
A departmental hearing took place on July 3, 2019. Perez was served
with an August 21, 2019 Final Notice of Disciplinary Action ("FNDA"),
removing him effective August 23, 2019 on the following charges:
incompetency, inefficiency, or failure to perform duties, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-
2.3(a)(1); conduct unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6);
neglect of duty, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7); and other sufficient cause, N.J.A.C.
4A:2-2.3(a)(12).
In its specifications for the charges, Kean indicated that on February 6,
2019, "Perez was dispatched to a medical call for a student. After responding
to the call, Perez [made] several derogatory and threatening comments laced
with profanity regarding the student while speaking to . . . Willix over a
recorded police telephone line." Kean further specified that Perez left his duty
belt, duty weapon, and police-issued radio unsecured and unattended in a
public area. After becoming trapped in a locked bathroom, Perez was freed
from the bathroom by other officers, "result[ing] in costly damage to the
A-3769-19 5 restroom door." Perez then remained in his patrol vehicle from approximately
5:34 a.m. until 7:24 a.m., "socializing for much of that time . . . [and] did not
perform any patrol functions between about 4:51 [a.m.] and the end of his shift
at 8:00 [a.m.]." "During an Internal Affairs interview conducted on or about
March 28, 2019, Officer Perez untruthfully stated that he resumed patrol duties
after leaving the Field House."
Perez appealed his removal to the Commission and the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL). The appeal was assigned to an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) as a contested case.
At a prehearing conference held on October 9, 2019, Kean informed
Perez and the ALJ that it intended to file a motion for summary decision , and
did so on January 23, 2020. Perez opposed the motion.
On April 2, 2020, the ALJ issued a twenty-one page Amended Initial
Decision, which granted Kean's motion for summary decision, finding the case
was "ripe for summary decision" because the material facts were "clear and
undisputed." The ALJ explained:
In this case, no genuine issue as to the material facts exists, and the only question presented is whether Kean sustained its charges, and if sustained, the appropriate discipline. More pointedly, no genuine issue exists that Perez used profanity and made derogatory comments about a student on a recorded police-designated phone line and that he left his service weapon and radio unattended in a public A-3769-19 6 location. Further, Perez did not resume vehicle patrol duties away from the fieldhouse following extrication for the conclusion of his shift on February 6, 2019, and was untruthful about "driving off" to resume patrol duties during an internal affairs interview.
The Amended Initial Decision included a detailed recitation of the facts.
The ALJ noted that "[t]he material evidence against Perez [was] his
admissions supported by inherently credible sources of surveillance video
footage, [body-worn camera] footage, a dispatch audio recording, and an
internal affairs interview of Perez. Indeed, Perez does not question the
credibility of this evidence." The ALJ found that "[n]either Perez nor Graham
logged CAD entries of patrol or building checks after Perez's extrication from
the restroom." In addition, surveillance cameras showed that Graham and
Perez "remained in their cars at the fieldhouse from 5:34 a.m. until 7:25 a.m.
Thus, Perez did not check the security of any other building or parking lot for
nearly two hours."
The ALJ further found that "[a]t the departmental hearing, . . . Perez
apologized for his inappropriate discussion about the student." In his opposing
certification, Perez claimed "that following the incident in the bathroom, he
felt frightened and desired to be in the presence of other people."
The ALJ found that the evidence established the following facts:
Perez engaged in a series of acts that are incompatible with a high degree of integrity expected A-3769-19 7 of all law enforcement officials. Initially, even if patrol duties permit an officer to remain in his vehicle and speak with another officer for an extended period, Perez did not "drive off" and resume patrol duties, as he stated during his internal investigation interview. The dispute is not what does or does not encompass patrol duties, but that Perez did not do what he said he did during his interview. In other words, he lied.
Also, Perez became separated from and did not secure his service weapon or police radio before entering the restroom. The safety risk to the public may diminish with a holstered gun in a locked and empty public building. Yet, an unattended service weapon still poses a public safety risk and violates Kean's rules and regulations. Undeniably, the rules do not provide exceptions for weapons left in holsters or temporarily empty public buildings. Further, Perez was required to have his radio in his possession, turned on, and tuned to the proper frequency while on duty; instead, he did not. Without his radio, Perez was unable to call out for aid.
Regardless of the student's absence during Perez's statements about him and Perez's correct handling of the medical call, Perez showed significant disrespect and disregard for a student whom he must serve and protect. Perez's conduct is not consistent with high ethical standards required of officers, on or off-duty, under Rule 3.16, even when not a violation of conduct towards the public under Rule 4.10.1.
The ALJ concluded that Kean had sustained the charges by a preponderance of
the evidence except violating Rule 4.10.1 (courteous treatment of the public)
and General Order 22.3.1.4A (signing release before using workout facilities), .
A-3769-19 8 The ALJ then considered the appropriate penalty for Perez's misconduct.
The ALJ noted that "[m]isconduct is severe when it renders the employee
unsuitable for continuation in the position, or when the application of
progressive discipline would be contrary to the public interest—such as when
the job involves public safety and the misconduct causes a risk of har m to
persons or property."
The ALJ found that Perez had received prior discipline, including a
written reprimand for discourteous conduct toward a student in 2008, a two -
day suspension for refusal to submit a report in 2010, and a six-day suspension
for insubordination and disrespectful conduct unbecoming a police officer in
2013. Perez had also received a series of corrective memoranda addressing
issues concerning patrol duties in 2007, following orders in 2009, and abuse of
sick leave in 2010. The ALJ recognized that Perez had been a KUPD police
officer for nearly twenty years, his most recent discipline occurred nearly six
years before these incidents, and much of it did not involve similar conduct.
The ALJ determined that removal was justified due to "the egregious
nature of Perez's conduct on February 6, 2019, and during his internal affairs
interview on March 28, 2019 . . . ." "Perez demonstrated a serious lapse in
judgment by failing to secure his service weapon or carry his radio that created
an unnecessary safety risk for the public." His statements about the student
A-3769-19 9 requesting medical assistance were "admittedly offensive." His untruthfulness
during his internal affairs interview compromised "the integrity of legitimate
law-enforcement work" and "public trust in law enforcement suffers."
The ALJ rejected Perez's claims that procedural irregularities warranted
dismissal of the charges. She noted that Perez received notice of the Internal
Affairs investigation. The PNDA advised Perez of the charges brought against
him. As to the timeliness of the filing of the charges, the ALJ noted the forty -
five-day rule filing period did "not begin until the person authorized to file the
charges obtains adequate information necessary to determine whether charges
are appropriate." Moreover, the forty-five-day rule only applies to charges
"related to violations of departmental rules and regulations, not complaints
based on misconduct where no time constraints apply." Less than forty-five
days elapsed between the completion of the Internal Affairs investigation and
the issuance of the PNDA.
As to the alleged procedural improprieties at the departmental hearing,
including claims that the departmental hearing officer was biased, the ALJ
explained that such irregularities are cured by a later hearing at the OAL. The
ALJ noted the appeal of the disciplinary action was considered "as if no prior
hearing occurred and as if no decision had issued."
A-3769-19 10 Perez filed lengthy exceptions to the Amended Initial Decision. He
complained that the ALJ did not adequately consider his arguments and that
the outcome was predetermined. He contended that the ALJ misinterpreted
Perez as a university police officer rather than a campus police officer. Perez
asserted that the Initial Decision incorrectly stated he had not identified any
lay or expert witnesses that he intended to call as a witness. His attorney
certified that "Perez requested that certain witnesses be made available at the
departmental hearing" to provide facts, context, and additional information
regarding the alleged incidents. Perez claimed Kean refused to provide the
witnesses he requested unless they were witnesses Kean was calling.
Perez also contended that his denial he was untruthful during the Internal
Affairs interview created a fact in dispute involving credibility, making it
inappropriate to decide the appeal by summary decision. Perez also
challenged the ALJ's conclusion that he provided no evidence to support his
allegation that the hearing officer was biased. He noted that a civil lawsuit had
been filed against the hearing officer.
On May 22, 2020, the Commission issued a final administrative action
accepting and adopting the findings of fact and conclusions contained in the
ALJ's Amended Initial Decision, affirming the granting of Kean's motion for
summary decision, and affirming the removal of Perez. This appeal followed.
A-3769-19 11 Perez raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
KEAN WAS ENTIRELY WITHIN ITS RIGHT TO PROCEED WITH ITS DEPARTMENTAL HEARING WITHOUT ALLOWING PEREZ TO RETAIN AN EXPERT AND CALL THAT EXPERT TO TESTIFY. (Not argued below).
POINT II
PEREZ WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS OPPORTUNITY TO CURE DEFICIENCIES AT KEAN'S DEPARTMENTAL HEARING IN THE OAL.
POINT III
THE SUMMARY DISPOSITION MOTION IN THIS MATTER WAS DECIDED ON SOMETHING LESS THAN THE FULL RECORD.
POINT IV
THE ALJ'S AMENDED INITIAL DECISION CONTAINS A PATENT FALSEHOOD CONCERNING THE IDENTIFICATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES PEREZ PLANNED TO CALL IF THERE WERE A HEARING.
POINT V
PEREZ'S PAST DISCIPLINARY HISTORY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ATTACHED AS AN EXHIBIT TO THE MOTION FILED BY KEAN, BUT RATHER SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED UNDER SEAL TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. (Not argued below).
A-3769-19 12 POINT VI
ANY REMAND TO THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW VIA THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SHOULD INCLUDE A REASSIGNMENT TO AN ALTERNATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE.
We affirm the final administrative action of the Commission removing
Perez substantially for the reasons expressed by the ALJ in her comprehensive
and well-reasoned Amended Initial Decision, which the Commission accepted
and adopted. The Commission's final administrative action "is supported by
sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole" and does not warrant
extended discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). We add the following comments.
"A party may move for summary decision upon all or any of the
substantive issues in a contested case." N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). The motion may
be granted if the motion record "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as
a matter of law." N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). To avoid summary decision, the
adverse party "must by responding affidavit set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary
proceeding." Ibid. If the opposing party does not demonstrate that a genuine
issue of material fact exists, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary, even when
constitutionally protected interests are at stake. Contini v. Bd. of Educ. of
A-3769-19 13 Newark, 286 N.J. Super. 106, 120-21 (App. Div. 1995) (citing Codd v. Velger,
429 U.S. 624 (1977); Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S.
609 (1973)).
The standard for summary decision "is substantially the same as that
governing a motion under Rule 4:46-2 for summary judgment in civil
litigation." Id. at 121. "Under this standard, the court or agency must
determine 'whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the
applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to
resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.'" Id. at
122 (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995)).
Here, the record demonstrates that the controlling material facts were not
in dispute. The ALJ properly decided the appeal by summary decision.
Perez argues there were deficiencies at the department hearing, including
the alleged bias of the hearing officer, that he could not remedy because Kean
was granted summary decision. We are unpersuaded.
In re Morrison involved similar facts where a police officer appealed a
decision of the Commission terminating his employment. 216 N.J. Super 143
(App. Div. 1987). The officer argued the proceedings at the departmental
hearing were void ab initio because of bias. Id. at 151. We rejected the
A-3769-19 14 officer's argument, finding that the ALJ "considered all of the evidence anew
and made findings which were not premised on any finding of the hearing
officer at the local level." Id. at 151-52. In fact, we held that any review of the
departmental hearing was precluded because the ALJ provided a de novo
hearing which was done by an unbiased adjudicator and "[i]t is as if there had
been no prior hearing and as if no decision had been previously rendered." Id.
at 151 (quoting Cliff v. Morris Cnty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 197 N.J. Super. 307,
315 (App. Div. 1984)). We reach the same conclusion here. The ALJ did not
base her findings or conclusions on what occurred at the departmental hearing
or the findings or conclusions of the hearing officer. She considered the
evidence anew.
Our scope of review of the final administrative action of an agency is
limited. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 101 N.J. 95,
103 (1985); Kadonsky v. Lee, 452 N.J. Super. 198, 201-02 (App. Div. 2017).
A strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to the Commission's decision.
In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001). The party
challenging the final administrative action has the burden to demonstrate
grounds for reversal. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544,
563 (App. Div. 2002). Reversal of an agency's decision is only appropriate if
the challenger clearly demonstrates that the decision was "arbitrary, capricious
A-3769-19 15 or unreasonable." Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963).
Under that standard, our scope of review is guided by three major inquiries: (1)
whether the agency's decision conforms with the relevant law; (2) whether the
decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record; and (3)
whether in applying the law to the facts, the administrative agency clearly
erred in reaching its conclusion. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011).
"When an agency's decision meets those criteria, then a court owes substantial
deference to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular
field." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007).
When an agency decision satisfies such criteria, we accord substantial
deference to the agency's fact-finding and legal conclusions, acknowledging
the agency's "expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field." Circus
Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009)
(quoting Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)).
A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for the agency's even though
it may have reached a different result. Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194.
The deferential standard of review "applies to the review of disciplinary
sanctions as well." Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28. Considering "the deference
owed to such determinations," the test "'is whether such punishment is so
disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be
A-3769-19 16 shocking to one's sense of fairness.'" Id. at 28-29 (quoting In re Polk, 90 N.J.
550, 578 (1982)).
In appeals from major disciplinary action, the appointing authority bears
the burden of proof. N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4(a). The appointing authority must
prove the charges "by a fair preponderance of the believable evidence." In re
Suspension or Revoc. License of Kerlin, 151 N.J. Super. 179, 184 n.2 (App.
Div. 1977) (citing Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143, 149 (1962)). The
hearing as to both guilt and the penalty imposed is de novo. Henry v. Rahway
State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579 (1980).
"[A] police officer is a special kind of public employee." Moorestown v.
Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965). They represent "law
and order to the citizenry and must present an image of personal integrity and
dependability in order to have the respect of the public." Ibid. "Police officers
are held to higher standards of conduct than other public employees." In re
Att'y Gen. L. Enf't Directive Nos. 2020-5 & 2020-6, 465 N.J. Super. 111, 147
(App. Div. 2020), aff'd as modified, 246 N.J. 462 (2021) (citing In re Phillips,
117 N.J. 567, 577 (1990)). Consequently, their performance is subject to "a
higher degree of scrutiny" than other public employees. Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A.
40A:14-118).
A-3769-19 17 A police officer's dishonesty during an internal affairs investigation is
particularly significant because it calls "into question [the officer's] honesty,
integrity, and truthfulness, essential traits for a law enforcement officer."
Ruroede v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 214 N.J. 338, 362 (2013).
"Conduct unbecoming a public employee" is an elastic phrase
encompassing conduct that adversely affects the morale or efficiency of a
governmental unit, or that tends to destroy public respect for governmental
employees and confidence in the delivery of governmental services. Karins v.
City of Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532, 554-55 (1998). In turn, conduct unbecoming a
police officer need not "be predicated upon a violation of any particular rule or
regulation but may be based merely upon the violation of the implicit standard
of good behavior." Hartmann v. Police Dep't of Vill. of Ridgewood, 258 N.J.
Super. 32, 40 (App. Div. 1992) (quoting Asbury Park v. Dep't of Civil Serv.,
17 N.J. 419, 429 (1955)). We have recognized the importance of maintaining
discipline in a police department. Rivell v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 115 N.J.
Super. 64, 72 (App. Div. 1971). "Refusal to obey orders and disrespect cannot
be tolerated. Such conduct adversely affects the morale and efficiency of the
department." Ibid. In Cosme v. E. Newark Twp. Comm., we affirmed the
dismissal of a police officer for infractions that went to the heart of the
A-3769-19 18 officer's ability to be trusted to function appropriately in his position . 304 N.J.
Super. 191, 206-07 (App. Div. 1997).
Generally, "neglect of duty" means the failure to perform an assigned
task or responsibility and act as required by the description of the employee's
job title. Under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(1), demonstrated lack of competence or
unfitness are grounds for termination. Klusaritz v. Cape May Cnty., 387 N.J.
Super. 305, 316 (App. Div. 2006). Failure to exercise appropriate judgment is
also a basis for removal of an employee in a sensitive position that requires
public trust in that judgment. Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 36-38.
Kean satisfied its burden of proof. The motion record clearly established
that Perez was guilty of these charges. The ALJ's findings and conclusions
were amply supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and
consonant with applicable law. In turn, the Commission undertook an
"independent evaluation of the record" and the ALJ's Amended Initial
Decision. Based on that evaluation, the Commission affirmed the ALJ's
decision to grant Kean's motion for grant summary decision and remove Perez.
Perez's misconduct was severe, negatively impacted the department,
risked public safety, and was compounded by his untruthfulness during the
internal affairs interview. Removal was not disproportionate to the violations
A-3769-19 19 committed or otherwise manifestly unfair. We discern no abuse of discretion
or legal error.
Perez argues that the case must be remanded so that the record includes
his expert's report. We disagree. The expert report did not address the
material facts. It focused entirely of procedural aspects of the internal aff airs
investigation. The material facts were not in dispute. Unassailable evidence
in the record established the nature and severity of Perez's misconduct.
Therefore, summary decision was appropriate.
Perez's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E)
Affirmed.
A-3769-19 20