Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-24-00561-CV
IN THE MATTER OF A.J.P.
From the 386th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024JUV00245 Honorable Jacqueline Herr-Valdez, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Velia J. Meza, Justice
Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: June 11, 2025
AFFIRMED
Appellant, A.J.P., challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an order
committing her to the custody of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD). A jury found
A.J.P. engaged in delinquent conduct by committing aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
The juvenile court signed an order of adjudication consistent with the jury’s verdict. The court
then signed an order of disposition committing A.J.P. to the custody of TJJD for a determinate
period of fifteen years with a possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The
court found placement outside the home was appropriate (1) due to the serious nature of the offense
and the injuries to the victim, (2) due to the use of a weapon in commission of the offense, and (3)
because the child is a danger to herself or others. We affirm. 04-24-00561-CV
BACKGROUND
A.J.P. was arrested at fifteen-years old on allegations of aggravated robbery and aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon arising from two separate incidents. 1 0F
In the early morning of December 19, 2023, A.J.P. messaged another fifteen-year-old, J.H.,
on Instagram, planning to fight in a Denny’s parking lot. A.J.P. arrived in a stolen car with an
entourage of unidentified friends and J.H. showed up with a friend named C.S.
Exiting her vehicle in a black ski mask, A.J.P. robbed J.H. and C.S. at gunpoint, telling
them to “run it.” 2 J.H. and C.S. refused to comply. A.J.P. then began firing in their direction, 1F
causing both girls to run for cover. While running, J.H. was struck from behind by a bullet. The
bullet traveled through J.H.’s intestines and genitals, causing significant, permanent injury. A.J.P.
jumped back in the car and fled.
The emergency medical technician who responded to the scene testified that J.H.’s injuries,
both their extent and location, put her at “a high risk for mortality.” J.H. was given a blood
transfusion en route to the hospital. J.H. spent a month recovering, required a dozen surgeries, and
coded three times. During her hospital stay, J.H. received an Instagram message from A.J.P.
containing a video recording of the shooting.
The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that A.J.P. engaged in delinquent conduct by
committing aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. A.J.P. elected to have her disposition
decided by the judge. Following adjudication based on the jury’s findings, the judge ordered A.J.P.
committed to TJJD for a determinate period of 15 years.
1 During the trial, the State abandoned the aggravated assault charge arising from the second incident due to the erroneous inclusion of a “reckless” mental state in its petition. The crime charged required that it be committed “knowingly” and “intentionally.” 2 According to C.S., “run it” means “give me all you have.”
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ANALYSIS
In a single issue, A.J.P. argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support
the disposition findings required by section 54.04(i)(1) of the Texas Family Code. A.J.P. does not
challenge the adjudication of delinquent conduct.
1 Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A juvenile court has considerable discretion to determine a suitable disposition for a child
adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent behavior. In re E.K.G., 487 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.). “Absent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not
disturb the juvenile court’s disposition.” Id.
While fact findings supporting an adjudication of delinquency must be supported by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the Juvenile Justice Code provides no such requirement for a trial
court’s disposition order. 3 However, “if an initial disposition order places a child in [TJJD] . . . [the 2F
order] must expressly state that (1) removal from the home is in the child’s best interests, (2)
reasonable efforts were made to avoid removal, and (3) care and supervision the child needs to
meet the conditions of probation cannot be provided at home.” In re J.P., 136 S.W.3d 629, 630
(Tex. 2004) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.04(i)(1)).
Under the abuse of discretion standard, we evaluate whether these fact findings are
supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. For legal sufficiency review, we consider
evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable fact finder could and disregard evidence contrary
to the finding unless a reasonable fact finder could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,
807, 827 (Tex. 2005). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each necessary
3 Compare TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.03(f) (establishing burden of proof for adjudication) with id. § 54.04 (laying out standards applicable to disposition without establishing a burden of proof) and id. § 51.17(a) (providing the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply to juvenile proceedings unless stated otherwise).
-3- 04-24-00561-CV
finding renders the order legally sufficient. Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444,
450 (Tex. 1996). For factual sufficiency review, we set aside the finding only if, after considering
and weighing all of the evidence in the record pertinent to the finding, we determine that the
credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of
all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.
1986).
2 Application
Here, the trial court made the required statutory findings when it found that (1) it is in the
child’s best interest to be placed outside the child’s home, (2) reasonable efforts were made to
prevent or eliminate the need for the child’s removal from the home, and (3) the child’s home
cannot provide the quality of care and level of support and supervision the child needs to meet the
conditions of probation. These findings were pronounced orally at the disposition hearing and in
writing in the disposition order.
The court heard evidence regarding A.J.P.’s propensity for violence and criminal conduct.
While in detention pending trial, A.J.P. engaged in violent behavior “at least two dozen” times
with staff and needed to be restrained on multiple occasions. In September 2023, A.J.P. started a
fight with another student at Clark High School. A.J.P. needed to be physically restrained to stop
her from continuing to strike the other student. A.J.P. told the school security officer the fight
began because the other student pulled her hair. However, when the security officer reviewed video
surveillance, he determined that A.J.P. initiated the fight by “running full speed toward [the
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Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-24-00561-CV
IN THE MATTER OF A.J.P.
From the 386th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024JUV00245 Honorable Jacqueline Herr-Valdez, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Velia J. Meza, Justice
Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: June 11, 2025
AFFIRMED
Appellant, A.J.P., challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an order
committing her to the custody of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD). A jury found
A.J.P. engaged in delinquent conduct by committing aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
The juvenile court signed an order of adjudication consistent with the jury’s verdict. The court
then signed an order of disposition committing A.J.P. to the custody of TJJD for a determinate
period of fifteen years with a possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The
court found placement outside the home was appropriate (1) due to the serious nature of the offense
and the injuries to the victim, (2) due to the use of a weapon in commission of the offense, and (3)
because the child is a danger to herself or others. We affirm. 04-24-00561-CV
BACKGROUND
A.J.P. was arrested at fifteen-years old on allegations of aggravated robbery and aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon arising from two separate incidents. 1 0F
In the early morning of December 19, 2023, A.J.P. messaged another fifteen-year-old, J.H.,
on Instagram, planning to fight in a Denny’s parking lot. A.J.P. arrived in a stolen car with an
entourage of unidentified friends and J.H. showed up with a friend named C.S.
Exiting her vehicle in a black ski mask, A.J.P. robbed J.H. and C.S. at gunpoint, telling
them to “run it.” 2 J.H. and C.S. refused to comply. A.J.P. then began firing in their direction, 1F
causing both girls to run for cover. While running, J.H. was struck from behind by a bullet. The
bullet traveled through J.H.’s intestines and genitals, causing significant, permanent injury. A.J.P.
jumped back in the car and fled.
The emergency medical technician who responded to the scene testified that J.H.’s injuries,
both their extent and location, put her at “a high risk for mortality.” J.H. was given a blood
transfusion en route to the hospital. J.H. spent a month recovering, required a dozen surgeries, and
coded three times. During her hospital stay, J.H. received an Instagram message from A.J.P.
containing a video recording of the shooting.
The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that A.J.P. engaged in delinquent conduct by
committing aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. A.J.P. elected to have her disposition
decided by the judge. Following adjudication based on the jury’s findings, the judge ordered A.J.P.
committed to TJJD for a determinate period of 15 years.
1 During the trial, the State abandoned the aggravated assault charge arising from the second incident due to the erroneous inclusion of a “reckless” mental state in its petition. The crime charged required that it be committed “knowingly” and “intentionally.” 2 According to C.S., “run it” means “give me all you have.”
-2- 04-24-00561-CV
ANALYSIS
In a single issue, A.J.P. argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support
the disposition findings required by section 54.04(i)(1) of the Texas Family Code. A.J.P. does not
challenge the adjudication of delinquent conduct.
1 Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A juvenile court has considerable discretion to determine a suitable disposition for a child
adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent behavior. In re E.K.G., 487 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.). “Absent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not
disturb the juvenile court’s disposition.” Id.
While fact findings supporting an adjudication of delinquency must be supported by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the Juvenile Justice Code provides no such requirement for a trial
court’s disposition order. 3 However, “if an initial disposition order places a child in [TJJD] . . . [the 2F
order] must expressly state that (1) removal from the home is in the child’s best interests, (2)
reasonable efforts were made to avoid removal, and (3) care and supervision the child needs to
meet the conditions of probation cannot be provided at home.” In re J.P., 136 S.W.3d 629, 630
(Tex. 2004) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.04(i)(1)).
Under the abuse of discretion standard, we evaluate whether these fact findings are
supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. For legal sufficiency review, we consider
evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable fact finder could and disregard evidence contrary
to the finding unless a reasonable fact finder could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,
807, 827 (Tex. 2005). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each necessary
3 Compare TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.03(f) (establishing burden of proof for adjudication) with id. § 54.04 (laying out standards applicable to disposition without establishing a burden of proof) and id. § 51.17(a) (providing the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply to juvenile proceedings unless stated otherwise).
-3- 04-24-00561-CV
finding renders the order legally sufficient. Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444,
450 (Tex. 1996). For factual sufficiency review, we set aside the finding only if, after considering
and weighing all of the evidence in the record pertinent to the finding, we determine that the
credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of
all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.
1986).
2 Application
Here, the trial court made the required statutory findings when it found that (1) it is in the
child’s best interest to be placed outside the child’s home, (2) reasonable efforts were made to
prevent or eliminate the need for the child’s removal from the home, and (3) the child’s home
cannot provide the quality of care and level of support and supervision the child needs to meet the
conditions of probation. These findings were pronounced orally at the disposition hearing and in
writing in the disposition order.
The court heard evidence regarding A.J.P.’s propensity for violence and criminal conduct.
While in detention pending trial, A.J.P. engaged in violent behavior “at least two dozen” times
with staff and needed to be restrained on multiple occasions. In September 2023, A.J.P. started a
fight with another student at Clark High School. A.J.P. needed to be physically restrained to stop
her from continuing to strike the other student. A.J.P. told the school security officer the fight
began because the other student pulled her hair. However, when the security officer reviewed video
surveillance, he determined that A.J.P. initiated the fight by “running full speed toward [the
student], grabbing her by the hair, pulling her down to the floor and continuously striking her.”
The predisposition report, admitted during the disposition hearing, indicated A.J.P. had a
significant disciplinary history in school, including suspensions for possessing a controlled
substance, assaulting another student, and excessive unexcused absences. Additionally, the report
-4- 04-24-00561-CV
indicated that A.J.P. shot another person on February 15, 2024, involving a similar type of conduct
as in the December 2023 shooting for which she was adjudicated.
As to the conditions of A.J.P.’s home, the report stated that A.J.P. lives with her mother
who is unemployed, without a permanent residence, and has a long criminal history, including
forgery, fraud, and possession of controlled substances. A.J.P. reported that, due to her sexual
orientation and relationships with other girls, she fought with her mother, and that A.J.P.’s father
was absent. A.J.P. frequently ran away from home for periods of up to a week at a time. Finally,
A.J.P. successfully completed a GPS monitor program. 4 Ultimately, the Bexar County Juvenile 3F
Staffing Committee recommended residential placement, due to A.J.P. “not having any prior
services.”
In summary, the evidence showed that A.J.P. (1) shot two people, one of whom nearly
died, (2) had a history of violent conduct in school settings, (3) failed to attend school and
frequently ran away, (4) continued to engage in violent conduct with juvenile detention staff while
the case was pending, (5) had complex behavioral needs, and (6) had an unstable and unsupportive
home environment.
“[I]t is not necessary for a juvenile court to exhaust all possible alternatives before
committing a juvenile to the TJJD.” E.K.G., 487 S.W.3d at 678. And in juvenile justice, “the best
interests of children who engage in serious and repeated delinquent conduct are superseded to the
extent they conflict with public safety.” J.P., 136 S.W.3d at 633; see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.01
(laying out public policy of Juvenile Justice Code and stating that a child should only be removed
from their parents “when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interest of public safety). Based
4 Neither the predisposition report nor the probation officer’s testimony explained the purpose or terms of this GPS monitor program—only that A.J.P. complied with the program and yet continued to use marijuana after the program ended.
-5- 04-24-00561-CV
on the evidence presented, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the
juvenile court’s findings under section 54.04(i)(1). See E.K.G., 487 S.W.3d at 678–79 (holding
disregard for authority, repeated assaultive behavior, and inadequate supervision and structure in
the home supported commitment to TJJD).
CONCLUSION
Because the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the required statutory
findings, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the proper
disposition for A.J.P. was to be sent to TJJD. E.K.G., 487 S.W.3d at 678–79; City of Keller, 168
S.W.3d at 826–27. We affirm the court’s disposition order.
Velia J. Meza, Justice
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