J-S34032-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.Z.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: I.H., FATHER
No. 180 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order and Decree Entered December 2, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at Nos.: AP#CP-51-AP-0000527-2016 DP#CP-51-DP-0001542-2015 FID#51-FN-000614-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.T.H., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. 181 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order and Decree Entered December 2, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at Nos.: AP#CP-51-AP-0000529-2016 DP#CP-51-DP-0000769-2014 FID#51-FN-000614-2014 J-S34032-17
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.J.H., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. 182 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order and Decree Entered December 2, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at Nos.: AP#CP-51-AP-0000528-2016 DP#CP-51-DP-0000642-2014 FID#51-FN-000614-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SOLANO, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2017
In these consolidated appeals1, I.H. (Father) appeals from the decrees
of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, entered December 2,
2016, that terminated his parental rights to his children, Z.B. (d.o.b. 5/15),
D.H. (d.o.b. 10/12), and J.H. (d.o.b. 6/05) (Children) pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and the orders that changed
the Children’s goals to adoption. We affirm.2
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 This Court consolidated these appeals, sua sponte, on February 10, 2017. 2 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the Children’s mother, L.B. (Mother) on December 2, 2016. Mother did not appeal that termination and she is not a party to this appeal.
-2- J-S34032-17
Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services (DHS) filed petitions to
terminate Father’s parental rights to the Children on June 9, 2016. The trial
court aptly summarized the events that led DHS to file those petitions in its
opinion entered January 26, 2017. We direct the reader to that opinion for
the facts of this case.
The trial court held a hearing on DHS’ petitions on December 2, 2016.
Father was present at the hearing and represented by counsel. Mother was
not present and the trial court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts
to locate and serve her. (See N.T. Hearing, 12/02/16, at 5). In addition to
Father, Community Umbrella Agency case manager, Frank Cervantes,
testified at that hearing. The trial court entered its decrees terminating
Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8)
and (b) on December 2, 2016. Father filed his notices of appeal and
statements of errors complained of on appeal on December 30, 2016.
Father raises the following questions on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of [F]ather pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. sec. 2511(a)(1) without clear and convincing evidence of [F]ather’s intent to relinquish his parental claim or refusal to perform his parental duties[?]
2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of [F]ather pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. sec. 2511(a)(2) without clear and convincing evidence of [F]ather’s present incapacity to perform parental duties[?]
3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of [F]ather pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. sec. 2511(a)(5) without clear and convincing evidence to prove that reasonable efforts were made by [DHS] to provide [F]ather with additional
-3- J-S34032-17
services and that the conditions that led to placement of the [C]hildren continue to exist[?]
4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of [F]ather pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. sec. 2511(a)(8) without clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to placement of the [C]hildren continue to exist when [F]ather presented evidence of compliance with the goals and objectives of his family service plan[?]
5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of [F]ather pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. sec. 2511(b) without clear and convincing evidence that there is no parental bond between [F]ather and [the] [C]hildren and that termination would serve the best interest of the [C]hildren[?]
(Father’s Brief, at 7).
Our standard of review is as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even though the record could support an opposite result.
We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Though we are not bound by the trial court’s inferences and deductions, we may reject its
-4- J-S34032-17
conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s sustainable findings.
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
Before we begin our analysis, we must discuss a shortcoming of
Father’s brief. In his third issue, Father claims that DHS failed to make
reasonable efforts to provide him with services. (See Father’s Brief, at 7).
However, Father did not raise this issue in his statement of errors
complained of on appeal and he has therefore waived it for our review.3 See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 542 (Pa. Super.
2008).
In regard to the other issues Father raises, we have examined the
opinion entered by the trial court on January 26, 2017, in light of the record
in this matter and are satisfied that that opinion is a complete and correct
analysis of this case. (See Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/17, at 4-15) (finding:
3 We also find that Father has waived any challenge to the change of permanency goal to adoption by his failure to raise the issue in the statement of questions involved. See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“We will not ordinarily consider any issue if it has not been set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief’s statement of questions involved.”) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a)); (see also Father’s Brief, at 7). Moreover, as Father failed to develop any argument about the change of permanency goal, he waived the issue.
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J-S34032-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.Z.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: I.H., FATHER
No. 180 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order and Decree Entered December 2, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at Nos.: AP#CP-51-AP-0000527-2016 DP#CP-51-DP-0001542-2015 FID#51-FN-000614-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.T.H., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. 181 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order and Decree Entered December 2, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at Nos.: AP#CP-51-AP-0000529-2016 DP#CP-51-DP-0000769-2014 FID#51-FN-000614-2014 J-S34032-17
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.J.H., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. 182 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order and Decree Entered December 2, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at Nos.: AP#CP-51-AP-0000528-2016 DP#CP-51-DP-0000642-2014 FID#51-FN-000614-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SOLANO, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2017
In these consolidated appeals1, I.H. (Father) appeals from the decrees
of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, entered December 2,
2016, that terminated his parental rights to his children, Z.B. (d.o.b. 5/15),
D.H. (d.o.b. 10/12), and J.H. (d.o.b. 6/05) (Children) pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and the orders that changed
the Children’s goals to adoption. We affirm.2
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 This Court consolidated these appeals, sua sponte, on February 10, 2017. 2 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the Children’s mother, L.B. (Mother) on December 2, 2016. Mother did not appeal that termination and she is not a party to this appeal.
-2- J-S34032-17
Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services (DHS) filed petitions to
terminate Father’s parental rights to the Children on June 9, 2016. The trial
court aptly summarized the events that led DHS to file those petitions in its
opinion entered January 26, 2017. We direct the reader to that opinion for
the facts of this case.
The trial court held a hearing on DHS’ petitions on December 2, 2016.
Father was present at the hearing and represented by counsel. Mother was
not present and the trial court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts
to locate and serve her. (See N.T. Hearing, 12/02/16, at 5). In addition to
Father, Community Umbrella Agency case manager, Frank Cervantes,
testified at that hearing. The trial court entered its decrees terminating
Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8)
and (b) on December 2, 2016. Father filed his notices of appeal and
statements of errors complained of on appeal on December 30, 2016.
Father raises the following questions on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of [F]ather pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. sec. 2511(a)(1) without clear and convincing evidence of [F]ather’s intent to relinquish his parental claim or refusal to perform his parental duties[?]
2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of [F]ather pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. sec. 2511(a)(2) without clear and convincing evidence of [F]ather’s present incapacity to perform parental duties[?]
3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of [F]ather pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. sec. 2511(a)(5) without clear and convincing evidence to prove that reasonable efforts were made by [DHS] to provide [F]ather with additional
-3- J-S34032-17
services and that the conditions that led to placement of the [C]hildren continue to exist[?]
4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of [F]ather pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. sec. 2511(a)(8) without clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to placement of the [C]hildren continue to exist when [F]ather presented evidence of compliance with the goals and objectives of his family service plan[?]
5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights of [F]ather pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. sec. 2511(b) without clear and convincing evidence that there is no parental bond between [F]ather and [the] [C]hildren and that termination would serve the best interest of the [C]hildren[?]
(Father’s Brief, at 7).
Our standard of review is as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even though the record could support an opposite result.
We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Though we are not bound by the trial court’s inferences and deductions, we may reject its
-4- J-S34032-17
conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s sustainable findings.
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
Before we begin our analysis, we must discuss a shortcoming of
Father’s brief. In his third issue, Father claims that DHS failed to make
reasonable efforts to provide him with services. (See Father’s Brief, at 7).
However, Father did not raise this issue in his statement of errors
complained of on appeal and he has therefore waived it for our review.3 See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 542 (Pa. Super.
2008).
In regard to the other issues Father raises, we have examined the
opinion entered by the trial court on January 26, 2017, in light of the record
in this matter and are satisfied that that opinion is a complete and correct
analysis of this case. (See Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/17, at 4-15) (finding:
3 We also find that Father has waived any challenge to the change of permanency goal to adoption by his failure to raise the issue in the statement of questions involved. See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“We will not ordinarily consider any issue if it has not been set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief’s statement of questions involved.”) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a)); (see also Father’s Brief, at 7). Moreover, as Father failed to develop any argument about the change of permanency goal, he waived the issue. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011) (stating, “[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”) (citations omitted); (see also Father’s Brief, at 10-14).
-5- J-S34032-17
(1) Father has failed or refused to perform parental duties during six-month
period before filing petition; (2) in spite of DHS providing Father with
services, he is unwilling or unable to remedy causes of his incapacity to
parent in order to provide Children with essential care, control, or
subsistence necessary for physical and mental well-being; (3) Children have
been in pre-adoptive home with Grandmother for significant period of time
and cannot wait any longer for Father to summon the ability to parent; (4)
Father is unable to provide evidence of his progress of his drug and alcohol
and mental health programs, conditions that led to Children’s removal still
exist, and Father is not ready or able to parent Children full-time; and (5)
Children do not have bond with Father and would not suffer irreparable harm
if his rights are terminated). Accordingly, we affirm the decrees of the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that terminated Father’s parental
rights, and orders that changed the Children’s goals to adoption, on the
basis of the concise, thoughtful, and well-written opinion of the Honorable
Joseph Fernandez.
Decrees and orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 7/31/2017
-6- Circulated 07/07/2017 02:06 PM