in the Interest of W.L., a Child
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Opinion
In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-22-00012-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF W.L., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 76th District Court Camp County, Texas Trial Court No. CPS-18-03104
Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and van Cleef, JJ. ORDER
On February 1, 2022, the trial court entered an order of termination, terminating the
parent-child relationship between W.L. and her father pursuant to statutory grounds D, E, and O.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O).1 Father’s appellate counsel has filed a
brief that summarizes the record and reviews the trial court proceedings in detail. After
evaluating the record, Father’s appointed counsel appears to have concluded that there are no
arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743–44
(1967); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 509–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see In re P.M., 520
S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (recognizing that Anders procedures apply in parental-
rights termination cases). Under the requirements of Anders v. California, counsel is required to
conduct a “conscientious examination” of the record and file “a brief referring to anything in the
record that might arguably support the appeal.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
The appellate brief fails to address whether factually and legally sufficient evidence
supports the termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to statutory grounds D and E.
Although appellate counsel recognizes that a termination order may be affirmed on any ground
found by the trial court, see , e.g., In re N.R., 101 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003,
no pet.), counsel failed to consider the due process implications of a termination of parental
rights based on statutory grounds D or E, irrespective of whether another statutory ground
supports termination. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (“We hold that due
process and due course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court detail its analysis for
1 We refer to the father as “Father” in order to protect the identity of the minor children who are the subject of this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8. 2 an appeal of termination of parental rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) of the Family
Code.”). Due process is implicated because termination of parental rights under these grounds
may implicate the parent’s parental rights to other children. Id. at 234; see TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (providing as a ground for termination of parental rights that the parent
“had his or her parent-child relationship terminated with respect to another child based on a
finding that the parent’s conduct was in violation of Paragraph (D) or (E)”).
After conducting our own investigation of the record, we have identified several arguable
issues that require additional briefing, including (1) whether factually and legally sufficient
evidence supported the termination of Father’s parental rights under statutory ground D and (2)
whether factually and legally sufficient evidence supported the termination of Father’s parental
rights under statutory ground E.
“When we identify issues that counsel on appeal should have addressed but did not, we
need not be able to say with certainty that those issues have merit; we need only say that the
issues warrant further development by counsel on appeal.” Wilson v. State, 40 S.W.3d 192, 200
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, order). In such a situation, we “must then guarantee appellant’s
right to counsel by ensuring that another attorney is appointed to represent appellant on appeal.”
Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511 (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744).
Accordingly, we grant current counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we abate this case to
the trial court for the appointment of new appellate counsel. The appointment is to be made
within five days of the date of this order. A memorialization of the trial court’s appointment
shall be entered into the record of this case and presented to this Court in the form of a
3 supplemental clerk’s record within three days of the date of appointment. Newly appointed
appellate counsel is to address the issues presented here, as well as any other issues that warrant
further development on appeal.
In addition, we note that the order of termination recites that the final hearing in the case
occurred on September 29, 2021, and November 2, 2021. Nevertheless, the record on appeal
contains a reporter’s record only from November 2, 2021. Therefore, the trial court shall direct
the court reporter to prepare and file, within ten days of the date of this order, the transcript of
the September 29, 2021, hearing.
The current submission date of July 7, 2022, is hereby withdrawn. Upon receipt of the
supplemental clerk’s record contemplated by this order, our jurisdiction over this appeal will
resume and we will establish a new briefing schedule. We note, however, that because this case
involves an appeal from the termination of Father’s parental rights, this matter is to be expedited
at all levels. Newly appointed counsel should be prepared to pursue the appeal without delay or
requests for extensions of time.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
BY THE COURT
DATE: June 21, 2022
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