in the Interest of W.F.

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-20-00237-CV ________________

IN THE INTEREST OF W.F. ________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 317th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. C-234,933 ________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A.F. and R.F. appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to their

son, W.F. 1, 2 The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence, statutory

grounds exist for termination of A.F. and R.F.’s parental rights, and termination of

their rights was in W.F.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. §

161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P), and (R). A.F. and R.F.’s court-appointed appellate

counsel submitted a brief in which counsel contends there are no meritorious

1 To protect the identity of the minor, we use initials for the child and his parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 A.F. and R.F. are married and shared a court appointed attorney at trial, as well as on appeal. 1 grounds to be advanced on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967);

In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The brief

provides counsel’s professional evaluation of the record. Counsel certified A.F and

R.F. were served with a copy of the Anders brief filed on their behalf. This Court

notified A.F. and W.F. of their right to file a pro se response, as well as the deadline

for filing the response. This Court did not receive a pro se response from either A.F.

or R.F. We have independently reviewed the appellate record and counsel’s brief,

and we agree any appeal would be frivolous. We find no arguable error requiring us

to appoint new counsel to re-brief this appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503,

511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating A.F. and R.F.’s

parental rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by their court-appointed

appellate counsel, because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or

waiver of all appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B); In re P.M., 520

S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). In the event A.F. and R.F. decide to pursue an appeal to

the Supreme Court of Texas, counsel’s obligations to A.F. and R.F. can be met “by

filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re

P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28.

2 AFFIRMED.

________________________________ CHARLES KREGER Justice

Submitted on February 2, 2021 Opinion Delivered February 18, 2021

Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.