In the Interest of W.E. v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)
• Decided: June 25, 2026
• Docket: 09-26-00103-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-26-00103-CV __________________

IN THE INTEREST OF W.E.

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 279th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 24DCFM1398 __________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother and Father appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to

their eighteen-month-old daughter, W.E. The trial court found, by clear and

convincing evidence, that statutory grounds exist for the termination of Mother’s

and Father’s parental rights and that termination of their parental rights would be in

the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (I),

(N), (O).

Mother’s and Father’s court-ordered attorneys submitted briefs in which both

attorneys conclude that there are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeals

1 are frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161

S.W.3d 728, 730-31 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Anders procedures

apply in parental-right termination cases). The briefs present the attorneys’

professional evaluation of the record and explain why no arguable grounds exist to

overturn the trial court’s judgment. Both attorneys filed a letter with this court

indicating that they sent Mother and Father a copy of the Anders brief they filed,

notified both parents of their right to file a pro se brief, and provided Mother and

Father a copy of the appellate record. The Court notified Mother and Father of their

right to file a pro se response and of the deadline for doing so. Neither Mother nor

Father filed a response with the Court.

We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the briefs filed by

Mother’s and Father’s court-appointed attorneys. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-

28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2009, no pet.). Based on our review, we have found nothing that would arguably

support an appeal, and we agree that the appeals are frivolous and lack merit. See

Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating

in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record

for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619.

2 Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief

the appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental

rights. We deny the motions to withdraw filed by Mother’s and Father’s court-

appointed appellate attorneys because the right to counsel in suits seeking the

termination of parental rights extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all

appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(2)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27

(Tex. 2016). Accordingly, the obligation of Mother’s counsel to Mother and the

obligation of Father’s counsel to Father have not been discharged. See In re P.M.,

520 S.W.3d at 27. Should Mother or Father decide to pursue an appeal to the

Supreme Court of Texas, their respective counsel’s obligation can be met “by filing

a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 27-

28.

AFFIRMED.

LEANNE JOHNSON Justice

Submitted on June 17, 2026 Opinion Delivered June 25, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.