in the Interest of V.B.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 24, 2019
• Docket: 09-18-00393-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-18-000393-CV ____________________

IN THE INTEREST OF V.B.

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 317th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. C-230,775 ________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

N.B. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to his daughter,

V.B. 1, 2 The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence statutory grounds

exist for termination of N.B.’s parental rights, and termination of his rights would

be in V.B.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E) (West

Supp. 2018). Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in

1 To protect the identity of the minor, we use initials for the child and her parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 The mother’s parental rights to V.B. were terminated in an earlier proceeding. She is not a party to this appeal. 1 which counsel contends there are no meritorious grounds to be advanced on appeal.

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728,

731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The brief provides counsel’s

professional evaluation of the record. Counsel certified Appellant was served with a

copy of the Anders brief filed on his behalf. This Court notified Appellant of his

right to file a pro se response, as well as the deadline for filing the response. This

Court did not receive a pro se response from Appellant. We have independently

reviewed the appellate record and counsel’s brief, and we agree any appeal would

be frivolous. We find no arguable error requiring us to appoint new counsel to re-

brief this appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating N.B.’s parental

rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by N.B.’s court-appointed appellate

counsel, because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all

appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B) (West Supp. 2018); In re P.M.,

520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). In the event N.B. decides to pursue an appeal to the

Supreme Court of Texas, counsel’s obligations to N.B. can be met “by filing a

petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M.,

520 S.W.3d at 27–28.

2 AFFIRMED.

_________________________ CHARLES KREGER Justice

Submitted on January 2, 2019 Opinion Delivered January 24, 2019

Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.