IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0560 Filed May 25, 2022
IN THE INTEREST OF V.B., Minor Child
C.H., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas J. Straka,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child.
AFFIRMED.
Gina L. Kramer of Kramer Law Office, PLLC, Dubuque, for appellant
mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Patricia Reisen-Ottavi, Dubuque, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
child.
Considered by May, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child, V.B.
She argues the juvenile court erred by denying her an extension of time and
violated her due process rights during a pre-termination, dispositional hearing.
She also contends termination is not in the child’s best interests and an exception
to termination should be applied. Upon our de novo review, we affirm termination
of her parental rights to this child.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
V.B. first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human Services
(DHS) because her mother had an outstanding warrant and was taken to jail after
giving birth to her in March 2020. After the mother demonstrated sufficient
progress with her substance-abuse and mental-health concerns, the DHS returned
care of V.B. to her mother in August and closed the case in February 2021 when
the mother moved out of state.
The mother eventually returned to Iowa. In August, she called 911 and was
transported to the hospital due to heavy alcohol intoxication. She was V.B.’s sole
caregiver at that time, and V.B. has not since been returned to her care. Upon her
release from the hospital, the mother spent thirty days in jail and then began living
at a local shelter pursuant to her probation. She tested positive for alcohol on two
occasions and left the shelter in late October, despite knowledge that her early
departure would likely result in a warrant for her arrest.
The mother’s subsequent participation in services was “essentially non-
existent” according to the DHS caseworker. She stopped participating in
substance-abuse treatment, family-centered services, and mental-health 3
treatment. She was previously diagnosed with borderline personality disorder,
bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder. She
missed her last scheduled visit with V.B. in October, was nonresponsive in
November, and attended one visit in December. She did not appear for an
additional scheduled visit in December or for another visit in January. The mother
spent a total of eighteen hours during nine visits with her daughter from September
2021 through January 2022. She has not established stable housing or
employment, staying with various friends and working at times as a bartender.
The mother was arrested in mid-January 2022 for trespassing and violation
of her probation. A hearing was held shortly thereafter for V.B.’s child-in-need-of-
assistance (CINA) matter. In light of the parents’ history of nonparticipation in this
and previous cases, the State motioned for a waiver of reasonable effort services,
which the juvenile court granted. The mother has had parental rights terminated
to four other children, with the first incident of child abuse occurring in 2010 and
the most recent termination in 2019. The underlying issues similarly revolved
around the mother’s unmanaged mental health and abuse of substances.
The mother remained in jail at the time of the termination hearing in March
2022. She expected to be released to a residential treatment facility in the next
few weeks following trial if a bed became available. The timeline for halfway-house
programming at the facility is inexact, but she has previously completed it in six
months. She filed a timely appeal after the juvenile court terminated her parental
rights. V.B.’s father did not appeal termination of his rights. 4
II. Review.
Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. See In re B.H.A., 938
N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 2020). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights
where there is clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for
termination. Evidence is clear and convincing when there is no serious or
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the
evidence.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 431 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (internal citation
omitted). Though not binding, we give weight to the juvenile court’s fact findings.
See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g); In re C.A.V., 787 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Iowa Ct. App.
2010). We likewise engage in de novo review as it relates to constitutional
challenges. See State v. Leedom, 938 N.W.2d 177, 185 (Iowa 2020).
III. Discussion.
The principal concern in termination proceedings is the child’s best
interests. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019). Iowa courts use a three-
step analysis to review the termination of parental rights. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d
467, 472 (Iowa 2018). Those steps are whether: (1) grounds for termination have
been established, (2) termination is in the child’s best interests, and (3) we should
exercise any of the permissive exceptions to preclude termination. Id. at 472–73.
Here, the juvenile court found the State proved by clear and convincing
evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was appropriate under
paragraphs (g) and (h) of Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2022). The mother does
not directly challenge these grounds for termination. Rather, she argues the
findings in support of the grounds were tainted by the court’s failure to grant an
extension of time and her attorney’s failure to allow her testimony regarding the 5
waiver of reasonable effort services. The mother also challenges steps two and
three of our analysis regarding the child’s best interests and the application of an
exception. We address each argument in turn.
A. Six-Month Extension.
The mother maintains that a six-month extension would have provided her
sufficient time to resolve the issues preventing reunification with her daughter.
Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b) authorizes extending a child’s placement for an
additional six months if the court identifies “specific factors, conditions, or expected
behavioral changes” that provide a basis for determining “that the need for removal
of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional
six-month period.” Here, the mother’s history simply does not support giving her
more time to address her substance-abuse, housing, and mental-health issues.
She has been intermittently engaged in services for more than a decade without
long-term success. She was incarcerated at the time of trial with an uncertain
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0560 Filed May 25, 2022
IN THE INTEREST OF V.B., Minor Child
C.H., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas J. Straka,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child.
AFFIRMED.
Gina L. Kramer of Kramer Law Office, PLLC, Dubuque, for appellant
mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Patricia Reisen-Ottavi, Dubuque, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor
child.
Considered by May, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child, V.B.
She argues the juvenile court erred by denying her an extension of time and
violated her due process rights during a pre-termination, dispositional hearing.
She also contends termination is not in the child’s best interests and an exception
to termination should be applied. Upon our de novo review, we affirm termination
of her parental rights to this child.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
V.B. first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human Services
(DHS) because her mother had an outstanding warrant and was taken to jail after
giving birth to her in March 2020. After the mother demonstrated sufficient
progress with her substance-abuse and mental-health concerns, the DHS returned
care of V.B. to her mother in August and closed the case in February 2021 when
the mother moved out of state.
The mother eventually returned to Iowa. In August, she called 911 and was
transported to the hospital due to heavy alcohol intoxication. She was V.B.’s sole
caregiver at that time, and V.B. has not since been returned to her care. Upon her
release from the hospital, the mother spent thirty days in jail and then began living
at a local shelter pursuant to her probation. She tested positive for alcohol on two
occasions and left the shelter in late October, despite knowledge that her early
departure would likely result in a warrant for her arrest.
The mother’s subsequent participation in services was “essentially non-
existent” according to the DHS caseworker. She stopped participating in
substance-abuse treatment, family-centered services, and mental-health 3
treatment. She was previously diagnosed with borderline personality disorder,
bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder. She
missed her last scheduled visit with V.B. in October, was nonresponsive in
November, and attended one visit in December. She did not appear for an
additional scheduled visit in December or for another visit in January. The mother
spent a total of eighteen hours during nine visits with her daughter from September
2021 through January 2022. She has not established stable housing or
employment, staying with various friends and working at times as a bartender.
The mother was arrested in mid-January 2022 for trespassing and violation
of her probation. A hearing was held shortly thereafter for V.B.’s child-in-need-of-
assistance (CINA) matter. In light of the parents’ history of nonparticipation in this
and previous cases, the State motioned for a waiver of reasonable effort services,
which the juvenile court granted. The mother has had parental rights terminated
to four other children, with the first incident of child abuse occurring in 2010 and
the most recent termination in 2019. The underlying issues similarly revolved
around the mother’s unmanaged mental health and abuse of substances.
The mother remained in jail at the time of the termination hearing in March
2022. She expected to be released to a residential treatment facility in the next
few weeks following trial if a bed became available. The timeline for halfway-house
programming at the facility is inexact, but she has previously completed it in six
months. She filed a timely appeal after the juvenile court terminated her parental
rights. V.B.’s father did not appeal termination of his rights. 4
II. Review.
Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. See In re B.H.A., 938
N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 2020). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights
where there is clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for
termination. Evidence is clear and convincing when there is no serious or
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the
evidence.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 431 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (internal citation
omitted). Though not binding, we give weight to the juvenile court’s fact findings.
See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g); In re C.A.V., 787 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Iowa Ct. App.
2010). We likewise engage in de novo review as it relates to constitutional
challenges. See State v. Leedom, 938 N.W.2d 177, 185 (Iowa 2020).
III. Discussion.
The principal concern in termination proceedings is the child’s best
interests. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019). Iowa courts use a three-
step analysis to review the termination of parental rights. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d
467, 472 (Iowa 2018). Those steps are whether: (1) grounds for termination have
been established, (2) termination is in the child’s best interests, and (3) we should
exercise any of the permissive exceptions to preclude termination. Id. at 472–73.
Here, the juvenile court found the State proved by clear and convincing
evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was appropriate under
paragraphs (g) and (h) of Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2022). The mother does
not directly challenge these grounds for termination. Rather, she argues the
findings in support of the grounds were tainted by the court’s failure to grant an
extension of time and her attorney’s failure to allow her testimony regarding the 5
waiver of reasonable effort services. The mother also challenges steps two and
three of our analysis regarding the child’s best interests and the application of an
exception. We address each argument in turn.
A. Six-Month Extension.
The mother maintains that a six-month extension would have provided her
sufficient time to resolve the issues preventing reunification with her daughter.
Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b) authorizes extending a child’s placement for an
additional six months if the court identifies “specific factors, conditions, or expected
behavioral changes” that provide a basis for determining “that the need for removal
of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional
six-month period.” Here, the mother’s history simply does not support giving her
more time to address her substance-abuse, housing, and mental-health issues.
She has been intermittently engaged in services for more than a decade without
long-term success. She was incarcerated at the time of trial with an uncertain
timeline for release. “While we recognize the law requires ‘a full measure of
patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills,’”
this patience is built into the six-month statutory scheme set forth in Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(h). In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000) (quoting In re
A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987)). Although we commend the mother’s
intentions to complete halfway-house programming and address her mental
health, we remain unconvinced that her troubles will be resolved within six months.
Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision to deny an extension. 6
B. Due Process Rights.
The mother argues her due process rights were denied because her
attorney did not allow her to testify at the January hearing regarding the waiver of
reasonable effort services. There is no question that parents have due process
rights at both CINA and termination proceedings. See In re A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d
867, 870 (Iowa 1994). “Generally, the fundamental requirement of due process is
an opportunity to be heard.” Id. The mother participated in the hearing from jail
via video conferencing. She did not communicate with her attorney when he stated
she would not tesify. She did not voice or otherwise indicate disagreement with
this statement. She was muted later in the proceeding but did speak after her
attorney’s statement regarding testimony. Her attorney made arguments on her
behalf during the hearing. The mother later requested new counsel and indicated
she had been pressured into voluntarily consenting to termination of her parental
rights, but she did not mention the alleged inability to testify. There was no motion
to reconsider or appeal filed relative to the order entered by the court in connection
with this hearing. See id. at 872 (finding a mother’s due process argument waived
when she failed to file a motion to reconsider, enlarge, or amend in CINA
proceedings). Based on this record of events, we find the mother waived her due
process challenge to the court’s order.
C. Best Interests of the Child.
To evaluate the child’s best interests, “the court shall give primary
consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the
long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Here, the 7
mother’s inability to maintain sobriety, unstable housing, and inattention to her
mental-health needs combine to support termination. In light of her history, we are
not inclined to believe that her behavior will improve sufficiently in a reasonable
time. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (“Insight for the
determination of the child’s long-range best interests can be gleaned from
evidence of the parent’s past performance for that performance may be indicative
of the quality of the future care that parent is capable of providing.” (citation
omitted)).
Furthermore, the child is in a stable placement with her foster family, who is
a long-term option, and has been able to bond with her biological sibling, who was
adopted by this family. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b); In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d
212, 225 (Iowa 2016) (noting a child’s favorable integration into a foster placement
supports finding termination is in the child’s best interests). While we lament the
separation of a child from her parent at any age, we recognize the need for
permanency and stability in V.B.’s life weigh in favor of termination. See A.S., 906
N.W.2d at 474 (“[I]t is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency
after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by
hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable
home for the child.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude termination of
her mother’s parental rights is in V.B.’s best interests.
D. Exceptions to Termination.
The mother asserts that the detriment termination would cause to the child
warrants an exercise of our discretion. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c) (providing
a discretionary exception to termination when “[t]here is clear and convincing 8
evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to
the closeness of the parent-child relationship.”). The parent bears the burden to
prove the applicability of an exception to termination. A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476.
Here, the mother highlights her positive interactions with V.B. during visits
and the way V.B. lights up when she sees her mother. However, we note the
mother’s limited participation in visitation has not demonstrated meaningful efforts
to allow her daughter to develop a strong, parent-child relationship. “Parenting
cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It must be constant, responsible, and
reliable.” In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990). We do not find the parent-
child relationship is so strong that it outweighs the need for termination. See In re
W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 315 (Iowa 2021) (finding the existence of a bond is
insufficient when parents have “failed to provide the clear and convincing evidence
necessary to show that, on balance, that bond makes termination more detrimental
than not”). We conclude this exception will not preclude termination.
IV. Disposition.
In sum, we find an extension of time is not warranted, the mother’s due
process challenge was waived, termination is in the child’s best interests, and an
exception should not be applied. Therefore, we affirm termination of the mother’s
parental rights to V.B.