In the Interest of T.S.L., a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-26-00070-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF T.S.L., a Child

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024-PA-00562 Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 22, 2026

AFFIRMED

Appellant Father appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights as an alleged

father to T.S.L. 1 In his first issue, Father argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

his oral motion for continuance asserted at the beginning of trial. In his second issue, Father argues

there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental

rights is in the child’s best interest. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

denied the oral motion for continuance because the motion did not comply with the Texas Rules

of Civil Procedure and because the case was nearing the mandatory dismissal date. We need not

1 To protect the identity of a minor child in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we refer to the parents as “Mother” and “Father” and we refer to the child using the child’s initials or as “the child.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). 04-26-00070-CV

address Father’s second issue because there is an unchallenged ground for termination: Father’s

failure to acknowledge paternity of the child. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s termination

order.

BACKGROUND

The Department became involved in the underlying case when it received a referral that

Mother was struggling with her mental health and the Department was concerned Mother was

unable to protect and care for T.S.L. The Department was unable to locate Father when it was

investigating the referral.

On April 8, 2024, the Department filed a petition seeking termination of Father’s and

Mother’s parental rights to the child. Commendably, Mother completed all her services and has

shown she can provide the child with a safe and loving environment. Therefore, the trial court

ordered reunification between the child and Mother pursuant to a monitored return. The

Department maintained its petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. The trial court held a

bench trial on January 5, 2026. The trial court heard testimony from Christine Stutts, the

Department’s removal investigator; Aleta Worden, the Department’s caseworker; and Father.

On January 22, 2026, the trial court signed an order awarding Mother sole managing

conservatorship of the child and terminating Father’s parental rights to the child. The trial court

terminated Father’s parental rights for failure to acknowledge paternity pursuant to section

161.002(b)(3) of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.002(b)(3).

Alternatively, the trial court found termination of Father’s parental rights was supported pursuant

to statutory grounds (E), (L), and (P) in subsection 161.001(b)(1) of the family code. See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(E), (L), (P). The trial court also found it was in the child’s best

interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Father appeals.

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BEST INTEREST

In his second issue, which we address first, Father argues the evidence is insufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

The Department responds that we need not review the best interest finding because we should

affirm the trial court’s termination order on the independent, unchallenged ground that Father

failed to assert or acknowledge paternity under subsection 161.002(b)(3) of the Texas Family

Code. The trial court heard testimony that Father is an alleged Father who has not taken a DNA

test to establish paternity and has not filed a notice of intent to claim paternity of the child in the

Paternity Registry. 2 Father took the stand and testified he did not want to “judicially legitimate”

his paternity, that is, he did not acknowledge his paternity under oath.

Subsection 161.002(b)(3) of the family code provides: “The rights of an alleged father may

be terminated if . . . the child is under one year of age at the time the petition for termination of the

parent-child relationship . . . is filed and he has not registered with the paternity registry under

Chapter 160[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE 161.002(b)(3). 3

On appeal, Father only challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental

rights is in the child’s best interest. However, termination based on a failure to assert or

acknowledge paternity is an independent basis for termination that does not require a best interest

finding. See id.; In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 682 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied)

(concluding termination for failure to legitimate paternity does not require proof that termination

is in the child’s best interest). “An appellant must challenge all independent bases or grounds that

fully support a judgment or appealable order.” S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 682. “When a parent fails

2 Upon the Department’s request, the trial court took judicial notice that the certificate of paternity registry search was filed in the clerk’s record. 3 Although the trial court’s order finds termination under subsections 161.001(b)(2) and (3), the record reflects the child was under one year of age at the time the Department filed its petition seeking termination.

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to challenge on appeal an independent ground for termination of parental rights, the appellate court

accepts the validity of the unchallenged ground and affirms on that basis without examining the

sufficiency of the evidence to support the challenged ground.” In re A.A.T., No. 04-21-00270-CV,

2021 WL 6127926, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 29, 2021, no pet.). By failing to

challenge the trial court’s finding that Father failed to file an admission of paternity or otherwise

acknowledge his paternity of the child, Father has failed to challenge each independent ground for

termination. See S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 682. As such, we must accept the unchallenged finding

supporting termination as true and affirm the trial court’s termination order under the unchallenged

ground. See id. Because termination based on a failure to assert or acknowledge paternity does

not require a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest, we need not address Father’s

second issue contending there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that

termination was not in the child’s best interest. See id. at 683.

Accordingly, Father’s second issue is overruled.

MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

In his first issue, Father contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his

oral motion for continuance. Father, who had been incarcerated during the entire pendency of the

case, announced “not ready” at trial. Father asserted he would be eligible for parole in

November 2026 and requested the trial court continue the trial to allow Father more time to

complete services. The trial court denied the “not ready” announcement. On appeal, Father treats

the “not ready” announcement as a motion for continuance; therefore, we will as well. See In re

R.F. III, 423 S.W.3d 486, 489–90 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (interpreting Father’s

“not ready” announcement as a motion for continuance).

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We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion.

See id. The trial court abuses its discretion if it rules “without reference to any guiding rules and

principles, such that its ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable.” Id. (quoting Low v. Henry,

221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007)).

We cannot conclude the trial court acted arbitrarily or without any guiding rules and

principles. First, the rules of civil procedure provide a motion for continuance should not be

granted “except for sufficient cause supported by affidavit, or by consent of the parties, or by

operation of law.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 251. “A trial court is presumed to have correctly exercised its

discretion when it denies a motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 251 of the

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, including [when the motion is] not made in writing, verified, or

supported by an affidavit.” R.F. III, 423 S.W.3d at 490. Here, Father did not file a written motion

for continuance that was verified or supported by affidavit, and Father does not argue that the

continuance was required by operation of law.

Second, the record reflects the trial court was concerned with how long the case had been

pending. Specifically, the trial court stated the child was less than three years old at the time of

trial and the case had been pending for nearly two years. The goal of establishing a stable,

permanent home for a child is a compelling government interest that may justify the trial court’s

denial of a motion for continuance in a parental termination case. See In re J.R.R., No. 04-22-

00076-CV, 2022 WL 3047099, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion for continuance

when the motion did not comply with Rule 251 and permanency for the children in a parental

termination case justified the denial).

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Finally, it is clear from the context of the record that the trial court was concerned it would

lose jurisdiction in a week if it did not commence the trial. On April 8, 2024, the Department filed

a petition seeking termination of parental rights, and the trial court rendered an order appointing

the Department as temporary managing conservator of the child that same day. Thus, the one-year

automatic dismissal date was April 8, 2025. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(a) (providing

the trial court loses jurisdiction over a suit by the Department seeking termination of parental rights

one year after the trial court renders a temporary order appointing the Department as temporary

managing conservator of the child). On January 27, 2025, the trial court signed an order extending

the automatic dismissal date to October 11, 2025. See id. § 263.401(b) (providing the trial court

may extend the automatic dismissal date by 180 days based on findings that extraordinary

circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the Department’s care and that the appointment

of the Department as temporary managing conservatorship is in the child’s best interest). On

July 16, 2025, the trial court ordered a monitored return of the child to Mother, thereby extending

the automatic dismissal date by another 180 days to January 12, 2026. See id. § 263.403 (providing

the automatic dismissal date may be extended for an additional 180 days if the trial court orders a

monitored return of the child to a parent and finds that retaining jurisdiction is in the child’s best

interest). Then, trial was set for January 5, 2026. The trial court acknowledged that, under the

automatic dismissal statutes, it would lose jurisdiction over the case in one week if it did not

commence the trial. If the trial court were to grant the continuance, the trial court would lose

jurisdiction over the case and it would be automatically dismissed.

We cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Father’s oral motion

for continuance. Father’s motion did not comply with Rule 251’s requirements, a continuance

would delay permanency for the child, and the trial court would be divested of jurisdiction if it

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granted the motion for continuance. See R.F. III, 423 S.W.3d at 490; J.R.R., 2022 WL 3047099,

at *2; In re J.P.H., No. 04-23-00131-CV, 2023 WL 5280376, at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

Aug. 16, 2023, pet. denied).

Accordingly, Father’s first issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s termination order.

Irene Rios, Justice

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