In the Interest of T.R.C. v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)·Decided July 6, 2026·No. 09-26-00019-CV·Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

NO. 09-26-00019-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF T.R.C.

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 14-10-11718

OPINION

Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her minor child, T.R.C. (“Tim”).1 Termination of parental rights should be reserved for “extreme cases[.]” See In the Int. of H.S., No. 24-0307, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 533, at *2 (June 5, 2026). “[A] parental-termination order must always be a last resort and never a first impulse.” Id. We echo what was said by now Chief Justice Blacklock in In the Int. of A.M.:

1 To preserve the parties’ privacy, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child, Mother, foster parents, and family members. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

Most of the [appeals] this Court receives in parental-termination cases involve parents whose severe abuse or abandonment of their children, debilitating drug addiction, or violent and criminal behavior provide the clear and convincing evidence required for imposition of the draconian remedy of termination. This case is more difficult than most. It raises close questions of evidentiary sufficiency.

630 S.W.3d 25, 26 (Tex. 2019) (Blacklock, J.; concurring in the denial of the petition for review). We conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department”) made reasonable efforts to return Tim to Mother before trial and that despite such efforts a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents Tim’s return to Mother. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(f)(1). We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights as to Tim, and render judgment that Mother’s rights are not terminated. We also conclude the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that the Department is Tim’s permanent managing conservator, because the trial court did not make the finding required by section 153.002(c)(1). See id. § 153.002(c)(1). Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order appointing the Department as Tim’s permanent managing conservator.

The Scope of Our Review vs. The Parameters of Our Opinion Although our legal sufficiency review requires us to conduct a thorough review of the entire record, our rules of procedure require us to “hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.” Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (emphasis added).

The distinction between what is reviewed and what is included in the opinion is particularly important in an appeal from a parental-termination order. “Appellate opinions in these important cases should distinguish between facts that support termination and facts that do not, rather than reciting every piece of evidence relied upon by the government.” In the Int. of A.M., 630 S.W.3d at 27 (Blacklock, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for review). We will attempt to heed Justice Massengale’s wise “caution against the dangers of kitchen-sink approaches to opinion writing, particularly in the area of parental-termination appeals.” In the Int. of A.K.T., No. 01-18-00647-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 10018, at *47 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (Massengale, J., concurring); see also In the Int. of K.N., No. 24-0881, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 535, at *30 n.3 (June 5, 2026) (declining to recount evidence that “is not the basis of our judgment[,]” noting, “A kitchen-sink approach risks misleading lower courts as to what evidence matters.”).

We will not, therefore, rehearse all the evidence the Department offered at trial and now argues on appeal as support for the trial court’s statutory-predicate and best-interest findings. As explained below, we do not reach those issues; instead, we decide this case by answering a separate question—whether the evidence is legally sufficient to establish, clearly and convincingly, that despite reasonable efforts by the Department to return Tim to Mother, a continuing danger remains in the home

that prevents his return. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(f)(1). When deciding what evidence to include in our opinion, we have attempted to focus on the evidence that answers that question. Nevertheless, voluminous records were introduced at trial, and in order to comply with Rule 47.1, we must include sufficient details from those records to explain our disposition of this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 Factual Background

When Tim was 17 months old, he was diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes, a serious condition which requires careful monitoring of Tim’s blood-sugar level. Too low a level can be immediately life-threatening; too high a level risks diabetic ketoacidosis which can potentially cause coma.

Tim has a brother, “Chris,” who is one year younger than Tim. Mother has another son, “Trevor” who is several years older than Tim and Chris, and who was an adult at the time of trial. In 2016, when Tim was four and Chris was almost three, their parents divorced. The Final Decree of Divorce, signed in early 2017, appointed Mother as Tim’s and Chris’s sole managing conservator. Father, who was appointed possessory conservator, was to have periods of visitation, but these would be supervised by Tim’s grandmother or someone else approved by Mother, because the court found credible evidence Father engaged in a pattern of abuse and neglect directed at Mother and the children. Before any such visitation would be allowed, however, Father—and anyone else who would be supervising Tim during Father’s

periods of possession—would have to complete diabetes education training. No such requirement was placed on Mother who was granted the exclusive right to consent to the boys’ medical, dental, surgical, psychiatric and psychological treatment. 2 In September 2018, when Tim was six and Chris was five, Father died in a motorcycle accident. Years later, when the Department filed this action to terminate Mother’s parental rights in 2024, Tim and Chris were referred to Elizabeth Salmeron, Ph.D., for comprehensive psychological evaluations. The Department’s caseworker, Casandra Duran, informed Dr. Salmeron that Tim and Chris had been placed in separate homes, and that “the brothers do not have healthy boundaries . . . they fight often.” Dr. Salmeron did not testify, but her reports which were admitted into evidence indicate that both boys were dealing with multiple issues, including “grief and loss[.]” Tim expressed to Dr. Salmeron that he wished Father had “[n]ot crash[ed] on that day” and that his “dad could come back and the dogs and we all be together again as a family and the whole world not do bad things.”

Based on information obtained from Tim’s paternal uncle, with whom Tim had been temporarily placed, Dr. Salmeron’s report indicates that Tim exhibited “the following problematic behaviors to a moderate to clinically significant degree:” feels sad; feels down on himself; worries a lot; fidgets or unable to sit still; distracts easily;

2 Father maintained the right to consent to non-invasive medical and dental treatment for the boys during Father’s periods of possession, and surgical treatment in the event of emergency.

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