NUMBER 13-11-00616-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
IN THE INTEREST OF T.R.C. JR., A CHILD
On appeal from the 343rd District Court of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez This is a restricted appeal in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 25.7, 26.1(c), 30. By two issues, appellant Thomas1 contends that the
trial court abused its discretion when (1) it denied his request for a bench warrant to
appear in this suit filed by the Office of the Attorney General (OAG); and (2) when it did
not allow his appearance by any other effective means. We affirm.
1 We will refer to the appellant as Thomas and to his child as T.R.C. Jr. in accordance with rule of appellate procedure 9.8. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). I. BACKGROUND2
Thomas, who was incarcerated and proceeding pro se, answered the OAG's suit
and requested a bench warrant to appear in court. The record does not reflect an explicit
ruling on Thomas's request, but the trial court notified Thomas of the trial setting and
proceeded to trial without issuing the bench warrant.3
Thomas did not appear at trial, and the court rendered a default judgment against
him. The judgment appointed the mother and Thomas joint managing conservators of
their child, T.R.C. Jr., and set the terms of conservatorship and access. The judgment
also ordered Thomas to pay current child support of $216 per month, cash medical
support of $57 per month, and no retroactive support. Thomas did not file any
post-judgment motions and did not request findings of fact and conclusions of law. See
id. at R. 25.1(d)(7), 30 (both requiring that a notice of appeal in a restricted appeal state
that the appellant did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment and the
appellant did not timely file a post judgment motion or notice of appeal). Within six
months after the judgment was signed, Thomas filed a notice of restricted appeal. See
id. at R. 26.1(c) (providing that in a restricted appeal, notice must be filed within six
months after the judgment or order is signed).
2 Because all issues of law are settled, our memorandum opinion only advises the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for it. See id. at R. 47.4. 3 The docket entry for the initial February 23, 2011 hearing includes the following notation: "Bench warrant denied – Resp.'s appearance and testimony are not necessary under these circumstances." The trial court did not issue a written order denying the bench warrant request. The case was reset to April 20, 2011 because, as indicated on the docket sheet, Thomas was entitled to forty-five days' notice. The order resetting the case for a trial on the merits was signed the day of the hearing, and the docket sheet reflects that notice of the trial was sent on March 1, 2011.
2 II. THE LAW
A. Restricted Appeal
"A restricted appeal is a direct attack on a default judgment." Eguia v. Eguia, 367
S.W.3d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2012, no pet.). To succeed on restricted
appeal, the appellant must establish that: (1) he filed the notice of restricted appeal
within six months after the final judgment is signed; (2) he was a party to the underlying
lawsuit; (3) he did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained
of and did not file any post-judgment motions or requests for findings of fact and
conclusions of law; and (4) the error complained of is apparent on the face of the record.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.7, 26.1(c), 30; Alexander v. Lynda's Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845,
849 (Tex. 2004); Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tex. 1985); Autozone, Inc. v.
Duenes, 108 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
In this case, the record shows that the notice of restricted appeal was filed within
six months after the default judgment was signed, that Thomas was a party to the
underlying lawsuit, but did not participate in the hearing which resulted in the
complained-of judgment, and that he did not file any post-judgment motions or requests
for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c), 30. Therefore,
our discussion will center solely on whether the error complained of is apparent from the
face of the record. See Alexander, 134 S.W.3d at 849.
B. Bench Warrant
We review a trial court's decision on an inmate's request for a bench warrant for an
abuse of discretion. See In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 165. The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without reference 3 to any guiding rules or legal principles. K-Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt, 24 S.W.3d 357, 360
(Tex. 2000) (per curiam); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238,
241-42 (Tex. 1985).
It is well settled that litigants cannot be denied access to the courts merely
because they are inmates. In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003). "However,
an inmate does not have an absolute right to appear in person in every court proceeding."
Id.; see In re D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.)
(explaining that an inmate, whether plaintiff or defendant in a civil action, does not have
an automatic right to appear personally in court); see also Jackson v. Neal, No.
13-07-00164-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 370, at *14 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 22,
2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same). Rather, in determining whether a personal
appearance is warranted, the trial court must balance the prisoner's right of access to the
courts against the government's interest in protecting the integrity of the correctional
system. In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 165; Heine v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 92 S.W.3d
642, 649 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied).
When deciding whether to grant an inmate's request for a bench warrant, Texas
courts apply the factors articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d
730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976). In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 165. These factors include the
costs and inconvenience of transporting the prisoner to the courtroom; the security risk
the prisoner presents to the court and the public; whether the prisoner's claims are
substantial; whether the matter's resolution can reasonably be delayed until the prisoner's
release; whether the prisoner can and will offer admissible, noncumulative testimony that
cannot be effectively presented by deposition, telephone, or some other means; whether 4 the prisoner's presence is important in judging his demeanor and credibility; whether the
trial is to the court or a jury; and the prisoner's probability of success on the merits. Id.;
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NUMBER 13-11-00616-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
IN THE INTEREST OF T.R.C. JR., A CHILD
On appeal from the 343rd District Court of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez This is a restricted appeal in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 25.7, 26.1(c), 30. By two issues, appellant Thomas1 contends that the
trial court abused its discretion when (1) it denied his request for a bench warrant to
appear in this suit filed by the Office of the Attorney General (OAG); and (2) when it did
not allow his appearance by any other effective means. We affirm.
1 We will refer to the appellant as Thomas and to his child as T.R.C. Jr. in accordance with rule of appellate procedure 9.8. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). I. BACKGROUND2
Thomas, who was incarcerated and proceeding pro se, answered the OAG's suit
and requested a bench warrant to appear in court. The record does not reflect an explicit
ruling on Thomas's request, but the trial court notified Thomas of the trial setting and
proceeded to trial without issuing the bench warrant.3
Thomas did not appear at trial, and the court rendered a default judgment against
him. The judgment appointed the mother and Thomas joint managing conservators of
their child, T.R.C. Jr., and set the terms of conservatorship and access. The judgment
also ordered Thomas to pay current child support of $216 per month, cash medical
support of $57 per month, and no retroactive support. Thomas did not file any
post-judgment motions and did not request findings of fact and conclusions of law. See
id. at R. 25.1(d)(7), 30 (both requiring that a notice of appeal in a restricted appeal state
that the appellant did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment and the
appellant did not timely file a post judgment motion or notice of appeal). Within six
months after the judgment was signed, Thomas filed a notice of restricted appeal. See
id. at R. 26.1(c) (providing that in a restricted appeal, notice must be filed within six
months after the judgment or order is signed).
2 Because all issues of law are settled, our memorandum opinion only advises the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for it. See id. at R. 47.4. 3 The docket entry for the initial February 23, 2011 hearing includes the following notation: "Bench warrant denied – Resp.'s appearance and testimony are not necessary under these circumstances." The trial court did not issue a written order denying the bench warrant request. The case was reset to April 20, 2011 because, as indicated on the docket sheet, Thomas was entitled to forty-five days' notice. The order resetting the case for a trial on the merits was signed the day of the hearing, and the docket sheet reflects that notice of the trial was sent on March 1, 2011.
2 II. THE LAW
A. Restricted Appeal
"A restricted appeal is a direct attack on a default judgment." Eguia v. Eguia, 367
S.W.3d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2012, no pet.). To succeed on restricted
appeal, the appellant must establish that: (1) he filed the notice of restricted appeal
within six months after the final judgment is signed; (2) he was a party to the underlying
lawsuit; (3) he did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained
of and did not file any post-judgment motions or requests for findings of fact and
conclusions of law; and (4) the error complained of is apparent on the face of the record.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.7, 26.1(c), 30; Alexander v. Lynda's Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845,
849 (Tex. 2004); Stubbs v. Stubbs, 685 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tex. 1985); Autozone, Inc. v.
Duenes, 108 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
In this case, the record shows that the notice of restricted appeal was filed within
six months after the default judgment was signed, that Thomas was a party to the
underlying lawsuit, but did not participate in the hearing which resulted in the
complained-of judgment, and that he did not file any post-judgment motions or requests
for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c), 30. Therefore,
our discussion will center solely on whether the error complained of is apparent from the
face of the record. See Alexander, 134 S.W.3d at 849.
B. Bench Warrant
We review a trial court's decision on an inmate's request for a bench warrant for an
abuse of discretion. See In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 165. The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without reference 3 to any guiding rules or legal principles. K-Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt, 24 S.W.3d 357, 360
(Tex. 2000) (per curiam); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238,
241-42 (Tex. 1985).
It is well settled that litigants cannot be denied access to the courts merely
because they are inmates. In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003). "However,
an inmate does not have an absolute right to appear in person in every court proceeding."
Id.; see In re D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.)
(explaining that an inmate, whether plaintiff or defendant in a civil action, does not have
an automatic right to appear personally in court); see also Jackson v. Neal, No.
13-07-00164-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 370, at *14 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 22,
2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same). Rather, in determining whether a personal
appearance is warranted, the trial court must balance the prisoner's right of access to the
courts against the government's interest in protecting the integrity of the correctional
system. In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 165; Heine v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 92 S.W.3d
642, 649 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied).
When deciding whether to grant an inmate's request for a bench warrant, Texas
courts apply the factors articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d
730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976). In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 165. These factors include the
costs and inconvenience of transporting the prisoner to the courtroom; the security risk
the prisoner presents to the court and the public; whether the prisoner's claims are
substantial; whether the matter's resolution can reasonably be delayed until the prisoner's
release; whether the prisoner can and will offer admissible, noncumulative testimony that
cannot be effectively presented by deposition, telephone, or some other means; whether 4 the prisoner's presence is important in judging his demeanor and credibility; whether the
trial is to the court or a jury; and the prisoner's probability of success on the merits. Id.;
Heine, 92 S.W.3d at 650. It is the inmate's burden to show the trial court why his
presence is warranted. In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166; In re A.W., 302 S.W.3d 925, 929
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Request for a Bench Warrant to Appear in Person at the Hearing
By his first issue, Thomas complains that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his request for a bench warrant. Although the trial court did not rule on
Thomas's motion, after the initial February 23, 2011 hearing, it is undisputed that the trial
court notified Thomas of the April trial setting. By proceeding to trial without issuing a
bench warrant, the trial court implicitly denied Thomas's request. See In re Z.L.T., 124
S.W.3d at 165.
Importantly, based on our review of the record, Thomas did not address any of the
Stone factors in his request for a bench warrant. See id., 124 S.W.3d at 166; In re A.W.,
302 S.W.3d at 929. Thomas presented no factual information that would have enabled
the trial court to balance all of the Stone factors. Because Thomas failed to meet his
burden to prove his entitlement to a bench warrant, we cannot say the trial court abused
its discretion by implicitly denying Thomas's request for a bench warrant. See In re
Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse discretion in
denying a bench warrant where the inmate listed the Stone factors but failed to provide
factual information showing how his interest in appearing outweighed its impact on the
correctional system); In re A.W., 302 S.W.3d at 929-30 (determining that despite a strong 5 showing regarding the inmate's claims and testimony, in the absence of a factual showing
concerning transportation and safety, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion for a bench warrant); In re D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d at 312 (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a bench warrant where an inmate cited Stone
factors but did not provide sufficient factual information to enable the court to balance the
factors); see also Jackson, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 370, at *16 ("Because [appellant] failed
to meet his burden to prove his entitlement to a bench warrant, we cannot say the trial
court abused its discretion in implicitly denying Phillip's request for a bench warrant.").
Having so concluded, Thomas cannot succeed in this restricted appeal because we find
no error on the face of the record in this regard. See Alexander, 134 S.W.3d at 849.
We overrule Thomas's first issue.
B. Appearance by Other Effective Means
By his second issue, Thomas contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
not allowing his appearance by other effective means. We disagree.
To be entitled to appear in person or through an alternate means, such as
telephonic or video communications technology, the burden rests on the prisoner-inmate
to request access to the court through these alternate means and also to demonstrate
why a trial court should authorize them. See also Graves v. Atkins, No. 01-04-00423,
2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10975, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 21, 2006, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166). Our review of the record reveals
that Thomas made no request to appear by alternative means, such as by telephone
conference, deposition, or affidavit. See In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166; see also
Graves, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10975, at *7-8. And we find nothing in the record that we 6 can construe as such a request. Cf. In re Daugherty, 42 S.W.3d 331, 336 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (construing Daugherty's request in a motion for
continuance that the trial court consider "an alternative dispute resolution by means of a
conference call" as a request "to participate in the trial in some manner" and determining
that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow Daugherty to participate in the
trial in some meaningful way). Thus, we conclude Thomas waived this issue. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Further, even had Thomas made such a request, we find no factual
support provided by Thomas that would demonstrate to the trial court why it should
authorize such an alternate appearance. See In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166; see also
Graves, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 10975, at *7-8. We overrule Thomas's second issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's order.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ Justice
Delivered and filed the 16th day of August, 2012.