In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-20-00359-CV ___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF T.R., T.R., AND R.N.-R., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 231st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 231-679118-20
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this termination case, appellant J.R. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her children T.R. (Trevor), T.R. (Tina), and R.D.N.-
R. (Robert) (collectively the Children).1 In six issues, Mother contends the evidence
was legally and factually insufficient to support termination under Family Code
Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P), and (R) and that the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. Because we will
hold that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support both the conduct
grounds and the trial court’s best-interest finding, we will affirm the trial court’s
termination order.
I. Background
Drugs are at the heart of this termination. Mother, who was thirty-nine at the
time of trial, testified that she began using marijuana at eighteen and began using
methamphetamines at twenty-one. Her first child, Trevor, was born in October
2012 when Mother was thirty-one. Mother testified that she was not using drugs when
Trevor was born. Mother’s daughter, Tina, was born in December 2017. Mother
testified that she began using heroin shortly after Tina’s birth. She explained that she
began using heroin daily and was a heroin user from 2018 until 2020.
1 We use aliases to refer to the Children and the parties. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2 The Department of Family and Protective Services became involved with
Mother in April 2019, when it received allegations that she had purchased
methamphetamines and “would stay up for several days at a time due to her being
under the influence.” Morgan Overn, an investigator with the Department, testified
that she met with Mother after receiving the allegation, and Mother told her she had
used illegal drugs “several years prior” but that she had not used illegal drugs in
“about 10 years.” Overn requested that Mother complete an oral swab drug test, but
Mother refused. Mother told Overn that she would go to a drug-testing site the
following day, but Mother did not have the testing done. After the Department
became involved, Mother placed Trevor in the care of one of Mother’s relatives and
placed Tina in the care of Tina’s paternal grandmother. In May 2019, Trevor and Tina
were taken to Cook Children’s Medical Center to be drug tested. Trevor did not have
enough hair to be tested, but Tina was tested, and her results were positive for
methamphetamines and heroin. Overn later referred Mother to Recovery Resource
Council, and Mother engaged its services in June 2019. Mother admitted to Recovery
Resource Council that she had used marijuana, methamphetamines, and heroin in the
thirty days prior to June 2019, at a time when she was pregnant with Robert.
The Department filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights as to
Trevor and Tina in August 2019. In the petition, the Department sought termination
of Mother’s parental rights based on the predicate termination grounds set forth in
Subsections (D), (E), (F), (K), (M), (N), (O), (P), (Q), and (R) of Section 161.001(b)(1)
3 of the Family Code.2 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E), (F), (K), (M),
(N), (O), (P), (Q), (R). Around that time, Jamesha Richard, a conservatorship
specialist for the Department, was assigned to Mother’s case. Richard met with
Mother at a hearing on August 30, 2019, and Mother admitted to Richard that she had
relapsed “right before the . . . hearing.”
Richard developed a service plan for Mother. Among other things, Mother was
asked to complete parenting classes, to attend individual counseling, to submit to a
psychological evaluation, to submit to a drug abuse assessment, to comply with
requests for random drug testing, and to refrain from engaging in criminal activity.
Mother complied with some aspects of the service plan. She completed parenting
classes, attended counseling sessions,3 submitted to a psychological evaluation, and
submitted to a drug abuse assessment.
As to the random drug testing and the requirement that she refrain from
criminal activity, Mother’s drug-test results came back negative in the early months of
the case: she had negative test results in September 2019, October 2019, and
November 2019. In December 2019, however, Mother tested positive for
methamphetamines and heroin. That same month, Robert was born. Robert tested
2 The petition was later amended in December 2019, following Robert’s birth, and the Department sought termination of Mother’s rights as to all the Children alleging the same termination grounds as in the original petition.
While Mother attended several substance abuse counseling sessions, she was 3
not discharged from counseling due to her continued use of illegal drugs.
4 positive for opiates at his birth, and after spending a month in the NICU, he was
placed with a foster family. In February 2020, Mother tested positive for heroin. In
May 2020, Mother tested positive for methamphetamines. In July 2020, Mother tested
positive for heroin. In August 2020, Mother tested positive for methamphetamines.
Richard testified that Mother was dishonest about her drug use. Richard stated that
when Mother was confronted with the positive test results, Mother would typically
deny that she had used drugs. At trial, however, Mother stated that she did not
dispute the results of any of the drug tests. In explaining her relapses, Mother testified
that she had been prescribed a legal dose of methadone during the summer of
2019 after becoming pregnant with Robert, and that she began using heroin in
2020 after she attempted to stop taking methadone on her own.
In October 2020, Mother was admitted to Nexus Recovery. She was still
residing at Nexus at the time of trial in November 2020 but stated that she would be
discharged at the end of the week. Mother testified at trial that she had been “clean
for over a month.” She stated that following her discharge from Nexus, she was going
to attend a sober-living program at the Oxford House, an addiction recovery center.
She stated that at the Oxford House she would receive counseling and recovery
support services and that she would go to Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics
Anonymous meetings. She also stated that she would have a recovery coach that
could assist her with finding a job. Mother admitted, however, that it would take
5 “months” before she was fully recovered and “a couple months” to get a home, find a
job, and be prepared to take care of the Children.
Following trial, the trial court issued a ruling terminating Mother’s parental
rights to the Children under Subsections (D), (E), (O), (P), and (R) and finding that
such termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals from that
II. Conduct Grounds
In her first and second issues, Mother argues that the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient to support termination under Family Code Section
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E).
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the party seeking
termination must prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: 1) that the
parent’s actions satisfy one ground listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1); and
2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. Id. § 161.001(b); In re E.N.C.,
384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is
clear and convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 101.007; E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802.
6 To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental-termination
cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged
findings—here the endangerment findings—to determine whether a reasonable
factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. In re J.P.B.,
180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).
We assume that the factfinder settled any evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if
a reasonable factfinder could have done so. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. We disregard all
evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved, and we consider
undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we consider
evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard
contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. See id. The factfinder is the
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336,
346 (Tex. 2009).
We must perform “an exacting review of the entire record” in determining the
factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of a parent–child
relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we give due
deference to the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant them with our own. In re
H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). Here, we review the whole record to decide
whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the
Department proved the endangerment grounds. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
7 § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder
reasonably could form such a firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually
sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19.
B. LAW ON ENDANGERMENT
Subsections (D) and (E) of Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1) provide
that the trial court may order the termination of a parent’s rights if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence that a parent has
(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child; [or]
(E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child[.]
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).
“Endanger” means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize. Tex. Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117,
125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Under Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D), it is
necessary to examine the evidence related to the environment of the child to
determine if the environment was the source of the endangerment to the child’s
physical or emotional well-being. J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. Conduct of a parent in
the home can create an environment that endangers the physical and emotional well-
being of a child. Id. As an example, a parent’s illegal drug use and drug-related
8 criminal activity supports the conclusion that a child’s surroundings endanger the
child’s physical or emotional well-being. Id.
Under Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence
exists that the endangerment of the child’s physical well-being was the direct result of
the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. See id.; see also Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Termination under Subsection (E) must be based
on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of
conduct by the parent is required. J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. It is not necessary,
however, that the parent’s conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually
suffer injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. The specific danger
to a child’s well-being may be inferred from parental misconduct standing alone. In re
R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). “As a general
rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the
physical and emotional well-being of a child.” Id. Additionally, “[a] mother’s use of
drugs during pregnancy may amount to conduct that endangers the physical and
emotional well-being of the child,” and “[d]rug addiction and its effect on a parent’s
life and ability to parent may establish an endangering course of conduct as well.”
J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125–26.
C. ENDANGERMENT ANALYSIS
Because the evidence pertaining to Subsections (D) and (E) is interrelated, we
conduct a consolidated review. In re S.H., No. 02-17-00188-CV, 2017 WL 4542859, at
9 *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 12, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re T.N.S.,
230 S.W.3d 434, 439 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.).
Here, the record contains evidence that Mother had used illegal drugs for much
of her adult life and that she displayed little ability to stop her addiction. Mother
began using marijuana at eighteen and methamphetamines at twenty-one. Although
she testified that she was not using drugs when Trevor was born, Mother admitted
that she began using heroin shortly after Tina’s birth. Mother testified that she used
heroin daily and that she used the drug from 2018 until 2020. The record further
reflects that the Department became involved in this case due to allegations of
Mother’s drug use—it was alleged that Mother “would stay up for several days at a
time due to her being under the influence.” In May 2019, Tina tested positive for
methamphetamines and heroin. Records from Recovery Resource Council show that
Mother admitted to using marijuana, methamphetamines, and heroin while she was
pregnant with Robert.
Mother’s illegal drug use continued even after the Department filed its petition
to terminate her parental rights. Mother tested positive for methamphetamines and
heroin in December 2019. That same month, Robert tested positive for opiates at his
birth. Mother tested positive for heroin in February 2020, tested positive for
methamphetamines in May 2020, tested positive for heroin in July 2020, and tested
positive for methamphetamines in August 2020. Richard testified that Mother was
10 dishonest about her drug use. At trial, Mother did not dispute the results of her drug
tests.
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
judgment and recognizing that the factfinder is the sole arbiter of the witnesses’
credibility and demeanor, we hold that there is some evidence of an endangering
environment on which a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or
conviction that Mother had knowingly placed or had knowingly allowed the Children
to remain in conditions or surroundings that had endangered their emotional or
physical well-being and that there is some evidence of endangering conduct on which
a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother had
engaged in conduct that had endangered the Children’s physical or emotional well-
being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125–26.
Giving due deference to the factfinder’s endangering-environment and
endangering-conduct findings, without supplanting the factfinder’s judgment with our
own, and after reviewing the entire record, we hold that a factfinder could reasonably
form a firm conviction or belief that Mother had knowingly placed or had knowingly
allowed the Children to remain in conditions or surroundings that had endangered
their emotional or physical well-being and that Mother had engaged in conduct that
had endangered the Children’s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125–26.
11 We overrule Mother’s first and second issues. Because we hold that the
evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the endangerment findings, and
because only one finding is necessary to sustain a parental-rights termination, we need
not address Mother’s challenges to the trial court’s other findings of grounds for
termination. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803; J.L.,
163 S.W.3d at 84; see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We therefore overrule Mother’s third,
fourth, and fifth issues.
III. Best Interest
In her sixth issue, Mother argues that the evidence was legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BEST-INTEREST FACTORS
We review Mother’s challenge to the sufficiency of the trial court’s best-interest
finding under the review standards stated regarding the conduct grounds. In
determining whether to support a best-interest finding, we review the entire record. In
re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013). Although we generally presume that
keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112,
116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s
well-being, safety, and development, In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018).
Evidence probative of a child’s best interest may be the same evidence that is
probative of a Subsection (b)(1) ground. E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249; C.H., 89 S.W.3d
at 28; see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (2). We also consider the evidence in
12 light of nonexclusive factors that the factfinder may apply in determining the child’s
best interest:
(A) the child’s desires;
(B) the child’s emotional and physical needs, now and in the future;
(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the child’s best interest;
(F) the plans for the child by these individuals;
(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(H) the parent’s acts or omissions indicating that the existing parent- child relationship is not a proper one; and
(I) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at
249 (stating that in reviewing a best-interest finding, “we consider, among other
evidence, the Holley factors” (footnote omitted)); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807. These
factors are not exhaustive, and some listed factors may not apply to some cases. C.H.,
89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just one factor may be
sufficient to support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. Id. On
the other hand, the presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor will not support
such a finding. Id.
13 B. BEST-INTEREST ANALYSIS
With regard to the Children’s emotional and physical needs now and in the
future and the emotional and physical danger to them now and in the future, the
record reflects that Mother abused illegal drugs to the detriment of the Children.
Mother became a daily heroin user shortly after Tina’s birth, and shortly after the
Department became involved, Tina tested positive for methamphetamines and heroin.
The record further reflects that Mother used illegal drugs while pregnant with
Robert—records from Recovery Resource Council indicate that Mother used
marijuana, methamphetamines, and heroin in the thirty days prior to June 2019, and
Richard testified that Mother told her that she had relapsed “right before” an August
30, 2019 hearing. Robert ultimately tested positive for opiates at his December
2019 birth. Mother continued using illegal drugs following Robert’s birth, testing
positive for methamphetamines and/or heroin in February, May, July, and August
2020. While Mother stated that she had been “clean for over a month” at trial, Mother
had previously had periods where she had not taken illegal drugs before relapsing. The
trial court was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of terminating
Mother’s parental rights to the Children.
With regard to the plan for the Children by the individuals seeking custody and
the stability of the home or proposed placement, the record reflects that Richard
recommended that the Children be adopted and that it was in their best interest to be
adopted. The record also reflects that Robert was placed with a foster family shortly
14 after his birth and that he had bonded with the family, was thriving, and that the
family wished to adopt him. The record further reflects that that same foster family
was interested in adopting Tina.4 The record also reflects that Trevor’s current
caregiver—Mother’s relative that had taken care of him since shortly after the
Department’s involvement in the case—desired to adopt him. The Department was
also considering whether Trevor could be placed with a former boyfriend of Mother’s
who had been a father figure in Trevor’s life. Mother testified that the Children
appeared to be well taken care of by their respective placements. As to Mother’s
plans, the record reflects that Mother had not established employment at the time of
trial and had not established any kind of home or housing, although Mother believed
that a recovery coach at the Oxford House could assist her with finding a job. Mother
admitted, however, that it would take “months” before she was fully recovered from
her drug addiction and that it would take “a couple months” to get a home, find a job,
and be prepared to take care of the Children. The trial court was entitled to find that
this factor weighed in favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children.
With regard to Mother’s acts or omissions indicating that the existing parent–
child relationship is not a proper one and any excuse for Mother’s acts or omissions,
the record reflects, as detailed above, that Mother abused illegal drugs to the
4 Tina’s paternal grandmother, who had been taking care of Tina since the Department’s involvement in the case, was evidently in hospice care at the time of trial.
15 detriment of the Children. Tina tested positive for methamphetamines and heroin,
Mother used marijuana, methamphetamines, and heroin while pregnant with Robert,
and Robert ultimately tested positive for opiates at his birth. Mother continued using
illegal drugs following Robert’s birth, testing positive for methamphetamines and/or
heroin in February, May, July, and August 2020. At trial, Mother stated that she began
using drugs on a regular basis because she was “molested as a child [and] grew up with
alcoholic parents,” although Mother admitted that she was responsible for Robert
being positive at birth for opiates and that she was responsible for Tina testing
positive for methamphetamines and heroin. The trial court was entitled to find that
this factor weighed in favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children.
C. BEST-INTEREST CONCLUSION
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s best-
interest finding, we hold that a reasonable factfinder could have reasonably formed a
firm conviction or belief that termination of the parent-child relationship between
Mother and the Children was in the Children’s best interest, and we therefore hold
that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. Based on our
exacting review of the entire record and giving due deference to the factfinder’s
findings, we likewise conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the
trial court’s best-interest finding. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19. Accordingly, we
overrule Mother’s sixth issue.
16 IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Mother’s six issues, we affirm the trial court’s termination
order.
/s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice
Delivered: April 15, 2021