In the Interest of T.K.W., A.R.W., and A.R.W. v. the State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedAugust 29, 2024
Docket09-24-00160-CV
StatusPublished

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In the Interest of T.K.W., A.R.W., and A.R.W. v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-24-00160-CV __________________

IN THE INTEREST OF T.K.W., A.R.W., AND A.R.W.

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law Orange County, Texas Trial Cause No. 230242-D __________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Following a trial to the bench, the trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s

parent-child relationship with T.K.W., whom we will call Tucker, with A.R.W.,

whom we will call Anna, and with A.R.W., whom we will call Amy. 1 After the trial

court signed the order terminating Tucker’s, Anna’s, and Amy’s relationship with

their Mother and Father, Father filed a notice to appeal but Mother did not.

1We have used pseudonyms to protect the identity of the minors. See Tex. R.

App. P. 9.8(a), (b). 1 The judgment states that the trial court found, by clear and convincing

evidence, that Father (1) knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in

conditions that endangered their well-being; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly

placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct who endangered the

children’s physical or emotional well-being; (3) constructively abandoned the

children who have been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of

the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than six months and:

(i) the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the children to Father, (ii)

Father has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the children,

and (iii) Father has demonstrated an inability to provide the children with a safe

environment; (4) failed to comply with the provision of a court order establishing

the actions necessary for Father to obtain the children’s return; and (5) used a

controlled substance, as defined by Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code, in a

manner that endangered the health or safety of the children, and (i) failed to complete

a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program, or (ii) after completion of a

court-ordered substance abuse treatment program continued to abuse a controlled

substance. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P). The trial

court also found that terminating the parent-child relationship between Father and

the children is in the children’s best interest. Id. § 161.001(b)(2).

2 Father’s court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in which counsel

contends that there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In the Interest of L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional

evaluation of the record. Counsel served Father with a copy of the Anders brief filed

on his behalf. This Court notified Father of his right to file a pro se response, as well

as the deadline for doing so. Father filed a pro se letter brief.

We have independently reviewed the appellate record, counsel’s brief, and

Father’s letter brief, and we agree that any appeal would be frivolous. We find no

arguable error requiring us to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief this

appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Although we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal, we

conclude that the order of termination requires modification. The reporter’s record

reflects that the trial court rendered judgment in open court upon its findings that

Father committed the following predicate violations – Family Code subsections

161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and (P). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D),

(E), (O), (P). The written judgment reflects that the grounds for termination were

Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), and (P). See id. §

161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P). Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s order

of termination to reflect the proper predicate violations – Family Code subsections

3 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and (P). See Getts v. State, 155 S.W.3d 153, 155-158

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (affirming appellate court’s reformation of trial court’s

judgment in Anders case); see also R.J.O. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,

No. 03-13-00478-CV, 2013 WL 6060778, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 13,

2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); In the Interest of S.R., No. 10-17-00372-CV, 2018 WL

2142740, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 8, 2018) (no pet.) (mem. op.).

We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights as

modified.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

KENT CHAMBERS Justice

Submitted on July 26, 2024 Opinion Delivered August 29, 2024

Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.

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Related

Anders v. California
386 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Stafford v. State
813 S.W.2d 503 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Getts v. State
155 S.W.3d 153 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2005)
in the Interest of L.D.T., C.R.E.T. and W.G.T.
161 S.W.3d 728 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2005)

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In the Interest of T.K.W., A.R.W., and A.R.W. v. the State of Texas, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-tkw-arw-and-arw-v-the-state-of-texas-texapp-2024.