In the Interest of T.K.W., A.R.W., and A.R.W. v. the State of Texas
This text of In the Interest of T.K.W., A.R.W., and A.R.W. v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of T.K.W., A.R.W., and A.R.W. v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-24-00160-CV __________________
IN THE INTEREST OF T.K.W., A.R.W., AND A.R.W.
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Orange County, Texas Trial Cause No. 230242-D __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a trial to the bench, the trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s
parent-child relationship with T.K.W., whom we will call Tucker, with A.R.W.,
whom we will call Anna, and with A.R.W., whom we will call Amy. 1 After the trial
court signed the order terminating Tucker’s, Anna’s, and Amy’s relationship with
their Mother and Father, Father filed a notice to appeal but Mother did not.
1We have used pseudonyms to protect the identity of the minors. See Tex. R.
App. P. 9.8(a), (b). 1 The judgment states that the trial court found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Father (1) knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in
conditions that endangered their well-being; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly
placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct who endangered the
children’s physical or emotional well-being; (3) constructively abandoned the
children who have been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of
the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than six months and:
(i) the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the children to Father, (ii)
Father has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the children,
and (iii) Father has demonstrated an inability to provide the children with a safe
environment; (4) failed to comply with the provision of a court order establishing
the actions necessary for Father to obtain the children’s return; and (5) used a
controlled substance, as defined by Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code, in a
manner that endangered the health or safety of the children, and (i) failed to complete
a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program, or (ii) after completion of a
court-ordered substance abuse treatment program continued to abuse a controlled
substance. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P). The trial
court also found that terminating the parent-child relationship between Father and
the children is in the children’s best interest. Id. § 161.001(b)(2).
2 Father’s court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in which counsel
contends that there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In the Interest of L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional
evaluation of the record. Counsel served Father with a copy of the Anders brief filed
on his behalf. This Court notified Father of his right to file a pro se response, as well
as the deadline for doing so. Father filed a pro se letter brief.
We have independently reviewed the appellate record, counsel’s brief, and
Father’s letter brief, and we agree that any appeal would be frivolous. We find no
arguable error requiring us to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief this
appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Although we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal, we
conclude that the order of termination requires modification. The reporter’s record
reflects that the trial court rendered judgment in open court upon its findings that
Father committed the following predicate violations – Family Code subsections
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and (P). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D),
(E), (O), (P). The written judgment reflects that the grounds for termination were
Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), and (P). See id. §
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P). Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s order
of termination to reflect the proper predicate violations – Family Code subsections
3 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and (P). See Getts v. State, 155 S.W.3d 153, 155-158
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (affirming appellate court’s reformation of trial court’s
judgment in Anders case); see also R.J.O. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,
No. 03-13-00478-CV, 2013 WL 6060778, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 13,
2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); In the Interest of S.R., No. 10-17-00372-CV, 2018 WL
2142740, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 8, 2018) (no pet.) (mem. op.).
We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights as
modified.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
KENT CHAMBERS Justice
Submitted on July 26, 2024 Opinion Delivered August 29, 2024
Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.
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