IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1148 Filed October 29, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF T.H., Minor Child,
C.H., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Ashley Beisch,
Judge.
A mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights
to her minor child. AFFIRMED.
Chira L. Corwin of Corwin Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Mark J. Olberding of Olberding Law Office, Nevada, guardian ad litem for
minor child.
Audra Saunders of Wasker, Dorr, Wimmer & Marcouiller, P.C., West Des
Moines, attorney for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and
Sandy, JJ. 2
AHLERS, Presiding Judge.
The juvenile court removed a ten-year-old child from her mother’s custody
because the mother was facing incarceration and using illegal drugs. The child
was adjudicated as a child in need of assistance (CINA). The child was placed
with her father, but she was removed from the father’s custody after he allowed a
registered sex offender to live in the same home. The child was then placed with
a foster family.
After receiving additional time to work toward reunification, neither parent
had progressed significantly, so this termination-of-parental-rights action was
started. Following a trial, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both
parents. Only the mother appeals.
I. Standard and Process of Review
We review terminations of parental rights de novo. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d
280, 293 (Iowa 2021). We are not bound by the juvenile court’s fact findings, but
we give them respectful consideration, especially when assessing the credibility of
witnesses. Id.
Our review of termination orders under Iowa Code chapter 232 (2024)
follows a three-step analysis to determine whether statutory grounds exist for
termination, whether termination is the child’s best interests, and whether an
exception should apply to prevent termination. Id. at 294. However, we do not
address any step in the process that is not challenged on appeal. In re P.L., 778
N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). “After addressing any challenged steps of the three-
step process, we then address any additional claims raised by a parent.” In re
L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025). 3
II. Analysis
The mother raises three issues on appeal. She contends (1) the court erred
by finding clear and convincing evidence sufficient to terminate her parental rights
under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f); (2) the court did not make a proper
determination that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interests;
and (3) the court should have granted her a six-month extension to work toward
reunification.1 See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40.
A. Statutory Ground
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under
section 232.116(1)(f). That ground permits termination if (1) the child is four years
of age or older; (2) the child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance;
(3) the child has been removed from the parent’s physical custody for twelve of the
last eighteen months; and (4) “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that at the
present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents.”
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f). The mother only challenges the fourth element—
whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the child could not be returned
to her custody.
After our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that the child
could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing.
In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014) (concluding “at the present time”
1 The mother’s petition on appeal attempts to frame her request for an additional
six months as an exception to termination under section 232.116(3). But her petition does not cite or argue for application of a specific exception. Therefore, we interpret her argument as one for a six-month extension and not as a request for application of an exception under section 232.116(3). 4
means at the time of the termination trial). At the termination trial, in response to
the question whether she believed the child could be returned to her home at that
time, the mother answered, “Obviously not.” This admission is sufficient in itself to
meet the element the mother now challenges. See In re T.M.-L., No. 24-1818,
2025 WL 548851, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025) (finding a parent’s admission
at trial that the child could not be returned to the parent’s custody is enough to
summarily reject the parent’s appellate challenge to the contrary). But there’s
more. Due to lack of attendance, the mother was discharged unsuccessfully from
mental-health and substance-use treatment ordered as part of a previous six-
month extension. Although she testified to having a place to live with her
substance-use sponsor for the three months leading to the termination trial and
she started a job the week before the trial, these recent steps in the right direction
are insufficient to alleviate our concerns. See In re D.M., 516 N.W.2d 888, 891
(Iowa 1994) (finding eleven-hour improvements to prevent termination insufficient
given the mother’s previous and consistent shortcomings). While the CINA case
was ongoing for nearly three years, the mother has been in and out of jail, moved
to another state for a time, and did not maintain stable housing. The mother’s
unresolved substance-use issues, unresolved mental-health issues, and instability
support her admission that the child could not be returned to her custody.
Like the juvenile court, we find clear and convincing evidence that the child
could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the trial. As a result,
a statutory ground for termination was established. 5
B. Best Interests
Next, the mother challenges the juvenile court’s best-interests
determination, claiming the determination was insufficient because it was
conclusory. When determining whether termination is in a child’s best interests we
“give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for
furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical,
mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40
(quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). To make this determination the court may
consider the child’s integration into a pre-adoptive home and what the future holds
for the child if returned to the parent based on the parent’s past parenting
performance. In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 171 (Iowa 2020).
The juvenile court’s order regarding the child’s best interests specifically
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1148 Filed October 29, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF T.H., Minor Child,
C.H., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Ashley Beisch,
Judge.
A mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights
to her minor child. AFFIRMED.
Chira L. Corwin of Corwin Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Mark J. Olberding of Olberding Law Office, Nevada, guardian ad litem for
minor child.
Audra Saunders of Wasker, Dorr, Wimmer & Marcouiller, P.C., West Des
Moines, attorney for minor child.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and
Sandy, JJ. 2
AHLERS, Presiding Judge.
The juvenile court removed a ten-year-old child from her mother’s custody
because the mother was facing incarceration and using illegal drugs. The child
was adjudicated as a child in need of assistance (CINA). The child was placed
with her father, but she was removed from the father’s custody after he allowed a
registered sex offender to live in the same home. The child was then placed with
a foster family.
After receiving additional time to work toward reunification, neither parent
had progressed significantly, so this termination-of-parental-rights action was
started. Following a trial, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both
parents. Only the mother appeals.
I. Standard and Process of Review
We review terminations of parental rights de novo. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d
280, 293 (Iowa 2021). We are not bound by the juvenile court’s fact findings, but
we give them respectful consideration, especially when assessing the credibility of
witnesses. Id.
Our review of termination orders under Iowa Code chapter 232 (2024)
follows a three-step analysis to determine whether statutory grounds exist for
termination, whether termination is the child’s best interests, and whether an
exception should apply to prevent termination. Id. at 294. However, we do not
address any step in the process that is not challenged on appeal. In re P.L., 778
N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). “After addressing any challenged steps of the three-
step process, we then address any additional claims raised by a parent.” In re
L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025). 3
II. Analysis
The mother raises three issues on appeal. She contends (1) the court erred
by finding clear and convincing evidence sufficient to terminate her parental rights
under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f); (2) the court did not make a proper
determination that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interests;
and (3) the court should have granted her a six-month extension to work toward
reunification.1 See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40.
A. Statutory Ground
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under
section 232.116(1)(f). That ground permits termination if (1) the child is four years
of age or older; (2) the child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance;
(3) the child has been removed from the parent’s physical custody for twelve of the
last eighteen months; and (4) “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that at the
present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents.”
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f). The mother only challenges the fourth element—
whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the child could not be returned
to her custody.
After our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that the child
could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing.
In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014) (concluding “at the present time”
1 The mother’s petition on appeal attempts to frame her request for an additional
six months as an exception to termination under section 232.116(3). But her petition does not cite or argue for application of a specific exception. Therefore, we interpret her argument as one for a six-month extension and not as a request for application of an exception under section 232.116(3). 4
means at the time of the termination trial). At the termination trial, in response to
the question whether she believed the child could be returned to her home at that
time, the mother answered, “Obviously not.” This admission is sufficient in itself to
meet the element the mother now challenges. See In re T.M.-L., No. 24-1818,
2025 WL 548851, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025) (finding a parent’s admission
at trial that the child could not be returned to the parent’s custody is enough to
summarily reject the parent’s appellate challenge to the contrary). But there’s
more. Due to lack of attendance, the mother was discharged unsuccessfully from
mental-health and substance-use treatment ordered as part of a previous six-
month extension. Although she testified to having a place to live with her
substance-use sponsor for the three months leading to the termination trial and
she started a job the week before the trial, these recent steps in the right direction
are insufficient to alleviate our concerns. See In re D.M., 516 N.W.2d 888, 891
(Iowa 1994) (finding eleven-hour improvements to prevent termination insufficient
given the mother’s previous and consistent shortcomings). While the CINA case
was ongoing for nearly three years, the mother has been in and out of jail, moved
to another state for a time, and did not maintain stable housing. The mother’s
unresolved substance-use issues, unresolved mental-health issues, and instability
support her admission that the child could not be returned to her custody.
Like the juvenile court, we find clear and convincing evidence that the child
could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the trial. As a result,
a statutory ground for termination was established. 5
B. Best Interests
Next, the mother challenges the juvenile court’s best-interests
determination, claiming the determination was insufficient because it was
conclusory. When determining whether termination is in a child’s best interests we
“give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for
furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical,
mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40
(quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). To make this determination the court may
consider the child’s integration into a pre-adoptive home and what the future holds
for the child if returned to the parent based on the parent’s past parenting
performance. In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 171 (Iowa 2020).
The juvenile court’s order regarding the child’s best interests specifically
referenced the facts set forth in its determination on the grounds for termination.
In that section, the court analyzed the mother’s lack of communication and
collaboration with the department, her substance-use history, her inconsistent
contact with the child, her failure to take advantage of the services provided to help
her with her substance-use and mental-health issues, and her unstable living and
employment history. The court also elaborated on the child’s placement in a
pre-adoptive home noting that, despite some recent mental-health issues, the child
“is physically healthier than she was when in her parent’s care,” and “[e]ven given
the placement movements [the child] has gone through within the foster care
system, her parents have been no more stable.” The juvenile court’s best-interests
determination was based on its extensive review of the facts, and we agree with
its determination that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests. 6
C. Additional Time
Finally, the mother claims she has made great progress and should be
given an additional six months to work toward reunification. In certain
circumstances, the court is allowed to grant a parent six additional months to work
toward reunification before termination. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5) (permitting
the court to enter a permanency order pursuant to section 232.104 if it does not
terminate parental rights); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b) (providing a permanency
option of giving an additional six months to work toward reunification). But before
doing so, a court must be able to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or
expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that
the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the
end of the additional six-month period.” Id. § 232.104(2)(b).
The underlying CINA case was open for nearly three years before the
termination trial, in part because the court previously gave the mother a six-month
extension with the expectation the mother’s progress would continue.
Unfortunately, it didn’t. Although her recent efforts in obtaining employment and
temporary housing are commendable, they are not enough to convince us that the
child could be returned to her custody in six months. There is no credible evidence
she has progressed in her mental-health or substance-use treatment or secured
stable housing for herself and the child. Additionally, the child has grown so weary
of the mother’s instability that the child no longer desires to be in her mother’s
custody. 7
In short, we see no credible evidence that the child could be safely returned
to the mother by the end of a six-month extension. As a result, we affirm the
juvenile court’s decision denying the mother’s request for a six-month extension.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.