In the Interest of T.F., a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

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No. 02-25-00480-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF T.F., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 324th District Court Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 324-748154-24

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Father appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his child, T.F.,1 and awarding permanent managing conservatorship of her to the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (TDFPS).2 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). Because there are no arguable grounds that might support the appeal, we affirm.

Father’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief stating that she conducted a professional evaluation of the record and concluded that there are no arguable grounds to support an appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no reversible grounds on appeal. See id., 87 S. Ct. at 1400; see also In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (order) (approving use of Anders procedures in termination-of-parental-rights appeals); In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776– 77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in termination cases).

1 In termination-of-parental-rights cases, we use aliases for the names of the children and their parents. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

2 In the same termination order, the trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights to T.F. However, Mother has not appealed the termination order and is not a party to this appeal.

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Further, counsel (1) provided Father with a copy of the Anders brief;

(2) informed Father of his rights to request and review the appellate record and to file a pro se brief in response; (3) explained to Father the process of obtaining the appellate record; and (4) provided Father with a motion for pro se access to the appellate record, which lacked only Father’s signature and the date. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We too notified Father of his rights to request and examine the appellate record and to file a pro se response to the Anders brief, but he has not done so.

We then notified TDFPS that Father had not filed a pro se response and that its response to the Anders brief, if any, was due by January 5, 2026. TDFPS has declined to file a response but agrees with counsel’s assertion that there are no arguable grounds for relief.

When reviewing a brief that asserts an appeal is frivolous and that fulfills the requirements of Anders, we must independently examine the record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. See In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied) (citing Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). We also consider the Anders brief itself and any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Having carefully reviewed the record and the Anders brief, we conclude that there are no arguable grounds that might support Father’s appeal; therefore, we agree

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with counsel that the appeal is frivolous. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to T.F.3 /s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell

Justice

Delivered: January 30, 2026

3 Father’s counsel also filed a motion to withdraw. We deny that motion because counsel did not show good cause for withdrawal independent from her conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27; C.J., 501 S.W.3d at 255. Accordingly, Father’s counsel remains appointed in this case through any proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court unless otherwise relieved of her duties. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27; see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(2)(C).