In the Interest of S.W., a Child v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 16, 2025
• Docket: 02-24-00444-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00444-CV ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF S.W., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 325th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 325-742406-23

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (Department) filed a

petition to terminate the parent–child relationship between Mother and her daughter

S.W.1 The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under Family Code Section

161.001(b) based on endangerment, failure to follow court orders, and the child’s best

interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2). Mother timely

appealed from the trial court’s termination order. 2

Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that her appeal

is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967);

see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)

(holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). The brief

meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record

and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal.

Mother was given the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate record and to file

a pro se response, but she has not done so. The Department agrees with Mother’s

counsel that Mother has no meritorious grounds upon which to appeal and has

declined to file a response.

1 In a termination-of-parental-rights case, we use aliases for the names of the children and their parents. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 In the same order, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the child’s alleged and presumed fathers, neither of whom has appealed.

2 When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate

record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-

00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.)

(mem. op.); see also Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays

v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). We also

consider the Anders brief itself and any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-18-00073-

CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet. denied)

(mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig.

proceeding).

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record and agree

with counsel that this appeal is without merit. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2009, pet. denied). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 3

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice

Delivered: January 16, 2025

3 Counsel did not file a motion to withdraw. Accordingly, he remains appointed in this appeal through proceedings in the supreme court unless otherwise relieved from his duties for good cause in accordance with Family Code Section 107.016. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016; In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016).