in the Interest of S.S., F.C.S. and A.C.S., Jr., Children

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided July 19, 2017·No. 04-17-00072-CV·Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-17-00072-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF S.S., F.C.S., and A.C.S., Children

From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2015-PA-02493 Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Associate Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 19, 2017 AFFIRMED Adelina and Adam appeal the trial court’s termination of their parental rights to S.S., F.C.S., and A.C.S. 1 They argue there is legally and factually insufficient evidence that termination of their respective parental rights is in the children’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

In December 2015, the Department of Family and Protective Services filed suit for conservatorship of the children and to terminate Adelina’s and Adam’s parental rights. The Department removed the children after receiving a report that A.C.S., who was less than a month

1 To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to the children’s parents by their first names and to the children by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West 2014); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).

old, had multiple bone fractures. The children were placed with a foster family, and the trial court ordered Adelina and Adam to complete a family service plan, which included individual counseling.

The case proceeded to a bench trial during which Adelina, Adam, Department caseworker Valerie Mendiola, the children’s foster mother Nancy, and Adelina’s counselor Stephanie Valdez testified. The trial court also admitted into evidence a July 2016 affidavit Adelina filed when seeking a protective order against Adam, a 2011 order terminating Adelina’s parental rights to two other children, a 2015 order in which the trial court found that appointing Adam managing conservator of his other child was not in the child’s best interest, and photographs of Adelina with the children.

After taking the case under advisement, the trial court appointed the Department as the children’s permanent managing conservator and terminated Adelina’s and Adam’s parental rights. The trial court found Adelina knowingly endangered the children, had her parental rights to another child terminated for knowing endangerment, and failed to comply with her family service plan. The trial court found Adam knowingly endangered the children and failed to comply with his family service plan. The trial court further found that termination of Adelina’s and Adam’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Adelina and Adam appeal.

THE BEST-INTEREST FINDINGS Adelina and Adam challenge only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s best-interest findings. They do not challenge the trial court’s findings of grounds for termination. Because Adelina and Adam filed separate notices of appeal and briefs, we address their appeals separately, considering the applicable standard of review, the best-interest standard, and the evidence at trial.

A. Standard of Review A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2016). To determine whether this heightened burden of proof was met, we employ a heightened standard of review to determine whether a “factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). “This standard guards the constitutional interests implicated by termination, while retaining the deference an appellate court must have for the factfinder’s role.” In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d 681, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). We do not reweigh issues of witness credibility but defer to the factfinder’s reasonable determinations of credibility. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005).

A legal sufficiency review requires us to examine the evidence “in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found incredible. Id. When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we evaluate “whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding.” Id. The evidence is factually insufficient “[i]f, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction.” Id. B. The Best-Interest Standard The best-interest determination is a wide-ranging inquiry, and the Texas Supreme Court has set out some factors relevant to the determination:

• the desires of the child;

• the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;

• the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;

• the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;

• the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child;

• the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;

• the stability of the home or proposed placement;

• the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and • any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976). The list is not exhaustive, and not every factor must be proved to find that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Evidence of only one factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest—especially when undisputed evidence shows that the parental relationship endangered the child’s safety. Id. “Evidence that the parent has committed the acts or omissions prescribed by section 161.001 may also be probative in determining the child’s best interest; but the mere fact that an act or omission occurred in the past does not ipso facto prove that termination is currently in the child’s best interest.” In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d at 684 (internal citation omitted). “A factfinder may infer that past conduct endangering the well-being of a child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the parent.” In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 471 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). C. The Evidence at Trial Adelina testified that when A.C.S. was only twenty-five days old, he had fractured ribs and his legs were broken due to being twisted. Adelina thought it was possible Adam had caused the injury and stated Adam “does have a temper at points.” She explained Adam has choked Adelina and hit her, giving her “a busted lip.” She stated that at the time of trial, she and Adam were no longer in a relationship, and she wanted his parental rights to the children terminated because of his temper and the threat he posed to the children.

Adelina stated Adam had been arrested for violating a protective order she obtained against him. She explained Adam had violated the protective order when she voluntarily “picked him up from work.” Adelina also testified that after Adam was arrested, she went back to his place of employment, retrieved his paycheck, and gave the money from Adam’s paycheck and her own money to a friend to post Adam’s bail. According to Adelina, it was the last time she spoke with Adam.

Adelina testified a trial court had terminated her parental rights to two other children, H.E.

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