IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0878 Filed August 31, 2022
IN THE INTEREST OF S.S. and G.S., Minor Children,
K.S., Mother, Appellant,
W.S., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County, Karen Kaufman
Salic, District Associate Judge.
A father and mother separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to two children. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Theodore J. Hovda, Garner, for appellant mother.
Cameron M. Sprecher, Mason City, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Jane Wright, Forest City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2
VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
A father and mother separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to two children, born in 2018 and 2019. Both parents (I) challenge the
evidence supporting the ground for termination cited by the juvenile court; (II)
argue termination was not in the children’s best interests; (III) assert termination
was detrimental due to the closeness of the parent-child bond; and (IV) argue they
should have been afforded six additional months to facilitate reunification.
I. Ground for Termination
The juvenile court terminated parental rights pursuant to several statutory
provisions. The parents only challenge the evidence supporting one of the
provisions, allowing us to affirm the termination decision on the unchallenged
grounds. See In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). We elect to
address the contested provision, Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2022), which
requires proof of several elements, including proof the children cannot be returned
to parental custody.
The parents contend they had “suitable housing” and employment, were
without a history of drug use or physical abuse of the children, had “a plan for
daycare,” and had “a strong support system,” permitting immediate reunification.
They also contend the department of human services failed to have “psychological
evaluations” completed which, in the father’s words, “would have been key in
understanding . . . their learning capabilities, [and] learning difficulties.” The
parents’ focus on the absence of psychological evaluations implicates the
department’s obligation to make reasonable reunification efforts. See In re C.B.,
611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). “The State must show reasonable efforts as a 3
part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.”
Id.
Our de novo review of the record reveals the following facts. The children
were one and two when the department learned that they were being locked in
their room overnight. The department issued a founded child abuse report. The
parents agreed to participate in services to address their parenting deficiencies.
The department began with a module on safe parenting. Because of
concerns with the parents’ “cognitive functioning levels,” the service provider who
administered the module “modif[ied]” it and broke “it down so it [was] more easily
understandable” before she moved on to the next phase of the module. She also
“focused on” one step “for more than one session.” According to the department
case manager, “it was clear that [the] parents weren’t understanding” and, as a
result, the department discontinued the training. The department substituted “an
intense daily service” in a “further attempt to maintain the children in the home.”
The service had minimal effect. The case manager testified “the children were
again found locked in their room.” During one visit after services were initiated,
the department discovered the children’s bedroom “covered in poop on the walls,
bed and floor” and on the children’s bodies and faces.
The department requested the children’s removal. The juvenile court
granted the request and later adjudicated the children in need of assistance. The
State ultimately filed a petition to terminate parental rights.
At the termination hearing, the case manager detailed the extensive
services afforded the parents and stated, “the only service that was court ordered
that the department was not able to offer was psychological evaluations for these 4
parents.” When asked why the evaluations were not provided, she responded,
“[t]here was not any places available to be able to do that testing.” She said she
“called all the way down to Iowa City and around to Des Moines, and there just
wasn’t any availability to do psychological testing.” Responding to a suggestion
that evaluations would have been useful, she testified,
You know, I think the information likely would have said the same that we’ve all assessed and that’s why we modified our teaching styles with the understanding of what their IQ likely is. I don’t know that the psychological testing would have necessarily given us any significant insight outside of it may have . . . been an additional assessment . . . on the[] [parents’] ability to parent these kids given what has already gone on.
The case manager pointed out that the “parents were still able to participate in
individual counseling, which would have likely been one of the things
recommended in a psychological eval[uation].”
There is no question the parents ultimately made progress on hygiene
issues and employment. But, as recently as a month before the termination
hearing, the case manager testified “the parents still [did not] understand why they
were involved” in the proceedings. When asked if she believed a return of the
children to parental custody “would pose a significant risk of life to the children,”
she responded, “I do.” We conclude the State satisfied its reasonable-efforts
mandate and proved the children could not be returned to parental custody.
II. Best Interests
Termination must be in the children’s best interests. Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2). The department reported:
[T]he concerns that were identified at the onset of this case remain at this time. The [d]epartment does not question that these parents love their children however remain very guarded with parents’ ability 5
to learn and demonstrate the necessary skills needed to parent these children on a full-time basis. Interactions between parents and children remain supervised despite the fact that parents have been provided with a barrage of services. Unfortunately the [d]epartment does not anticipate parents making the necessary changes or displaying a consistent understanding of the learned skills necessary to provide for these children’s needs now or in the near future. Termination of [p]arental rights would allow the children to achieve permanency through adoption, which is believed to be in the children’s best interest.
On our de novo review, we agree with this assessment. We conclude termination
was in the children’s best interests.
III. Bond
A court may grant a permissive exception to termination based on the
parent-child bond. See id. § 232.116(3)(c); In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475 (Iowa
2018).
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0878 Filed August 31, 2022
IN THE INTEREST OF S.S. and G.S., Minor Children,
K.S., Mother, Appellant,
W.S., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County, Karen Kaufman
Salic, District Associate Judge.
A father and mother separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to two children. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Theodore J. Hovda, Garner, for appellant mother.
Cameron M. Sprecher, Mason City, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Jane Wright, Forest City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2
VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
A father and mother separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to two children, born in 2018 and 2019. Both parents (I) challenge the
evidence supporting the ground for termination cited by the juvenile court; (II)
argue termination was not in the children’s best interests; (III) assert termination
was detrimental due to the closeness of the parent-child bond; and (IV) argue they
should have been afforded six additional months to facilitate reunification.
I. Ground for Termination
The juvenile court terminated parental rights pursuant to several statutory
provisions. The parents only challenge the evidence supporting one of the
provisions, allowing us to affirm the termination decision on the unchallenged
grounds. See In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). We elect to
address the contested provision, Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2022), which
requires proof of several elements, including proof the children cannot be returned
to parental custody.
The parents contend they had “suitable housing” and employment, were
without a history of drug use or physical abuse of the children, had “a plan for
daycare,” and had “a strong support system,” permitting immediate reunification.
They also contend the department of human services failed to have “psychological
evaluations” completed which, in the father’s words, “would have been key in
understanding . . . their learning capabilities, [and] learning difficulties.” The
parents’ focus on the absence of psychological evaluations implicates the
department’s obligation to make reasonable reunification efforts. See In re C.B.,
611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). “The State must show reasonable efforts as a 3
part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.”
Id.
Our de novo review of the record reveals the following facts. The children
were one and two when the department learned that they were being locked in
their room overnight. The department issued a founded child abuse report. The
parents agreed to participate in services to address their parenting deficiencies.
The department began with a module on safe parenting. Because of
concerns with the parents’ “cognitive functioning levels,” the service provider who
administered the module “modif[ied]” it and broke “it down so it [was] more easily
understandable” before she moved on to the next phase of the module. She also
“focused on” one step “for more than one session.” According to the department
case manager, “it was clear that [the] parents weren’t understanding” and, as a
result, the department discontinued the training. The department substituted “an
intense daily service” in a “further attempt to maintain the children in the home.”
The service had minimal effect. The case manager testified “the children were
again found locked in their room.” During one visit after services were initiated,
the department discovered the children’s bedroom “covered in poop on the walls,
bed and floor” and on the children’s bodies and faces.
The department requested the children’s removal. The juvenile court
granted the request and later adjudicated the children in need of assistance. The
State ultimately filed a petition to terminate parental rights.
At the termination hearing, the case manager detailed the extensive
services afforded the parents and stated, “the only service that was court ordered
that the department was not able to offer was psychological evaluations for these 4
parents.” When asked why the evaluations were not provided, she responded,
“[t]here was not any places available to be able to do that testing.” She said she
“called all the way down to Iowa City and around to Des Moines, and there just
wasn’t any availability to do psychological testing.” Responding to a suggestion
that evaluations would have been useful, she testified,
You know, I think the information likely would have said the same that we’ve all assessed and that’s why we modified our teaching styles with the understanding of what their IQ likely is. I don’t know that the psychological testing would have necessarily given us any significant insight outside of it may have . . . been an additional assessment . . . on the[] [parents’] ability to parent these kids given what has already gone on.
The case manager pointed out that the “parents were still able to participate in
individual counseling, which would have likely been one of the things
recommended in a psychological eval[uation].”
There is no question the parents ultimately made progress on hygiene
issues and employment. But, as recently as a month before the termination
hearing, the case manager testified “the parents still [did not] understand why they
were involved” in the proceedings. When asked if she believed a return of the
children to parental custody “would pose a significant risk of life to the children,”
she responded, “I do.” We conclude the State satisfied its reasonable-efforts
mandate and proved the children could not be returned to parental custody.
II. Best Interests
Termination must be in the children’s best interests. Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2). The department reported:
[T]he concerns that were identified at the onset of this case remain at this time. The [d]epartment does not question that these parents love their children however remain very guarded with parents’ ability 5
to learn and demonstrate the necessary skills needed to parent these children on a full-time basis. Interactions between parents and children remain supervised despite the fact that parents have been provided with a barrage of services. Unfortunately the [d]epartment does not anticipate parents making the necessary changes or displaying a consistent understanding of the learned skills necessary to provide for these children’s needs now or in the near future. Termination of [p]arental rights would allow the children to achieve permanency through adoption, which is believed to be in the children’s best interest.
On our de novo review, we agree with this assessment. We conclude termination
was in the children’s best interests.
III. Bond
A court may grant a permissive exception to termination based on the
parent-child bond. See id. § 232.116(3)(c); In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475 (Iowa
2018). The district court concluded “[a]ny sadness the child[ren] [might]
experience because of termination” would not “overcome the likely long-term
hardship and neglect” they would “suffer if in the care of” their parents. On our de
novo review, we agree.
The parents did not develop a solid bond with the children while they were
in their care. After removal, their participation in supervised visits was “sporadic.”
These failed opportunities to cultivate a close relationship meant that the children
looked to others for security. As an example, they saw the case manager only
once a month but came to her rather than their parents “to meet their needs.”
Under these circumstances, the juvenile court appropriately declined to invoke the
parental bond exception to termination. 6
IV. Additional Time
The father argues he should have been afforded additional time to reunify
because “the [d]epartment did not provide adequate services to the family.” The
mother argues that, if the court does not overturn the termination order, she should
“be given an additional six months to show her ability to parent her children.” See
Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). As discussed, the reunification services afforded the
parents were more than adequate. As for the viability of continuing those services
for six more months, the case manager said it best: “I’d like to be able to say that
with some more time, these boys can go home, but, unfortunately, that’s not
something that has been displayed. Parents are not demonstrating the skills, the
stability, the knowledge to be able to parent these boys on a full-time bases.” On
our de novo review, we determine that an extension of time of six months for
reunification services would not eliminate the need for removal of the children from
the home.
We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of parental rights to these two
children.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.