In the Interest of: S.R.W.
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Opinion
In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION ONE
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.R.W. ) No. ED112622 ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of St. Charles County ) Cause No. 23AD-JU00122 ) ) Honorable Vincent Johnson ) ) Filed: June 17, 2025
Introduction
Mother and Father appeal from the trial court’s judgment terminating their parental rights
to S.R.W. (“Child”). On appeal, Father and Mother argue there was insufficient evidence
supporting the trial court’s findings on failure to rectify and parental unfitness, that the trial court
erred in finding it was in Child’s best interest to terminate parental rights, and in not allowing
them to reopen evidence following trial. 1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
1 Mother previously filed a motion to adopt Father’s brief as her own for the purposes of this appeal. This Court denied that motion. In her brief, Mother adopted Father’s points on appeal and facts section verbatim. Additionally, Mother’s argument section substantially copies Father’s argument with minor edits (i.e., changing “Father” to “Mother”, and deleting argument relating solely to Father). Rule 84.04 sets forth the requirements of briefs filed in appellate courts. Bi- National Gateway Terminal, LLC v. City of St. Louis, 697 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024). “Compliance with Rule 84.04 is required to give notice to the other party of the precise matters at issue and to ensure that appellate courts do not become advocates for the appellant by speculating facts and arguments that have not been made.” Id. (quoting Murphy v. Steiner, 658 1 Factual and Procedural History
Facts 2
Child was born in July 2021. Following Child’s birth, medical personnel had concerns
about Mother and Father not being able to give Child appropriate care despite medical personnel
giving them infant education. There were also concerns with Father’s claim that he would take
the baby and care for Child alone. Additionally, Mother checked herself out of the hospital early
against medical advice despite Child needing close monitoring and feeding care. As a result of
these concerns, a newborn crisis assessment was completed while Child was still in the hospital.
Then, the Children’s Division performed an investigation, filed a petition to take custody of
Child, and took custody of Child.
Mother
S.W.3d 588, 591 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)). Mother’s verbatim copying and pasting of Father’s facts, points relied on, and argument sections makes this Court’s job quite difficult because Mother’s brief does not distinctly advise the other party and this Court as to Mother’s precise matters at issue. This Court is left to parse, on its own, the specific factual differences and potential arguments based on those differences between Mother’s and Father’s claims. Mother’s briefing requires this Court, in effect, to become an advocate for Mother which is impermissible. Id. To the extent we can understand the facts and arguments without advocating, we review ex gratia. We view the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, and set forth the facts specifically as to each parent. 2 Father’s and Mother’s statements of facts violate Rule 84.04(c). Rule 84.04(c) requires appellants provide a “specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits.” Appellants’ statements of facts violate Rule 84.04(c) by providing no citations to the record whatsoever. By providing no citations to the record, Appellants’ statements of facts fail “to fulfill [their] ‘primary purpose’—‘to afford an immediate, accurate, complete, and unbiased understanding of the facts of the case.’” Litvinchyk v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 449 S.W.3d 810, 811 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (quoting Nichols v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 399 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013)). Failure to follow the requirements of Rule 84.04(c) constitutes grounds for dismissal. Republic Finance, LLC v. Ray, 698 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024). Because a parents right to raise their child(ren) is a fundamental liberty interest, we elect not to dismiss.
2 After the Children’s Division took custody of Child, Mother was placed on a service
plan. This plan required visitation with Child; financially supporting Child by providing food,
formula, clothes, gifts, and monetary support; paying child support; attending parenting classes;
and working with a parent aide/coach, among other requirements.
Early in the process, Mother visited Child, but later all visits to Child stopped. Mother
was ordered to participate in services for the return of Child, but she did not participate in any
services other than when the parent aide went to the home to help with parenting skills. Mother
has an intellectual disability which required supervision and a safety plan when she was with
Child. During a trial placement, Mother attempted to feed Child and was observed on several
occasions feeding Child with a dirty utensil and out of previously-opened jars of baby food.
Mother was not employed and did not have independent housing. Mother was dependent upon
Father to take primary responsibility for Child’s care. Mother did not care for Child.
Mother appeared at the first review hearing in November 2021. The juvenile officer
report, at that time, reported that Mother had an intellectual disability and “did not wish to work
her service plan, get referrals for services, or wish to reunify with the baby.” Mother indicated
she wanted Father to have full custody of Child.
Mother was not present for most of her remaining case review hearings and the juvenile
officer reported Mother was not compliant with her service plan. Eventually, the juvenile officer
filed a petition to terminate parental rights and Mother appeared at the March 2024 termination
of parental rights hearing with her attorney and appointed guardian ad litem.
At that hearing, witnesses who had interacted with Mother indicated she was mostly non-
verbal, and they were concerned that Child could not safely be in her care. Mother did not know
how to feed Child and properly dispose of Child’s diaper. Mother previously had left a diaper
3 open on the floor with feces when the Child was on the floor nearby. Another witness was also
concerned that Mother was unable to properly hold Child so Child did not fall off of the couch.
Hospital records from Child’s birth also demonstrate Mother’s cognitive delay. Staff
noted that Mother had little signs of understanding how to feed child and that Mother did not
understand that she could not keep a blanket on Child’s face or it would risk suffocating Child.
Mother also, though attempting to engage, “lack[ed] understanding and carryover of education . .
. .” Finally, the records noted both “parents’ lack of understanding of infant’s signs of stress
during feeding.”
At the termination of parental rights hearing, Mother’s guardian ad litem was present and
when asked by the court whether her client was able to comprehend the proceedings she
answered “No” because she did “not believe that [her] client underst[ood] the nature of the
proceedings.” Moreover, she did not believe that Mother would even “be capable of . . .
testifying or understanding the questions that would be asked of her.” Additionally, Mother’s
guardian ad litem testified that she did not believe Mother could safely parent Child.
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In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION ONE
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.R.W. ) No. ED112622 ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of St. Charles County ) Cause No. 23AD-JU00122 ) ) Honorable Vincent Johnson ) ) Filed: June 17, 2025
Introduction
Mother and Father appeal from the trial court’s judgment terminating their parental rights
to S.R.W. (“Child”). On appeal, Father and Mother argue there was insufficient evidence
supporting the trial court’s findings on failure to rectify and parental unfitness, that the trial court
erred in finding it was in Child’s best interest to terminate parental rights, and in not allowing
them to reopen evidence following trial. 1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
1 Mother previously filed a motion to adopt Father’s brief as her own for the purposes of this appeal. This Court denied that motion. In her brief, Mother adopted Father’s points on appeal and facts section verbatim. Additionally, Mother’s argument section substantially copies Father’s argument with minor edits (i.e., changing “Father” to “Mother”, and deleting argument relating solely to Father). Rule 84.04 sets forth the requirements of briefs filed in appellate courts. Bi- National Gateway Terminal, LLC v. City of St. Louis, 697 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024). “Compliance with Rule 84.04 is required to give notice to the other party of the precise matters at issue and to ensure that appellate courts do not become advocates for the appellant by speculating facts and arguments that have not been made.” Id. (quoting Murphy v. Steiner, 658 1 Factual and Procedural History
Facts 2
Child was born in July 2021. Following Child’s birth, medical personnel had concerns
about Mother and Father not being able to give Child appropriate care despite medical personnel
giving them infant education. There were also concerns with Father’s claim that he would take
the baby and care for Child alone. Additionally, Mother checked herself out of the hospital early
against medical advice despite Child needing close monitoring and feeding care. As a result of
these concerns, a newborn crisis assessment was completed while Child was still in the hospital.
Then, the Children’s Division performed an investigation, filed a petition to take custody of
Child, and took custody of Child.
Mother
S.W.3d 588, 591 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)). Mother’s verbatim copying and pasting of Father’s facts, points relied on, and argument sections makes this Court’s job quite difficult because Mother’s brief does not distinctly advise the other party and this Court as to Mother’s precise matters at issue. This Court is left to parse, on its own, the specific factual differences and potential arguments based on those differences between Mother’s and Father’s claims. Mother’s briefing requires this Court, in effect, to become an advocate for Mother which is impermissible. Id. To the extent we can understand the facts and arguments without advocating, we review ex gratia. We view the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, and set forth the facts specifically as to each parent. 2 Father’s and Mother’s statements of facts violate Rule 84.04(c). Rule 84.04(c) requires appellants provide a “specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits.” Appellants’ statements of facts violate Rule 84.04(c) by providing no citations to the record whatsoever. By providing no citations to the record, Appellants’ statements of facts fail “to fulfill [their] ‘primary purpose’—‘to afford an immediate, accurate, complete, and unbiased understanding of the facts of the case.’” Litvinchyk v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 449 S.W.3d 810, 811 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (quoting Nichols v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 399 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013)). Failure to follow the requirements of Rule 84.04(c) constitutes grounds for dismissal. Republic Finance, LLC v. Ray, 698 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024). Because a parents right to raise their child(ren) is a fundamental liberty interest, we elect not to dismiss.
2 After the Children’s Division took custody of Child, Mother was placed on a service
plan. This plan required visitation with Child; financially supporting Child by providing food,
formula, clothes, gifts, and monetary support; paying child support; attending parenting classes;
and working with a parent aide/coach, among other requirements.
Early in the process, Mother visited Child, but later all visits to Child stopped. Mother
was ordered to participate in services for the return of Child, but she did not participate in any
services other than when the parent aide went to the home to help with parenting skills. Mother
has an intellectual disability which required supervision and a safety plan when she was with
Child. During a trial placement, Mother attempted to feed Child and was observed on several
occasions feeding Child with a dirty utensil and out of previously-opened jars of baby food.
Mother was not employed and did not have independent housing. Mother was dependent upon
Father to take primary responsibility for Child’s care. Mother did not care for Child.
Mother appeared at the first review hearing in November 2021. The juvenile officer
report, at that time, reported that Mother had an intellectual disability and “did not wish to work
her service plan, get referrals for services, or wish to reunify with the baby.” Mother indicated
she wanted Father to have full custody of Child.
Mother was not present for most of her remaining case review hearings and the juvenile
officer reported Mother was not compliant with her service plan. Eventually, the juvenile officer
filed a petition to terminate parental rights and Mother appeared at the March 2024 termination
of parental rights hearing with her attorney and appointed guardian ad litem.
At that hearing, witnesses who had interacted with Mother indicated she was mostly non-
verbal, and they were concerned that Child could not safely be in her care. Mother did not know
how to feed Child and properly dispose of Child’s diaper. Mother previously had left a diaper
3 open on the floor with feces when the Child was on the floor nearby. Another witness was also
concerned that Mother was unable to properly hold Child so Child did not fall off of the couch.
Hospital records from Child’s birth also demonstrate Mother’s cognitive delay. Staff
noted that Mother had little signs of understanding how to feed child and that Mother did not
understand that she could not keep a blanket on Child’s face or it would risk suffocating Child.
Mother also, though attempting to engage, “lack[ed] understanding and carryover of education . .
. .” Finally, the records noted both “parents’ lack of understanding of infant’s signs of stress
during feeding.”
At the termination of parental rights hearing, Mother’s guardian ad litem was present and
when asked by the court whether her client was able to comprehend the proceedings she
answered “No” because she did “not believe that [her] client underst[ood] the nature of the
proceedings.” Moreover, she did not believe that Mother would even “be capable of . . .
testifying or understanding the questions that would be asked of her.” Additionally, Mother’s
guardian ad litem testified that she did not believe Mother could safely parent Child.
Father
Father too was placed on a service plan. His service plan required visitation with Child;
maintaining suitable housing; financially providing for the child by providing food, formula,
clothes, gifts, and monetary support, paying child support; parenting class; a psychological
evaluation; counseling; working with a parent aide/coach; and drug screening.
Father partially complied with the service plan. Father attended parenting classes and
worked with a parent aide or parent coach. Father regularly visited Child, but sometimes he
would fail to show up, show up late, or he would leave early. Also, during these visits Father
would be minimally engaged with Child, and instead would be on his cell phone. During the
4 visits, Child would not interact with Father and did not seem to bond with Father. Instead, Child
seemed to bond and interact more with her grandfather, who accompanied Father on some visits.
Father held employment for a brief period, but is currently unemployed, and has not
maintained appropriate and consistent employment. Additionally, Father listed certain jobs on
his resume but he did not hold them.
Father maintained a place to live, but there was debris all over the floors, and it appeared
that the floors had not been cleaned between the home visits throughout a year. In the home,
Father failed to have age-appropriate toys for Child. Also, Father had things within Child’s reach
that Child could choke on or injure Child.
Father did not provide food or clothing for Child. At one point, the case manager ordered
formula for Child and had it delivered to Father because she was concerned about Child not
having any. The deputy juvenile officer also found that Father lacked having formula for Child.
Every time after Child visited with Father, Child’s foster parents would have to immediately feed
Child because Child was not getting enough to eat during the visits.
Father had not provided any financial support for Child. The deputy juvenile officer had
concerns about Father being able to financially support Child because Father’s only income was
a disability payment of approximately four-hundred dollars a month. The deputy juvenile officer
did not believe Father could support Child on that income.
The Children’s Division did two trial home placements with Child. The first started in
April 2022, and lasted four months. At a home visit during the first placement, the deputy
juvenile officer observed a disheveled and dirty home with the lack of age appropriate toys.
When walking through the home, the deputy juvenile officer also observed a lack of food for
Child, and when Father was asked about the lack of food and what he would do about it, he did
5 not have an answer. The deputy juvenile officer also discussed Father’s belief that Child was
“overweight and overfed” with Father. Because of the lack of feeding, Child has lost a pound and
a half while in Father’s care even though Child had previously and steadily gained weight while
in foster care.
At another home visit during the first placement, the deputy juvenile officer observed
spoiled food sitting out, which included formula that had curdled and separated along with blood
from red meat that had dripped onto fruit in the refrigerator and the blood leaked out of the
bottom of the refrigerator. The deputy juvenile officer saw that Father was standing in dog urine
during this visit. When the deputy juvenile officer asked Father about these conditions, he did
not seem to acknowledge they existed. Ultimately, the court terminated the trial home placement
at a hearing in August 2022 because there were concerns about Father’s care of Child.
A second trial home placement began in late February or early March of 2023. This
placement ended shortly after it began due to Father’s use of marijuana in the home and Child’s
hair follicle testing positive for the presence of marijuana. Father also tested positive for the
presence of marijuana, after initially denying use. When Father was asked about Child testing
positive for marijuana, Father blamed it on Child’s foster parents and did not take any
responsibility. Based upon Child’s positive test and other observations in the home, the deputy
juvenile officer had major concerns about returning Child to Father.
Following Father’s positive marijuana test, Father has not participated in any testing or
shared any information regarding his sobriety. But Father later admitted to smoking two to three
grams of marijuana daily.
During the second placement, Father did not give Child adequate medical care. Father
believed that Child had an ear infection, but waited a week before seeking treatment. Child
6 ended up having a double ear infection. Also, during the case manager’s home visit Child was
congested and the case manager learned from Father that Child had a fever and was whining
constantly. When the manager asked if Father had taken Child to the doctor, Father replied he
had not and instead had given Child a homeopathic treatment that he found online of some
ancient Chinese garlic milk.
Throughout the course of Father’s service plan, Father had a history of making
conflicting and inaccurate statements. Father had not been open to the feedback and advice on
parenting Child. Father had also demonstrated aggressive behavior by making threats against the
case manager when she would say things that would upset him or when he did not agree with
something. For example, Father told the case manager on the day that she took Child from the
home when the last trial home placement ended, “Somebody else is going to be raising your
kids.” When she asked Father what he meant, Father stated, “You know what I mean. Somebody
else is going to be raising your kids.”
Despite Father’s threats, Father’s case manager attempted to teach Father how to properly
store food, and went to the home to help him appropriately clean the home. The case manager
indicated she was attempting to reunify the family, in Child’s best interest. But the case manager
knew of no other services that she could have offered that could have allowed Child to be
successfully at home with either parent. The case manager believed she could not have done
anything more to help Father be successful. Father had not been receptive to the case manager’s
efforts.
The deputy juvenile officer stated that she had concerns with Father providing long term
care for Child because Father did not understand what is age appropriate, proper feeding and
discipline, and when Child may be getting ill and when it is appropriate to take Child to the
7 doctor. The officer concluded that without constant supervision from the Children’s Division,
Child would be in danger if she was returned home. Father’s case manager agreed with this
conclusion.
Child’s foster parent also had issues with Father when she attempted to speak about
Child’s care. Father would not speak about Child or Child’s care. When Child’s foster parent
would attempt to engage Father, he would blatantly ignore her and “just turn around and walk
out with her and just walk away.” On one occasion, Father accused Child’s foster parent of
pinching Child in an attempt to make her cry. Father frequently complained about the care
Child’s foster parent was giving her.
Father, while denying he had disability, indicated that he received psychiatric or
psychological care in the past. This was after he was diagnosed with an intellectual disability and
ADHD. Father received treatment, but Father has since stopped treatment, and has only briefly
reengaged with other services.
In the three years Child has been under the care of others, Child was not able to be
successfully reunified with either parent. The case manager believed that Child needed
permanency and it would be in Child’s best interest that both Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights be terminated because they had not made any progress that would enable her to go home
in the foreseeable future.
Procedural History
On July 10, 2021, Child was placed in foster care, and has remained in foster care
through the present. Child was placed in protective custody of the Children’s Division on July
13, 2021, following a hearing on July 12, 2021.
8 On August 27, 2021, the trial court found that the child was within Section 211.031, 3 and
placed custody of Child with the Children’s Division. The court found Child needed care and
treatment because Father and Mother neglected the child by failing to provide proper care and
supervision of her and by exhibiting a deficient understanding of child development and care.
The court based its findings on testimony of hospital staff demonstrating the parents’ lack of
suitable housing, not attending to the child’s basic needs, and concern with the parents’ lack of
capability in caring for Child.
After placing Child in the custody of the Children’s Division, the court held a
dispositional hearing on September 7, 2021, and after further briefing and recommendations
from the Children’s Division and Mother’s guardian ad litem, the court ordered that Mother take
part in a parenting class, receive a psychological evaluation, work with a parent aide, receive
drug screenings, maintain appropriate and consistent employment finances, and produce a
written child care plan.
The court then held regular case review hearings from November 2021 to March 2024.
The court continued to affirm its permanent plan as reunification of Child with her parents until
its Permanency Hearing in October of 2023, where it changed its plan to adoption, while
retaining the goal of reunification as well. In the court’s March 2024 case review, it fully
changed its plan to adoption.
Simultaneously on April 20, 2023, the Children’s Division filed a Petition to Terminate
Parental Rights. The circuit court held a termination of parental rights hearing on March 5, 2024.
3 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016), unless otherwise indicated. 9 Following the hearing, the court issued its judgment and decree terminating parental rights of
both Father and Mother.
Mother and Father appealed separately. On this Court’s own motion, the Court
consolidated the appeals.
Discussion
We address Father’s four points first, followed by Mother’s four points.
Father’s Point One
In his first point, Father argues the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights in
that there was insufficient evidence to support its finding and conclusions pursuant to Section
211.447.5(3) (failure to rectify).
Standard of Review
“In termination of parental rights cases, we will sustain the trial court’s judgment unless
there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it
erroneously declares or applies the law.” Interest of K.A.M.L., 644 S.W.3d 14, 20 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2022). “The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and
will be reversed only if we are firmly convinced the judgment is erroneous.” Id. “The party
seeking termination bears the burden of proof.” Id. “We recognize the trial court is better
positioned than this Court to determine witness credibility and weigh evidence in the context of
the whole record.” Id.
Analysis
“To terminate a party’s parental rights, a trial court must: (1) find by ‘clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence’ that one or more grounds for termination of parental rights exists, and (2)
determine whether it is in the child’s best interest to terminate a party’s parental rights.” Id. at 22.
10 “Evidence that is ‘clear, cogent, and convincing’ instantly tilts the scales in favor of termination
when weighed against the evidence in opposition, and the trier of fact is left with an abiding
conviction that the evidence is true.” Id. “Section 211.447 provides the statutory grounds for
judicial termination of parental rights.” Id. at 22-23. The trial court found grounds existed for the
termination of Father’s parental rights under sections 211.447.5(3), failure to rectify, and
211.447.5(5), parental unfitness. “These are separate grounds for termination, and we will affirm
the trial court’s ruling if one is appropriate.” Id. at 23. “If the trial court finds at least one
statutory ground for termination exists, the court must then determine whether, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.”
Id. (citing Section 211.447.7).
Section 211.447.5(3) provides that the juvenile officer or the division may file a petition
to terminate parental rights if:
The child has been under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for a period of one year, and the court finds that the conditions which led to the assumption of jurisdiction still persist, or conditions of a potentially harmful nature continue to exist, that there is little likelihood that those conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future, or the continuation of the parent-child relationship greatly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.
Section 211.447.5(3). In determining whether to terminate parental rights under this subdivision,
the court shall consider and make findings on the following:
(a) The terms of a social service plan entered into by the parent and the division and the extent to which the parties have made progress in complying with those terms; (b) The success or failure of the efforts of the juvenile officer, the division or other agency to aid the parent on a continuing basis in adjusting his circumstances or conduct to provide a proper home for the child; (c) A mental condition which is shown by competent evidence either to be permanent or such that there is no reasonable likelihood that the condition can be
11 reversed and which renders the parent unable to knowingly provide the child the necessary care, custody and control; (d) Chemical dependency which prevents the parent from consistently providing the necessary care, custody and control over the child and which cannot be treated so as to enable the parent to consistently provide such care, custody and control. . .
Id. “These factors ‘are not separate grounds for termination by themselves, but rather categories
of evidence that the court may consider along with all other relevant evidence in determining
whether grounds for termination exist under Section 211.447.5(3).’” K.A.M.L., 644 S.W.3d at 23
(quoting In Interest of K.M.A.-B., 493 S.W.3d 457, 474 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016)). “While a court
must make findings on all four factors, evidence supporting just one factor is sufficient to terminate
parental rights.” Id. at 23.
Father argues that the trial court’s findings are not supported by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence. 4 We address each finding in turn.
(a) Service Plan
Father contends that he completed a significant amount of the services detailed in his
service plan. Father then argues that the trial court’s concern with stable housing and financial
ability to provide for the Child is unfounded because “Father had maintained the same housing
from the beginning of the case and had managed to make do financially during the pendency of
the case.”
4 In his point relied on, Father argues there is insufficient evidence to support the findings. However, in his argument section, Father argues the trial court’s findings are against the weight of the evidence. These are separate claims. For Father “to be successful on a claim that there was insufficient evidence, Father would be required to demonstrate that there was no substantial evidence to support the circuit court’s judgment.” J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Mo. banc 2014). “A claim that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence presupposes that there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment.” Id. at 630. We proceed under the claim in the point relied on, that there was insufficient evidence supporting the judgment. 12 The trial court found that Father did indeed participate in services during the life of the
case, but it was inconsistent at times. While Father did maintain a home, the home was
unsanitary and unsafe despite the instruction from the case workers on proper food storage and
cleaning. Testimony demonstrated that Father left out spoiled food including formula that had
curdled and separated along with blood from red meat that dripped onto fruit in the refrigerator
and was leaking out of the bottom of the refrigerator. There was also testimony that Father was
standing in a puddle of dog urine during a home visit, and Father, when asked about the
unsanitary conditions, did not seem to acknowledge they existed. Testimony also revealed that
Father left out items within Child’s reach that Child could choke on or injure herself. The failure
to maintain clean, sanitary, and safe housing can lead to a finding of substantial evidence of
failing to comply with the service plan. Interest of A.M.W., 652 S.W.3d 225, 237 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2022). This also includes the failure to seek adequate medical care. Id. Here, Father did not
seek medical care when Child had a double ear infection and Father’s actions of not adequately
feeding Child caused Child to lose weight even though Child had normally gained weight while
Although Father claims he managed to “make do” financially during the pendency of the
case, the testimony presented during trial demonstrates otherwise. Testimony demonstrated that
the deputy juvenile officer had concerns about Father being able to financially support Child.
Father had not provided any financial support for the Child. This was because Father’s only
income was a disability payment of approximately four-hundred dollars per month. The deputy
juvenile officer did not believe Father could support Child on that income.
“Partial compliance with a service plan does not prevent a court from finding grounds for
termination as a result of a failure to rectify conduct or conditions.” In re G.G.B., 394 S.W.3d
13 457, 470 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013). “The failure to achieve progress towards the terms of a social
service plan supports termination of parental rights when a dangerous condition is left
uncorrected as a result.” Id. (quoting In re I.G.P., 375 S.W.3d 112, 121 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Father’s actions of maintaining an unsafe and unsanitary home environment for Child is
supported by cogent, convincing, and clear evidence. As the trial court found, these conditions
twice required the trial court to terminate the home placements. Although Father was successful
in some respects in completing aspects of the service plan, Father was “unable to consistently
and adequately meet the [child’s] needs.” A.M.W., 652 S.W.3d at 238. Thus, substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s findings.
(b) Agency Efforts
Father argues that, following the termination of the second trial home placement, no
further services were offered to him. While Father’s argument is factually correct, it simply
ignores all of the agency efforts during the pendency of the case up to the termination of the
second trial home placement. The trial court found that the case manager “had done things in this
case that she did not normally do – such as buy and pay for formula for the child, assist Father
with actually cleaning the child’s home, teach Father how to safely store food and/or provide
ongoing parenting advice even in the face of Father’s hostility towards her. The case manager
reported that at times Father would accept her help – however at other times when Father became
angry he threatened her life.” The trial court also found that “the Deputy Juvenile Officer and the
foster parent experienced the same hostility and inconsistency from Father.” These findings are
supported by cogent, clear, and convincing evidence. Despite these agency efforts, Father has not
been able to make a sustained change to appropriately care for his child.
14 (c) Mental Condition
Father does not challenge the trial court’s findings on Father’s mental health conditions.
The trial court concluded it did not have sufficient evidence to determine whether Father suffered
from a permanent mental condition. The trial court found that “Father’s behavior provides many
red flags and concerns, but whether his behavior is due to an irreversible mental condition is not
able to be determined at this time.” Nonetheless, the trial court found that “Father’s mental
health is compromised at this time, and it would appear it is having an impact on his ability to
parent. While the Court cannot diagnose Father, his behavior is cause for concern, and a mental
illness cannot be ruled out from the information the Court has.” This factor need not support
termination independently, but can be considered “along with all other relevant evidence in
determining whether grounds for termination exist under Section 211.447.5(3).” K.A.M.L., 644
S.W.3d at 23 (quoting K.M.A.-B., 493 S.W.3d at 474).
(d) Chemical Dependency
The trial court found that “Father has a current chemical dependency that has impacted
his ability to provide safe care for his child.” The trial court concluded:
Father most recently advised his counselor that he is using marijuana on a daily basis – two to three grams per day – to cope with his ADHD symptoms. However, Father has not voluntarily done anything to address his positive screen in March, 2023, nor has he admitted to the Court that he was even smoking marijuana. Father originally represented to the Court that he had not used marijuana at all, and also told each evaluator that he had no history of marijuana or other drug use. At this time, whether Father has an ongoing chemical dependency that is untreatable is unknown, but the fact that he allowed his 2 year old daughter to ingest marijuana while he had her in his home certainly suggests an impairment.
The trial court did not explicitly find that Father had a chemical dependency that was
untreatable, which is the standard to terminate parental rights. See K.M.A.-B., 493 S.W.3d at 469.
15 Instead, the trial court findings indicate it had concerns regarding Father’s marijuana use and his
ability to parent Child.
Father focuses most of his argument on how recreational marijuana usage is legal in
Missouri, and there was “no evidence that father’s legal use of marijuana interferes with his
ability to parent his child or poses a risk of danger to the child – admittedly other than the child
tested positive for THC as to which there was no explanation for how this may have happened.”
Father correctly cites In re D.D.C., for the proposition that “drug use is not grounds for
termination, nor is chemical dependency: rather, the statute provides grounds for termination for
a chemical dependency ‘which cannot be treated.’” In re D.D.C., 351 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2011). In D.D.C., the Western District of this Court found that there was not clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence of a chemical dependency that could not be treated because
there was no “evidence of a service plan, a drug or alcohol assessment, a request or an attempt at
treatment.” Id. at 731. But the Court did find that Father’s drug use rendered him unfit as a
parent. Id. at 732.
However, Father’s citation to In Interest of K.M.A.-B., 493 S.W.3d 457 (Mo. App. E.D.
2016), is inapposite. In K.M.A.-B., this Court found that:
At all relevant times, Father maintained a job, had a suitable home ready for the child and consistently provided for the child’s needs. It is undisputed that Father had consistently appropriate visits with the child, in which he fed, played with, talked to, disciplined when necessary and encouraged the child. Father was able to care for the child at those visits, even though he was also using marijuana during that time period outside of the child’s presence.
Id. at 470. The facts of this case are easily distinguishable from K.M.A.-B. Here, Father did not
maintain a job or a suitable home for Child, and did not consistently provide for Child’s needs.
Father’s visits with Child did not result in a strong bond between Father and Child as Father was
16 disengaged. Finally, Father’s marijuana use resulted in Child testing positive for the presence of
marijuana. The facts of this case indicate a lack of an ability to care for Child, unlike in K.M.A.-
B.
Although there is not substantial evidence that Father’s chemical dependency is
untreatable, as noted by the trial court, there are grave concerns about Father’s marijuana use and
his ability to care for Child. Similar to the mental condition factor, this factor need not support
termination independently, but can be considered “along with all other relevant evidence in
determining whether grounds for termination exist under Section 211.447.5(3).” K.A.M.L., 644
In sum, there is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s
findings that Father failed to fully comply with his service plan, and that despite the best efforts
of the juvenile officer and the case manager, Father was not able to form a sustained change to
be able to appropriately care for Child. Since evidence supporting one factor is sufficient to
terminate parental rights, K.A.M.L., 644 S.W.3d at 23, the trial court did not err in terminating
Father’s parental rights on the basis of Section 211.447.5(3) (failure to rectify).
Father’s Point Two
In his second point, Father argues the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights in
that there was insufficient evidence to support its finding and conclusions pursuant to Section
211.447.5(5) (parental unfitness). 5
Section 211.447.5(5)(a) provides:
5 Though evidence supporting one factor is sufficient to terminate parental rights, we nevertheless address Father’s point two due to the gravity of terminating parental rights. 17 The parent is unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship because of a consistent pattern of committing a specific abuse including, but not limited to, specific conditions directly relating to the parent and child relationship which are determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that renders the parent unable for the reasonably foreseeable future to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child.
Further, it is presumed a parent is unfit if “at least fifteen of the twenty-two months prior
to the filing of the petition, the child has been in foster care under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.” Section 211.447.5(5)(b)(e).
The trial court determined Father was unfit to parent on two bases. First, the trial
court found that the Child was in foster care for twenty-eight months while the trial court
had jurisdiction over the matter, therefore invoking the presumption. Second, the trial court
cited “ongoing issues with providing care for their child” and “expos[ing] their toddler
daughter to marijuana.”
Father argues there was insufficient clear, cogent and convincing evidence to support this
conclusion. 6 In support of his argument Father argues that the trial court based its findings on a
lack of participation in court ordered services until the petition was filed, and the presumption for
unfitness based upon Child’s time in foster care.
We find, there is sufficient clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supporting the trial
court’s finding of unfitness. As an initial matter, by operation of Section 211.447.5(5)(b)(e),
there is a presumption that Father is unfit because Child had been in foster care for greater than
6 Father also seems to argue that the trial court did not make specific enough findings for appellate review. The claim of insufficient evidence and the specificity of the trial court’s findings are distinct and separate claims. Appellant Father failed to raise the lack of specific findings argument in his point on appeal and thus it is waived and we do not consider it. State ex rel. Nixon v. Worthy, 247 S.W.3d 8, 13 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008). 18 fifteen of the twenty-two months prior to the filing of the petition. 7 See generally Interest of
Z.R.L.C., 700 S.W.3d 539, 542 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (this showing triggers “the rebuttable
presumption of parental unfitness”). “The presumption of unfitness is rebuttable and can be
overcome by evidence that . . . the parent is no longer unfit.” In re E.D.M., 126 S.W.3d 488, 495
(Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (quoting In re A.H., 9 S.W.3d 56, 61 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000)). Father
failed to rebut this presumption through his evidence presented. Father’s witnesses had not
interacted with Father in over a year prior to the hearing and had no current information about
Father’s parental fitness, as child was not present for visits.
In contrast, the juvenile officer presented clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that
Father had failed to adequately care for the child through inadequate nutrition and feeding,
maintaining an unsanitary home environment for Child, and was consistently using marijuana in
the presence of Child, even though he fervently denied use and blamed others for the presence of
marijuana. See D.D.C., 351 S.W.3d at 732. Further evidence demonstrated it was unlikely that
Father would be able to make a sufficient change to safely parent Child. Thus, sufficient
evidence supports the finding that Father was unfit to parent Child and Father has failed to rebut
the statutory presumption. See E.D.M., 126 S.W.3d at 495-96.
Father’s Point II is denied.
Father’s Point Three
In his third point, Father argues the trial court erred in finding that it was in the Child’s
best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 211.447.7.
7 Child had been in foster care for twenty-eight months of the thirty-three months this case has been proceeding. 19 “In reviewing the trial court’s best interest determination, our standard of review is abuse
of discretion.” K.A.M.L., 644 S.W.3d at 25. “An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial
court’s ruling is ‘clearly against the logic of the circumstances and so unreasonable and arbitrary
that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.’” Id.
(quoting Interest of D.L.P., 638 S.W.3d 82, 89 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)).
“Once grounds for termination of parental rights are identified, a trial court must then
analyze the seven factors under § 211.447.7 and determine whether termination is in the child’s
‘best interest.’” K.A.M.L., 644 S.W.3d at 25. “The ‘best interest’ determination is a subjective
assessment based on the totality of the circumstances and is discretionary.” Id. The seven factors
courts evaluate in the “best interest” determination are:
(1) Emotional ties to the birth parent; (2) The extent to which the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with the child; (3) The extent of payment by the parent for the cost of care and maintenance of the child when financially able to do so including the time that the child is in the custody of the division or other child-placing agency; (4) Whether additional services would be likely to bring about lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of the child to the parent within an ascertainable period of time; (5) The parent’s disinterest in or lack of commitment to the child; (6) The conviction of the parent of a felony offense that the court finds is of such a nature that the child will be deprived of a stable home for a period of years; provided, however, that incarceration in and of itself shall not be grounds for termination of parental rights; (7) Deliberate acts of the parent or acts of another of which the parent knew or should have known that subjects the child to a substantial risk of physical or mental harm.
Id. at 26 (citing Section 211.447.7). “There is no requirement, by statute or otherwise, that all
seven of these factors must be negated before termination can take place.” Interest of N.D.P.H.,
20 675 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023). “The presence of a single factor could support the
determination of a child’s best interest when it is reviewed in the totality of the circumstances,
and that finding is a subjective assessment made by the trial court that is not reweighed by this
Court.” Id. (quoting Interest of M.K.S., 612 S.W.3d 260, 262 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020)).
The trial court made findings on six factors when it found that it was in the best interest
of Child for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. The court first found that Child seemed to
recognize Father, and appeared to behave as if she had some bond to him. Nonetheless, the trial
court found that Child seemed to have a stronger bond with her grandfather, and preferred to
interact with him during the visits. Finally, the trial court found that currently Child has no
emotional ties to Father based upon the testimony of Child’s foster mother.
Second, the trial court found that Father regularly visited Child, but was often disengaged
in the visits, and appeared late and left early. The trial court noted that in the most recent visits,
the case manager indicated that it was preferable that Child’s grandfather came to the visits with
Father because Father does not interact with Child at the visits.
Third, the trial court found that “neither parent has provided any form of monetary support
for the child during the time she has been in the care of the Court. Neither parent provided food,
clothing or other necessaries to the child while she was in alternative care.”
Fourth, the trial court found that “the evidence adduced at trial indicated there are no
additional services which would be likely to bring about any lasting parental adjustment to
enable a return of the child to Mother or Father in the near future.” The trial court noted that the
case manager “put forth more effort in this case than in most cases to try and assist Father in
reunifying with his child, to no avail.” Further, the court found that neither the deputy juvenile
21 officer nor the case manager had “additional services to offer that they believed would allow for
reunification between Child and either parent in the foreseeable future.”
Fifth, the trial court found that “Father, rather than take proactive steps to address
the issues that were raised by the Team, particularly after Child tested positive for
marijuana, has shown a clear disinterest in her and a lack of a commitment outside of his
own self-serving words.” The court found that:
Father’s refusal to interact with his child at the majority of his visits since the termination of his second trial home placement speaks volumes as to his commitment to his daughter. Rather than use the time he has had to bond with and care for his child, he was disengaged during visits, and is only interested in participating in services when he believed he had to or it was court-ordered. Father had nearly a year to rehabilitate his situation after he exposed his daughter to drugs. Rather than take proactive steps to do so, he stopped working, stopped attending therapy and did nothing to address his issues with marijuana.
Sixth, the trial court found that “Father exposed Child to marijuana during the time he
had her on his second trial home placement, and that he also neglected her medical care.” The
court concluded that “these acts were deliberate acts on Father’s part. Acts for which he has
taken no responsibility, or even admitted to any wrongdoing for. He subjected Child to a
substantial risk of physical harm by allowing her access to his marijuana, and the Court has no
assurances this would not happen in the future should Father have access to [Child]
unsupervised.”
Father’s arguments challenging each finding simply ask this Court to reweigh the trial
court’s decision. This we will not do. See N.D.P.H., 675 S.W.3d at 782. All six of the trial
court’s findings are fully supported by the record. And each factor indicates that it is in Child’s
best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights.
22 The totality of the circumstances supports the finding that it is in Child’s best
interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Father’s Point III is denied.
Father’s Point Four
In his fourth point, Father argues the trial court erred when it denied his post-trial motion,
which included a request to reopen the evidence and allow Father to testify.
We review a trial court’s decision on whether to reopen evidence following the close of
evidence for abuse of discretion. Interest of T.M.L., 615 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020).
“Ordinarily when there is no inconvenience to the court nor unfair advantage to one of the parties
it would be an abuse of discretion to refuse to permit the introduction of material evidence which
might substantially affect the merits of the case.” Id. (quoting In Interest of S---G., 779 S.W.2d
45, 54 (Mo. App. S.D. 1989)).
Father argues the trial court abused its discretion because “there was no inconvenience to
the Court and there was not an unfair advantage to the juvenile officer to allow Father to testify.
Had Father testified the juvenile officer, as well as the Court, would have been able to question
Father.” Father contends that the trial court’s judgment even notes that Father’s choice not to
testify hindered the trial court’s ability to make an informed judgment. But Father concedes that
“he had an opportunity to testify and chose not to do so and is now asking this Court to allow
him to change his mind and testify. He made a decision and did not like the outcome and now
wants a chance to testify.”
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing Father to reopen evidence.
Father cites this Court’s decision in Interest of T.M.L., where this Court reversed the trial court’s
23 termination of parental rights for the father. Id. at 103. In T.M.L., the father was ill and unable to
attend the hearing. Id. The father filed a motion to reopen evidence citing his illness and absence.
Id. The trial court never explicitly ruled on the motion and entered judgment terminating the
father’s parental rights. Id. This Court reversed the termination of parental rights finding “there is
no indication the trial court reviewed or considered the merits of the motion; it did not conduct a
hearing or rule on the motion and instead entered its judgments terminating Father’s parental
rights approximately seven weeks after Father had filed the motion.” Id. This Court concluded
that “if the trial court had considered Father’s motion to reopen the evidence and determined he
was free of dereliction in failing to appear at the trial, there is nothing to suggest that reopening
the evidence would have created an inconvenience to the trial court or given Father an unfair
advantage.” Id.
Here, the trial court heard arguments and reviewed Father’s request to reopen evidence
within his Motion to Vacate, Reopen, Correct, Amend or Modify the Judgment. The trial court
denied the motion in its entirety. This is easily distinguishable from T.M.L., where the trial court
did not consider the motion. Id. Here, the trial court reviewed the motion and found it to be
without merit.
Further, as Father concedes in his brief, Father had the opportunity to testify in the
hearing, but chose not to. Father further concedes that he had made a decision and did not like
the outcome and now wants a chance to testify. Effectively, Father is “dissatisfied with the
original ruling and want[s] a second bite at the apple.” Dunn v. Hussman Corp., 892 S.W.2d 676,
680 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994). We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Father’s motion.
Father’s Point IV is denied.
24 We now address Mother points on appeal.
Mother’s Point One
In her first point, Mother argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights in
that there was insufficient evidence to support its finding and conclusions pursuant to Section
As previously mentioned, “to terminate a party’s parental rights, a trial court must: (1)
find by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ that one or more grounds for termination of
parental rights exists, and (2) determine whether it is in the child’s best interest to terminate a
party’s parental rights.” K.A.M.L., 644 S.W.3d at 22. The trial court found grounds existed for
the termination of Mother’s parental rights under section 211.447.5(3), failure to rectify, and
211.447.5(5), parental unfitness. “These are separate grounds for termination, and we will affirm
the trial court’s ruling if one is appropriate.” Id. at 23. “If the trial court finds at least one
statutory ground for termination exists, the court must then determine whether, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.”
Applying the four factors enunciated in Section 211.447.5(3), the trial court found that
Mother had failed to comply with the relevant portion of her service plan; the juvenile officer
and the Children’s Division had made efforts to reunify Mother and Child, but those efforts did
not successfully aid the parent on a continuing basis in adjusting her circumstances or conduct to
provide a proper home for the child; and a mental condition, shown by competent evidence to be
permanent, renders Mother unable to knowingly provide the child the necessary care, custody,
and control. The court, however, found no evidence of Mother having a chemical dependency.
(a) Social Service Plan Compliance
25 The trial court found that Mother had failed to comply with the relevant portion of her
service plan, parent education and/or support services. Specifically, the trial court noted that
“Mother indicated from the onset of the case through the date of trial that Mother did not wish to
reunify with her daughter, and in fact had indicated that she wanted the child to be with Father
and/or another relative. Mother did not avail herself of any services throughout the life of the
case, and had only visited the child two times in the year prior to the trial in this matter.” Further,
“Mother resided with Father on and off again throughout the time [Child] was in care, and relied
upon him for her support. The credible evidence is that Mother is not willing or able to parent the
child at this time, and has shown no interest in doing so throughout the duration of this case.”
This was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Mother was also ordered to participate in services but did not. The only exception to her
lack of participation was initially when she lived with Father and participated in training with the
parent aides during their visits to Father’s home.
In the Children’s Division’s court report in September 2021, they noted that Mother had
indicated her desire for Father to have full custody. At the time of the trial court’s case review
hearing in November 2021, Mother was non-compliant as to both an ordered psychological
evaluation and an ordered parenting class. Additionally, Mother continued to indicate to the
court that she wanted Father to have full custody of the child, and that she did not wish to work
her service plan, get referrals for services, or reunify with the baby. Mother’s position continued
through her case review hearings until her permanency review hearing in May 2023, when the
juvenile officer recommended proceeding to terminating her parental rights. Thus, there was
substantial evidence that Mother was not willing and had failed to comply with the relevant
portion of her service plan.
26 (b) Agency Efforts
The court found that the Children’s Division made reasonable efforts over three years to
reunify Child with Mother however those efforts were never met with any desire or willingness
on Mother’s part to parent the child. The court explained that the case manager and the
Children’s Division’s efforts were unsuccessful because Mother failed to follow through with
getting engaged in or enrolled in services – specifically those services most relevant to this
situation including psychological services and parent education. There is substantial evidence to
support this finding as well.
As noted above, Mother was noncompliant with court ordered services, all of which were
intended to help the Children’s Division reunify Mother with Child. Mother continued to express
that she did not want to work her service plan, get referrals for services, or reunify with Child.
At the termination hearing, there was testimony that even during the services Mother did
participate in during the visits to Father’s home, agency efforts did not produce any changes in
her behavior. The case worker observed Mother on multiple occasions feeding Child from a jar
of baby food that had been left open and unrefrigerated for days with a dirty spoon despite case
workers efforts to correct the behavior. Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding.
(c) Mental Condition
The court had evidence before it that Mother was diagnosed with Intellectual
Developmental Disorder and was on disability for that disorder. The witnesses who had
interacted with Mother indicated she was mostly non-verbal. Both the case worker and juvenile
officer, during their limited interactions with Mother at home visits, testified that she did not
appear to understand the child’s situation or understand instructions.
27 Hospital records from Child’s birth also demonstrate Mother’s cognitive delay and her
inability to understand and care for Child. Records further indicate both “parents' lack of
understanding of infant’s signs of stress during feeding.”
At the termination of parental rights hearing, Mother’s guardian ad litem was present and
when asked by the court whether her client was able to comprehend the proceedings she
answered “No” because she did “not believe that [her] client underst[ood] the nature of the
proceedings.” Moreover, she did not believe that Mother would even “be capable of . . .
testifying or understanding the questions that would be asked of her.” Given Mother’s situation,
she did not believe Mother could safely parent Child.
There was no evidence in the record that Mother’s condition is reversible, and therefore
at this time she is unable to knowingly provide the child with the necessary care, custody and
control. There was also no evidence that any other services that could be offered would be
successful in allowing Mother to reunify given her lack of a desire to do so, and her lack of a
capacity to want to do so. Thus, there was substantial evidence that Mother had a mental
condition shown by competent evidence to be permanent which renders Mother unable to
knowingly provide Child the necessary care, custody, and control.
Though there were no signs of chemical dependency in Mother, there is substantial
evidence of the three other grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section
The court only needed to find support for one ground by a preponderance of the evidence
to terminate Mother’s parental rights. K.A.M.L., 644 S.W.3d at 22 (citing Section 211.447.7).
The trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights.
28 Mother’s Point I is denied.
Mother’s Point Two
In her second point, Mother argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights
in that there was insufficient evidence to support its finding and conclusions pursuant to Section
211.447.5(5) (parental unfitness). 8
As previously stated, Section 211.447.5(5)(a) allows for the termination of parental rights
if the parent is deemed unfit demonstrated by “specific conditions directly relating to the parent
and child relationship which are determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that renders
the parent unable for the reasonably foreseeable future to care appropriately for the ongoing
physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child.” A parent is presumed unfit when “at least
fifteen of the twenty-two months prior to the filing of the petition, the child has been in foster
care under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Section 211.447.5(5)(b)(e).
The trial court found Mother unfit based upon the presumption and the “ongoing issues
with providing care for their child.” Sufficient cogent, clear, and convincing evidence supported
the trial court’s findings. Evidence at trial demonstrated Child had been in foster care for twenty-
eight months of the thirty-three months this case has been proceeding. This raises a rebuttable
presumption of parental unfitness. Z.R.L.C., 700 S.W.3d at 542. Other evidence demonstrated
that Mother could not be considered an appropriate caregiver for Child or that Mother had the
ability to care and safely provide for the child. Mother had no desire to participate in any sort of
services to assist with her care of Child. Mother also indicated she did not want to be reunified
8 Though evidence supporting one factor is sufficient to terminate parental rights, we nevertheless address Mother’s point two due to the gravity of terminating parental rights. 29 with Child. Also, Mother’s cognitive condition and intellectual disability necessitated that any
visits between Mother and Child be supervised. It would not have been appropriate for Mother to
care for Child alone.
Throughout trial Mother did not testify and failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut
the presumption of unfitness.
Mother’s Point II is denied.
Mother’s Point Three
In her third point, Mother argues the trial court erred in finding that it was in the Child’s
best interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 211.447.7.
As previously stated, we review the trial court’s best interest determination for abuse of
discretion. K.A.M.L., 644 S.W.3d at 25. “An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial
court’s ruling is ‘clearly against the logic of the circumstances and so unreasonable and arbitrary
that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.’” Id.
(quoting D.L.P., 638 S.W.3d at 89).
The trial court, in applying the seven best interest factors, pursuant to Section 211.447.7,
found that first, Mother had no parent-child bond with Child. The trial court found that Mother
had very limited contact with Child, thus any emotional ties Child would have with Mother were
not present. Second, the trial court found that Mother had not visited Child on any regular or
consistent basis. Third, the trial court found that “neither parent has provided any form of
monetary support for the child during the time she has been in the care of the Court. Neither
parent provided food, clothing or other necessaries to the child while she was in alternative
30 care.” Fourth, the trial court found that “the evidence adduced at trial indicated there are no
additional services which would be likely to bring about any lasting parental adjustment to
enable a return of the child to Mother or Father in the near future.” Fifth, the trial court found
that Mother had demonstrated a lack of commitment to the child, reasoning that Mother’s
unwillingness to engage may be due to her cognitive issues.
Mother challenges each finding without citation to facts in the record or to the law. For
example, Mother states she disagrees with the trial court’s findings that Mother has no emotional
ties to the child. The evidence at trial indicated that Mother had no interest in keeping Child, and
instead wanted to give Child to another family member. Further evidence demonstrated that
aside from the two trial home placements, and within the first three weeks of Child’s life, Mother
had no contact with Child. “A lack of bonding is substantial evidence supporting that termination
is in the best interest of the child, particularly when taken in conjunction with other factors
supporting termination.” In re C.A.M., 282 S.W.3d 398, 408 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009). The trial
court need not speculate as to the amount of time needed to establish a parent-child bond, if a
bond can be established at all, because the evidence at trial demonstrated Mother’s lack of
interest in the child and Mother’s failure to comply with her service plan for reunification. See In
re J.D.P., 406 S.W.3d 81, 85 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).
In addition to the first and second factors, the rest of Mother’s arguments focus on
reweighing the evidence and the trial court’s decision. This runs afoul of our standard of review.
See N.D.P.H., 675 S.W.3d at 782. We are required to view the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s judgment.” K.A.M.L., 644 S.W.3d at 20. Viewing the remainder of
the evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, the trial
court’s findings are well supported by the record.
31 Viewing the totality of the circumstances, the trial court’s findings that it was in Child’s
best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights was not an abuse of discretion.
Mother’s Point III is denied.
Mother’s Point Four
In her fourth point, Mother argues the trial court erred when it denied Father’s post-trial
motion, which included a request to reopen the evidence and allow Mother and Father to testify.
Preservation
Respondent argues Mother failed to preserve this issue because Mother failed to file a
post-trial motion for new trial that alleged this as error. Respondent also reasons that “Father’s
Motion did not request Mother be allowed to testify if the evidence was re-opened.”
Rule 78.07 provides that in a cases tried without a jury “neither a motion for a new trial
nor a motion to amend the judgment or opinion is necessary to preserve any matter for appellate
review if the matter was previously presented to the trial court.”9 Mother did not file a motion for
new trial and did not present this alleged error to the trial court. Thus, Mother failed to preserve
this issue for appeal. See Ferkel v. Ferkel, 434 S.W.3d 108, 109 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014).
“Although we may review an unpreserved claim for plain error, we rarely review for plain error
in civil cases.” Id. at 110 (quoting Bowman v. Prinster, 384 S.W.3d 365, 372 (Mo. App.
E.D.2012)).
We decline to review for plain error. 10
9 All Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2023), unless otherwise indicated. 10 Mother also likely lacks standing to bring this point on appeal. See In Interest of D.J., 555 S.W.3d 490, 491-92 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018) (finding no standing for a mother to present arguments on a father’s behalf in an appeal of the termination of her parental rights). Mother was not aggrieved by the trial court’s order denying Father’s Motion to Vacate the Judgment and Mother cannot raise claims on Father’s behalf. See id. 32 Mother’s Point IV is denied.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
__ Angela T. Quigless, J.
James M. Dowd, P.J., and John P. Torbitzky, J., concur.
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In the Interest of: S.R.W., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-srw-moctapp-2025.