In the Interest of S.P., Minor Child

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: February 19, 2025
• Docket: 24-2008
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-2008 Filed February 19, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF S.P., Minor Child,

V.P., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Joan M. Black,

Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Karina A. Miller of Astraea Legal LLC, Iowa City, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Sue Kirk of Arnott & Kirk, PLLC, Iowa City, attorney and guardian ad litem

for minor child.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ. 2

BADDING, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, born in

2024, under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2024).1 She claims the juvenile

court erred in terminating her parental rights because insufficient evidence

supported the ground for termination, termination was not in the child’s best

interests, the permissive parent-child bond exception in section 232.116(3)(c)

applied, and she should have been granted more time for reunification. We affirm

upon our de novo review of the record.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The day after the child was born, the Iowa Department of Health and Human

Services received a report that the infant had methamphetamine and marijuana in

her system. The mother admitted that she used both drugs throughout her

pregnancy—until just three days before the child was born.2 The department put

a safety plan into place that required the mother and child to live with the maternal

grandparents. One week later, in April 2024, the juvenile court removed the child

from the mother’s custody, and the State filed a child-in-need-of-assistance

petition.

The mother stipulated to the child’s adjudication and began participating in

services. She and the child remained in the maternal grandparents’ home, where

the mother cared for the child under her family’s supervision and did “a great job

1 The juvenile court also terminated the rights of the presumed father and any

putative fathers. The presumed father did not participate in the proceedings and has not appealed. 2 The mother also used methamphetamine while pregnant with her first child, who

was born in December 2022. She voluntarily placed that child for adoption. 3

meeting [the child’s] basic needs,” according to the department’s social work case

manager. The mother quickly completed a substance use evaluation, started

mental-health and substance-use treatment at a dual diagnosis program, and

obtained a full-time job. But her participation in drug testing was inconsistent, as

was her communication with the department and other providers.

In July, the mother tested positive for methamphetamine, which she blamed

on “accidentally vap[ing] methamphetamine that belonged to a friend of hers.”

Around the same time, the mother stopped attending substance-use treatment.

She restarted treatment in August but had another positive test for

methamphetamine that month. Because the mother was not making progress with

her sobriety, the department changed its permanency goal to termination of

parental rights. The State filed a termination petition in September. The next

week, the mother was arrested. She remained in jail through October. Once she

was released, the mother moved back in with the maternal grandparents and got

a new substance-use evaluation. But she soon tested positive for

methamphetamine again. After that positive test, the grandparents told the

department they could no longer care for the child, who was then moved to a foster

home.

A termination hearing was held in December. The mother did not attend

the hearing because she was sick, and through her attorney, declined the juvenile

court’s offer to participate remotely. At the hearing, the case manager agreed with

the mother’s attorney that she was “a good mother when she is parenting sober.”

But she had yet to achieve lasting sobriety. As the guardian ad litem told the

juvenile court in closing, the mother “has chosen meth over her child, and I know 4

she’s racked with guilt about that. She can’t seem to commit to addressing her

addiction, and so I believe that termination is appropriate under the

circumstances.” The court agreed and terminated the mother’s parental rights

under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h). The mother now appeals.

II. Analysis

We review terminations of parental rights de novo, using a three-step

analysis that asks whether (1) a statutory ground for termination is satisfied, (2) the

child’s best interests are served by termination, and (3) a statutory exception

applies and should be exercised to preclude termination. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d

311, 313 (Iowa 2022); see also Iowa Code § 232.116(1)–(3). The mother

challenges each of these steps and asks for more time to work towards

reunification. See In re L.T., No. 24-1348, 2024 WL 4966040, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

Dec. 4, 2024) (“If all three steps support termination, we then consider any other

issues the parent raises, such as whether more time should have been granted.”);

see also Iowa Code §§ 232.104(2)(b), 232.117(5).

A. Waiver and Error Preservation

The State preliminarily argues that the mother waived each of these claims

because she did not attend the termination hearing. Cf. In re J.R., No. 24-0942,

2025 WL 52738, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2025) (en banc) (holding that a parent

does not have to “personally participate in a termination hearing to . . . prevent

waiver on appeal” when represented by an attorney). The State also argues that

the mother did not preserve error on the statutory ground or permissive exception

issues. We elect to bypass these waiver and error-preservation concerns and

proceed to the merits. See State v. Taylor, 596 N.W.2d 55, 56 (Iowa 1999) 5

(bypassing error preservation problem and proceeding to the merits of the issue

raised on appeal); accord In re Q.E., No. 14-0783, 2014 WL 3939918, at *4 n.2

(Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2014).

B. Statutory Ground

For her challenge to the sole ground for termination—

section 232.116(1)(h)—the mother argues that because she was allowed to live

with the child and maternal grandparents, the child was not “practically removed”

from her custody until “just days before the termination trial” when the

grandparents notified the department they could no longer care for the child. The

mother contends there is not clear and convincing evidence that the child “could

not be returned to this arrangement at this present time.” In making this argument,

the mother acknowledges that she needs “treatment and sobriety” and asks this

court for a remand “with a grant of additional time to work for reunification.” We

reject this argument for two reasons.

First, the record is clear that the child was removed from the mother’s

custody in April 2024, satisfying the third element of section 232.116(1)(h). See

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(3) (requiring the State to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the “child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s

parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six

consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days”).

Second, the mother’s concession on appeal that she needs more time to parent

the child on her own is clear and convincing evidence that the child could not have

been returned to her custody at the termination hearing, as required by the fourth

element of section 232.116(1)(h). See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 6

(Iowa 2010) (interpreting the statutory language “at the present time” in

section 232.116(1)(h)(4) to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”); see also

In re J.K., No. 24-1065, 2024 WL 4370055, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2024). The

record bolsters that conclusion.

All six of the drug tests that the mother took for the department—out of the

twelve that she was asked to take—were positive for methamphetamine. The

mother’s last positive test was the month before the termination hearing. While

the case manager testified that the mother was exploring inpatient treatment, she

had not yet been accepted into a program and had only recently started outpatient

treatment again after her release from jail. “Because the evidence revealed an

ongoing danger of methamphetamine use, we have no serious doubts about the

juvenile court’s conclusion” that the child could not be returned to the mother’s

custody at the termination hearing. In re O.J., No. 24-0675, 2024 WL 3688591,

at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2024). We accordingly find clear and convincing

evidence supported termination under section 232.116(1)(h).

C. Best Interests

The mother next claims that termination is not in the best interests of the

child. On this question, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the

best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and

to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa

Code § 232.116(2); see also In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 36–39 (Iowa 2010). The

mother argues the “best placement and long-term nurturing for the child is to

remain in a similar one to the past year”—where the mother would live with the

maternal grandparents and parent the child under their supervision. But that 7

placement was no longer an option at the termination hearing because of the

mother’s persistent positive tests for methamphetamine. In any event, the “crucial

days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to

face up to their own problems.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987). We

agree with the juvenile court that because the mother “continues to actively use

methamphetamine and has made no real progress towards reunification,”

termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interests.

D. Permissive Exception

The permissive exception in Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c) allows the

juvenile court to avoid termination when the parent proves by clear and convincing

evidence that it “would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness

of the parent-child relationship.” See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa 2016)

(noting the exception is “permissive, not mandatory” (citation omitted)). The

department’s case manager and the child’s guardian ad litem both recognized

there was a bond and “a lot of love” between the mother and child. Yet they

recommended terminating the mother’s parental rights because, as the case

manager testified, the mother “has never been able to show any form of sobriety”

aside from when she was incarcerated. We agree with the juvenile court that the

child’s “need for safety, consistency and permanency outweighs the loss of the

bond that does exist.” See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (“[T]he

existence of a bond is not enough.”).

E. Additional Time

The mother asked for a six-month extension of permanency at the

termination hearing. The juvenile court “may deny termination and give the parent 8

an additional six months for reunification only if the need for removal ‘will no longer

exist at the end of the additional six-month period.’” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d

315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). On appeal, the mother

argues that an extension will allow her “to demonstrate her ability to remain sober,”

pointing out her efforts since her last relapse in obtaining another substance-use

evaluation, attending outpatient treatment, and contacting an inpatient treatment

program. But given the mother’s past performance, “we are not convinced

additional time or services” will alleviate the need for removal at the end of an

extension. In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990); see also In re N.F., 579

N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (“[A] good prediction of the future conduct

of a parent is to look at the past conduct.”). We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s

denial of the mother’s request for additional time.

AFFIRMED.