In the Interest of S.P., J.B.P., and L.R.P., Children v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals of Texas

In the Interest of S.P., J.B.P., and L.R.P., Children v. the State of Texas

DecidedOctober 2, 2025

Docket11-25-00252-CV

StatusPublished

This text of In the Interest of S.P., J.B.P., and L.R.P., Children v. the State of Texas (In the Interest of S.P., J.B.P., and L.R.P., Children v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In the Interest of S.P., J.B.P., and L.R.P., Children v. the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

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Opinion

Opinion filed October 2, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals ___________

No. 11-25-00252-CV ___________

IN THE INTEREST OF S.P., J.B.P, AND L.R.P., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 29th District Court Palo Pinto County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. C49295

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Christopher M. Perricone, filed a pro se notice of appeal from the trial court’s denial of his “Motion to Declare Sealing Order Void Ab Initio.” Because the order from which Appellant attempts to appeal is not a final judgment or an otherwise appealable order, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. When this appeal was docketed, the clerk of this court wrote Appellant and informed him that it did not appear that the order from which he attempted to appeal was appealable. We requested that Appellant respond and show grounds to continue the appeal, and we informed him that the appeal was subject to dismissal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3. In his response, Appellant agrees that the trial court’s order “does not dispose of all claims and parties, has not been severed, and is not made appealable by statute in this Family Code matter.” He states that, nevertheless, the “submission” of his response is made “without prejudice to Appellant’s right to [otherwise] seek appropriate relief.” Unless specifically authorized by statute, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840–41 (Tex. 2007); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). The trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to declare a sealing order “void ab initio” is not an appealable order because it does not dispose of all parties and claims in the proceedings below and an appeal from such an order is not otherwise authorized by statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a) (West Supp. 2024); Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. As a result, we conclude that Appellant’s notice of appeal does not invoke this court’s appellate jurisdiction.1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

October 2, 2025 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

1 Within his notice of appeal, Appellant includes a motion for extension of time to file the notice. Appellant states in his response that he “removes all motion language,” that “[n]o motion is presented here, and [that] Appellant withdraws any motion language contained in his prior filing.” To the extent Appellant is referring to his “motion” for extension of time to file his notice of appeal in his response, we grant his request to withdraw the motion. Appellant’s motion is moot given our disposition of this appeal. 2

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Opinion filed October 2, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals ___________

No. 11-25-00252-CV ___________

IN THE INTEREST OF S.P., J.B.P, AND L.R.P., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 29th District Court Palo Pinto County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. C49295

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Christopher M. Perricone, filed a pro se notice of appeal from the trial court’s denial of his “Motion to Declare Sealing Order Void Ab Initio.” Because the order from which Appellant attempts to appeal is not a final judgment or an otherwise appealable order, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. When this appeal was docketed, the clerk of this court wrote Appellant and informed him that it did not appear that the order from which he attempted to appeal was appealable. We requested that Appellant respond and show grounds to continue the appeal, and we informed him that the appeal was subject to dismissal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3. In his response, Appellant agrees that the trial court’s order “does not dispose of all claims and parties, has not been severed, and is not made appealable by statute in this Family Code matter.” He states that, nevertheless, the “submission” of his response is made “without prejudice to Appellant’s right to [otherwise] seek appropriate relief.” Unless specifically authorized by statute, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840–41 (Tex. 2007); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). The trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to declare a sealing order “void ab initio” is not an appealable order because it does not dispose of all parties and claims in the proceedings below and an appeal from such an order is not otherwise authorized by statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a) (West Supp. 2024); Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. As a result, we conclude that Appellant’s notice of appeal does not invoke this court’s appellate jurisdiction.1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

October 2, 2025 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

1 Within his notice of appeal, Appellant includes a motion for extension of time to file the notice. Appellant states in his response that he “removes all motion language,” that “[n]o motion is presented here, and [that] Appellant withdraws any motion language contained in his prior filing.” To the extent Appellant is referring to his “motion” for extension of time to file his notice of appeal in his response, we grant his request to withdraw the motion. Appellant’s motion is moot given our disposition of this appeal. 2

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