IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-2038 Filed March 5, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF S.M., Minor Child,
S.C., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Susan Cole, Judge.
A father appeals a juvenile court order terminating parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Joseph P. Goedken of Orsborn, Mitchell & Goedken, P.C., Ottumwa, for
appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Samuel Erhardt, Ottumwa, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of one-year-old S.M.’s
mother and father. Only the father appeals. The father disputes the court’s finding
that clear and convincing evidence supported termination and contends that
termination is not in the child’s best interests. The father also argues that the
termination would harm S.M. because of the closeness of their parent-child
relationship. After our de novo review of the record, we credit the views of the
professionals in the case that, despite making efforts to gain parenting skills, the
father lacks the ability to care for S.M. safely.1
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
When S.M. was born prematurely in October 2023, he weighed just over
four pounds. His mother could not care for him because of her intellectual
challenges.2 So the department removed S.M. from her custody. Shortly after
S.M.’s birth, the mother identified S.C. as the biological father.3 Paternity testing
confirmed that identification. In December 2023, S.M.’s guardian ad litem (GAL)
reported: “There have been enough serious concerns raised about parents’
1 “We review termination proceedings de novo, examining both the facts and law
and adjudicating anew those issues properly preserved and presented.” In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 589 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). We are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings, but we give them weight. Id. 2 The mother reported to the Department of Health and Human Services that she
has fetal alcohol syndrome, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder diagnoses. When her older child was an infant, she tried to smother him with a pillow. That child is in a guardianship with the maternal grandmother. The mother also is a registered sex offender. 3 The father had parental rights terminated to two other children in 2021 after
admitting to sexual abuse of their half-sister. We affirmed those terminations on appeal. In re G.C., No. 21-1781, 2022 WL 246270 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2022). The father faced criminal charges but was found incompetent to stand trial because of an intellectual disability. 3
capabilities that I would be ‘scared to death’ to allow this infant to be placed with
either of them at this time.” In January 2024, the court adjudicated S.M. as a child
in need of assistance (CINA).
Through most of the CINA case, S.C. lived with her parents.4 S.C. received
disability payments with her father as the payee. S.C. was consistent in visiting
S.M. and progressed to overnight visits in March 2024. But complications arose
about a month later. S.C. suffered seizures and was prescribed medication that
had side effects preventing her from being alone with S.M. The father also
reported that S.M.’s grandfather acted inappropriately when the infant visited their
home. The grandfather was reportedly frustrated with the infant and threatened to
“throw [him] off of a bridge.”5 Those developments jarred the department into
reinstating fully supervised visitation in public spaces. During those visits, the
social workers noted safety concerns over S.C.’s parenting. The father would
“often walk into the street without really checking for traffic.” The father would also
set S.M. on high surfaces without supervising him and required prompting to meet
the child’s needs.6
To remedy those deficits, the father engaged in services, including 24/7
Dads and Safe Care. S.C. recalled: “I tried learning to be a better father to [S.M.],
and I listened closely.” But despite completing those programs, S.C. lacked the
4 S.C. uses she/her pronouns. 5 At the termination trial, S.C. downplayed the grandfather’s hostility, insisting “he
won’t hurt people.” But S.C. conceded that the grandfather had a quick temper and has also threatened to hurt her. 6 S.M. had developmental delays but had not been diagnosed with any specific
conditions. The department was working with the Area Education Agency to assess what services S.M. would need when the grandfather “kicked” the AEA representative out of the house. 4
capacity to be a safe caretaker in the view of the department case manager. The
GAL agreed that the father could not resume custody: “[S.C.] wants to raise [S.M.]
and tries very hard to do so. She also, generally, recognizes her limitations. It
breaks my heart to see such a spirited, nice, and willing parent unable to provide
the necessary care for their child.”
The juvenile court terminated S.C.’s parental rights under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1) (2024), paragraphs (e), (h), and (g). She appeals.
II. Analysis
The analysis for terminating parental rights follows three steps. In re P.L.,
778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (discussing Iowa Code section 232.116(1)–(3)).
At a minimal level, S.C. contests each step.
A. Statutory Ground
We first examine whether the State offered clear and convincing evidence
to support a ground for termination. When the court terminates on more than one
ground, we may affirm on any alternative supported by the record. In re A.B., 815
N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We focus on paragraph (h). That alternative
requires the State to prove these elements: the child (1) is three or younger; (2) has
been adjudicated a CINA; (3) has been removed from the physical custody of the
parents for at least six months; and (4) cannot be returned to the custody of the
parents at the present time. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h).
S.C. challenges the fourth element. She asserts that S.M. “could safely be
returned to her, given additional time to find suitable housing away from her
parents, and on her own, when she would be able to secure more regular
employment or handle her disability payment on her own.” But no further delay is 5
built into paragraph (h). “Present time” means the date of the termination hearing.
In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). The record does not feature any
evidence that S.M. could safely be returned home with his father at the time of the
termination hearing. And even if time were not a factor, both the caseworker and
GAL expressed ongoing concern about the father’s capacity for safe parenting.
See In re C.P., No. 10-1629, 2010 WL 5394863, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 22,
2010) (“No professional was willing to offer the opinion that the parents are capable
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-2038 Filed March 5, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF S.M., Minor Child,
S.C., Father, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Susan Cole, Judge.
A father appeals a juvenile court order terminating parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Joseph P. Goedken of Orsborn, Mitchell & Goedken, P.C., Ottumwa, for
appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Samuel Erhardt, Ottumwa, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of one-year-old S.M.’s
mother and father. Only the father appeals. The father disputes the court’s finding
that clear and convincing evidence supported termination and contends that
termination is not in the child’s best interests. The father also argues that the
termination would harm S.M. because of the closeness of their parent-child
relationship. After our de novo review of the record, we credit the views of the
professionals in the case that, despite making efforts to gain parenting skills, the
father lacks the ability to care for S.M. safely.1
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
When S.M. was born prematurely in October 2023, he weighed just over
four pounds. His mother could not care for him because of her intellectual
challenges.2 So the department removed S.M. from her custody. Shortly after
S.M.’s birth, the mother identified S.C. as the biological father.3 Paternity testing
confirmed that identification. In December 2023, S.M.’s guardian ad litem (GAL)
reported: “There have been enough serious concerns raised about parents’
1 “We review termination proceedings de novo, examining both the facts and law
and adjudicating anew those issues properly preserved and presented.” In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 589 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). We are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings, but we give them weight. Id. 2 The mother reported to the Department of Health and Human Services that she
has fetal alcohol syndrome, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder diagnoses. When her older child was an infant, she tried to smother him with a pillow. That child is in a guardianship with the maternal grandmother. The mother also is a registered sex offender. 3 The father had parental rights terminated to two other children in 2021 after
admitting to sexual abuse of their half-sister. We affirmed those terminations on appeal. In re G.C., No. 21-1781, 2022 WL 246270 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2022). The father faced criminal charges but was found incompetent to stand trial because of an intellectual disability. 3
capabilities that I would be ‘scared to death’ to allow this infant to be placed with
either of them at this time.” In January 2024, the court adjudicated S.M. as a child
in need of assistance (CINA).
Through most of the CINA case, S.C. lived with her parents.4 S.C. received
disability payments with her father as the payee. S.C. was consistent in visiting
S.M. and progressed to overnight visits in March 2024. But complications arose
about a month later. S.C. suffered seizures and was prescribed medication that
had side effects preventing her from being alone with S.M. The father also
reported that S.M.’s grandfather acted inappropriately when the infant visited their
home. The grandfather was reportedly frustrated with the infant and threatened to
“throw [him] off of a bridge.”5 Those developments jarred the department into
reinstating fully supervised visitation in public spaces. During those visits, the
social workers noted safety concerns over S.C.’s parenting. The father would
“often walk into the street without really checking for traffic.” The father would also
set S.M. on high surfaces without supervising him and required prompting to meet
the child’s needs.6
To remedy those deficits, the father engaged in services, including 24/7
Dads and Safe Care. S.C. recalled: “I tried learning to be a better father to [S.M.],
and I listened closely.” But despite completing those programs, S.C. lacked the
4 S.C. uses she/her pronouns. 5 At the termination trial, S.C. downplayed the grandfather’s hostility, insisting “he
won’t hurt people.” But S.C. conceded that the grandfather had a quick temper and has also threatened to hurt her. 6 S.M. had developmental delays but had not been diagnosed with any specific
conditions. The department was working with the Area Education Agency to assess what services S.M. would need when the grandfather “kicked” the AEA representative out of the house. 4
capacity to be a safe caretaker in the view of the department case manager. The
GAL agreed that the father could not resume custody: “[S.C.] wants to raise [S.M.]
and tries very hard to do so. She also, generally, recognizes her limitations. It
breaks my heart to see such a spirited, nice, and willing parent unable to provide
the necessary care for their child.”
The juvenile court terminated S.C.’s parental rights under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1) (2024), paragraphs (e), (h), and (g). She appeals.
II. Analysis
The analysis for terminating parental rights follows three steps. In re P.L.,
778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (discussing Iowa Code section 232.116(1)–(3)).
At a minimal level, S.C. contests each step.
A. Statutory Ground
We first examine whether the State offered clear and convincing evidence
to support a ground for termination. When the court terminates on more than one
ground, we may affirm on any alternative supported by the record. In re A.B., 815
N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We focus on paragraph (h). That alternative
requires the State to prove these elements: the child (1) is three or younger; (2) has
been adjudicated a CINA; (3) has been removed from the physical custody of the
parents for at least six months; and (4) cannot be returned to the custody of the
parents at the present time. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h).
S.C. challenges the fourth element. She asserts that S.M. “could safely be
returned to her, given additional time to find suitable housing away from her
parents, and on her own, when she would be able to secure more regular
employment or handle her disability payment on her own.” But no further delay is 5
built into paragraph (h). “Present time” means the date of the termination hearing.
In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). The record does not feature any
evidence that S.M. could safely be returned home with his father at the time of the
termination hearing. And even if time were not a factor, both the caseworker and
GAL expressed ongoing concern about the father’s capacity for safe parenting.
See In re C.P., No. 10-1629, 2010 WL 5394863, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 22,
2010) (“No professional was willing to offer the opinion that the parents are capable
of caring for [the children] now, or even that they would be able to do so within a
reasonable period of time.”).7
B. Best Interests
The father next contends that it is not in S.M.’s best interests to sever their
bond. We acknowledge the parent-child bond may fit into an analysis of best
interests. But we give primary consideration to S.M.’s safety, to the best placement
for fostering his “long-term nurturing and growth,” and to his “physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs.” See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We also consider
S.M.’s integration into his foster family. See id. § 232.116(2)(b).
We are most worried about S.M.’s safety. The record shows that the father
cannot protect the child from day-to-day hazards like traffic and falls. And as the
State points out, S.C. struggles to meet her own needs, relying on her father who
has made threats toward both S.C. and S.M.
7 It is possible for the juvenile court to grant the parent more time to work toward
reunification if there are “specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes” that suggest the need for removal will be alleviated at the end of that time. Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). But we find no such indicators here. 6
Given these harsh realities, we find it is in S.M’s best interests to move
toward a more stable future. See In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 173 (Iowa 2020)
(declining to deprive child of permanency while “hoping someday” that parent will
be able to provide stable home (citation omitted)). While S.M.’s current foster
parents cannot adopt him, the department is exploring the possibility that the foster
parents’ son and daughter-in-law may be a long-term placement option.
C. Exception Based on Closeness of Relationship
Finally, the father mentions the exception to termination at Iowa Code
section 232.116(3)(c), which allows a court to deny termination if the parent offers
clear and convincing evidence that it would harm the child based on the closeness
of their relationship. But at the termination hearing, the father presented no
evidence that S.M. would suffer physically, mentally, or emotionally upon
termination. See In re L.H., 13 N.W.3d 627, 629 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). Just citing
their bond is not enough to trigger application of this permissive exception. Id.
Finding no cause for reversal, we affirm the termination of the father’s
parental rights.