In the Interest of: S.K.L.R.; Apl of: K.H.

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 17, 2021
• Docket: 5 WAP 2021
• Status: Published

Opinion

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.K.L.R., A MINOR : No. 5 WAP 2021 : : Appeal from the Order of the APPEAL OF: K.H. : Superior Court entered November : 13, 2020 at No. 440 WDA 2020, : reversing the Order of the Court of : Common Pleas of Westmoreland : County entered February 6, 2019 at : No. 34 of 2019, and remanding. : : ARGUED: May 19, 2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.M.J.R., A MINOR : No. 6 WAP 2021 : : Appeal from the Order of the APPEAL OF: K.H. : Superior Court entered November : 13, 2020 at No. 441 WDA 2020, : reversing the Order of the Court of : Common Pleas of Westmoreland : County entered February 6, 2019 at : No. 35 of 2019, and remanding. : : ARGUED: May 19, 2021

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: AUGUST 17, 2021 The trial court in the instant matter denied a county agency’s petitions to terminate

involuntarily the parental rights of a mother. The agency appealed to the Superior Court,

which reversed the trial court’s order and effectively terminated the mother’s parental

rights to two of her children. We granted the mother’s petitions for allowance of appeal

to consider two issues: (1) whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s opinion in In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2010); and (2) whether the Superior Court

erred by substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. We respectfully decide both

issues in the mother’s favor, vacate the Superior Court’s judgment, and reinstate the trial

court’s order.

I. Background summary.1 K.H. (“Mother”) and P.R. (“Father”) are the parents of S.K.L.R. (“Daughter”), born

on September 22, 2014, and L.M.J.R. (“Son”), born on December 30, 2015.2 On July 18,

2017, Mother had her third child, B.H. (“Younger Son”), with a man we will refer to as T.H.

In September of 2017, the Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau (“Agency”) offered

services to Mother and T.H. after it received reports that Mother was overwhelmed with

caring for her three young children, that she was rough with the children when disciplining

them, and that she struggled with appropriate parenting skills. In addition, Mother had a

history of mental health issues.

On December 5, 2017, the Agency received a referral from the Children’s Hospital

of Pittsburgh regarding Younger Son. At the hospital, doctors performed a CT scan and

an MRI on Younger Son to determine why he had an increased head circumference.

These tests revealed that Younger Son had subdural hematomas on both sides of his

head. Mother had no explanation for these injuries, and hospital personnel were

concerned that the hematomas were the result of abuse.

1 We glean our summary of these circumstances from the trial court’s thorough opinion

docketed on February 10, 2020, as the parties do not contest this portion of the court’s opinion. 2 When appropriate, we will refer to Son and Daughter collectively as the “Children.”

Although Mother has other children, Son and Daughter are the only children directly impacted by the lower courts’ decisions. Further, while the Superior Court’s disposition of these matters resulted in the termination of Father’s parental rights, he is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, we will not provide a robust summary of the facts or issues that are solely relevant to Father.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 2 On December 7, 2017, the Agency assumed emergency custody of all three

children. The Agency then filed a petition for dependency on December 18, 2017.

Therein, the Agency shared Children’s Hospital’s referral and alleged that the children

lacked proper parental care and control. The Agency also noted that it was involved with

the older children from 2015 to 2017 due to parenting concerns and issues regarding

domestic violence between Mother and T.H., who had been charged with one count each

of simple assault and harassment for his alleged abuse of Mother. The petition for

dependency further alleged as follows: (1) T.H. was incarcerated at SCI-Fayette on

November 27, 2017; (2) Father was incarcerated at SCI-Camp Hill on multiple

convictions; (3) on December 13, 2017, the landlord for Mother and T.H. posted an

eviction notice at their residence, causing concerns for possible homelessness; and (4)

Mother had ongoing mental health problems and previously was diagnosed with anxiety,

depression, bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, and post-traumatic stress

disorder.

On January 19, 2018, a hearing officer held an adjudication and dispositional

hearing. That day, the children were adjudicated dependent and remained in the

Agency’s custody with continued placement in their kinship foster homes. 3 Important to

the instant appeal, Mother was charged with the following laundry list of goals: (1) to

continue with mental health treatment, individual counseling, and her prescribed

medication; (2) to participate in nurturing parenting instruction; (3) to partake in life skills

services; (4) to engage in anger management counseling; (5) to obtain and maintain

appropriate and stable housing; and (6) to secure and maintain employment.

3 Specifically, the Children were placed and remain with Mother’s aunt. We further observe that, according to the Agency, it utilized concurrent planning to aid in achieving permanency for the Children. Agency’s Brief at 14. We discuss this concept infra.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 3 A permanency review hearing occurred on July 27, 2018. The hearing officer

concluded that Mother complied moderately with the permanency plan. For example,

although Mother “had maintained housing and employment, she did not regularly attend

anger management classes, individual counseling, or parenting classes.” Trial Court

Opinion, 2/10/2020, at 9. Further, it was reported that Mother gave birth to her fourth

child, W. (“Younger Daughter”), on July 16, 2018. Mother’s goals remained the same.

The next permanency review hearing was held on January 2, 2019. At that

hearing, Mother was found to have complied substantially with the permanency plan and

made moderate progress. Regarding this assessment, the trial court observed, inter alia,

that, on the one hand, Mother was unemployed and continued to get agitated easily at

the Children during visits, but that, on the other hand, she maintained housing,

cooperated with services, and made advances in utilizing skills that she had been taught.

At the conclusion of this hearing, Mother was directed to continue with her original goals;

however, because T.H. moved back in with Mother and abuse continued to be a concern,

Mother was given the additional goals of addressing domestic violence issues and

participating in couples counseling.

On April 12, 2019, Mother signed a consent to adopt form, agreeing to terminate

voluntarily her parental rights as to Son and Daughter. However, at a June 26, 2019,

hearing, she informed the trial court that she wanted to revoke her consent. The court

eventually granted her request in an order dated December 20, 2019.

Another permanency review hearing occurred on July 22, 2019. Mother did not

attend, as she did not want to jeopardize her new job. However, her counsel was present.

Mother was found to have complied moderately with the permanency plan but to have

made minimal progress overall. For example, while Mother found employment, the

Agency was informed that she was using cocaine, which resulted in her need to be tested

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 4 for drugs. In addition, she attended few mental health therapy sessions but successfully

completed anger management classes and her nurturing parent curriculum. Mother

essentially was directed to continue to work toward achieving her original goals, save for

the ones that she already had met.

II. Petitions for termination of parental rights and subsequent hearing.

On March 28, 2019, the Agency filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights

as to Son and Daughter. In those petitions, the Agency contended that termination was

proper pursuant to Subsections 2511(a)(5), 2511(a)(8), and 2511(b) of the Adoption Act.

These statutory provisions provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

***

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 5 be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

On January 16, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the petitions. At that hearing,

the Agency presented testimony from the following witnesses: Kelsey Oddis, a family

resource specialist with Justice Works; Amy Kowalewski, a supervisor of the resource

specialists at Justice Works; Taylor Patton, a mental health and drug and alcohol

counselor from Southwestern Pennsylvania Human Services (“SPHS”); and Tara

Lorenzo-Hendershot, an Agency caseworker.

Ms. Oddis testified that, in November of 2019, in her role at Justice Works, she

began to supervise visits that the Children had with Mother.4 N.T., 1/16/2020, at 10. At

that time, Mother and the Children met twice per month for a two-hour period. According

to Ms. Oddis, since the July 22, 2019, permanency hearing, 12 of 15 scheduled

supervised visitations occurred; the three that did not come to fruition were due to Mother

failing to confirm visits within 24 hours of when the visits were to occur. Id. at 10-11. Ms.

Oddis shared that, for purposes of her agency, Mother’s goals were to develop skills to

ensure the safety, well-being, and permanence of all of her children. Id. at 12. Ms. Oddis

stated that those goals remained ongoing. Id. at 13.

As to her observations of the interactions among the Children and Mother, Ms.

Oddis testified that, when the Children arrived at Mother’s residence, they usually kissed

and hugged Mother, and Mother would ask the Children if they had eaten. Mother would

then make them dinner, eat with them, and set up a movie to watch. Id. Ms. Oddis

4 Later in her testimony, Ms. Oddis revealed that she supervised only three of the families’

visits. N.T., 1/16/2020, at 17.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 6 reported that, when Mother began a movie, the Children either would watch it or play. Id.

at 16. Ms. Oddis testified that Mother would either watch the movie with the Children, “be

on her phone,” or engage with them on the floor. Id. at 16-17.

Ms. Oddis stated that, when the Children misbehaved, Mother asked them to

apologize to one another or encouraged them to incorporate sharing into their play. Id.

at 18. Ms. Oddis also stated that Mother generally did not yell at the Children, save for

perhaps asking them to calm down to watch television. Id. at 18-19. Ms. Oddis

specifically testified that Mother always used appropriate rules and boundaries, and that

she never witnessed Mother do anything that concerned her with respect to the Children.

Id. at 19. Lastly, Ms. Oddis explained that, when the visits came to an end, the Children

hugged and kissed Mother; Son usually had no behavioral issues; but Daughter had

temper tantrums when leaving the home and being placed into her car seat. Id. at 19-20.

Ms. Kowalewski was the next witness to testify for the Agency.5 Ms. Kowalewski

stated that her agency, Justice Works, provided the family with “Just Care” level of

services, which was involved in the supervision of visits and providing nurturing parenting

instruction. Id. at 25-26. Justice Works constructed this program based upon Mother’s

performance on family and parenting tests; Mother tested anywhere from above average

to below average on those tests. Id. at 27-28. Mother was compliant with these services,

completing the nurturing parent curriculum in February of 2019. Id. at 28.

Ms. Kowalewski reported that Mother struggled to apply the skills that she had

been taught to actual parenting scenarios; she highlighted that Mother “would play on her

phone and not interact with the children as much as would have been liked.” Id. at 29.

Ms. Kowalewski, however, observed that Mother had successfully corrected problems

5 Throughout her testimony, Ms. Kowalewski confirmed aspects of Ms. Oddis’ testimony.

We will not reiterate these portions of Ms. Oddis’ testimony.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 7 with failing to confirm visitation with the Children 24 hours in advance. Id. at 29-30. In

terms of Mother’s ability to discipline the Children, Ms. Kowalewski stated that: Mother

sometimes put the Children on time out; at times, the Children oblige; but the supervising

specialist intervened on occasion. Id. at 32-33.

According to Ms. Kowalewski, Mother became more compliant with services over

time, both in terms of confirming visitation and disciplining the Children, though she stated

her belief that Mother remained unable to parent effectively both Son and Daughter at the

same time. Id. at 34-36. Significantly, on cross-examination, Ms. Kowalewski conceded

that she personally observed the family only once when she filled in for Ms. Oddis in

December of 2019. Id. at 36-37.

The Agency followed up with testimony from Taylor Patton, a mental health and

drug and alcohol counselor at SPHS. Notably, Mother was a client at SPHS but not one

of Ms. Patton’s clients. Id. at 40-41. Nonetheless, Ms. Patton testified that, at SPHS,

Mother was diagnosed with bipolar I disorder, major depressive disorder, unspecified

personality disorder, and adjustment disorder. Id. at 42. According to Ms. Patton, on

September 7, 2018, Mother entered into a treatment agreement for one session of out-

patient therapy per week. Ms. Patton reported that Mother generally complied with this

arrangement insomuch as she attended 11 of 30 sessions; however, she ultimately was

discharged in June of 2019 for her failure to participate more fully in her treatment. Id. at

42-43.

On cross-examination, Ms. Patton confirmed that Mother’s testing suggested that

she needed mental health treatment, but not drug and alcohol treatment. Id. at 44. When

Mother’s counsel asked Ms. Patton whether she was aware that Mother’s treatment

attendance issues began when she moved out of the area, Ms. Patton stated that she

could not answer that question because she was not Mother’s counselor and was basing

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 8 her testimony solely on a letter drafted by Mother’s actual counselor - a letter that merely

summarized the counselor’s recommendations and Mother’s treatment attendance.6 Id.

The Agency’s final witness was its caseworker, Tara Lorenzo-Hendershot, who

was assigned to the family’s case in October of 2018.7 Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot began

by describing the circumstances that led to the Children being placed in the Agency’s

custody, as detailed supra. Id. at 46-47. Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot reported that, at the

time of the termination hearing, the Children had been in care for 25 months. Id. at 47.

Next, Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot recounted Mother’s goals, the results of her initial

evaluations and recommendations, as well as Mother’s participation, or lack thereof, in

the suggested services, including visitation with the Children. Id. at 47-58.

Notably, Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot personally observed Mother visit with the

Children on only two occasions: December 10, 2018, and February 26, 2019. Id. at 58-

64. Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot testified, inter alia, that during her visits, Mother asked for

less-restrictive visitation, but Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot stated her belief that Mother was

not ready for this step due to numerous concerns, including Mother’s ongoing anger

issues and her lack of interaction with the Children. Id. at 61-65. According to Ms.

Lorenzo-Hendershot, she informed Mother in November of 2019, that the Agency would

be reducing her visitation from four times per month to two times per month because

“typically when the Agency file[s] for termination of parental rights, it decreases visitation

between a parent and child.” Id. at 66. Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot acknowledged that this

prospect upset Mother. Id.

6 None of the parties objected to Ms. Patton’s testimony on any grounds, including hearsay or competency. 7 As compared to the Agency’s other witnesses, Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot’s testimony

was extensive. For present purposes, we will provide only a brief overview of her testimony and supplement that summary as needed later in the opinion.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 9 At that point, counsel for the Agency began to question Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot

about the details of Mother’s current situation. For example, counsel elicited testimony

that: (1) Mother then currently lived with her grandmother in a home that may not have

accommodated all of its current residents as well as the Children, id. at 66-67; (2) Mother

had an unstable employment history, though she then was currently employed, id. at 67;

and (3) Mother was tested 26 times for cocaine, and although she tested positive twice,

the screening ceased because she “consistently tested negative,” id. at 68-69.

After Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot explained Father’s circumstances relative to the

petitions to terminate his parental rights to the Children, id. at 69-76, she explained why

she believed that termination of Mother’s parental rights was justified pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5). In this regard, she testified that: (1) the Children had been out of

Mother’s custody for at least six months; (2) the conditions that led to the Children’s

removal, i.e., Mother’s mental health issues, continue to exist; and (3) the conditions that

led to the Children’s removal will not be remedied within a reasonable amount of time in

the future because “[g]iven the length of time that the children have been in Agency

custody and given the services provided to mother, it is unlikely that mother will remedy

the conditions within a reasonable time period in the future.” Id. at 78-79.

When counsel asked whether Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot believed that termination

would best serve the needs and welfare of the Children, she responded in the affirmative.

Id. at 80. In support of this opinion, Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot explained that Mother has

not demonstrated that she is able to reunify with the Children despite being offered

numerous services and that the Children’s needs are being met by their kinship foster

mother with whom they have an appropriate bond. Id.

Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot then explained why she believed that termination was

proper pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8): (1) the Children had been in agency custody

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 10 for over 12 months; (2) the conditions that led to their removal continued to exist; and (3)

for the reasons previously stated, termination would best serve the Children’s needs and

welfare. Id. at 81. Along these same lines, Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot testified that

termination of Mother’s rights would meet the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Id.

She also stated her belief that, if the court terminated Mother’s parental rights, it would

not be cutting off a necessary and beneficial relationship for the Children. Id. at 84.

On cross-examination, Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot verified that Mother completed

anger management training and her nurturing parenting curriculum. Id. at 86. She also

stated that Mother has been employed and earning an income. Id. Ms. Lorenzo-

Hendershot shared that Mother, at times, had made progress, but she reported that the

Agency had concerns about Mother allowing T.H. back into the home. Ms. Lorenzo-

Hendershot then acknowledged that T.H. no longer had any involvement with Mother. Id.

at 90-91. Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot further reported that Younger Daughter was doing

well with Mother and that the Agency had no concerns for that child. Id. at 92-93.

Mother testified in an attempt to rebut the Agency’s position. She explained that

she works for a temporary employment company and that she was placed in a full time

position with some mandatory overtime. Id. at 129. Her current position is “temp to hire,”

and she is hoping that she will transition out of the temporary nature of the job. Id. at 129.

Mother also provided a detailed description of her visits with the Children. Id. at 131-38.

According to Mother, the Children are excited to see her when they arrive, and she

engages in activities with them. Id. at 131-32. Mother suggested that the alleged

excessive time she spends on her phone is due to her taking pictures of the Children

throughout their visits. Id. at 133.

Mother reported that, when it was time for the Children to return to their foster

home, they shared their desire to stay with her. Id. at 136. Daughter had a particularly

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 11 difficult time leaving Mother; she screamed, cried, and refused to get into her car seat.

Id. at 136-37. According to Mother, despite her pleas, the caseworkers did not document

these difficulties. Id. at 138.

Concerning her mental health treatment, Mother testified that she began treatment

but had to stop when she moved away from T.H. to live with her grandmother. Id. at 139.

She reported other difficulties with getting treatment. For example, work limited her ability

to see a therapist, and she lost her medical benefits for a time period. Id. at 139-40.

Mother reported that she only stopped taking her mental health medications when she

was pregnant with Younger Daughter and that she had been taking over-the-counter

“stress gummies” regularly. Id. at 141.

Mother described her typical workday, claiming that she leaves her home around

5:00 a.m., drops off Younger Daughter at daycare, and then works until 3:15. Id. at 140.

She does not return home with Younger Daughter until 5:00 p.m. Id. at 141. When asked

whether she would like to be reunified with the Children, Mother answered in the

affirmative. Id. at 142. She also shared her concerns with the Children’s current

placement with their kinship foster mother, such as the foster mother not cooking for them.

Id. at 143. Mother feels that her recent progress has gone unnoticed by the Agency. She

recounted that she: has no involvement with T.H.; now has a car and is employed; and

is working toward moving into her own housing. Id. at 143-44. Mother noted that, if the

Children returned to her care, they could go to the same daycare as Younger Daughter.

Id. at 144.

III. Trial court order and opinion.

On February 10, 2020, the trial court entered an order denying the termination

petitions. The court authored an opinion in support of its decision. Therein, the court

provided a lengthy summary of the background of the cases and of the evidence

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 12 submitted by the parties at the January 16, 2020, termination hearing. Trial Court

Opinion, 2/10/2020, at 1-23. The court then provided its reasons for denying the Agency’s

petitions.

The trial court acknowledged that the Children had been removed from Mother for

over six months but noted that many of the conditions that led to their removal no longer

exist. Id. at 23. In this regard, the court found it significant that Mother severed her

abusive relationship with T.H. The court observed that, since the Children were removed

from Mother’s care, she has: (1) participated in mental health treatment; (2) completed

parenting instruction; (3) lived with her mother, grandmother, and Younger Daughter while

beginning to search for independent housing; (4) secured gainful employment; (5) gained

insight into how to parent her children; and (5) demonstrated that she has been able to

incorporate some of the skills she has learned during visitation with the Children, e.g.,

she cooked for them, appropriately disciplined the Children, and played with them. Id. at

23-24. The trial court also was encouraged by the Children’s affection toward Mother.

Id. at 24.

The trial court then stated, “Of considerable note in this case is that Mother gave

birth to her fourth and youngest child, who is now one and one-half years old, and there

have been no concerns about Mother’s capacity to parent this child.” Id. Along these

lines, the court highlighted that, at the termination hearing, the Agency caseworker stated

unequivocally that they have no concerns for this child. Id. According to the court, “[b]ut

for the fact that Mother has not attended therapy sessions recently with a mental health

professional because her work schedule allows her little time, none of the conditions that

led to the removal and placement of the children continue to exist. If they did, we believe

Mother’s youngest child would not be in her custody either.” Id.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 13 Next, the trial court concluded that the Agency failed to prove that termination of

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the Children. The court

recounted that the Children were excited upon seeing Mother, running up to her to give

her hugs and kisses. Id. at 24-25. The court further observed that the Children did not

want to leave at the end of their visits with Mother, causing Daughter to scream and cry.

The court opined that, “[b]ased upon this evidence, coupled with the continuing efforts

and progress made by Mother to strengthen her relationship with her Children, we find

that a bond exists between Mother and her Children.” Id. at 25. The court acknowledged

the caseworker’s testimony that the Children are “flourishing” in their foster home.

However, the court asserted that it had “little to no evidence to determine whether the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the Children would be

served by severing their relationship with their Mother.” Id. Indeed, the court ultimately

determined that the Children would be harmed if their relationships with Mother were

terminated. Id.

As we discuss in more detail infra, the trial court recognized that the Agency

appears to have cast aside the core concept of concurrent planning. In this regard, the

court stated, “We are disturbed by the fact that Mother’s visitation time with the Children

was reduced by the Agency in November 2019.” Id. at 26. The court observed that the

Agency cut in half Mother’s physical contact with the Children, citing as justification its

decision to pursue the termination of Mother’s parental rights. “In other words,” the court

opined, “when the Agency decided it would pursue termination, it also presumed that

termination would be granted and began to withdraw services aimed toward reunification

of the family unit.” Id. The court reminded the Agency that, until a court determines that

termination is in a child’s best interests, the Agency should continue to aim to reunify the

child with his or her family. Id.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 14 The trial court ultimately concluded that the Agency failed to present sufficient

evidence to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination

was appropriate pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), (a)(8), or (b). The court bolstered

this conclusion by suggesting that, given reasonable time and services, Mother can

remedy her need for mental health services. Id. at 27. The court noted Mother’s

improvement, going so far as to propose that, “with a few more months of steady

progress, Mother may avoid losing parental rights to her Children permanently.” Id. at 28.

The Agency appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court’s order and

remanded the matter with instructions to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Interest of:

S.K.L.R., 242 A.3d 415 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum) (“Memorandum”).

IV. Superior Court Memorandum.

The Agency raised six issues on appeal. Relevant to the current appeal, the

Agency argued that it presented sufficient evidence to meet its substantial burden of proof

for termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to all of the above-

mentioned statutory provisions. The Superior Court began its substantive analysis of this

claim by addressing the requirements of 23 P.S. § 2511(a)(8). Memorandum at 18-19.

The court then concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the

Agency failed to present sufficient evidence to meet the elements of this subsection. Id.

at 19.

In support of this conclusion, the Superior Court stressed that the Children had

been removed from parental care for a period exceeding 12 months and that the reasons

for their removal continue to exist. Citing to its decision in In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 338

(Pa. Super. 2002), the Superior Court insisted that the trial court “erred to the extent that

it sought to invoke the fact that Mother maintains custody of her youngest child as a basis

to forego the termination of her parental rights to [the Children].” Memorandum at 19.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 15 According to the intermediate court, “[i]t is beyond peradventure that evidence concerning

a parent’s ability to care for another child is irrelevant and inadmissible in a proceeding to

terminate parental rights with regard to the child at issue.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

Next, the Superior Court concluded that, through the testimony of Ms. Lorenzo-

Hendershot (the Agency caseworker), the Agency demonstrated that the conditions which

led to the Children’s removal, which the court identified as Mother’s mental health

problems, still exist. Id. at 20. In this regard, the court highlighted Ms. Lorenzo-

Hendershot’s testimony that, inter alia, Mother had not adequately addressed her mental

health issues, as she was discharged unsuccessfully from services on June 6, 2019. The

court further noted Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot’s concerns with Mother’s ability to parent

successfully. Id. at 20-21. In addition, the court emphasized termination hearing

testimony which suggested that, rather than engaging with the Children on their visits,

Mother played a movie and occupied herself on her phone. Id. at 21.

The Superior Court found it to be important that the trial court acknowledged that

Mother had not adequately remedied the conditions that lead to the Children’s removal.

In this vein, the Superior Court stated its belief that the trial court merely speculated that

Mother may do well in the future. Id. at 22 (quoting the trial court as stating, “We do not

find that Mother cannot or will not remedy the remaining conditions, particularly pertaining

to addressing her mental health needs, within a reasonable period of time. . . . In other

words, with a few more months of steady progress, Mother may avoid losing parental

rights to her [c]hildren permanently. [Trial Court] Opinion and Order, 2/10/20, at 27-28

(emphasis added [by the Superior Court])).” In this regard, the Superior Court observed

that, unlike 23 Pa.C.S § 2511(a)(5), there is no element of 23 Pa.C.S § 2511(a)(8) that

requires an agency to present evidence that a parent cannot remedy the underlying

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 16 conditions within a reasonable period of time or that continued services would not likely

alleviate the conditions which led to a child’s placement. “Hence,” the Superior Court

concluded, “the portion of the trial court’s dedication to Mother’s anticipated progress is

not only entirely speculative, but also statutorily irrelevant to the § 2511(a)(8) analysis.”

Id. at 22.

At that point in its Memorandum, the Superior Court turned its attention to whether

the Agency met the requirements of the third prong of Subsection 2511(a)(8), i.e., whether

the Agency proved that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the

Children’s needs and welfare. In concluding that the Agency met its burden under this

prong, the court again relied in large part on Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot’s testimony.

Specifically, the intermediate court noted that, according to Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot: (1)

Mother attended 80 out of 121 visits scheduled with the Children; (2) the Children looked

to service givers instead of Mother to address their needs during visitation; (3) the

Children are together and thriving in their pre-adoptive kinship care foster home and view

their foster mother as their mother; (4) the Children do not talk about Mother; (5)

terminating Mother’s rights would not sever a necessary and beneficial relationship for

the Children; and (6) termination would best serve the Children’s needs and welfare.

Memorandum at 23-24. For these reasons, the Superior Court held that the trial court

abused its discretion by determining that the Agency failed to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that termination was proper under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). Id. at

24.

The Superior Court then examined whether the Agency met its burden with respect

to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). After providing an overview of the law in this area, id. at 24-25,

the intermediate court asserted that the record belied the trial court’s conclusion that a

meaningful bond exists between Mother and the Children and that the Agency presented

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 17 a dearth of evidence concerning the effect on the Children of severing of that bond.

Building on the evidence it cited in support of its Subsection 2511(a)(8) analysis, the

intermediate court highlighted that Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot opined that: (1) “termination

of parental rights in anticipation of adoption supports the developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare of [the Children],” id. at 25; (2) the Children have a strong

bond with their foster mother, who meets all of the Children’s needs; and (3) terminating

Mother’s parental rights would not sever a necessary and beneficial relationship for the

Children, id. at 25-26. Indeed, the Superior Court concluded that Ms. Lorenzo-

Hendershot’s testimony established by clear and convincing evidence all of the elements

of Subsection 2511(b). Id. at 26. For these reasons, the Superior Court reversed the trial

court’s order and remanded the matter to the trial court, instructing that court to enter an

order within 30 days terminating the parental rights of Mother. Id. at 33-34.

V. Allowance of appeal to this Court.

Mother filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which this Court granted, limited to

the following issues, as framed by Mother:

(1) Whether the Superior Court erred in rejecting the trial court’s findings under 2511(a)(8) and 2511(b), thereby conflicting with this Honorable Supreme Court’s holding in In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2010).

(2) Whether the Superior Court in the instant case has substituted its own discretion for that of the trial court, thereby substantially departing from an accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. Interest of S.K.L.R., 249 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2021).

VI. Issue 1.

A. This Court’s decision in In re R.J.T.

To understand the nature of this issue and the parties’ related arguments, it is

helpful for us to provide a summary of this Court’s decision in In re R.J.T., supra. A trial

court adjudicated R.J.T. dependent due to, inter alia, domestic violence concerns

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 18 between his parents; he was placed in a foster home. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1181. After

several permanency review hearings, and two years after R.J.T.’s placement, the trial

court held another permanency review hearing. At that hearing, the evidence was mixed

as to the parents’ progress toward meeting the goals that they needed to achieve to

reunify with R.J.T. Id. at 1183 (explaining that “[t]estimony revealed that [R.J.T.’s parents]

had made some progress toward addressing their domestic violence and drug and

alcohol problems, as well as their other goals. [Allegheny County Office of Children,

Youth, and Families (“CYF”)], however, emphasized that [the parents] had not attained

all the goals at the time of the hearing . . .”).

At this hearing, over the parents’ objection, CYF made an oral motion for a

permanency plan goal change from reunification of R.J.T. with his parents to adoption.

Id. Although the trial court acknowledged that the case presented a “close call,” it

ultimately denied CYF’s motion. In its opinion in support of its decision, the court explicitly

noted the significant obstacles that the family faced to achieve reunification. However,

the court “determined, based on the facts at the time of the hearing, that reunification

[was] best suited to [R.J.T.’s] safety, protection and physical, mental, and emotional

welfare and adoption [was] not best suited for several reasons.” Id. at 1184 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

The “several reasons” that the trial court cited to bolster its decision included: (1)

the parents’ adamant efforts to regain custody of R.J.T. by working toward the service

plan goals; (2) the father’s attendance at anger management and parenting classes; (3)

the fact that the parents completed at least some of their mandated behavioral health

sessions; and (4) the mother’s securing of housing and a full-time job. Id. CYF appealed

to the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for entry of an

order changing R.J.T.’s goal to adoption. Id.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 19 In support of its decision, the Superior Court, inter alia, discussed record testimony

that emphasized that the parents had not met all of their goals and that problems

remained between them. Importantly, the trial court did not rely upon this evidence in

reaching its conclusion. Id. at 1188. Indeed, “[d]espite quoting the trial court’s statement

during the hearing that the case involved a ‘very close call,’ the Superior Court found that

the trial court abused its discretion in not granting the goal change to adoption.” Id.

R.J.T.’s mother filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which this Court granted to

consider “[w]hether the Superior Court erred in determining the trial court abused its

discretion in denying CYF’s permanency goal change request from reunification to

adoption.” Id. at 1188-89. We ultimately reinstated the trial court’s order, concluding that

the Superior Court erred by finding that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

CYF’s motion to change R.J.T.’s goal to adoption.

We began our substantive analysis by observing that the standard of review in

dependency cases “requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does

not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of

law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 1190. It is our discussion

and application of this standard of review that is at issue in the instant matter.

This Court in R.J.T. had no “quarrel with the trial court’s observation that this case

is a very close call.” Id. In fact, we observed that the record could have supported a goal

change to adoption, as R.J.T. had been in CYF custody for an extended period and his

parents had not attained their goals at the time of the permanency review hearing. We,

however, highlighted that the record also supported the trial court’s decision to deny a

goal change. With these circumstances in mind and most relevant to the instant matter,

we explained as follows:

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 20 This case epitomizes why appellate courts must employ an abuse of discretion standard of review, as we are not in a position to make the close calls based on fact-specific determinations. Not only are our trial judges observing the parties during the hearing, but usually, as in this case, they have presided over several other hearings with the same parties and have a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best interests of the individual child involved. Thus, we must defer to the trial judges who see and hear the parties and can determine the credibility to be placed on each witness and, premised thereon, gauge the likelihood of the success of the current permanency plan. Even if an appellate court would have made a different conclusion based on the cold record, we are not in a position to reweigh the evidence and the credibility determinations of the trial court. The Superior Court in this case did just that in highlighting negative information regarding [R.J.T.’s parents]. Moreover, the Superior Court did not conclude that the trial court's findings of fact were not supported by the record. Accordingly, we conclude that the Superior Court erred in reevaluating the evidence. Id.

B. The parties’ arguments.

1. Mother’s arguments.

Mother concedes that R.J.T. differs from the instant matter insomuch as the issue

in R.J.T. involved a goal change in a dependency proceeding, whereas this case

concerns the termination of a parent’s rights to her children. Mother nonetheless

suggests that the primary principle discussed in R.J.T. is applicable to termination

proceedings. More specifically, Mother observes that, in R.J.T., this Court explained that

an appellate court is not in a position to make close calls in child dependency cases based

on fact-specific determinations. Indeed, Mother notes, in R.J.T., the Court explicitly

stated, “Even if an appellate court would have made a different conclusion based upon

the cold record, we are not in a position to reweigh the evidence and the credibility

determinations of the trial court.” R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.

In further support of her position, Mother emphasizes that there is no language in

R.J.T. limiting its application to goal change cases. Along these lines, Mother points out

that we cited to and positively discussed R.J.T. in In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 21 2012), a case involving the termination of parental rights, not a goal change. Mother

dedicates the remainder of her argument regarding this issue to contending that the

Superior Court violated the fundamental principle announced in R.J.T., i.e., an appellate

court should not alter close calls made by a trial court in a highly factual child welfare

proceeding.8

2. The Agency’s arguments.

The Agency adopts the position that R.J.T. does not control this matter, as it is

materially dissimilar to the instant case in several ways. The Agency begins with the

obvious: R.J.T. was a goal change proceeding, whereas this case concerns the

termination of parental rights. Later in its brief, the Agency explains that, inapposite to a

goal change proceeding, which does not result in a permanent or preventative result,

termination hearings require trial courts to make lasting, potentially harmful decisions

regarding the fate of children.

Next, the Agency posits that, in addition to discussing the role of an appellate court

in goal change proceedings, the Court in R.J.T. clearly held that the Superior Court in that

matter misinterpreted the pertinent law. Here, the Commonwealth argues, the Superior

Court made no such mistake. In fact, according to the Agency, the Superior Court

correctly concluded that the trial court made several errors of law.

For example, the Agency submits that the trial court erred as a matter of law

because it based its denial of the termination petitions, in part, on Mother’s demonstrated

ability to care for Younger Daughter. The Agency insists that the Superior Court properly

relied on the court’s previous decision in In re A.L.D., supra, when it stated, “It is beyond

peradventure that evidence concerning a parent’s ability to care for another child is

8 Mother then details the portions of the record that support the trial court’s order denying

the Agency’s petitions to terminate her parental rights. At this point, we need not discuss this aspect of her argument, as it is closely related to the second issue in this matter.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 22 irrelevant and inadmissible in a proceeding to terminate parental rights with regard to the

child at issue.” Memorandum at 19. The Agency further notes that, unlike the

circumstances presented in R.J.T., the Superior Court in the matter sub judice clearly

found that the record did not support several of the trial court’s factual findings.

C. Analysis.

This Court has not specifically addressed whether the general principles of

appellate review announced in R.J.T. should be applied to termination proceedings.

Thus, we first must answer this threshold question.9 Without hesitancy, we hold that the

general principles of appellate review discussed in the goal change context in R.J.T.

should be employed with equal force to the review of trial court termination decisions. In

support of this conclusion, we highlight that the standard of review is exactly the same in

goal change and termination proceedings. In both types of cases, an appellate court

should: (1) review a trial court’s order for an abuse of discretion; and (2) accept the

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the

record. See, e.g., In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826 (explaining that “appellate courts

must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court’s determination

of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of

review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record”).

Just as in the dependency setting, this abuse-of-discretion standard of review is

crucial in termination proceedings, as appellate courts “are not in a position to make the

close calls based on fact-specific determinations.” R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Indeed, the

role of trial courts in termination proceedings shares many similarities to the part that they

9 This query presents a question of law. “Like all questions of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Skotnicki v. Ins. Dep’t, 175 A.3d 239, 247 (Pa. 2017).

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 23 play in goal change matters: (1) “Not only are our trial judges observing the parties during

the hearing, but usually, as in this case, they have presided over several other hearings

with the same parties and have a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best

interests of the individual child involved[;]” (2) appellate courts, therefore, should defer to

“the trial judges who see and hear the parties and can determine the credibility to be

placed on each witness and, premised thereon, gauge the likelihood of the success of the

current permanency plan[;]” and (3) “[e]ven if an appellate court would have made a

different conclusion based on the cold record, we are not in a position to reweigh the

evidence and the credibility determinations of the trial court.” Id.

When a trial court makes a “close call” in a fact-intensive case involving a goal

change or the termination of parental rights, the appellate court should review the record

for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence supports that trial court’s conclusions;

the appellate court should not search the record for contrary conclusions or substitute its

judgment for that of the trial court. We, therefore, must examine whether the Superior

Court in the instant matter violated these principles, which we will do within the context of

Mother’s second issue questioning whether the Superior Court substituted its judgment

for that of the trial court.

However, before we reach that issue, we take this opportunity respectfully to reject

the Superior Court’s adoption, and the Agency’s promotion, of a per se rule that “evidence

concerning a parent’s ability to care for another child is irrelevant and inadmissible in a

proceeding to terminate parental rights with regard to the child at issue.” Memorandum

at 19 (quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 338 (Pa. Super. 2002)). As an initial matter, to

preserve a claim that evidence was admitted in error, the offended party must timely

object to the admissibility of the evidence and state a specific ground for the objection.

Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1)(A) and (B). Here, the Agency waived any challenge to the admissibility

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 24 of the testimony that Mother ably parents Younger Daughter, as it failed to object to this

evidence on any basis.

More importantly, there simply is no support in the law for the proposition that this

type of evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible as a matter of the law. The well-settled

test for relevancy states that evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a

fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of

consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401. Relevant evidence is admissible,

unless, for example, its probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice. Pa.R.E. 402

and 403. There is nothing inherent about testimony in a termination case that a parent is

competently caring for another child that would render that evidence per se irrelevant and

inadmissible. Rather, trial courts in termination cases should utilize the established

relevancy test on a case-by-case basis when asked to assess the admissibility of

evidence related to a parent’s ability to care for a child other than the child who is subject

to the termination proceeding. If the trial court deems the evidence to be relevant, then

the evidence should be admitted into the record and the court, as fact-finder, should

assign that evidence the appropriate weight to which it is entitled in reaching its factual

and legal conclusions.

VII. Issue 2.

A. The parties’ arguments.10

In support of her position that the Superior Court substituted its judgment for that

of the trial court, Mother highlights the various factual findings that the trial court made

which weighed in favor of denying the termination petitions. In this regard, Mother notes

10 The parties zealously argue over myriad factual findings of both the trial court and

Superior Court. Our summary of their arguments is intended to highlight just a few of their contentions.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 25 that the trial court found that she successfully completed anger management and

parenting classes, secured employment, and obtained stable housing. In Mother’s view,

the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that she has utilized the skills that she

learned in her various classes. Mother concedes that she did not satisfy her mental health

treatment goals, but she points out that the record also supports the trial court’s

conclusions that, at various times, she did participate in mental health treatment and she

missed some treatment while fulfilling her goal to sustain gainful employment.

Mother submits that these findings alone are sufficient to support the trial court’s

decision to deny the termination petitions. She contends that, by refusing to substantiate

these findings and instead searching the record for a contrary conclusion, the Superior

Court violated the principles discussed in R.J.T. by failing to apply the abuse-of-discretion

standard of review and substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. Yet, as Mother

observes, the Superior Court was in no position to reassess the case on a cold record.

Building on this premise, Mother further insists that the record supports the trial

court’s conclusions concerning her positive interactions with the Children during

supervised visits. For example, ample hearing testimony established, inter alia, that the

Children greet Mother with hugs and kisses and that she engages with the Children,

appropriately disciplines them, and comforts them when they become upset while leaving

from visits. In addition, Mother suggests that, to the extent that the trial court credited her

testimony over that of Agency Caseworker, Ms. Oddis, the decision was warranted given

the few visits that Ms. Oddis had with the family. Indeed, Mother submits that the

Agency’s evidence carried little weight in total given the dearth of direct observation of

the family by the Agency’s various witnesses.

Mother also shares her view that the trial court’s conclusions regarding the

Children’s best interests are supported by the record. In this regard, Mother believes that

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 26 the trial court appropriately determined that the Children have a strong bond with her and

that severing that bond could cause harm to the Children. Mother submits that, had the

three Superior Court judges been the trial court judge in this case, they may have

reasonably reached the conclusion that termination was appropriate. However, Mother

maintains that, because the Superior Court was acting as a reviewing court, it erred by

substituting its judgment for that of the trial court and overlooking that the trial court

implicitly resolved a number of testimonial conflicts in her favor.

The thrust of the Agency’s argument is that the Superior Court correctly concluded

that the Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that the requirements set forth

in 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(8) and 2511(b) were met and that, therefore, termination of

Mother’s parental rights was appropriate. In particular, the Agency advocates that the

Superior Court correctly concluded that: (1) the Children had been in the Agency’s

custody for 25 months; (2) the conditions that led to the Children’s removal, most notably

Mother’s mental health problems, continued to exist; and (3) termination of Mother’s

parental rights best serves the needs and welfare of the Children.

The Agency further agrees with the Superior Court’s assessment that termination

of Mother’s parental rights will not sever a necessary and beneficial relationship for the

Children. In support of its position, the Agency refers to the hearing testimony of Ms.

Lorenzo-Hendershot, which we detailed supra. The Agency notes that, in finding that the

Children have a meaningful bond with Mother, the trial court relied solely on Mother’s

testimony, which conflicted with Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot’s testimony. According to the

Agency, the trial court neglected to resolve this, and other, conflicts in testimony.

The Agency also builds on its stance that the Superior Court appropriately

determined that the trial court erred as a matter of law on several occasions. For example,

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 27 the Agency contends that the trial court made clear that it considered Mother’s post-

termination petition conduct in denying the Agency’s termination petitions. Trial Court

Opinion, 2/10/2020, at 27. However, the Agency argues, because consideration of this

conduct is prohibited, the Superior Court correctly concluded that the trial court erred in

this regard. Agency’s Brief at 19-20 (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) (“With respect to any

petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.”)).

In addition, the Agency reminds the Court that permanency is the ultimate goal for

the Children and that they have been in a stable kinship foster care home for nearly two

years. Although the Agency concedes that a future termination proceeding could occur,

it urges this Court to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment, as all of the statutory

requirements have been met and the Children should not linger in placement on the

speculative hope that Mother can one day care for them.

In sum, the Agency avers that the Superior Court acted within its standard of review

by reversing the trial court. The Agency explains that, because the trial court made legal

errors and factual findings that were not supported by the record, the Superior Court

properly concluded that the trial court’s order could not withstand appellate scrutiny. The

Agency firmly rejects the notion that this matter constituted a “close case” and contends

that the Superior Court in no way substituted its judgment for that of the trial court.

B. Analysis.

On multiple occasions, this Court has acknowledged that parents enjoy a

fundamental constitutional right to raise their children as they deem fit. See, e.g., Hiller

v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 883 (Pa. 2006) (explaining that the United States Supreme

Court has “recognized the existence of a constitutionally protected right of parents to

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 28 make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”) (referring

primarily to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.

57 (2000)). The involuntary termination of a parent’s rights to a child obviously constitutes

a state’s most extreme and permanent measure of interfering with that right.

Consequently, and as previously noted, any party seeking this remedy must prove by

clear and convincing evidence that termination of a parent’s rights is warranted pursuant

to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.11 In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

As noted throughout this opinion, appellate review of an order granting or denying

a petition to terminate involuntarily a person’s parental rights is limited. An appellate court

is required to accept a trial court’s finding of facts and credibility determinations if they are

supported by the record. Id. at 267. If the trial court’s factual conclusions are supported

by the record, then the appellate court can examine whether the trial court abused its

discretion in entering its order. Id. Concerning the central principles at issue here, a trial

court’s order “may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Importantly, an appellate court should not reverse a trial court’s

order merely because the record would support a result contrary to that reached by the

trial court. Id. Further, and perhaps most significant to the instant matter, this Court has

repeatedly “emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.” Id. (citing R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190).

The Agency sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§§ 2511(a)(5) and (8). Both of these provisions require the party seeking termination to

prove that “the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to

11 “The standard of ‘clear and convincing’ evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 29 exist.” Here, several conditions prompted the Agency to remove the Children from

Mother’s custody: (1) the potential abuse of Younger Son; (2) Mother’s struggles with

parenting and disciplining the Children; (3) Mother’s mental health issues; (4) Mother’s

difficulty managing her anger; (5) T.H. abusing Mother; (6) housing concerns; and (7)

Mother’s inability to sustain gainful employment.

To reunify with the Children, Mother was tasked with meeting a laundry list of goals

that even the most competent and dedicated of parents would struggle to accomplish.

Mother was required to complete the following: (1) mental health treatment; (2) parenting

instruction; (3) life skills classes; (4) anger management counseling; (5) obtain stable

housing; (5) secure employment; and (6) address domestic violence and abuse issues.

After observing all of the witnesses testify at the termination hearing, the trial court

concluded that “many of the conditions which led to [the Children’s] removal no longer

exist[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 2/10/2020, at 23.

As we discussed above, the trial court was persuaded that, since the Children have

been removed from Mother’s care, she has: (1) participated in mental health treatment;

(2) completed parenting instruction and anger management classes; (3) lived with her

mother, grandmother, and Younger Daughter while beginning to search for independent

housing; (4) secured gainful employment; (5) gathered insight into how to parent the

Children; and (6) demonstrated that she has been able to incorporate some of her learned

skills during visitations with the Children, e.g., she cooks for them, disciplines them, and

plays with them. Id. at 23-24. According to the court, “[b]ut for the fact that Mother has

not attended therapy sessions recently with a mental health professional because her

work schedule allows her little time, none of the conditions that led to the removal and

placement of the children continue to exist.” Id. at 24.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 30 In reversing the trial court, the Superior Court focused almost exclusively on

Mother’s inability to rid herself of mental health problems in concluding that the conditions

that led to the Children’s removal continue to exist.12 Memorandum at 20 (“Furthermore,

the conditions which led to removal, Mother’s mental health problems, still exist.”). The

Superior Court was mistaken in this regard. Indeed, utilizing the proper standard of

review, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that the conditions

that led to the removal of the Children no longer exist.

Unlike the Superior Court, the trial court correctly identified that several conditions,

not just Mother’s mental health issues, led to the removal of the Children from Mother’s

custody. Trial Court Opinion, 2/10/2020, at 23-24. Further, evidence of record fully

supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mother successfully addressed these conditions.

It is undisputed that Mother completed anger management and parenting classes and

that, at least to some significant degree, she has been able to translate those learned

skills to parenting the Children. For example, as noted above, Ms. Oddis testified that

Mother rarely, if ever, yells at the Children and, instead, appropriately disciplines them

when they misbehave. N.T., 1/16/2020, at 18-19.

It also is indisputable that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mother obtained

gainful employment and stable housing. In addition, the record supports the trial court’s

determination that Mother adequately addressed issues of domestic violence and abuse

by severing her relationship with T.H. For instance, Ms. Lorenzo-Hendershot testified

that T.H. no longer has any involvement with Mother, id. at 91, and Mother’s testimony

confirmed this fact, id. at 143.

12 The Agency’s position suffers from a similarly narrow focus. See, e.g., Agency’s Brief at 19 (“The conditions that led to Children's removal, most notably Mother’s mental health concerns, continued to exist.”).

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 31 Regarding Mother’s mental health status, it is true that she did not complete her

treatment goals or fully recover from her mental health challenges. However, as we

documented above, the record undeniably supports the trial court’s conclusion that

Mother participated in some mental health treatment. In addition, the trial court’s opinion

makes clear that the court implicitly credited Mother’s testimony that her inability to

complete or engage fully in her mental health treatment was due in part to her current full-

time employment and schedule related thereto. If, as the Agency currently advances,

Mother’s mental health treatment was the principle condition precedent in reuniting the

Children with her, then Mother’s goals should have been pared down and prioritized to

allow her to focus on and accomplish that goal.13

Before summarizing our conclusion, we pause to address the Agency’s

contentions regarding the role that concurrent planning has played in this family’s

experience. “[C]oncurrent planning ‘is a dual-track system under which child welfare

service agencies provide services to parents to enable their reunification with their

children, while also planning for alternative permanent placement should reunification

fail.’” In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1183 (quoting In re Adoption of S.E.G., 901 A.2d 1017, 1019

(Pa. 2006)).

According to the Agency, it chose not to pursue a goal change from reunification

with Mother to adoption in this case, electing instead to utilize concurrent planning.

Agency’s Brief at 14. The Agency submits that, by choosing this course, it was able to

offer the family reunification services and allow the Children’s primary goal to remain

reunification. Id. However, the Agency further asserts that, “[u]nder concurrent planning,

13 Indeed, the record strongly suggests that Mother may have met her mental health goals

had she sacrificed her employment. We find it irreconcilable that the Agency demanded Mother’s attendance at her employment and mental health treatment, when the time for completing these tasks occurred simultaneously.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 32 an [a]gency is not then required to pursue reunification only and further delay a child’s

permanency outcome.” Id. at 16.

In our respectful view, the Agency’s actions failed to adhere to the fundamental

tenets of concurrent planning by unilaterally cutting in half Mother’s contact with the

Children when it decided to file petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights. As the trial

court adeptly observed, the Agency simply “presumed that termination would be granted

and began to withdraw services aimed toward reunification of the family unit.” Trial Court

Opinion, 2/10/2020, at 26. When a child’s goal is reunification with his or her parent,

unless and until a trial court finds merit to a termination petition, concurrent planning

requires that an agency continue to provide appropriate reunification services to the family

while pursuing potential termination of parental rights. Otherwise, as here, the agency

risks that the trial court will deny the termination petition, causing the decrease in services

to impede further a parent’s chances of regaining custody of his or her child and,

importantly, failing to serve a child welfare agency’s core mission of protecting children’s

best interests.

VIII. Conclusion.

Termination of parental rights is among the most powerful legal remedies that the

judicial system possesses. The decision to sever permanently a parent’s relationship

with a child is often bound up in complex factual scenarios involving difficult family

dynamics and multiple service providers. Our trial courts are tasked with carefully

considering and weighing all of the evidence presented at termination hearings in

determining whether the petitioning party has met its burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that termination meets the exacting standards outlined in the

Adoption Act.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 33 Because trial courts are on the front lines assessing the credibility of witnesses

and weighing competing and often challenging evidence, it is paramount that, in reviewing

trial courts’ decisions in this arena, appellate courts defer to trial courts’ first-hand

observations as they relate to factual determinations. In this regard, we reiterate that

appellate courts must review such decisions for an abuse of discretion or error of law,

and appellate courts may reverse trial courts only when that discretion has been breached

or when the law has been misapplied. In other words, an appellate court should review

the certified record to decide whether it supports the trial court’s order, regardless of

whether the appellate court agrees with the result that the trial court reached.

In the instant matter, we respectfully conclude that the Superior Court exceeded

its standard of review. Rather than examining the record to determine whether it supports

the trial court’s conclusion that the various conditions that led to the Children’s removal

from Mother’s custody no longer continue to exist, the intermediate court focused

exclusively on one condition that led to the Children’s removal, i.e., Mother’s mental

health issues, and searched the record to support its view that Mother has failed to

address this condition adequately. Because the Superior Court erred by substituting its

judgment for that of the trial court, we vacate the Superior Court’s judgment and reinstate

the trial court’s order.

Justices Saylor, Todd, Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht and Mundy join the opinion.

[J-41A-2021 and J-41B-2021] - 34