In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-24-00381-CV ________________
IN THE INTEREST OF S.D.T. and S.D.T. ________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 3 Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 23-10-15339-CV ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor children,
Sally and Sam 1 (collectively “the children”). The trial court found, by clear and 0 F
convincing evidence, that statutory grounds exist for termination of Mother’s
parental rights and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best
interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (O), (2). In five issues,
Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the
1To protect the identity of the children, we use pseudonyms to refer to the
children and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 1 predicate grounds and the best interest finding, and complains that she received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
As more fully discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s Order of
Termination as to Mother.
Background and Facts Leading to Removal
In March 2023, the Department of Family and Protective Services (“the
Department”) filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Sally and
Sam. 2 The Department supported its petition with the affidavit of its investigator, 1 F
Tameshia Copeland (“Copeland”). Copeland’s affidavit set out the information
leading to the children’s removal.
According to Copeland’s affidavit, the Department received an initial referral
alleging the neglectful supervision of the children. Mother, Sally, and Sam were
residing at the Crisis Center shelter (the “shelter”), and Sally and Sam were left
unaccompanied after Mother was involuntarily admitted to a mental health facility.
Mother stated that she was born in Ethiopia and was a pop star. Mother presented
two different identities at the shelter and had no identification for Sally and Sam.
Mother signed a childcare contract allowing an adult at the shelter to care for Sally
and Sam; however, for legal reasons, the children could not remain at the facility.
2The alleged Father was included in the termination suit; however, he did not
appeal the termination of his parental rights to Sally and Sam, and he is not a party to this appeal. 2 The Department contacted the relative who Mother listed as an emergency
contact at the shelter. Mother’s relative indicated that Mother stayed at her home for
a few days, and then stayed at a motel before asking to be brought to the shelter.
Mother’s relative indicated that Mother has thought she was Megan Thee Stallion,
Nicki Minaj, and others. Mother’s relative further confirmed that she would like
Sally and Sam to be placed with her; however, she was not an option after a review
of her “CPI history and her criminal history.” The Department contacted several
other family members for possible placement, but none were willing to care for the
children.
The Department contacted the facility were Mother was being treated and was
informed that Mother was admitted under the name “Queen.” Mother was not
admitted under her legal name but under a different identity that she was claiming.
Mother stated that her family members were in the United Kingdom, and she needed
to contact the Royal family. Mother tried to contact two relatives to care for the
children but neither answered the phone. Mother stated that she did not want her
children in foster care and asked that they be transported to another relative for 24
to 72 hours. Mother would not give the Department permission to transport the
children to her relative since her relative does not drive at night. The affidavit
outlined many of Mother’s other claims including that she was married to or
involved with various rappers, she had thirty kids, and she was born blind and deaf.
3 The affidavit explained that Mother insisted her name was Queen and
repeatedly denied her legal identity. Mother’s relative informed the shelter that
Mother was once on medication but has been off it for a while. The shelter later
convinced Mother to go to Texana Behavioral Health Care Clinic (“Texana”) for a
medical checkup. During intake, Mother reiterated the same claims regarding her
identity but began to “shut down” once she realized the visit was more about her
mental health rather than a medical checkup. The therapist from the shelter
accompanied Mother to Texana, and she informed the intake worker that Mother
was fine with her children and that there were no concerns of her abusing or
neglecting them. The therapist relayed that Mother did not exhibit violent or
aggressive behavior. The therapist indicated there was a concern that Mother was
incapable of taking care of the children once she left the shelter. It was determined
at the end of the assessment that Mother should be admitted.
The investigator noted that she interviewed Mother at Sun Behavioral
Hospital. During the interview, Mother claimed it all started when she was in college
and received a call that Child Protective Services (“CPS”) had her children. Mother
said she sued the girl who had her kids and that she had to come from England to get
verification from the judge. Mother relayed that President Trump, President Obama,
and Congress had to get involved, that her name is Queen, and she is married to a
rapper who adopted her children. Mother stated that she was married to Prince Harry
4 and that King Charles is the father of the children. Mother denied her legal name,
claimed her social security number was stolen, and in addition to Sally and Sam,
claimed that she is the mother of several royal family members. Mother stated that
her mother died during childbirth, her dad works for the government, that she has a
twin sister, that she was born deaf and blind, that she had a heart transplant, and then
began talking about suing caseworkers and a judge and winning a settlement because
she is also a judge.
The affidavit explained that Mother was brought to Sun Behavioral Hospital
involuntarily by law enforcement, and Mother’s drug tests were negative. As a result
of Mother’s hospitalization and the shelter being unable to keep the children, the
Department took emergency custody before a court order on March 24, 2023.
The affidavit described Mother’s prior CPS history. Her history included
allegations of neglectful supervision, which were ruled out on four occasions, ruled
“reason to believe” twice, and on one occasion the children were removed. Mother
had four class B misdemeanor convictions for possession of marijuana, theft of
property, and driving with an invalid license.
Trial Evidence
Officer Michael Moote
Officer Michael Moote (“Officer Moote”) testified that he is a licensed peace
officer with the Conroe Police Department. On July 2, 2024, while on patrol, Officer
5 Moote observed Mother make several traffic violations while operating a vehicle
including unsafe lane changes and failure to use a turn signal. Mother was alone in
the vehicle and did not have any government-issued identification, but provided
hospital paperwork, hospital armband, and citation from the Livingston Police
Department with an alias name. Through his investigation, Officer Moote
determined that Mother was not the person identified in the documents she provided.
Using a portable fingerprint scanner, Officer Moote was able to correctly identify
Mother. He then arrested Mother for failing to identify and giving “false fictitious
information.” On cross-examination, Officer Moote explained that once her
fingerprint was associated with a name, dispatch also provided a photo from either
a Texas identification card or driver’s license.
Officer Moote testified that it was very difficult to hold a conversation with
Mother, as she rambled and made little sense. For example, Mother stated that she
had a child every year since the age of five, and she continued to use the alias name
even after Officer Moote determined her legal name.
Mother
Mother testified that her name was an alias, “Alyssa Michelle Stephens,”
which is not her legal name. Mother acknowledged that Sally and Sam are her
children. Mother stated that she was the music artists Beyonce and Cardi B, and her
appearance changes. Mother testified that she has been self-employed over fifteen
6 or twenty years working for RSDA Records writing books, music, and poems and
making movies. She claimed to have made over a billion dollars last year. She
understood that her children are in the Department’s custody but denied leaving them
unattended at the shelter. According to Mother, she left the children at a day care
with the shelter’s “day care lady,” whose name she does not recall.
Mother acknowledged that the Department provided her with a service plan,
and she claimed she completed the plan including being evaluated by a psychologist,
although she could provide no documentation showing that. She did not have a
residence, was living at a hotel, and claimed to have other properties in Texas.
Mother denied ever using substances and denied ever being arrested for or pleading
guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The State presented Mother’s October
2023 Judgment of Conviction for possession of a controlled substance to the trial
judge, showing she pled guilty for an offense that occurred on September 17, 2023.
When asked if she had seen the children more than once in the past year,
Mother stated that she saw them several times but went into a coma. According to
Mother, she was born blind, mute, and deaf, and had to go to a facility when she
went blind. Mother testified she required therapy because she was raped. Mother
also testified that she has bone cancer, breast cancer, and stomach cancer, and is
receiving chemo treatments and was prescribed prescription marijuana. Mother
acknowledged that it was important for someone with health or mental issues to
7 receive treatment to care for their children, and without treatment, it could be
potentially dangerous for their children. Mother stated that she was sent to a facility
to verify her birth name, age, and occupation, but she was then sent home. Mother
denied needing help with her mental health.
For the two days before trial, Mother was renting a bed from someone at
Studio 6 hotel in Conroe. Before that, she stayed at another hotel for nineteen days,
and before that, she was in jail. Before jail, Mother said she lived between the
Salvation Army and an address she did not know, although she claimed that as her
residence.
On cross-examination, Mother stated that she was the children’s sole provider
from birth until the Department removed them. Mother testified that CPS came to
her home looking for a female with the same first name as her legal name, and
although CPS checked on the children they were not removed. According to Mother,
the Department helped to get their birth certificates, music contracts, social security
numbers, and helped the family relocate.
According to Mother, she went to the shelter and was sent to the hospital to
get information, but she acknowledged that she did not go to the hospital voluntarily.
Mother testified that she had an agreement with a lady in the shelter to watch the
children while she was at the hospital. Mother stated that while at the shelter, no one
questioned how she cared for the children. Mother believed she could take care of
8 the children but stated she needed help getting the proper documents regarding her
finances. Mother reiterated that she completed everything that the Department asked
of her.
Mother testified that in addition to Sally and Sam, her children are Princess
Charlotte and others fathered by Prince Harry, Prince Charles, and rappers. She
stated that she and her kids lived at “Kingston Palace.” Mother also stated that she
was not born black, but she darkened her skin color.
According to Mother, if a relative has the children, it is because the children’s
father gave them to her even though she is not a relative. Mother stated that if she
felt the need to talk to a psychologist, then she would, but right now she is dealing
with racial issues and “a lot of discrimination.” Mother does not believe that she
needs any mental health help right now.
Samantha Causey
Samantha Causey (“Causey”) is an investigator with the Department, and she
had been involved in Mother’s case since May 2022, when she visited Mother and
the children at an apartment. During that initial visit, Mother denied her legal name
and provided an alias before threatening to call the police and file a restraining order
on Causey. Once a police officer arrived, Causey “reengaged” with Mother over the
phone, but Mother stated that the FBI was on her case, and she refused to meet with
Causey without a police officer and her attorney.
9 Causey was eventually able to go inside Mother’s home and as a result,
Mother was detained so Causey could interview the children. Causey noted that the
home was messy but had lights, utilities, and working appliances. The children were
eating McDonald’s on the floor. Throughout this time, Mother claimed to be Kate
Middleton, Halle Berry, the mother of Prince Archie and Prince William, and that
she is a member of the royal family. The children seemed okay, although Causey
could not understand Sam’s speech very well. Causey testified she was concerned
about Mother’s mental health because she did not seem to understand who she was
and the impact it would have on the children. She explained that “the children were
living in that environment with the mother on a daily basis and her mental health
was influencing their daily lives.” Causey noted that Mother believed and was telling
the children they were royal family members, and Causey felt that could impact the
children’s mental health and development. Causey stated that leaving the children
unattended at a shelter would be a concern and a reason for removal of the children
by the Department.
Causey testified that she contacted Mother on two occasions, the children’s
general appearance was fine, and she did not observe marks or bruises on them. To
Causey’s knowledge, Mother was the children’s sole caregiver. Causey did not have
any concerns necessitating removal of the children. The children were four and five
years old; they had clothes and food in the apartment but were not enrolled in school.
10 After her visit, Causey applied for court-ordered services with the Department, but
it was denied.
Tawanna Anderson
Tawanna Anderson (“Anderson”) was a caseworker assigned to Mother’s case
from October or November 2023 to June 2024. Anderson’s review of Mother’s file
revealed Mother had not completed any assignments on her service plan, and Mother
stated that she would talk to her attorney about the plan. Anderson testified that it
was always difficult to contact Mother when requesting that she take a drug test,
Mother always said to go through her attorney, and Anderson never received any of
Mother’s drug test results. Mother never provided information on where she was
living or evidence she was working. While Anderson was the caseworker, the
children were in foster care and there was no visitation between Mother and the
children. Anderson explained that when she contacted Mother to schedule a visit,
Mother requested a time approximately six weeks away, but was incarcerated before
the visit occurred.
According to Anderson, Mother denied her legal name, which concerned her.
Anderson believed Mother had mental health issues, which her service plan would
have addressed, but Mother did not complete the plan. During Anderson’s time as
the caseworker, Mother did not demonstrate that she was able to provide the children
a safe environment.
11 Anderson acknowledged that she never met Mother nor arranged to meet
Mother outside of the courtroom. Anderson stated that although Mother did a
psychological evaluation in another county, Mother did not complete any tasks while
she was the caseworker. Anderson testified that Mother’s phone was out of service
at times, and she spoke with Mother to set up visitation with the children. In total,
Anderson spoke with Mother twice in-person in the courtroom, never spoke to her
over the phone, but she did exchange text messages with her. Anderson has never
spoken with the alleged father and does not know who he is.
Maria Reza-Day
Maria Reza-Day (“Reza-Day”) was the assigned caseworker on Mother’s case
from May to September 2023. Mother’s family plan of service indicated that she was
to participate in psychiatric services for her mental health and follow all
recommendations of her doctor, including taking medications. Reza-Day testified
that Mother completed a psychosocial evaluation through Heart to Heart, but that is
not a psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychosocial evaluation was
reviewed, and it stated that on the day Mother was evaluated, Mother “was floridly
psychotic and would not be able to care for her children appropriately due to very
poor reality testing.” After her psychosocial evaluation, inpatient psychiatric care
was recommended for Mother.
12 Based on the results, Reza-Day spoke with Mother about receiving inpatient
treatment, and Mother said she would go on her own to Sun Behavioral. Reza-Day
lost communication with Mother but when located, Mother stated that she did not
go to Sun Behavioral because she did not have identification. Reza-Day located
facilities that would take Mother but when contacted, Mother responded that she was
sick. In later calls, Mother represented that she was sick or moving around. Reza-
Day never received confirmation that Mother went to a psychiatric hospital, so
Mother did not complete her service plan while she was the caseworker.
The plan also required that Mother complete a parenting class and take drug
tests. Reza-Day never received a parenting class certificate from Mother, and
although Mother was sent for drug tests, she did not appear for testing. The plan
required that Mother complete a substance abuse assessment and individual
counseling, but neither provider could contact her for scheduling. From May through
September, Reza-Day was aware of Mother visiting the children twice. The notes
from the visit indicate that Mother did not interact with the children much. Mother
also refused visits in June and July, and did not participate in visits in August 2023.
During Reza-Day’s time on Mother’s case, Mother stated that she lived in an
apartment complex, a hotel, and that she was between homes.
Documents regarding Mother’s initial permanency conference were presented
to Reza-Day, and she did not dispute evidence that Mother participated in the initial
13 permanency conference. Reza-Day recalled that she met with Mother in
Montgomery County to go over the tasks in the plan. Reza-Day did not receive an
evaluation report from the physician that was appointed to conduct Mother’s
psychological or psychiatric evaluation, and she does not know if Mother had an
evaluation. Reza-Day is not aware of Mother completing the substance abuse
assessment, but she does not dispute any evidence that Mother went to an
assessment. It was later clarified that the document regarding a drug screening was
for a DNA test to determine maternity.
During Reza-Day’s time on the case, Mother went by multiple names. She
recalled Queen as one of the names and stated that Mother would get angry if called
by her legal name. Also during her time, the children were placed with a relative in
Montgomery County and doing well. Reza-Day did not know the father of the
Reza-Day believed that Mother had mental health issues because when they
spoke, Mother would say she had record deals, she referred to her attorney as her
immigration attorney, she continued to ask her attorney ad litem about her
immigration, she said someone stole her identity, and she said that she was a record
producer. She believed Mother had a substance abuse issue because Mother admitted
to the use of marijuana. Reza-Day did not attempt to verify if Mother worked in the
music industry or if she went to the police to obtain documents. During her time on
14 Mother’s case, Reza-Day did not see evidence that Mother was able to care for the
children, and she did not have stable housing, provide check stubs from employment,
or have a driver’s license or identification.
Cassie Beals
Cassie Beals (“Beals”) has been the conservatorship caseworker on Mother’s
case since June 2024. Beals testified that she has not seen any evidence or reports of
service that Mother has completed. Beals stated that since she has been on the case,
Mother had only one visit with the children on August 20, 2024. According to Beals,
she was concerned with some of Mother’s statements to the children. Beals testified
that Mother was adamant that the children know their real identities; she referred to
them as Prince Sam and Princess Sally, and she told them that she was suing the
Department for providing false documentation of their true royal titles. Mother also
stated that the term Prince and Princess is on the children’s birth certificate.
Beals stated that she feels termination is in the children’s best interest given
Mother’s mental health and inability to provide a safe and stable home environment.
Beals has no information regarding where Mother is living, and Mother has not
provided Beals any pay stubs. Beals testified that the plan is to transition the children
to an adoptive home.
15 Tamara Adams
Tamara Adams (“Adams”) has been the CASA advocate on Mother’s case
since November 2023. Adams has visited the children and described Sally as “very
girly” and “sweet,” and Sam as a “sweet boy.” Sally has some behavioral issues,
such as food hoarding, that are being addressed in therapy.
Adams explained that a scheduled visit in July was cancelled because they
learned that Mother was incarcerated on the day of the visit. Mother visited with the
children on the Friday before trial, and Adams was concerned with what Mother said
to the children. According to Adams, Mother told the children that she had houses
in California, she was working to get their paperwork and birth certificates, and she
planned to have them stay with her parents. Adams was concerned because Mother’s
statements were not true and could affect the children’s reality and identity. Adams
believes it is in the children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights and
allow adoption because Mother is unable to care for them in a stable and safe
environment.
Adams testified that she has had contact with Mother in court and by text and
telephone. Adams said that she facilitated the first scheduled visit but has not talked
with Mother about helping her with other services that CASA could provide. Other
than Mother’s comments to the children, her visit with the children was appropriate,
and the children were excited to see her. Adams is unaware of the children’s current
16 placement wanting to adopt either child. Placement of the children with their
maternal grandmother is not an option because she is deceased, and Adams has not
looked into placement of the children with another family. The children are no longer
placed with a maternal great aunt because the great aunt was also raising Mother’s
other four children. Adams has no knowledge of Mother working and she does not
know where Mother is living.
Adams believes it is in the children’s best interest to terminate the parental
rights of Mother and the father.
The Termination Order
After the bench trial, the trial court signed a final order terminating Mother’s
parental rights to the children. The trial court found that the Department had shown,
by clear and convincing evidence, that it was in the children’s best interest for
Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). The trial court
also found that the Department had shown by clear and convincing evidence grounds
for termination of Mother’s parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (O).
See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (O). The trial court found that Mother had engaged
in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct
which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children; she
constructively abandoned the children under section 161.001(b)(1)(N); and she
failed to comply with the court-ordered service plan. See id.
17 Mother appealed the trial court’s order and argued the evidence was legally
and factually insufficient to support termination under sections 161.001(b)(1)(E),
(N), (O), and (2). Mother further argues that she received ineffective assistance of
counsel which resulted in an improper result.
Standard of Review
Termination of parental rights requires proof by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. § 161.001(b). Under the Family Code, “‘[c]lear and convincing
evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the
trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established.” Id. § 101.007; see In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005) (citation
omitted). The movant must show that the parent committed one or more predicate
acts or omissions and that the termination is in the child’s best interest. See Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 84.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a parental rights
termination case, we must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief
or conviction that the finding was true. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344–45 (Tex.
2009) (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). We assume the
factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder
could do so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have
18 disbelieved. Id. In a factual sufficiency review, we “give due consideration to
evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and
convincing.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25
(Tex. 2002)). We must determine “‘whether the evidence is such that a factfinder
could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s
allegations.’” Id. (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25). “If, in light of the entire
record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in
favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have
formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id.
(citation omitted). In cases tried to the bench, the trial court in its role as factfinder
determines the credibility and weight of the witnesses’ testimony and resolves any
inconsistencies or conflicts in the evidence. See Webb v. Crawley, 590 S.W.3d 570,
578 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2019, no pet.). We defer to the factfinder’s credibility
determinations as long as they are not unreasonable. See In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d
570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 625 (Tex.
2004)).
Analysis
Predicate Grounds
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination
under section 161.001(b)(1)(E). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
19 Under subsection (E), the Department had the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Mother “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
children with persons who engaged in conduct” that endangered their physical or
emotional well-being. Id.
Generally, a parent’s conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and
instability has engaged in conduct that endangers their child’s physical and
emotional well-being. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 n.4 (collecting cases).
That said, proof of endangerment requires “more than a threat of metaphysical injury
or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment[,]” yet “it is not
necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers
injury.” Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)
(citations omitted). Rather, endangering a child based on the parent’s conduct means
“‘to expose a child to loss or injury’” or to jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical
health. In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at
533). Importantly, the parent’s endangering conduct need not occur in the child’s
presence, so conduct relevant to the factfinder’s decision may include conduct that
occurred before or after the child the subject of the Department’s suit was born. See
J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re B.P., No. 09-22-00031-CV, 2022 WL 2251739, at
*9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Generally, from
evidence of a parent’s past conduct showing the parent subjected a child to a life of
20 uncertainty and instability, a factfinder may infer that the parent will continue to
engage in the conduct and the same conduct will endanger another child’s physical
and emotional safety and well-being. See J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re D.P., No.
09-22-00048-CV, 2022 WL 2975691, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 28, 2022,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
A parent’s mental instability may contribute to a finding that the parent
engaged in a course of conduct that endangered a child’s physical or emotional well-
being. In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no
pet.). A parent’s mental illness or incompetence “alone are not grounds for
terminating a parent-child relationship; however, if a parent’s mental state causes
her to engage in conduct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of a
child, that conduct can support termination under subsection E.” Id. (citations
omitted). Evidence of a parent’s failure to comply with services to improve their
mental health is a factor that the trial court can consider in determining whether a
parent has engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the physical and
emotional well-being of a child. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 365 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). A parent’s untreated mental illness can
expose a child to endangerment, because when a parent fails to take required
medication, the parent can behave erratically and neglect the care of the child. See
In re P.H., 544 S.W.3d 850, 857–58 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.).
21 Here, the evidence shows that Mother and the children were staying at a
shelter when Mother left the children unaccompanied while she was involuntarily
admitted into a mental health facility. Mother’s trial was around eighteen months
after the Department became involved in Mother’s case. Throughout that time,
Mother did not have a permanent place to live and was never able to demonstrate
employment with income. At the time of trial, Mother testified that she was renting
a bed from someone at a hotel. Mother further testified that before the hotel where
she is currently renting a bed, she lived at another hotel, the jail, and the Salvation
Army. At trial, Mother also identified herself by an alias name that she had assumed,
denied her legal name, stated that she is a famous musical artist such as Cardi B and
Beyonce, and claimed that Princess Charlotte and others are her children, and her
children were fathered by Prince Harry, Prince Charles, and rappers.
The evidence at trial further shows that Mother received a service plan from
the Department, and at trial, Mother claimed that she completed the plan including
being evaluated by a psychologist. However, two caseworkers testified at trial that
Mother has not completed the service plan. Caseworker Anderson testified that
Mother was unable to demonstrate that she was able to provide the children a safe
environment and that although Mother did a psychological evaluation in another
county, Mother did not complete any tasks while Anderson was the caseworker.
Caseworker Reza-Day testified that Mother had a psychosocial evaluation by Dr.
22 Stadler, which differs from a psychological or psychiatric evaluation, and it specified
that at the time of the evaluation, Mother was floridly psychotic and unable to care
for the children. The evaluation further recommended that Mother receive inpatient
psychiatric treatment for her mental health, and Mother has failed to do so despite
Caseworker Reza-Day locating an available facility. Dr. Stadler further explained
that Mother’s delusions are very severe, Mother will probably not become stable
quickly, and that Mother will likely have recurring episodes throughout her life.
The record also established that Sally was exhibiting problematic behaviors
like food hoarding and was receiving treatment. Additionally, the record showed that
multiple witnesses testified that Mother’s erratic behavior in the children’s presence
and telling them things that had no basis in reality were a danger to their emotional
mental health and development. Likewise, the record showed that Mother’s
untreated mental illness had led to arrests when she failed to provide accurate
identifying information, which is another example of the instability she exposed her
children to.
The trial court could have reasonably believed that Mother’s abandonment of
the children at the shelter without a caregiver endangered the children’s physical and
emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d at 345; M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 269; Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re D.P., 2022
WL 2975691, at *8; In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d at 14. At that time, Mother left the
23 children unaccompanied when she went to the hospital involuntarily because
workers at the shelter were concerned about Mother’s mental health. The evidence
shows that the Department also had a concern about Mother’s mental health and that
at the time of trial, Mother still had not been mentally evaluated in accordance with
the service plan or received any treatment. Mother’s delusions and failure to receive
treatment for her mental health can endanger the physical and emotional welfare of
the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at
345; M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 269; Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re D.P., 2022 WL
2975691, at *8; In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d at 14. The evidence further showed
that Mother does not have a residence or income to provide the children with a safe
and stable environment.
Having determined that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
support predicate endangerment findings under subsection (E), we need not address
whether the evidence would also support the trial court’s predicate findings of one
or more of subsections (N) or (O), the remaining predicate findings that Mother
challenged in her brief. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (explaining
that a single predicate finding can support termination under prior version of statute);
In re G.M.S., No. 09-24-00207-CV, 2024 WL 4643302, at *8 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Oct. 31, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (explaining that if evidence is
24 sufficient to support single predicate finding under D or E, we need not address other
predicate grounds). We overrule Mother’s first issue.
Best Interest
Next, we address Mother’s argument that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s best interest finding. With respect to the
child’s best interest, there is a strong presumption that the best interest of a child is
served by keeping the child with the parent. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(b); In
re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). Even so, it is also presumed “the prompt
and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is…in the child’s best
interest.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a).
In reviewing a parent’s challenge to a best interest finding and when
considering the non-exclusive factors outlined in Holley v. Adams, “courts focus on
the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent.” In re H.M.R.J., No.
09-22-00171-CV, 2022 WL 17001955, at *9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 17, 2022,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted); see Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–
72 (Tex. 1976). Additionally, the Department is not required to present evidence
addressing all the Holley factors. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The fact that the
Department does not present evidence on some factors does not preclude the trier of
fact from forming a strong belief or conviction that terminating the parent’s
25 relationship with the child is in a child’s best interest, particularly when the evidence
is undisputed that the parent endangered the child. See id.
In a best interest analysis, the evidence supporting a trial court’s subsection
(E) finding may also support the trial court’s best interest finding. In re T.R.S., No.
09-18-00482-CV, 2019 WL 2455273, at *5 (Tex. App. —Beaumont June 13, 2019,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that the same evidence that supports a trial court’s
subsection (E) findings may be relevant to the trial court’s best interest finding). A
trial court’s best interest finding may be based on direct or circumstantial evidence,
or it may be based on subjective factors that the trial court may have observed in the
trial. Id. at *4. When evaluating what is best for a child’s future, trial courts may
consider a parent’s past conduct when that conduct is relevant to the child’s best
interest. Id. Ultimately, the question is whether the evidence when considered as a
whole allowed the trial court to reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that it
was in the children’s best interest for the trial court to terminate Mother’s parental
relationship with Sally and Sam. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25, 27–28. The trial
court was free to infer from the evidence that Mother’s mental health issues were
longstanding and persisted after the children were born. For example, the trial court
heard testimony that Mother failed to obtain treatment for her mental health during
the pendency of this case even though she was required to do so in the service plan.
The plan also required that Mother be gainfully and fully employed, provide proof
26 to the Department of her finances, and obtain and maintain a safe and stable home
When they testified, both the CASA advocate and a caseworker expressed
concerns about whether the children would be safe were they placed in Mother’s
care considering Mother’s untreated mental health. Mother provided the trial court
with no evidence that she could provide the children a safe and stable home. The
record shows that Mother is unemployed, has no permanent residence, and no
evidence that she has been treated for her mental health issues.
“While parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute.”
Id. at 28. Given Mother’s mental health history, the trial court could have reasonably
formed a firm belief or conviction that terminating Mother’s parental rights so that
the children could be permanently placed in a safe home where their needs can be
met is in their best interest. See id. at 27–28. We overrule Mother’s fourth issue.
Ineffective Assistance
In her fifth issue, Mother complains that she received ineffective assistance of
counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the timeliness of the adversary hearing
that was continued four times. According to Mother, trial counsel not only failed to
object to the timeliness of the adversary hearing, but also failed to file a mandamus.
Mother argues that she was prejudiced by the errors committed by her trial counsel
27 such that the trial court either lost jurisdiction or the children should have been
returned to Mother upon the expiration of the deadline.
Claims that trial counsel provide ineffective assistance in cases involving
termination of parental rights are governed by the two-prong test stated in Strickland
v. Washington. See 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 73 (Tex.
2021); In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544–45 (Tex. 2003). Under the Strickland test,
the complaining party must show: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, which
means counsel made errors so egregious that they were not functioning as
“‘counsel’” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the complaining party such that there is a reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings
would have been different. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687); see also In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d at 73.
When evaluating trial counsel’s performance, we indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable,
professional assistance, which includes trial strategy. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (other citations omitted). An appellant has the
burden to overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
conduct might be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689
(citation omitted). If the record is silent about the reasons for counsel’s actions, we
28 do not speculate to find ineffective assistance of counsel. See In re A.S., No. 09-21-
00142-CV, 2021 WL 5113817, at *11 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 4, 2021, pet.
denied) (mem. op.); see also Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs.,
312 S.W.3d 608, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (citation
omitted). “Any claim of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in the record
and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the ineffectiveness.” In re S.M.T., 241
S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (citation omitted).
The trial court does not lose jurisdiction if it fails to timely conduct the
adversary hearing. Instead, the remedy for the parents and the Department is to
compel the trial court by mandamus to conduct the adversary hearing promptly. In
re J.M.C., 109 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); In re E.D.L.,
105 S.W.3d 679, 687 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). Therefore, without
addressing whether counsel acted competently, we hold that Mother failed to show
she was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to seek return of the children on the basis
that there was no adversary hearing within the fourteen-day window.
The evidence also indicates that at the time the adversary hearing was
extended, Mother claimed that another woman was the birth mother of the children.
During the time of Mother’s assertion, the trial court removed the attorney appointed
for Mother and appointed an attorney to represent the alleged birth mother. The trial
court then ordered genetic testing on both Mother and the alleged birth mother to
29 determine the maternity of the children. The genetic testing results indicated that
Mother was the birth mother of the children. At the adversary hearing, the trial court
found that Mother and the alleged birth mother are the same person. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude that the extension and delay in conducting the adversary
hearing was to determine the maternity of the children. We overrule Mother’s fifth
issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Mother’s issues necessary to the appeal’s disposition, we
affirm the trial court’s termination order.
AFFIRMED.
W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice
Submitted on March 12, 2025 Opinion Delivered May 1, 2025
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.