IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0581 Filed June 15, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF S.B. and K.B., Minor Children,
C.S., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Daniel L.
Block, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Linda A. Hall of Linda Hall Law Firm & Mediation Services, P.L.L.C.,
Cedar Falls, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Melissa A. Anderson Seeber of the Juvenile Public Defender’s Office,
Waterloo, for minor children.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ. 2
McDONALD, Judge.
Christine challenges the termination of her parental rights in her children
S.B. and K.B., ages ten and eight, respectively. The juvenile court terminated
Christine’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (f), and
(l) (2015). The standard of review and controlling framework are well-established
and need not be repeated herein. See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa
2016) (stating review is de novo and setting forth the applicable “three-step
inquiry”); In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). We address each of
Christine’s arguments in turn.
Christine contends the Iowa Department of Human Services (IDHS) failed
to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Christine specifically challenges
the denial of family therapy sessions. As part of its ultimate proof, the State must
establish it made reasonable efforts to return the child to the child’s home. See
Iowa Code § 232.102(7) (providing IDHS must make “every reasonable effort to
return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best
interests of the child”); In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). “[T]he
reasonable efforts requirement is not viewed as a strict substantive requirement
of termination. Instead, the scope of the efforts by the [department of human
services] to reunify parent and child after removal impacts the burden of proving
those elements of termination which require reunification efforts.” C.B., 611
N.W.2d at 493. The core of the reasonable efforts mandate is the child welfare
agency must make reasonable efforts to “facilitate reunification while protecting
the child from the harm responsible for the removal.” In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d
343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). The nature of the reasonable efforts mandate is 3
determined by the circumstances of each case. See C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493
(discussing scope of mandate).
We conclude IDHS did make reasonable efforts under the circumstances
to reunify the family. The family was provided with numerous other services,
including, but not limited to: family, safety, risk, and permanency services;
parental skill training; supervised visitation; substance abuse evaluation and
treatment; substance abuse testing; mental health evaluation and treatment;
domestic violence counseling; transportation assistance; family counseling;
family team meetings; and play therapy. The specific family therapy sessions
Christine requested were to be provided at the discretion of the children’s play
therapist. The children’s play therapist invited Christine to call and discuss the
issue and attend the children’s sessions, but Christine did neither. Christine’s
personal therapist testified family therapy would have been helpful, but
Christine’s therapist did not contact the play therapist to recommend the
treatment. The play therapist recommended against family therapy because of
concerns regarding the mother’s inconsistency and the efficacy of the treatment
when the mother had not addressed her personal issues. The decision to not
proceed with family therapy was reasonable under the circumstances, and the
denial of the therapy where the mother had not taken action to ensure the
efficacy of the service does not constitute a failure to make reasonable efforts.
The issue in this case was not the department’s failure to make
reasonable efforts to reunify this family. The issue was Christine’s lack of
engagement in a timely, consistent, or earnest manner with the services provided
to address the issues precipitating removal. Christine has used marijuana and 4
methamphetamine, among other things, since she was nine years old. She has
a long history of unsuccessful participation in substance abuse treatment
programs since that time. During the pendency of this case, Christine was
unsuccessfully discharged from several different substance abuse treatment
programs and left several other substance abuse treatment programs against
medical advice. She missed forty-six of fifty-one drug tests while this case was
pending. On those occasions she did test, she tested positive for controlled
substances, including marijuana and methamphetamine. Christine has a long
history of mental health conditions she was unable to address. She has been
diagnosed with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and
polysubstance abuse. She did not follow her mental health treatment
consistently during the course of this case. The mother started treating with a
therapist in June 2015, almost nine months after the initiation of this case, but her
treatment was inconsistent. The mother missed eleven of twenty-seven
appointments. Christine’s failure to use the services provided defeats her
reasonable efforts claim. See, e.g., In re B.G., No. 15-0732, 2015 WL 5996936,
at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2015) (holding the State established reasonable
efforts where services were provided but the mother did not avail herself of the
services); In re D.L., No. 13-0645, 2013 WL 3458219, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July
10, 2013) (holding the State met its burden in making reasonable efforts where
services were provided but not used); In re B.B., No. 12-0807, 2012 WL
2408714, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 27, 2012) (“Considering the number and
variety of services offered or provided, the delays in or failure of services
attributable to the mother, the age of the child, and the length of time the child 5
has been removed from the mother’s care, we find the State made reasonable
efforts to reunite the mother with her daughter.”).
Christine contends the juvenile court should have deferred permanency in
this case and granted her request for an additional six months’ time to work
toward reunification with her children because of the department’s failure to make
reasonable efforts and provide necessary services. To defer permanency for six
months, the juvenile court must “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or
expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that
the need for removal of the child[ren] from the child[ren]‘s home will no longer
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0581 Filed June 15, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF S.B. and K.B., Minor Children,
C.S., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Daniel L.
Block, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Linda A. Hall of Linda Hall Law Firm & Mediation Services, P.L.L.C.,
Cedar Falls, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Melissa A. Anderson Seeber of the Juvenile Public Defender’s Office,
Waterloo, for minor children.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ. 2
McDONALD, Judge.
Christine challenges the termination of her parental rights in her children
S.B. and K.B., ages ten and eight, respectively. The juvenile court terminated
Christine’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (f), and
(l) (2015). The standard of review and controlling framework are well-established
and need not be repeated herein. See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa
2016) (stating review is de novo and setting forth the applicable “three-step
inquiry”); In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). We address each of
Christine’s arguments in turn.
Christine contends the Iowa Department of Human Services (IDHS) failed
to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Christine specifically challenges
the denial of family therapy sessions. As part of its ultimate proof, the State must
establish it made reasonable efforts to return the child to the child’s home. See
Iowa Code § 232.102(7) (providing IDHS must make “every reasonable effort to
return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best
interests of the child”); In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). “[T]he
reasonable efforts requirement is not viewed as a strict substantive requirement
of termination. Instead, the scope of the efforts by the [department of human
services] to reunify parent and child after removal impacts the burden of proving
those elements of termination which require reunification efforts.” C.B., 611
N.W.2d at 493. The core of the reasonable efforts mandate is the child welfare
agency must make reasonable efforts to “facilitate reunification while protecting
the child from the harm responsible for the removal.” In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d
343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). The nature of the reasonable efforts mandate is 3
determined by the circumstances of each case. See C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493
(discussing scope of mandate).
We conclude IDHS did make reasonable efforts under the circumstances
to reunify the family. The family was provided with numerous other services,
including, but not limited to: family, safety, risk, and permanency services;
parental skill training; supervised visitation; substance abuse evaluation and
treatment; substance abuse testing; mental health evaluation and treatment;
domestic violence counseling; transportation assistance; family counseling;
family team meetings; and play therapy. The specific family therapy sessions
Christine requested were to be provided at the discretion of the children’s play
therapist. The children’s play therapist invited Christine to call and discuss the
issue and attend the children’s sessions, but Christine did neither. Christine’s
personal therapist testified family therapy would have been helpful, but
Christine’s therapist did not contact the play therapist to recommend the
treatment. The play therapist recommended against family therapy because of
concerns regarding the mother’s inconsistency and the efficacy of the treatment
when the mother had not addressed her personal issues. The decision to not
proceed with family therapy was reasonable under the circumstances, and the
denial of the therapy where the mother had not taken action to ensure the
efficacy of the service does not constitute a failure to make reasonable efforts.
The issue in this case was not the department’s failure to make
reasonable efforts to reunify this family. The issue was Christine’s lack of
engagement in a timely, consistent, or earnest manner with the services provided
to address the issues precipitating removal. Christine has used marijuana and 4
methamphetamine, among other things, since she was nine years old. She has
a long history of unsuccessful participation in substance abuse treatment
programs since that time. During the pendency of this case, Christine was
unsuccessfully discharged from several different substance abuse treatment
programs and left several other substance abuse treatment programs against
medical advice. She missed forty-six of fifty-one drug tests while this case was
pending. On those occasions she did test, she tested positive for controlled
substances, including marijuana and methamphetamine. Christine has a long
history of mental health conditions she was unable to address. She has been
diagnosed with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and
polysubstance abuse. She did not follow her mental health treatment
consistently during the course of this case. The mother started treating with a
therapist in June 2015, almost nine months after the initiation of this case, but her
treatment was inconsistent. The mother missed eleven of twenty-seven
appointments. Christine’s failure to use the services provided defeats her
reasonable efforts claim. See, e.g., In re B.G., No. 15-0732, 2015 WL 5996936,
at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2015) (holding the State established reasonable
efforts where services were provided but the mother did not avail herself of the
services); In re D.L., No. 13-0645, 2013 WL 3458219, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July
10, 2013) (holding the State met its burden in making reasonable efforts where
services were provided but not used); In re B.B., No. 12-0807, 2012 WL
2408714, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 27, 2012) (“Considering the number and
variety of services offered or provided, the delays in or failure of services
attributable to the mother, the age of the child, and the length of time the child 5
has been removed from the mother’s care, we find the State made reasonable
efforts to reunite the mother with her daughter.”).
Christine contends the juvenile court should have deferred permanency in
this case and granted her request for an additional six months’ time to work
toward reunification with her children because of the department’s failure to make
reasonable efforts and provide necessary services. To defer permanency for six
months, the juvenile court must “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or
expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that
the need for removal of the child[ren] from the child[ren]‘s home will no longer
exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b).
On de novo review, we conclude an additional six months would not have
obviated the need for removal. The mother has long-lasting, severe, untreated
substance abuse issues and mental health conditions preventing her from
providing adequate care for the children. See, e.g., In re C.M., No. 14-1140,
2015 WL 408187, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2015) (affirming termination of
parental rights where the parents sought more time but evidence established
they were unlikely to resolve their substance abuse problems); In re H.L., No. 14-
0708, 2014 WL 3513262, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jul. 16, 2014) (affirming
termination of parental rights where the father had history of substance abuse);
In re C.L., No. 11-0178, 2011 WL 1781910, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2011)
(holding juvenile court “properly declined to defer permanency” where the father
“was not following through with substance abuse treatment or mental health
services”); In re J.L., No. 02-1968, 2003 WL 21544226, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July
10, 2003) (concluding that relapse of parent despite offer of services supported 6
termination of parental rights); In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App.
1998) (“[I]n considering the impact of a drug addiction, we must consider the
treatment history of the parent to gauge the likelihood that the parent will be in a
position to parent the child in the foreseeable future.”); In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d
909, 915 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that lengthy history of repeated
relapses and guarded prognosis for sobriety supported termination of parental
rights), overruled on other grounds by In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010).
She was long-term unemployed at the time of the termination hearing and had
only recently obtained shelter. While the mother now claims to be ready to
address these long-standing issues, “[w]hat’s past is prologue.” In re K.F., No.
14-0892, 2014 WL 4635463, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2014); see also In re
A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (noting a parent’s past conduct is
instructive in determining future behavior); In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa
1997) (concluding a parent’s past behavior is indicative of the quality of care the
parent is capable of providing in the future).
Christine contends termination of parental rights is not in the children’s
best interests because of the lack of concurrent planning. “The legislature has
categorically determined the needs of a child are promoted by termination of
parental rights if the grounds for termination of parental rights exist.” See In re
L.M.F., 490 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Iowa 1992). However, there is no all-encompassing
best interest standard that can resolve any particular case. The court must look
at the particular facts and circumstances of each case, determining the children's
short-, intermediate-, and long-term best interests. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)
(identifying relevant considerations); In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006) 7
(stating the court must look to immediate and long-term interests). The children
were placed in a preadoptive home. Prior to the termination hearing, the
preadoptive family advised the department of human services they could not
proceed with adoption but could continue to care for the children until a new
family was found. The change in circumstances does not militate in favor of
maintaining the parent-child relationship. The IDHS worker testified the mother
should not be granted additional time even while IDHS searched for a permanent
home for the children because of the mother’s demonstrated inability to care for
the children.
Christine contends the juvenile court should not have terminated her
parental rights due to the closeness of the parent-child bond. Section
232.116(3)(c) provides the court may avoid termination if “there is clear and
convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the
time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Our consideration is
not merely whether there is a parent-child bond, “our consideration must center
on whether the child would be disadvantaged by termination, and whether the
disadvantage overcomes” the mother’s inability to provide for the children's
developing needs. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010); see also Iowa
Code § 232.116(2) (setting forth the factors in determining the child's best
interests). Here, the mother has demonstrated over a long period of time the
inability to care for her children adequately. They have been removed from her
care on two different occasions for long periods of time. The older child told her
foster family, “I don’t feel like I’ve ever really had a mom.” The older child also
said that “she has no life” and just wants a “normal life.” She has waited long 8
enough for that opportunity. “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child
of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section
232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to
provide a stable home for the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41. “It is simply not in
the best interests of children to continue to keep them in temporary foster homes
while the natural parents get their lives together.” A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778.
We affirm the order terminating the mother’s parental rights in her children
S.B. and K.B.