In the Interest of S. L. D.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

In the Interest of S. L. D.

394 So. 2d 1072, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 18838

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 4, 1981

DocketNo. 80-253

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 394 So. 2d 1072 (In the Interest of S. L. D.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

In the Interest of S. L. D., 394 So. 2d 1072, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 18838 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

S.L.D., a juvenile, was charged with robbery. At the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the court announced its finding that the child had committed the lesser included offense of petty larceny.¹ The court then began the disposition process at which point defense counsel reminded the court that Section 39.11(3), Florida Statutes (1979), had the effect of limiting the term of commitment to sixty days since the statute specifies that “[a]ny commitment ... shall not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which an adult may serve for the same offense.”² The court responded by saying, “I’m going to take back what I said,” and proceeded to announce a finding of robbery and an adjudication based thereon. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in reversing itself after it concluded its responsibilities as the trier of fact. We agree and reverse.

It is axiomatic that a sentence can be molded to fit the crime, but the crime cannot be molded to fit the sentence. See Instruction 2.15(a), Florida Standard Jury Instructions (2d ed. 1975). Accordingly, the cause is reversed and remanded with instructions to enter an adjudication of delinquency based upon a finding of petty larceny together with the applicable limitation of Section 39.11(3), Florida Statutes (1979).

MOORE, GLICKSTEIN and HURLEY, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

S.L.D., a juvenile, was charged with robbery. At the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the court announced its finding that the child had committed the lesser included offense of petty larceny.¹ The court then began the disposition process at which point defense counsel reminded the court that Section 39.11(3), Florida Statutes (1979), had the effect of limiting the term of commitment to sixty days since the statute specifies that “[a]ny commitment ... shall not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which an adult may serve for the same offense.”² The court responded by saying, “I’m going to take back what I said,” and proceeded to announce a finding of robbery and an adjudication based thereon. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in reversing itself after it concluded its responsibilities as the trier of fact. We agree and reverse.

It is axiomatic that a sentence can be molded to fit the crime, but the crime cannot be molded to fit the sentence. See Instruction 2.15(a), Florida Standard Jury Instructions (2d ed. 1975). Accordingly, the cause is reversed and remanded with instructions to enter an adjudication of delinquency based upon a finding of petty larceny together with the applicable limitation of Section 39.11(3), Florida Statutes (1979).

MOORE, GLICKSTEIN and HURLEY, JJ., concur.

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394 So. 2d 1072, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 18838, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-the-interest-of-s-l-d-fladistctapp-1981.

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