In the Interest of: R.R.R., a Minor

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.R.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : :

APPEAL OF: R.R.R., A MINOR :

: : : : No. 513 MDA 2026

Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered January 28, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-29-JV-0000009-2025

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and NEUMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NEUMAN, J.: FILED: AUGUST 25, 2026

Appellant, R.R.R., a minor, appeals from the January 28, 2026

dispositional order adjudicating him delinquent of Indecent Exposure, 18

Pa.C.S. § 3127(a). On appeal, Appellant challenges the weight of the

evidence. After careful review, we affirm.

The juvenile court set forth the following factual history:

At the finding[-]of[-]fact hearing on November 13, 2025, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of C.M. At the time of the hearing[,] C.M. was 13 years old and in eighth grade…. [N.T., 11/13/25], at 6…. Last school year, C.M. was in seventh grade…. [Id.] at 7. She knows … [Appellant] and had class with him last [school] year. [Id. at] 7-8.

On or about April 2[,] … 2025, something alarming happened to C.M. involving [Appellant]. C.M. explained,

ok, so I was walking to class[,] and then I just sat down in my normal seat[,] and we were like five minutes into class or something. We were watching a video[,] so the lights were off[,] and all I hear is, “C.M., look.” [I thought] … [Appellant] dropped something [or] … needed something,

[so] I looked over and there it was, so I wasn’t going to pay any attention to details. I just looked away because I was not going to…[.]

[Id.] at 8-9. [The Commonwealth] then asked additional questions that elicited the following details[.] C.M. recalled that it was … current events class at about 2:18 p.m. [Id.] at 9. C.M. specifically recalled hearing [Appellant]’s voice and that he said, “C.M., look.” Id. She explained, “I looked because I thought he … needed something from me, and he pulled his pants down, and you know.” [Id.] at 10. C.M. described [Appellant] as facing [the] front, but turned so she could see his penis. Id. She did not recall what [Appellant] was wearing, but testified [they] both … were sitting down. Id. C.M. explained … [Appellant] did not stand up; “he just moved his hands to pull down his shorts.” [Id.] at 11. [He] pulled his shorts down just enough for C.M. to see — “like right up to the top of his thighs…” below his genitals. [Id.] at 19. “He moved his hips so she could see.” [Id.] at 20.

From a photograph marked as Joint Exhibit 1, C.M. identified … [the] classroom and marked the area where her desk and [Appellant]’s desk were on the date in question. [Id.] at 12-15. She corrected her mark on cross-examination. [Id.] at 18-19.[1] While there were other students in the classroom, C.M. thought there were students absent on the day of the incident because she “could clearly see through [to] where [Appellant] was sitting from where she was.” [Id.] at 15.

On cross-examination, C.M. explained … the lights in the classroom were off because they were watching a video. [Id.] at 17. She could see [Appellant]’s penis because the windows were open[, and he was seated in the row closest to the windows]. [Id.] at 22-23.

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1 We note that the photograph marked as Joint Exhibit 1 was taken during the

2025-2026 school year and did not accurately depict the classroom layout on April 2, 2025, since a row of desks near the windows had been removed. N.T. at 13. Nevertheless, the locations marked by C.M. on Joint Exhibit 1 indicate Appellant’s desk was located in the now-missing row closest to the windows, while her desk was located approximately 2 rows behind and 2 or 3 rows across from Appellant’s. See Joint Exhibit 1; see also Appellant’s Brief at 5 (“From the exhibit used at the hearing, the seating descriptions placed C.M. about [3] rows across and [2] rows behind [Appellant].”).

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Because she was embarrassed and too afraid, C.M. did not immediately bring the incident to her teacher’s attention. [Id.] at 11. The first person she told was her mother, in the gym at softball practice. Id. C.M. testified … her disclosure to her mother was on a different day, a couple weeks later. Id.

C.M. and [Appellant] were in class together all year. [Id.] at 23. They did not have a romantic relationship or an “adverse” relationship. [Id.] at 23-24. They had no fights and no friends with “beefs” with each other. Id. [C.M. testified,] “we were like friends at school.” [Id.] at 24.

Next, [the juvenile court] heard from A.M., who is C.M.’s mother. A.M. testified to the following:

We were in softball practice and we were doing some … fielding in the high school gym. She was off when I got there[,] because usually when I get there[,] she wants snacks and I usually have packs of applesauce[,] and she didn’t want any[. S]o it kind of made [me] think something happened during school[.] … [S]he came over to me and said something happened to her and I was like what, and she said that [Appellant] whipped his thing out at school, and … my first thought was like, again, because another kid did that just [a] week or so before that[.] … I guess I said it out loud [because] I got the coach’s attention, [M.C.], and she came over … [and] I said now you have to tell [M.C.] because [she] is with the school so she can handle it however she needs to handle it[. S]o C.M. recounted what happened that day to [M.C.,] and [M.C.] submitted a claim.

[Id.] at 26.[2] [M.C.] is a physical education teacher and the head softball coach. [Id.] at 27.

[Appellant’s first] witness, Pennsylvania State Trooper Derrick Cramer testified … he responded to [C.M.’s school] at the request of [T.C.], the school resource officer, on April 4, 2025, for a complaint of a student exposing his genitals to another student on April 2, 2025. [Id.] at 29-31. He interviewed C.M., another student, S.H., and [Appellant]. [Id.] at 30. “C.M. explained to

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2 We note that although A.M. does not specifically identify the date of C.M.’s

disclosure, our review of the record clearly demonstrates that the disclosure occurred on April 2, 2025, and not a few weeks later as C.M. claimed.

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[Trooper Cramer] that she was in her eighth period class. At the beginning of the class[, Appellant] said ‘C.[M.], look.’ She then looked in his direction, and she basically told [Trooper Cramer] that [Appellant’s] genitals at that time were exposed.” [Id.] at 30-31. [Trooper Cramer did] not recall following up with other students or teachers. Id. [Appellant] told [Trooper Cramer] that what was alleged to have happened[,] did not happen. [Id.] at 32. [Appellant] reasoned … “somebody else would have seen him do it due to where he sat in the classroom that day.” Id.

S.H. also told Trooper Cramer that he did not see anything. [Id.] at 33. S.H. said he sat next to [Appellant] in class. Id. Trooper Cramer investigated an incident involving S.H. earlier[,] in which S.H. was charged with exposing himself at [school]. [Id.] at 33- 34. S.H. and [Appellant] are close friends. [Id.] at 34. On cross- examination[,] Trooper Cramer acknowledged that he found no evidence corroborating C.M.’s story. [Id.] at 34.

[Appellant] testified in his own defense. [Appellant], [who was] 13 years old at the time of the finding of fact hearing, attended [the same school as C.M.] in the 2024-2025 school year as a seventh grader. [Id.] at 38. He was in … [an] eighth period current events class with C.M. last school year. [Id.] at 39, 42. He saw C.M. every day. Id. at 42. [Appellant] marked Joint Exhibit 1, the photograph of the classroom, with his and C.M.’s seat locations in about the same locations as C.M. [Id.] at 41-42.

[Appellant] described he and C.M. as “acquaintances” and [stated] that they had “dated” for about a week in fifth grade. [Id.] at 42.

[Appellant] testified … he did not recall yelling out to C.M. [Id.] at 43. He did not recall turning to face C.M. during class. Id. S.H. sat in front of him. Id. [There] were [two] teachers in the room all the time. [Id.] at 44. He never pulled his pants down in class. [Id.] C.M.’s desk was two rows behind his. [Id. at 45.] To face her, he would have had to turn to his right facing other students. [Id.] [Appellant] testified … he never exposed his genitals towards or at C.M. [Id.] at 46.

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[Appellant] was aware of the trouble S.H. got into for exposing himself. Id.[3]

Juvenile Court Opinion (“JCO”), 2/24/26, at 2-6 (unnecessary capitalization

omitted).

On June 5, 2025, a delinquency petition was filed against Appellant

charging him with Indecent Exposure. After a finding-of-fact hearing on

November 13, 2025, the juvenile court concluded the Commonwealth had

proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant had committed the act of

Indecent Exposure. Appellant was subsequently found to need treatment,

supervision, and rehabilitation, and was adjudicated delinquent at a hearing

on January 27, 2026. A dispositional order was entered on January 28, 2026,

which subjected Appellant to an indeterminate period of probation, 30 hours

of community service, and required him to participate in a class called ‘Beyond

Screens: Digital Boundaries and Technology in Relationships.’ Appellant filed

a timely post-dispositional motion pursuant to Pa.R.J.C.P. 620, challenging the

weight of the evidence on February 6, 2026. See also Pa.R.J.C.P. 415(A)(3)

(setting forth the requirements for how a weight of the evidence claim can be

raised with the juvenile court). The juvenile court determined an evidentiary

hearing was not necessary, but ordered the parties to submit written

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3 In its closing argument, the Commonwealth contended that “to suggest that

something that had happened a week or two before[,] and that’s as testified [to] by [A.M.], again, [the incident involving S.H.] just happened[,] that we would know what the consequences of that[,] and that would somehow deter [Appellant] from doing what sounds to me like may have been a TikTok challenge going on. I don’t find that to be a credible deterrent at all.” N.T. at 54.

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arguments by February 20, 2026. On February 24, 2026, the juvenile court

denied Appellant’s post-dispositional motion. On March 26, 2026, Appellant

filed a timely notice of appeal and a concise statement of matters complained

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). On March 31, 2026, the

juvenile court issued a statement in lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, adopting

its February 24, 2026 opinion addressing the issue raised by Appellant.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:

Did the juvenile court commit an abuse of discretion when[,] after reviewing the evidence presented at the finding of fact hearing from a weig[ht] of the evidence challenge[,] it determined that certain facts were not so clearly of greater weight than other facts such that i[]gnoring them resulted in a denial of justice?

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Appellant’s sole claim on appeal is that his adjudication of delinquency is

contrary to the weight of the evidence. Id. at 6-13. Appellant’s argument

centers around challenging C.M.’s credibility and the inferences the juvenile

court made from the evidence. Id. Specifically, Appellant contends the

juvenile court “abused its discretion by not applying greater weight to the

obvious facts that could reasonably be inferred from C.M.’s story.” Id. at 8.

Appellant suggests,

[f]or C.M.’s story to be believable, a reasonable person would have to be dismissive of the nature and circumstances surrounding the event. Specifically, to effectuate an indecent exposure to C.M., [Appellant] would have drawn attention to himself by calling out to C.M., which no one apparently heard or investigated. [He] would have had to expose himself in view of many other people including teachers, who apparently saw nothing, and finally, … the only person with awareness of this

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event was the intended victim. [Appellant] contests that to not apply sufficient weight to these other reasonably implied facts, obviously contrary to C.M.’s story, shock’s one sense of justice.

Id. at 8-9. Appellant claims the juvenile court’s reasoning “ignores the

greater, implied fact that [in] a room comprised of 12 and 13-year-old[

students], some would have been curious enough to look” and “[c]ertainly, a

teacher[’s] … attention would have been directed to [Appellant].” Id. at 12.

Our standard of review for a weight of the evidence claim is as follows:

“A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the grounds that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one’s sense of justice.” In re J.B., … 106 A.3d 76, 95 ([Pa. ]2014)…. Thus, we may reverse the juvenile court’s adjudication of delinquency only if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. In re J.M., 89 A.3d 688, 692 (Pa. Super. 2014)…. Moreover, where the juvenile court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Id. Rather, this Court is limited to a consideration of whether the juvenile court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim. Id. Hence, a juvenile court’s denial of a weight claim is the least assailable of its rulings, as conflicts in the evidence and contradictions in the testimony of any witnesses are for the fact finder to resolve. Id.

In re A.G.C., 142 A.3d 102, 109 (Pa. Super. 2016).

At the conclusion of the finding-of-fact hearing, the juvenile court stated

the following:

I disagree that [C.M.]’s testimony was vague. In fact, I believe it was detailed. It was credible. She was confident in her recollection of what happened[,] and importantly[,] her testimony with respect to her report was corroborated by her mother’s testimony[,] and then clearly that went forward to the coach, to the school resource officer[,] and then to Trooper Cramer.

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***

We also know that in criminal cases[,] when the accused takes the witness stand and elects to testify in their own defense[,] … a jury is instructed that in assessing the credibility of the defendant’s testimony[,] they may consider the fact that the defendant has a vital interest in the outcome of the case. I believe that to be wholly applicable here[,] and the [c]ourt can consider the fact that [Appellant] has a vital interest in the outcome of the case when evaluating [his] testimony.

I find Trooper Cramer’s testimony credible to the extent that he offered testimony[;] however, I can give no weight to the statement of [S.H.] to Trooper Cramer. [S.H.] wasn’t brought before the [c]ourt. He wasn’t subject to cross-examination, and I have no ability to weigh [his] credibility on the witness stand….

What I do know is that I don’t know what motivate[s] a 12 or 13[- ]year[-]old middle schooler to do much of anything[,] but in my mind there is no doubt, … I don’t see why [C.M.] would make this up. I don’t see why [C.M.] and her family would come to court today and tell me a bunch of lies. There’s no reason for that to happen. I haven’t been provided [with] any reason for that to happen.

I found [C.M.]’s testimony to be confident, to be credible, to not be vague, [and] to have detail and recollection commensurate with her 13 years of age. [C.M.] is not an adult. She described the events of April 2, 2025[,] in [her] eighth period current events classroom in the way that I would expect a 13[-]year[-]old [child] would testify.

N.T. at 56-58.

Additionally, in its opinion denying Appellant’s post-dispositional motion,

the juvenile court explained:

While [Appellant] denied C.M.’s allegations, [the juvenile court] found C.M.[’s] testimony credible. [It] also found C.M.’s mother’s testimony credible regarding [C.M.’s] being upset at softball practice later in the day and [making a report] to her and to the softball coach [of] what happened earlier in class. Further, C.M.’s statement to her mother and then to Trooper Cramer was consistent with her testimony in court.

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[The juvenile court] heard no evidence of any motive of C.M. to fabricate such an allegation against [Appellant]. By both C.M.’s account and [Appellant]’s, the two students were not on bad terms. In this [‘]she said/he said[’] scenario, [the juvenile court] found C.M.’s credible testimony to carry the day.

[In] address[ing Appellant]’s arguments, [the juvenile court] disagree[d] that C.M.’s description of the relative location of the parties’ desks in the classroom rendered [Appellant]’s actions physically impossible.

[It] further disagree[d] that C.M.’s error with respect to the timing of her disclosure to her mother calls into question whether the event ever happened. [It] consider[ed] that C.M. is a [13-]year- old child. [The juvenile court] heard the credible testimony of C.M.’s mother regarding her daughter’s disclosure to her and to the softball coach which then led to the school resource officer contacting the Pennsylvania State Police. [The juvenile court did] not find C.M.’s testimony regarding the timing of her disclosure to be fatal.

[The juvenile court] also disagree[d] with [Appellant]’s argument that if [he] called out loud enough for C.M. to hear, common sense and human nature would dictate that other students and teachers would have heard, as well. Perhaps other students and teachers could have heard. Perhaps other students and teachers did hear. Perhaps they heard and did not look because [Appellant] was calling out specifically to C.M. Perhaps others did hear and did not look because the class was watching a video. Perhaps they did not hear anything at all. What [is] certain is … that evidence [was not] before [the court] and [the court] cannot speculate. What [was in evidence was] that C.M. heard [Appellant] call out her name and she looked at him as a result.

Also, Trooper Cramer’s testimony regarding the scope of his investigation was vague at best.

***

Based on the record, … Trooper Cramer spoke with C.M., [Appellant,] and S.H. for certain. Other than those three students, [there was no evidence as] to whom Trooper Cramer spoke [with] at [the] … school. While [the juvenile court found] this apparent lack of investigation disappointing, it [did] not negate C.M.’s credible testimony.

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Finally, for the reasons … described on the record at the finding of fact hearing, [the juvenile court] gave less weight to [Appellant]’s testimony than to C.M.’s. [Appellant] had a vital interest in the outcome of the hearing and a motive to testify in the manner he did. See Com[monwealth] v. Rodriquez, 462 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Pa. Super. 1983) … (“Additionally, in assessing the defendant’s credibility, the factfinder could consider that the defendant had a vital interest in the outcome of the trial.”)[.] [The juvenile court] weighed [Appellant]’s interest in the outcome of the hearing and the lack of evidence of any motive by C.M. to fabricate th[e] incident. On balance, [the juvenile court] found C.M.’s testimony more credible.

JCO at 8-12 (emphasis in original).

Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the juvenile

court. See A.G.C., 142 A.3d at 109. To the extent Appellant claims C.M.’s

testimony was not believable due to a lack of corroboration, that issue is

exclusively reserved for the fact finder. See id. The juvenile court heard both

the Commonwealth’s evidence, including C.M.’s testimony, and the evidence

entered by Appellant. The juvenile court also heard Appellant’s counsel make

the same argument he does here. See N.T. at 48-49. After considering the

evidence, the juvenile court decided to credit C.M.’s testimony. The juvenile

court was free to believe “all, part, or none” of the testimony, and this Court

cannot reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for the

factfinder. J.M., 89 A.3d at 691. Further, as the juvenile court noted in its

opinion, uncorroborated testimony of a victim in a sexual offense case can be

the sole basis for an adjudication of delinquency. JCO at 8 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 3106) (“The testimony of a complainant need not be corroborated in

prosecutions under this chapter.”); see Commonwealth v. Castelhun, 889

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A.2d 1228, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“Furthermore, it is well-established that

the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness is sufficient to

convict a defendant of sexual offenses.”); see also In re K.A.S., No. 880

MDA 2024, unpublished memorandum at 5 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 20, 2024)

(applying Castelhun to a juvenile matter).4 As the juvenile court did not

“palpably abuse[] its discretion” in denying Appellant’s weight of the evidence

claim, see A.G.C., 142 A.3d at 109, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 8/25/2026

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4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (directing that unpublished non-precedential decisions

of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).