in the Interest of R.M.S. III

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided June 27, 2019·No. 09-19-00011-CV·Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-19-00011-CV __________________

IN THE INTEREST OF R.M.S. III __________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 14-09-10137-CV __________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The mother of the minor child R.M.S. III (“Mother”) appeals from a judgment

terminating her parental rights. In three issues, Mother argues that (1) the trial court

erred in terminating her parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(N); (2) the trial

court erred in terminating her parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(P); and (3)

the evidence was factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that

termination was in the best interest of R.M.S. III. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. §

161.001(b)(1)(N), (P), (2) (West Supp. 2018). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

1 BACKGROUND

In December 2017, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

(“the Department”) filed an original petition seeking the protection and removal of

R.M.S. III and the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The record shows that

the Department removed R.M.S. III due to allegations of drug use and neglectful

supervision and that on the day of removal Mother tested positive for

methamphetamines. The Department’s petition alleged Mother had committed seven

statutory grounds that supported termination and that termination was in the best

interest of R.M.S. III. The trial court appointed the Department as R.M.S. III’s

temporary managing conservator.

In November 2018, the trial court conducted a bench trial and terminated

Mother’s parental rights, finding clear and convincing evidence supported five

statutory grounds for termination. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D),

(E), (N), (O), (P) (West Supp. 2018). The trial court also found that termination of

Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of R.M.S. III. See id. §

161.001(b)(2). Mother appealed.

ANALYSIS

In issues one and two, Mother challenges two of the independent grounds that

the trial court found supported terminating her parental rights. In addition to a

2 finding that termination is in the child’s best interest, only one predicate finding

under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination. In

the Interest of A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); see Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. §

161.001 (West Supp. 2018). An appellant must challenge all independent grounds

that fully support a judgment. In the Interest of S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 682 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied). By failing to raise an appellate challenge to

the trial court’s findings under section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O), Mother failed

to challenge all of the independent grounds listed in the termination order.

Accordingly, we need not review Mother’s challenges to the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the trial court’s findings under subsections (N) and (P), because

this court must accept the unchallenged findings as true and affirm the trial court’s

findings under subsections (D), (E), and (O). See id. at 682-83; In the Interest of

N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 818 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.). We overrule

issues one and two.

In issue three, Mother challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the

best interest of R.M.S. III. With three grounds of termination being unchallenged,

we must affirm the termination if it is in the best interest of R.M.S. III. See In the

Interest of N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d at 818.

3 Regarding the child’s best interest, we consider a non-exhaustive list of

factors: (1) desires of the child; (2) emotional and physical needs of the child now

and in the future; (3) emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the

future; (4) parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) programs

available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) plans

for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) stability of

the home or proposed placement; (8) acts or omissions of the parent which may

indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuse

for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72

(Tex. 1976); see Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 263.307(b) (West Supp. 2018). No

particular Holley factor is controlling, and evidence of one factor may be sufficient

to support a finding that termination is in a child’s best interest. See In the Interest

of A.P., 184 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). The best interest

determination may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence, subjective facts, and

the totality of the evidence. See In the Interest of N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

In regard to the Holley factors, Mother contends that she had lived with

R.M.S. III for most of his life, her visits with R.M.S. III were appropriate, and she

and R.M.S. III were well bonded. Mother argues that because R.M.S. III’s paternal

4 grandparents have always provided stability and would continue to do so, evidence

of Mother’s lack of stability and living arrangements, inability to finish her service

plan, and her parenting skills is factually insufficient to support the trial court’s

finding that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of R.M.S. III.

With respect to the best interest finding, the trial court heard testimony from Tevana

Holder, an investigator with the Department, who testified that she investigated the

original allegation of abuse and neglect of R.M.S. III, which was based on Mother’s

suspected drug use while caring for the child.

According to Holder, the factual allegations included that Mother had sores

on her face, Mother’s attitude was up and down, and Mother was having outbursts

of anger. Holder testified that when she met with Mother, she had no concerns based

on R.M.S. III’s appearance, but Mother appeared to be under the influence and was

emotional and unable to focus. Holder explained that when they first talked, Mother

told Holder that she would not pass a drug test because she was taking Adderall and

had smoked marijuana, and later Mother admitted to using methamphetamine a

couple of times per week. Holder testified that Mother tested positive for

methamphetamine and did not have a stable residence, and R.M.S. III was removed

and placed with a relative. According to Holder, prior to removal, Mother took care

5 of the child during the week and the paternal grandparents took care of the child on

the weekends.

Victoria Warmuth, the Department caseworker assigned to R.M.S. III’s case,

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Related

Holley v. Adams
544 S.W.2d 367 (Texas Supreme Court, 1976)
in the Interest of N.L.D., a Child
412 S.W.3d 810 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2013)
In the Interest of N.R.T., a Child
338 S.W.3d 667 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2011)
In the Interest of A.V.
113 S.W.3d 355 (Texas Supreme Court, 2003)
In the Interest of A.P.
184 S.W.3d 410 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2006)
In the Interest of S.J.R.-Z.
537 S.W.3d 677 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2017)